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Abstract 
 
The Responsibility to Protect When the UN Security Council Fails to Act: Is There 
Room for a Tertiary Responsibility? 
 
Patrick M Butchard 
 
In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the international community accepted the emerging notion of the 
‘responsibility to protect’. The world recognised a primary responsibility on States to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Add itionally, 
they recognised a ‘secondary’ responsibility on the international community, including the United  
Nations, to assist and encourage States in their primary responsibility to protect. The emergence of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ is a relatively new development in international law - it is at the frontline of 
the international community’s efforts towards ensuring that States adhere to the principles of 
international law in response to mass atrocities within their own jurisdiction. It also calls for the wider 
international community to act in responding to such situations, highlighting legal and legitimate 
foundations upon which to assist or intervene when a State fails in its primary responsibility. 
 
However, if both the State (with a primary responsibility) and the Security Council (with a secondary 
responsibility) fail to act in response to the said mass atrocities, it may be difficult, if not impossible, 
for the international community to take appropriate action – especially if the use of military force is 
required. Therefore, this thesis will look beyond the Security Council for legal alternatives to its 
inaction. It shall assess popular arguments for alternative routes within the UN, such as through the 
General Assembly, and also outside of the UN system too, whether unilaterally or through regional 
organisations. With the fundamental principles of the prohibition of force and non -intervention as the 
focus of legal analysis, the original purpose of the UN collective security system will be traced from 
the origins of the Charter so that previously-rejected theories may shed new light on the interpretation 
of these important legal foundations. By evaluating the legality, and indeed the appropriateness, of 
options outside of the Security Council, the thesis will provide an opportunity to ask whether such 
alternatives can, or should, form part of a ‘tertiary’ responsibility to protect.  
 
Through its investigation, the thesis determines that there are legal avenues for establishing such a 
tertiary responsibility to protect, and identifies the relevant actors who have legal competence to 
implement it. 
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I 
 
Introduction and Background 
 
It is a very quiet and eerie place, the camp at Birkenau. Also known as Auschwitz II, 
the second camp, it remains a vast open space with speckles of the remnants of small 
buildings where men, women and children, mainly Jews from various countries of 
Europe, witnessed the darkest doings of man. Unlike the original Auschwitz camp, 
which had previously been an army barracks, Birkenau was purpose-built for atrocity 
by the Nazis. There can be no mistake that the camp was intended to imprison and 
intimidate. Even today, the ghosts of the empty guard towers surrounding the site still 
have a very real influence on the general mood for those who choose to visit. 
Following the distinctive railway track from the famous main entrance 
building, walking on uneven ground through the centre of the camp, it is a 1 km march 
between deep trenches and dominant barbed-wire fences. At the end of this track lie 
the untouched ruins of two brutal structures – gas chambers – destroyed by the Nazis 
themselves near the end of the War. The rubble lies, exposed to the elements, 
undisturbed. The tracks of the railway unite and cease in the middle of these two 
broken structures, where there lies a memorial for the estimated one and a half million 
people who were murdered at Auschwitz between 1940 and 1945. Eternally imprinted 
onto the memorial, repeated in many European languages, is a powerful message: 
 
FOR EVER LET THIS PLACE BE  
A CRY OF DESPAIR  
AND A WARNING TO HUMANITY 
 
To the current author, the camps at Auschwitz-Birkenau are not just a warning to 
humanity about the existence or use of death camps – they are a warning about the 
atrocities of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in 
general, no matter what method is used to commit them. Unfortunately, this warning 
did not prevent a repetition of atrocities, and Birkenau still cries out in despair. 
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1. Scope and Aim of this Thesis 
 
The horrors of the two world wars are referenced in the preamble of the Charter of the 
United Nations.1 Saving future generations from the ‘scourge of war’ which twice 
‘brought untold sorrow to mankind’, is written as a primary motivation for establishing 
this system of collective security. With this, States had a vision for the United Nations 
to be the world’s protector – via Article 24(1) of this Charter, States conferred primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security onto this 
organisation. In particular, onto the United Nations Security Council.  
With this great responsibility came great powers of enforcement.2 The Security 
Council became the exclusive authority for ordering military force or using mandatory 
coercive measures, where appropriate, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Within this organ, the five ‘great powers’3 at the end of World War II were 
bestowed the right of a veto4 – the ability to block a course of action, based upon the 
‘heavy burden’ they would entail as the main actors in fulfilling the Council’s 
decisions.5 
But when it comes to protecting the peoples of the world from atrocity crimes, 
unfortunately the United Nations, or the international community in general, does not 
have a legacy of which to be proud. As will be discussed, the Security Council has a 
history of inaction, including when it comes to purely humanitarian crises, and 
especially where there is a competing interest between the Permanent Five – or, 
perhaps, a mutual disinterest on the part of the international community in general.6 
At the 2005 World Summit, in response to increasing inaction, and competing 
arguments in favour of dubious legal rights to intervene in crises,7 the internationa l 
community unanimously accepted that they had a responsibility to protect their 
                                                 
1 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, as amended) 
1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
2 UN Charter, Chapter VII. 
3 The so-called ‘Permanent Five’ Members of the UN Security Council: the United States, United 
Kingdom, China, France and the USSR (now Russia); see Article 23(1) of the UN Charter. 
4 See Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. 
5 See, in the preparatory documents to the Charter, Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring 
Governments on the Voting Procedure in the Security Council, attached to, Statement by My John 
Sofianopoulos, Chairman of Technical Committee III/I on the Structure and Procedures of the Security 
Council, (8 June 1945) Doc III/1/37 (1), 11 UNCIO 710, Annexed to Doc 1050 III/1/58, at para [9]. 
6 See Section 2.3 below. 
7 See Section 2 below. 
3 
 
populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing.8 As will be discussed, this was a spark of hope that a new strategy for 
preventing and halting these atrocity crimes might find a more general consensus. 
The international community accepted that they had a primary responsibility 
to protect their own populations from these atrocities. Furthermore, they accepted that 
the international community in general also had a responsibility to assist and 
encourage States in their primary responsibility to protect. This author will refer to 
this more general responsibility as the ‘secondary’ responsibility to protect. This 
secondary responsibility also entails ‘timely and decisive’ collective action, through 
the United Nations, to use a range of peaceful and coercive measures, where 
appropriate, to step in and protect the populations of a State where it is ‘manifest ly 
failing’ to protect. This ‘timely and decisive’ action is to be taken through the Security 
Council.9 
However, if both the State (with a primary responsibility) and the Security 
Council (with a secondary responsibility) fail to act in response to the said mass 
atrocities, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the international community to take 
appropriate action – especially if the use of military force or other coercive measures 
are required. Even since 2005, and after accepting this responsibility to protect, the 
Security Council has been deadlocked in the face of humanitarian crisis. The situation 
in Syria is the clearest and most recent example of this problem,10 where the Council 
has been blocked time and time again by the veto of a permanent member. This is 
especially concerning because measures considered by the Council would have gone 
ahead if not for this veto, and indeed in the face of a majority of States in the General 
Assembly calling for such action.11 
Such deadlock does not observe the warnings of the past. Therefore, this thesis 
seeks to investigate the responsibility to protect, and whether there is room for it to 
continue beyond the UN Security Council. The responsibility to protect is not, yet, a 
legal doctrine in and of itself.12 It does not yet have the weight of a specific legal 
obligation. This thesis does not dispute that. The responsibility to protect, in its current 
form, is a mechanism of guidelines and tools which help States to identify how and 
                                                 
8 See Chapter II generally. 
9 See Chapter II, Section 3. 
10 See Chapter II, Section 3.2.2. 
11 See Chapter II, Section 3.2.2. 
12 See Chapter II, Section 4. 
4 
 
when it is possible or legal to act responsibly, without prescribing a definite course of 
action for any particular scenario. On the other hand, what the responsibility to protect 
does prescribe, in terms of its underlying moral obligation, is that something must be 
done, and that inaction is not an option.  
With this in mind, this thesis seeks to investigate whether the responsibility to 
protect is capable of prevailing beyond the inaction of the Security Council, by 
investigating the legality of alternative action beyond the Council. By investigat ing 
whether there are any alternative tools available, the responsibility to protect, as a set 
of guidelines and toolboxes, is capable of expansion and therefore continuing beyond 
deadlock. Again, it must be stressed that it is not the purpose of this thesis, or the 
responsibility to protect, to determine which specific measures or methods the 
international community should use to react in response to the threat or commiss ion 
of mass atrocity crimes – instead, it identifies the means and methods available to the 
actors who must make a choice as to how to implement their responsibilities. By 
seeking to clarify the availability of alternative measures beyond the UN Security 
Council, this thesis intends to demonstrate that there is, at the very least, room for this 
responsibility to continue. By demonstrating such, one would also establish that there 
exists a space in which the responsibility could grow, and determine the criteria and 
guidance which is to be applied to the use of such alternative measures. 
As well as finding the legal space for action beyond the UN Security Council, 
the thesis raises an important question about the relationship between the 
responsibility to protect and the responsibility for the maintenance of internationa l 
peace and security.13 By finding alternative routes to fulfil the responsibility to protect, 
the thesis also, by extension, finds alternative routes for the fulfilment of the 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security – particular ly 
where atrocity crimes threaten or breach this peace and security. Based on this overlap, 
this thesis argues that the responsibility to protect, when a situation crosses the 
threshold to become a concern for the responsibility to maintain peace and security, 
could then become a legal responsibility to protect. This is based upon analysis of the 
responsibility to maintain peace and security as a legal obligation, found within the 
                                                 
13 See generally, Chapter III. 
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UN Charter, conferred by States onto the UN Security Council, and thus also reverting 
onto the international community following the Council’s failure.14 
This author calls this space for development the ‘tertiary’ responsibility to 
protect. This is the concept of responsibilities on States and regional groups beyond 
the remit of the Security Council. It is an acknowledgement that the responsibility to 
protect remains with the international community when the Security Council fails to 
do so, and therefore should continue beyond this point. In other words, if it is possible 
for the responsibility to protect to continue because there are legally permissib le 
avenues to do so, there is no reason why it should not continue.  
To investigate the availability of options beyond the Security Council, the 
thesis concentrates on the legality of forcible and coercive measures such as milita ry 
force and ‘sanctions’, rather than more peaceful measures such as diplomacy. This 
scope is based upon two considerations. Firstly, most peaceful, non-coercive measures 
rarely conflict with other obligations or principles of international law, and so the 
question of their use beyond the Security Council within the responsibility to protect 
framework relies heavily on their suitability and hypothetical application to any given 
crisis – a matter not at issue in this thesis.  
Secondly, the use of coercive and forcible measures beyond the UN is one of 
the most heavily debated issues that goes to the very heart and purpose of the collective 
security system, and this debate alone arguably adds to the increased uncertainty of 
the legality and appropriateness of such action. By clarifying the legality of such 
methods in the specific context of UN Security Council failure, and in the face of mass 
atrocity crimes, this thesis can demonstrate the existence of a largely-unused reserve 
of measures that are available to implement the general responsibility to protect, and 
therefore argues for its continuation beyond the UN Security Council. 
To demonstrate the viability of these assertions, the thesis investigates 
measures beyond the Security Council by undertaking a thorough investigation of the 
main international law principles governing their use – the prohibition of force, and 
the principle of non-intervention.  
Chapter IV will address the legality of forcible measures, revisiting the 
prohibition of force in international law, as recognised in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, and undertakes a thorough assessment of its scope. While rejecting the 
                                                 
14 See Chapter III, Section 4. 
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legality of all unilateral measures, the thesis argues that there exists a more nuanced 
interpretation of the prohibition of force, which allows forcible action to be taken by 
the UN General Assembly.  
Secondly, non-forcible coercive measures such as ‘sanctions’,15 are 
investigated in light of the general principle of non-intervention. Chapter V addresses 
the scope of this principle, and addresses whether the customary international law 
doctrine of countermeasures could provide an avenue for taking such measures beyond  
the UN Security Council. The law of countermeasures, generally, allows certain 
international obligations to be ‘violated’ in response to a prior breach of an obligat ion 
by another party, subject to other applicable criteria. The Chapter highlights researc h 
into the question of whether countermeasures can be used by States not directly injured 
by a breach of an obligation, especially where that prior breach is of an obligation erga 
omnes – owed to the international community as a whole. 
After investigating possible legal avenues relating to the prohibition of force 
and the principle of non-intervention (and the doctrine of countermeasures therein), in 
order to determine whether the tertiary responsibility exists, these avenues must 
actually be capable of being implemented by actors who have the competence to do 
so. Therefore, once the scope of these principles has been investigated, Chapter VI 
investigates the implementation of this ‘tertiary’ responsibility in two situations: (i) 
within the United Nations, addressing the competence and ability of the General 
Assembly in this regard; and (ii), beyond the United Nations, investigating the legal 
restrictions on the ability of regional organisations or, failing that, individual States, 
to act.  
It must also be noted at this stage that this author recognises that the 
responsibility to protect is not just about the use of force or coercive measures. A 
considerable proportion of this emerging doctrine concentrates – quite rightly – on the 
tools and guidance for preventing atrocity crimes and their causes. This thesis does 
not dismiss this. However, the scope of the thesis is understandably much narrower in 
its focus, and is concerned with the responsibility in the very specific light of Security 
Council deadlock. It is only because of this scope of investigation that so much 
attention is paid to forcible and coercive measures, and there is no aim for the 
responsibility to protect to be used duplicitously as an excuse for expanding the range 
                                                 
15 Including asset freezes, trade restricitons, and embargoes. 
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of coercive measures available unilaterally, which would be prone to abuse. It is for 
this reason that the thesis uses the responsibility to protect as a framework to restrict 
the use of such measures to the very narrow scenario at hand, rather than to seek 
general authority to use such measures even where the Security Council is able and 
willing to live up to its responsibilities itself. It is also for this reason that the thesis 
seeks to suggest a framework for the institutional use of alternative routes beyond the 
UN Security Council, with unilateral measures only being very rarely recommended 
as a last resort once all other alternatives have been tried. Even then, such measures 
are found to be legally restricted, with very clear safeguards to prevent their misuse. 
 
1.1 Methodological Approach of the Investigation 
 
This thesis bases its analysis upon established sources of international law. At its heart, 
this is a legal thesis, and so the interpretation and impact of the law are given the most 
fundamental consideration when investigating the issues relating to the responsibility 
to protect beyond the UN Security Council. In this regard, it utilises the sources of 
international law recognised in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, which includes: (i) international conventions and treaties; (ii) internationa l 
customary law, defined as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and (iii) the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.16 
To investigate the issues at hand, this thesis revisits the relevant points of law 
from a renewed perspective, and interprets the relevant principles therein based upon 
well-established rules of the interpretation of international law. In this respect, the 
investigation adopts the principles of treaty interpretation recognised in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties17 as a cognitive framework for addressing the core 
legal questions of the thesis.  
In other words, the thesis follows the general rule of interpretation in Article 
31 of the VCLT, which requires that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
                                                 
16 While Artilce 38 also refers to scholarly teachings, this is in identifying sources that the International 
Court of Justice shall apply in its judgements, and so this thesis does not treat such scholarly teachings 
necessarily as a source of international law itself, but utilises them in engaging with relevant legal 
principles. 
17 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23rd May 1969, entered into force 27th January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
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context and in the light of its object and purpose.” It also takes into account, according 
to Article 31(3)(a) and Article 31(3)(b), any subsequent agreement or practice of States 
regarding the interpretation of a treaty. The resources utilised in investigating the law 
start primarily with authoritative sources of law themselves, and the most officia l 
documents possible when assessing State practice. Any examples of State practice 
cited are selected based upon their relevance to the debate at hand, and the value they 
add to the analysis. While every effort has been made to include all the most relevant 
cases instances to assess, it is of course impossible to include an exhaustive account 
of all relevant statements and developments therein.  
In accordance with Article 32 of the VCLT, where the ordinary interpretat ion 
of the law leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result that can be 
considered manifestly absurd or unreasonable, the thesis refers to the preparatory 
works of the relevant treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation. In Chapter 
IV, this is done in some detail to investigate the long-debated scope of the prohibit ion 
of force, as found in Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
Finally, in order to gain the fullest picture of the legal debate, and to come to 
its own conclusions on these matters, academic commentary is utilised throughout to 
shed light on respected juridical opinion. Therefore, the thesis adopts quite a doctrinal 
method of investigating the issues at hand, interpreting the law in a positivist manner. 
It is on this basis that the thesis constructs its conclusions and assesses whether there 
is room for a tertiary responsibility to protect beyond the UN Security Council. 
 
1.2 The Place of this Thesis in the Debate 
 
This thesis merges the consideration of several topics in international law to address 
the primary issues at hand. The first issue is the responsibility to protect as a concept. 
Since its acceptance by the international community in 2005, this issue has been 
widely debated in many respects with leading comments provided by those such as 
Evans,18 Bellamy,19 and Stahn.20 While there has been some debate, for example, as 
                                                 
18 G Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All  (Washington, 
DC, USA, Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 
19 A Bellamy “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World 
Summit,” (2006) 20 Ethics and International Affairs 143; see also, A Bellamy, The Responsibility to 
Protect: A Defence (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
20 C Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” (2007) 101(1) 
American Journal of International Law 99. 
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to the concept’s impact on the use of the veto in the Security Council,21 there has not 
yet been a comprehensive investigation into whether the responsibility can continue 
beyond the inaction of the Security Council.22 For example, the notion of a ‘tertiary’ 
responsibility to protect has been mentioned in passing, and only in relation to the 
residual duties of humanitarian organisations,23 whereas this thesis investigates the 
possibility of a tertiary responsibility to protect taking the development of the 
responsibility to protect to the next stage in its evolution. 
To investigate the availability of options beyond the Security Council, the 
thesis concentrates on the legality of forcible and coercive measures such as milita ry 
force or ‘sanctions’. The question of forcible measures beyond the UN Security 
Council, especially in response to humanitarian crises, has been a hotly-debated topic 
for many decades.24 Particularly with regard to the responsibility to protect, the debate 
has often focussed on the relationship between this responsibility and the so-called 
‘right’ of humanitarian intervention and whether there is a standalone legal basis for 
unilateral forcible intervention on humanitarian grounds.25 This thesis revisits this 
                                                 
21 See, for example, A Blätter and P D Williams, “The Responsibility Not to Veto”, (2011) 3 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 301; H Yiu, “Jus Cogens, the Veto and the Responsibility to Protect: A New 
Perspective,” (2009) 7 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 207; and C Koester, “Looking  
Beyond R2P for an Answer to Inaction in the Security Council”, (2015) 27 Florida Journal of 
International Law 377. 
22 Although, for a brief overview of the collective security framework that may be used to implement  
the responsibility to protect, see, M Payandeh, “With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The 
Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking”, (2010) 35(2) 
Yale Journal of International Law 469. 
23 See, for example, the use of this term in M Labonte, “Whose Responsibility to Protect? The 
Implications of Double Manifest Failure for Civilian Protection,” (2012) 16(7) International Journal 
of Human Rights 982-1002.  
24 For example, see generally, N D White, ‘The Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity’, (2000) 
5(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 27; J-P L Fonteyne, “The Customary International Law 
Doctrine on Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Legal Validity under the UN Charter,” (1973-1974) 
4 CWILJ 203; Fernando R Tesόn, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (New 
York, 2nd edn, Transnational Publishers, 1997); Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law  (Oxford, OUP, 2001); S G Simon, “The 
Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention”, (1993-1994) 24 California Western  
International Law Journal 117; A D’Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect  (New York, 2nd 
edn., Transnational Publishers, 1995), Chapter 3 generally; I Brownlie, International Law and the Use 
of Force by States (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963); Y Dinstein War, Aggression and Self-
Defence (Cambridge, 5th Ed, Cambridge University Press, 2012); N Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals 
Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity (Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1985); T M Frank, “Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention,” in J 
L Holzgrefe and R O Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003); C Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 
(Oxford, 3rd edn, OUP 2008); and O Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
in Contemporary International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
25 See, among others, J Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility To Protect: Who 
Should Intervene? (Oxford University Press, 2010); D Amnéus, “Responsibility to Protect: Emerging  
Rules on Humanitarian Intervention?” (2012) 26(2) Global Society 241; E Massingham, “Military  
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debate, and reveals some very important findings relating to the interpretation of the 
prohibition of force in international law which may provide a new framework for 
addressing such questions altogether. 
In terms of non-forcible measures, legal commentary on the question as to 
whether States may utilise these measures to respond to violations of erga omnes 
obligations such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, is relative ly 
limited.26 However, this thesis is the first attempt to include this debate in an 
investigation of the responsibility to protect beyond the Security Council. 
When considering whether there are any actors that are legally competent and 
capable of implementing the proposed tertiary responsibility to protect, the thesis also 
refers to debates relating to the competences of the UN General Assembly and regiona l 
organisations in utilising the measures under investigation. For example, academic 
debate has addressed the possibility of forcible action being authorised or 
recommended by the UN General Assembly in circumstances where the Security 
Council fails to do so.27 This thesis addresses this debate, and builds upon the works 
of other commentators who have suggested that this could form part of implementing 
the responsibility to protect,28 offering its own legal opinions in this regard. Most 
notably, this thesis considers in much more detail the possibility and mechanism for 
the General Assembly to coordinate the use non-forcible coercive measures beyond 
the Security Council. Similarly, the debate relating to whether regional organisat ions 
                                                 
intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the Responsibility to Protect  doctrine advance the legality 
of the use of force for humanitarian ends?” (2009) 91 Number-876 International Review of the Red 
Cross 806. 
26 Although, important works on this issue include: M Dawidowicz, “Public Law Enforcement Without 
Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and their 
Relationship to the UN Security Council”, (2006) 77 British Yearbook of International Law 333; P-E 
Dupont, “Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran”, 
(2012) 17(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 301-336; N Ronzitti (ed), Coercive Diplomacy, 
Sanctions and International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 2016); E J Criddle, “Humanitarian Financial 
Intervention”, (2013) 24(2) EJIL 583; C J Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); J Frowein, “Reactions by Not Directly Affected 
States to Breaches of Public International Law”, (1994) 248 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International 353; O Y Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988). 
27 See, H Kelsen, “Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations”, a supplement to The Law of the 
United Nations (first published New York: FA Praeger, 1950 – reprint, Lawbook Exchange 2000, 
2011); N Tsagourias and N D White, Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 
2013), at 292-293; AJ Carswell, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace 
Resolution”, (2013) 18(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 453-480. 
28 See, for example, C Kenny, “Responsibility to Recommend: The Role of the UN General Assembly 
in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security”, (2016) 3(1) Journal on the Use of Force and 
International Law 3-36; C Koester, “Looking Beyond R2P for an Answer to Inaction in the Security  
Council”, (2015) 27 Florida Journal of International Law 377. 
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may act autonomously, or take emergency action,29 is addressed in the specific context 
of implementing this proposed tertiary responsibility to protect. 
Finally, when assessing the nature of responsibilities in international law, there 
has been little real in-depth investigation into this issue. Only in the final months of 
preparing this research was this issue addressed in relation to the responsibility to 
protect. In this regard, the new Secretary-General of the UN, António Guterres, in his 
first report on the Responsibility to Protect,30 addressed the legal, political, and moral 
nature of ‘responsibilities’ in this context.31 This discussion may provide the 
groundwork for further investigation in future, but this thesis is one of the first 
examples of such a discussion in an academic context of which this author is aware. 
Therefore, although this thesis revisits some well-researched debates, it 
touches upon some new ground through its approach to these debates, its investigat ion 
of alternative non-forcible measures, and its arguments relating to the nature of 
responsibilities in international law. It is the hope of this author that, on this basis, this 
investigation will provide new insight into the scope and development of the 
responsibility to protect. 
 
2. History of the Responsibility to Protect and the Myth of 
Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Before embarking on this investigation, it is necessary to address the contentious issue 
of the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention. Importantly, this thesis rejects 
from the outset the proposition that States have a legal right to intervene unilatera lly, 
even in the face of mass atrocity crimes. 
The term ‘humanitarian intervention’ is an enigmatic shape-shifter in the 
realms of international law commentary. Some refer to humanitarian intervention as a 
phrase encompassing any coercive intervention on humanitarian grounds, without the 
                                                 
29 See, for example, A Abass, Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security: 
Beyond Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Hart, 2004); C Walter, “Security Council Control over 
Regional Action”, (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 129, at 152-153; U Villan i, 
“The Security Council’s Authorisation of Enforcement Action by Regional Organisations”, (2002) 6 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law  535; M Akehurst, “Enforcement Action by Regional 
Agencies, with Special Reference to the Organisation of American States”, (1967) 42 British Yearbook 
of International Law 175. 
30 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for 
Prevention, (10 August 2017) UN Doc A/71/1016–S/2017/556. 
31 Ibid, at para [9]-[17]. 
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consent of the State concerned, and with the aim of preventing widespread death or 
suffering – including action authorised by the Security Council.32 Others use the term 
to describe less-coercive action that does not necessarily involve the use of force, and 
not necessarily without the consent of the State concerned, encompassing a wide range 
of action that can even include the work of humanitarian relief agencies and charities. 33  
 But the form of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in focus here is that which 
describes forcible coercive action taken unilaterally (i.e. without the authorisation of 
the Security Council), without the consent of the target State, in response to a 
humanitarian catastrophe and with the primary aim of alleviating and further 
preventing such suffering.34 The distinguishing feature of this form of humanitar ian 
intervention is the unilateral nature of the intervention.35 This reflects the so-called 
‘doctrine’ of humanitarian intervention, which purportedly allows for unilatera l 
military action as an exceptional necessity beyond the remit of the Security Council 
when certain criteria are met. This is also often referred to as a ‘right’ of humanitar ian 
intervention, purportedly found in customary international law.  
 This section will briefly set out some key examples of State practice to 
demonstrate how the political train of thought in the international community has 
evolved, from the Cold War era through to more recent examples of interventions that 
come coupled with justifications based on humanitarian values. This exercise is useful 
to understand at a general level whether the international community continued to 
believe that it had a responsibility to prevent atrocities like those of the second world 
war, and how the collective conscience of States developed through to the acceptance 
of the responsibility they recognise today.  
Although this debate largely concentrates on the use of the use of force against 
States, while this thesis is also concerned with non-forcible measures, the internationa l 
                                                 
32 This is the definition adopted by Weiss: TG Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, 
(Cambridge, 2nd Edn, Polity Press, 2012), at 6. See also, W M Reisman, “Hollow Victory: Humanitarian  
Intervention and Protection of Minorities”, (1997) 91 ASIL Proc 431. 
33 See, e.g., A Roberts, “The So-Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention”, (2000) 3 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3-51, at 5; see also, A Roberts, “Humanitarian War: Military  
Intervention and Human Rights”, (1993) 69 International Affairs 429, at 445. 
34 For example, this is the definition adopted by Chesterman: S Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law  (Oxford, OUP, 2001), Introduction, at 5; see also, 
NJ Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society  (Oxford, OUP, 
2000), at 8, who uses ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a label to cover both UN-authorised intervention 
and unilateral intervention, but does distinguish between the two (at footnote 23, p 8); see also the 
definition used in M Brenfors and M M Petersen, “The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
– A Defence”, (2000) 69(4) Nordic Journal of International Law 449-499, at 450. 
35 See Wheeler, ibid; also, Brenfors and Petersen, ibid. 
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opinions therein may be cited to reveal the general trend of interventionism in 
international law at that time, and thus provide context for the introduction of the 
Responsibility to Protect. 
 
2.1 The Underlying Legal Principles – A Brief Overview 
 
Firstly, it is worth introducing briefly the main legal principles that determine the 
boundaries of this debate. Once this debate has been put into context, these principles 
will be further evaluated and analysed in detail.36 
Barriers to any intervention within a State can be attributed to the long-
standing legal principles of State sovereignty, non-intervention, and the prohibition of 
the use of force. These principles are essential to maintaining a stable system of 
international law that can provide States with the freedom and ability to exist, trade, 
and prosper in a peaceful and secure world.  
Starting with State sovereignty and non-intervention, a principle that has long-
established roots from the Peace of Westphalia treaties of 1648,37 the UN Charter 
recognises in Article 2(7) that: 
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. 
 
Equally, the Charter affirms under Article 2(1) that “[t]he Organisation is based upon 
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Note here that these 
provisions refer to obligations upon the UN or principles of ‘the Organisation’ . 
However, there does seem to be a wide consensus that the general principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention also apply to States individually, being recognised 
as having the status of customary international law.38 
                                                 
36 See Chapters IV and V generally. 
37 For a discussion of sovereignty in the context of the responsibility to protect, see Luke Glanville, 
Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History  (University of Chicago Press, 2013), from 
49-59, and Chapter 3. 
38 See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v USA) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (Nicaragua Case), at 106-107, para [202]. 
14 
 
These principles were expanded upon in the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
from the General Assembly in 1970,39 where it was emphasised that the territoria l 
integrity and political independence of any State are inviolable and that “no State or 
group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”40 The vital nature of 
this principle as a bedrock of international law is clear, so much so that the 
International Court of Justice confirmed the status of these provisions of the 
Declaration as declaratory of customary international law.41 
 Secondly, the prohibition of the treat or use of force is provided by Article 2(4) 
of the Charter: 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV, this provision has been fiercely debated over many years, 
and for many different purposes. For some, there are questions as to how far this 
provision prohibits the use of force, and whether it allows for action in particula r 
circumstances by using interpretations that may or may not stretch the wording of it 
beyond recognition.42 Others recognise it as a watertight prohibition, where the only 
exceptions are Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII, or a State’s inherent 
right of self-defence as recognised by Article 51 of the Charter.43 
 Taken together, the principle of non-intervention coupled with the prohibit ion 
of the use of force provide the general starting position when addressing any question 
of intervention. But, of course, these principles are limited to some extent. The 
Charter, and indeed the Declaration on Friendly Relations, recognise that these 
principles do not prejudice the application of measures relating to the maintenance of 
                                                 
39 UNGA Res 2625(XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations , Annex. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v Uganda), Judgment of 19th December 2005, (2005) ICJ Reports 168, at para [162]. 
42 See Chapter IV. 
43 See Chapter IV. 
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international peace and security – in particular, enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII of the Charter that are authorised by the Security Council.44 
Baring this in mind, it is useful to compare these fundamental principles with 
another – the Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international peace 
and security. In particular, Article 24(1) of the Charter provides: 
 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
 
It is important to consider whether or not this responsibility is to be interpreted as a 
legal duty, or something more of an aspirational nature, and this will be addressed in 
detail in Chapter III. In establishing the context and background to this thesis, 
however, it is worth focussing on States’ implementation of such a responsibility in 
the context of humanitarian crises, and also how the power of the Permanent Five 
members of the Security Council to veto Security Council action might impact upon 
this responsibility.45 This is especially true where the Security Council fails to act, or 
is blocked by the use of this veto power. While this thesis advocates for a solution to 
this issue by the continuation of the responsibility to protect, it is necessary to first  
address arguments that a solution to such inaction is found via a right of humanitar ian 
intervention in customary international law. 
 
2.2 Requirements of Customary International Law 
 
The most authoritative ‘definition’ of custom is found in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, where the sources of law that the Court should apply 
are listed. At Article 38(1)(b), the Court shall apply: International custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law. 
Cassese notes that this reflects the widely held view that custom is made up of 
two elements: (i) a general practice of States; and (ii) a belief on behalf of a State that 
this practice is accepted as law (also known as opinio juris) or is required by social, 
                                                 
44 Article 2(7) UN Charter; and Declaration on Friendly Relations (n.39). 
45 See Article 27(3), UN Charter. 
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economic or political exigencies (opinion necessitates).46 Cassese clarifies that 
practice by States on impulse of economic, political, or military demands is regarded 
as opinio necessitatis, and if this practice does not encounter strong and consistent 
opposition from other States, but is consistently accepted or acquiesced, then this 
practice gradually crystallises into a customary rule dictated by international law 
(opinion juris).47  The point from this example is that any customary rule must emerge 
from ‘settled practice’.  
 More fundamentally, this is reflected in several judgments of the ICJ. Firstly, 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,48 the Court expanded on custom, stating that: 
 
… two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned amount 
to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, 
as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the 
existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio 
juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even 
habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough.49 
 
This was confirmed in the Nicaragua Case,50 where the court further made clear that, 
for a rule to be established as one of custom, the corresponding practice need not be 
‘in absolutely rigorous conformity’ with the rule.51 Instances of inconsistent conduct 
by a State should generally be treated as breaches of that rule, and not as indicat ions 
of the existence or recognition of a new rule.52 
 With these fundamental principles in mind, we may now assess whether the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention exists in customary international law by 
reference to State practice and opinio juris. 
 
                                                 
46 A Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2005), at 156. 
47 Ibid, at 157 
48 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment) (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20th February 1969, [1969] ICJ Reports 3. 
49 Ibid, at para [77]. 
50 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA)  
(Merits), Judgment of 27th June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at para [185]. 
51 Ibid, at [186]. 
52 Ibid. 
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2.3 Relevant History and Practice of Intervention 
 
This section aims to highlight the evolution of thought in the international community 
regarding human rights violations and mass atrocities as a basis for the interference in 
a sovereign State, and therefore the lack of support for a customary right to 
humanitarian intervention. The purpose of this section is not to analyse or evaluate the 
legal arguments in detail,53 but to demonstrate the lack of practice and opinio juris for 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
2.3.1 Relevant Interventions in the Cold War Era 
 
During the Cold War, there were three main instances of State practice that have been 
highlighted by commentators as the primary examples of intervention that carry with 
them a ‘humanitarian’ character. India’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, 
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and Tanzania’s use of force in Uganda in 
1979 most effectively highlight the majority of views within the internationa l 
community of such intervention during this time. In these cases, the ‘humanitar ian’ 
character of the States’ interventions were mainly cited as a political justification for 
their actions, rather than a strictly legal one, with the use of force being justified mainly 
on grounds of self-defence. 
 
India’s Intervention in East Pakistan – 1971 
When Pakistan was formed of West Pakistan and East Pakistan,54 West Pakistan 
dominated the Eastern region in an imbalance of power, politics, and the economy. 55 
These circumstances accelerated a call for more autonomy in East Pakistan, with the 
Awami League representing this popular opinion within that region.56  
Thus, in the 1970 General Election, the Awami League won a landslide 
majority of seats within East Pakistan, making it the biggest single party in Pakistan’s 
                                                 
53 Although some of the legal arguments relating to humanitarian intervention and the prohibition of 
force will be addressed in Chapter IV. 
54 See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan  (Geneva: International 
Commission of Jurists Secretariat, 1972), at 7-11, available at <http://www.icj.org/the-events-in-east-
pakistan-1971-a-legal-study/> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
55 Ibid, at 10 
56 For excellent detail on this situation, see NJ Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention 
in International Society (Oxford, OUP, 2000), Chapter 2 generally (pg. 55-77). 
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National Assembly.57 As talks and negotiations for constitutional reform collapsed 
between President Yahya Khan and the leader of the Awami League, Sheik Mujibur 
Rahman, the President suspended the National Assembly indefinitely.58 Eventually, 
negotiations deteriorated further and, following a “Declaration of Emancipation” from 
the Awami League, the Pakistan Army moved into the region on 25 th March 1971, 
unleashing a brutal and violent crackdown within Dacca.59 
Conflict followed, with estimates that over a nine-month period one million 
people were killed and as many as ten million refugees fled into India.60 Harrowingly, 
Kuper61 suggests that this ruthless action included the use of torture and extermination 
camps.62 In addition to the influx of refugees, clashes on the boarder of India escalated 
a deteriorating relationship between India and Pakistan – with India threatening to take 
action in response.63  
Eventually, India invaded both East and West Pakistan in response to an 
airstrike against Indian airfields by Pakistani military forces. This sparked a war that 
lasted less than two weeks, with Pakistan’s army surrendering on the 16th December 
1971, and India recognising East Pakistan as the new independent State of 
Bangladesh.64 Primarily, India’s justification for this intervention implied that it acted 
in self-defence in light of ‘aggression’ from Pakistan.65 The Indian representative at 
the Security Council also suggested that part of India’s motives was the aim to “rescue 
the people of East Bengal from what they [were] suffering.”66 
Evans67 suggests that, while India may well have had a strategic interest in 
intervening within the region, the humanitarian objective was strong.68 Yet, the 
international community’s reaction to this crisis was less than supportive. As Wheeler 
notes, the strongest reaction from the international community was to affirm 
                                                 
57 See Wheeler (n.56), at 56; International Commission of Juris ts (n.54), at 12; see also, S Chesterman, 
Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law  (Oxford, OUP, 2001) at 72. 
58 International Commission of Jurists (n.54) at 14. 
59 Ibid, at 27. 
60 See Chesterman (n.57), at 72-73; International Commission of Jurists (n.54), at 24-26; Wheeler 
(n.56), at 58-59. 
61 L Kuper, The Prevention of Genocide (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985). 
62 Ibid, at 47; see also Wheeler (n.56), at 57. 
63 Wheeler (n.56), at 59-60. 
64 International Commission of Jurists (n.54), at 42-44. 
65 See, e.g. UNSC Verbatim Record, 1606th Meeting (4th December 1971), UN Doc S/PV.1606(OR), at 
[155]. 
66 Ibid, para [185]. 
67 G Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All  (Washington, 
DC, USA, Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 
68 Ibid, 23-24. 
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Pakistan’s right to sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention under Article 2(7) 
of the UN Charter.69 Others were more explicit in suggesting that the events in East 
Pakistan could not justify India’s actions against the territorial integrity and politica l 
independence of Pakistan.70 
With no progress made in the Security Council, the issue was taken to the 
General Assembly.71 Eventually, the Assembly passed Resolution 2793 (XXVI)72 
calling for both sides to initiate an immediate ceasefire and a withdrawal of forces on 
the other’s territory. Most notably, Wheeler highlights that the discussion by States in 
the General Assembly revealed little or no support for any kind of intervention on 
humanitarian grounds.73  
 
Vietnam’s Intervention in Cambodia – 1978 
In 1975, the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia (then known as Kampuchea) 
– a rise of power that would scar the Cambodian people. A broad and systematic 
violation of human rights followed, with Amnesty International estimating that 
hundreds of thousands of people were murdered by the Government while deaths from 
malnutrition or disease amounted to unconscionable figures that stretched between 1 
and 2 million.74  At the same time, the government launched cross-border attacks 
against Vietnam, on some occasions destroying Vietnamese villages along the 
disputed border and massacring civilians.75 
 In response, and after failed attempts at peaceful dialogue, Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia on Christmas Day, 1978.76 In terms of Vietnam’s justifications for its 
intervention, it was argued (quite unconvincingly) that a distinction should be drawn 
between the ‘border war’ fought between the two States and the ‘revolutionary war’ 
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between the people and their government – maintaining at the Security Council that it 
acted in self-defence, in response to the attacks on its territory by the Khmer Rouge. 77 
In fact, Vietnam did not actually formally acknowledge any such presence of 
Vietnamese troops within Cambodia.78 The international response to the situation was 
similar to that of India’s intervention in Pakistan in the sense that the deplorable human 
rights record of Khmer Rouge was acknowledged, but nevertheless the principle of 
non-intervention and State sovereignty toppled this.79  
Widespread condemnation of the invasion followed. For example, the United 
Kingdom stated: 
 
Whatever is said about human rights in Kampuchea, it cannot excuse Viet Nam, 
whose own human rights record is deplorable, for violating the territorial integrity of 
Democratic Kampuchea, an independent State Member of the United Nations.80 
 
France also expressed its concerns about any justifications for intervention based upon 
a humanitarian crisis: 
 
The notion that because a régime is detestable foreign intervention is justified and 
forcible overthrow is legitimate is extremely dangerous. That could ultimately 
jeopardize the very maintenance of international law and order and make the 
continued existence of various regimes dependent on the judgement of their 
neighbours.81 
 
Moreover, the Soviet Union’s support for Vietnam – coming from the other side of 
the Cold War divide – endorsed the ‘two wars’ argument, yet did not go as far as to 
validate any humanitarian basis for intervention.82 Instead, the Soviet Union used the 
atrocities as a background to support the argument that the Pol Pot regime was 
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overthrown by his own people83 – a contradiction in the Soviet human rights position 
that was later pointed out by the United Kingdom.84 
Thus, when the Soviet Union once again vetoed Resolutions within the 
Council, the issue went to the General Assembly, where, in contrast to the arguably 
‘softer’ approach that was taken in the India / East Pakistan situation, Vietnam’s 
intervention was condemned.85 Most crucially, the General Assembly maintained the 
general position of the international community as emphasising the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and independence of States.86 As is evident, similarly to the 
situation between India and Pakistan, the interests of the State and sovereignty seemed 
to take precedence. 
 
Tanzania’s Intervention in Uganda – 1979 
President of Uganda, Idi Amin, is said to have been responsible for the murder of 
between 100,000 and 500,000 people during his reign of power – violations of human 
rights that attracted a widespread condemnation through the internationa l 
community.87 In the strain of tense relations with neighbouring Tanzania, Amin 
occupied and annexed a small region of northwest Tanzania in October 1978.88 
Countering this ‘act of war’, Tanzanian troops forced Ugandan forces back onto their 
home territory, only to be invaded a second time by Amin’s command.89 Met with this 
further attack, Tanzania opposed Uganda’s attacks, and responded with an invasion of 
their own to destroy a number of Ugandan army bases in the aim of preventing any 
further attacks.90 
 As Uganda called upon the help of Libya, this dispute escalated until Tanzania 
made the decision to topple Idi Amin’s regime.91 Justifying Tanzania’s actions, 
President Nyerere, without explicitly adopting the language of self-defence, made a 
‘two-wars’ argument similar to that made by Vietnam, stating: 
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First there are Ugandans fighting to remove the Fascist dictator. Then there are 
Tanzanians fighting to maintain national security.92 
 
Tanzania did not invoke any humanitarian ground for their intervention, despite the 
gross record of human rights violations by the Amin regime. Unlike in the Vietnam 
situation, the international community’s response to this intervention was surprisingly 
hushed.93 While Uganda had requested a meeting at the Security Council, this was 
later withdrawn, and the issue did not receive attention in either the Security Council 
or the General Assembly.94 Commentators such as Tesόn95 suggest that this reaction 
by the international community legitimised Tanzania’s intervention,96 but Chesterman 
warns that it may be an exaggeration to see this as the international community 
accepting Tanzania’s actions as lawful – rather than just simply legitimate, but 
nevertheless still illegal.97 
 But, we may ask, why was the international community’s reaction to the 
Tanzanian intervention so ‘indifferent’ compared to the popular condemnation of 
Vietnam’s actions in Cambodia – even though the justifications put by the intervening 
parties were relatively similar? It has been suggested that the lack of condemnation in 
the Tanzanian case was due to the fact that Tanzania was not seen as having any 
‘hegemonic’ intentions in invading Uganda, whereas this was a popular opinion 
regarding Vietnam98 – with China even suggesting that Vietnam’s invasion was part 
of a wider hidden agenda by the Soviet Union.99  
Frank100 suggests that the international community’s acquiescence in the face 
of the Tanzanian invasion may be explained by the political feelings at the time.101 He 
explains that Idi Amin was universally notorious, while the Tanzanian President, 
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Julius Nyerere, was widely respected, and that despite this clear support for being rid 
of such a brutal dictator as was Amin, Tanzania’s actions were not justified as 
humanitarian intervention based on fears that such action would set a precedent 
legitimating a general right of States to engage in humanitarian intervention.102 If this 
is true, and such fears did exist within the international community, then the silence 
of the world seems nothing more than a compromise between two competing positions 
– one that saw a legal basis for the action in humanitarian intervention; and another 
that accepted the outcome of the Tanzanian intervention, but did not want to create 
such a legal precedent. If this is the case, then the international community cannot 
correctly be described as accepting the legality of humanitarian intervention as law. 
 
2.3.2 Conclusions on Cold War Interventions 
 
By identifying these three cases of intervention during the Cold War, we can see that 
the pattern of thought within the international community took a trend of non-
intervention based upon State sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The 
majority opinion of that time was that violations of human rights and mass atrocities 
– no matter how severe they had been reported to be – could not in themselves form 
the basis of any interference or action against a sovereign State. The States undertaking 
interventions even stayed clear of such arguments, basing their interventions on claims 
of self-defence (whether expressly or impliedly), and only utilising the arguments of 
human rights violations as a political background to support the outcome of their 
actions. 
 Indeed, the majority of arguments at that time in favour a humanitarian basis 
for intervention came from commentators rather than States, and even then that led to 
a divide within the academic community.103 Evans pins this era under the title of 
“cynicism and self-interest”,104 but whether that may or may not be the case, it is 
certainly evident that there was very little support for any intervention into an 
independent State being based upon the fact of a humanitarian crisis alone – never 
mind any kind of doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’.  
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2.3.3 Situations in the Post-Cold-War Era 
 
In the 1990s, the international community became more cooperative in their 
international relations following the end of the Cold War. We shall look now to 
examples of humanitarian crises during this post-Cold-War era, prior to the adoption 
of the responsibility to protect, and evaluate whether there was a shift in the 
international community’s collective conscience when faced with these dire situations. 
As we shall see, there was a distinctive shift towards UN-based operations. However, 
a lack of political will to take more coercive measures, and an unconscionable failing 
in response to the situation in Rwanda in 1994, reveal that there is still a stro ng 
reluctance among some States to violate or encroach upon the principles of State 
sovereignty and non-intervention, demonstrating further evidence that a right of 
humanitarian intervention is not widely accepted. 
 
The Situation in Iraq – 1990-1993 
When Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait in August 1990, the international community 
struck back at this illegal use of force with both condemnation and a robust response. 
The Security Council convened to condemn the aggressive action within hours of the 
invasion, recognising the situation as a breach of international peace and security and 
calling for Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait immediately.105 Eventually, when 
economic sanctions proved ineffective,106 the Security Council authorised States to 
use ‘all necessary measures’ under Chapter VII of the Charter, in cooperation with 
Kuwait, allowing a coalition of State forces to intervene militarily and restore 
international peace and security.107  
Once the operation to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait was over, this series of 
events was followed by a vicious repression of Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq, and 
Shiites in the south.108 When the Security Council’s ceasefire resolution relating to the 
Kuwait situation was passed, it made no mention of the deteriorating situation relating 
to civilians in Iraq.109 But after a short hesitation, the Council passed Resolution 
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688,110 calling for an end to the repression of civilians within Iraq, insisting upon 
immediate access for international humanitarian organisations, and appealing to 
Member States to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts.111 
But as the suffering and tragedy of the Kurdish people was broadcasted on 
television into the homes of millions of Western States, political pressure mounted in 
what has been dubbed the ‘CNN Effect’ or the ‘BBC Effect’.112 Initially reluctant to 
intervene, the US found support from France and the UK in establishing ‘safe havens’ 
to protect the Kurdish people.113 These ‘safe havens’ were then protected by no-fly 
zones established by the coalition forces, and the threat of ground troops within the 
region.114 
 These ‘safe havens’ and the no-fly zones had not been expressly authorised by 
the Security Council, leading to claims from the coalition parties that their actions 
were justified ‘in support’ of Resolution 688, and through an ‘implied authorisat ion’ 
from the Security Council.115 In later clashes between Iraqi forces and US / UK forces 
from 1992-1999 the use of force was justified in self-defence and pre-emptive action 
against Iraqi missile locations.116  
During this time, the United Kingdom altered its position in favour of a 
‘doctrine’ of humanitarian intervention, suggesting that humanitarian crises as a basis 
for the interference in a State’s affairs was in fact a legal possibility.117 The UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s [FCO] Legal Counsellor explicitly said:  
 
Resolution 688 … was not made under Chapter VII. Resolution 688 recognised that 
there was a severe human rights and humanitarian situation in Iraq and, in particular, 
northern Iraq; but the intervention in northern Iraq ‘Provide Comfort’ was in fact, not 
specifically mandated by the United Nations, but the states taking action in northern 
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Iraq did so in exercise of the customary international law principle of humanitarian 
intervention.118 
 
Division persisted between the Permanent Members of the Security Council over the 
legality of the military action right through to 1999, when clashes between the 
coalition forces and Iraqi forces intensified,119 and France eventually dropped its 
support for the coalition.120  
 
The Failure to Respond to the Genocide in Rwanda – 1994 
The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 is possibly the most important example of the 
quandary that is at the centre of this thesis. While approximately 800,000 people were 
killed in a systematic slaughter that lasted almost 100 days, the United Nations system 
failed to prevent, or halt, this colossal atrocity.121 As the Secretary-General of the UN 
called for the peacekeeping force UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda), 
whose resources were scarce, to be reinforced with the aim of coercing a ceasefire, 122 
the Security Council instead reduced the numbers of the force and withdrew a majority 
of its troops and civilian workers from the country.123 The genocide of those 800,000 
people followed in April to July. 
An independent inquiry found that part of the reason for this failure was a 
persistent lack of political will that hampered the ability of the Security Council to 
make any effective decisions that would have an impact on the situation.124 The report 
made fourteen key recommendations to the UN, including in particular: initiating an 
Action Plan to prevent genocide;125 a greater preparedness on the part of the Security 
Council and others to act to prevent genocide and gross violations of human rights, 
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emphasising that the political will to act should not be subject to different standards; 126 
and improving the protection of civilians in conflict situations.127 
 The main theme of these recommendations is clear: inaction is inexcusab le 
when faced with atrocities such as genocide. There can be no doubt that the moral 
conscience of the world collectively compels a response to these dire situations.128 But 
it is the question of how the world should respond that faces the greatest of challenges. 
One might think that the ability of the Security Council to act beyond the barriers of 
State sovereignty and the non-use of force would be enough to stop or halt mass 
atrocities when the time comes. One might also expect that the Security Council would 
act at the right time, in the right way, authorising the necessary measures to stop mass 
death. That would be the case in an ideal world. However, the case of the Rwandan 
Genocide of 1994 reveals that just because the Security Council can act does not 
always mean that it will. Furthermore, the lack of any intervention, or argument in 
favour of humanitarian intervention in response to this genocide, indicates further the 
lack of belief in the legality of such a doctrine. 
 
NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo – 1999 
When the threat of mass atrocities came over the horizon in the late 1990s, reluctance 
on the part of some veto-holding permanent members of the Security Council to act 
ignited a short spark for a few States to take the matter upon themselves to act. 
This was in support of NATO’s [the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Operation Allied Force was NATO’s response to the 
crisis in (what was at the time) Yugoslavia. Kosovar Albanians were the target of the 
use of excessive force against peaceful protests by Serbian authorities that eventually 
escalated into a repressive internal conflict by forces under President Milosevic.129 As 
the situation descended towards humanitarian catastrophe, with an increasing number 
of civilians being targeted in the bloodshed, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1199.130 Under this Resolution, the Security Council acted under Chapter 
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VII of the Charter to demand ‘the withdrawal of security units used for civilian 
repression.’131 
While many attempts at diplomatic settlement were made, the crisis eventually 
descended into a conflict where war crimes and mass human rights abuses were taking 
place.132 Then, in March 1999, NATO aircraft started an aerial bombing campaign 
against Yugoslavia, primarily in the Kosovo region – a campaign that would last 78 
days, with no prior express Security Council approval.133 
Many different political and moral arguments were put forward by NATO 
spokespersons and the NATO Secretary-General, mainly focussing on the need to 
prevent a further humanitarian catastrophe,134 but the legal justifications from NATO 
members ranged considerably. For example, during an emergency meeting called after 
NATO started its intervention, there were several responses from NATO Members to 
Russia’s condemnation of the organisation’s use of force.135 The US stressed that the 
NATO action was taken with the greatest reluctance, but was necessary and justified 
to stop the violence and prevent an even greater humanitarian disaster because 
Belgrade had been undermining and thwarting all other diplomatic efforts.136  
Only a minority of States concerned explicitly relied upon the humanitar ian 
crisis as a legal justification for their actions, rather than a solely political one. When 
Yugoslavia started legal action (later Serbia and Montenegro) in the ICJ against ten 
NATO Member States, it was alleged that those who undertook military action 
breached the prohibition of the use of force and, by assisting military forces within the 
State, also breached the principle of non-intervention.137 During proceedings, Belgium 
made some notable arguments.138 When arguing that the intervention had an 
‘unchallengeable basis’ in the Security Council resolutions relating to the situation in 
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the region, the representative of Belgium suggested that “we need to go further and 
develop the idea of armed humanitarian intervention.”139 
Belgium also made the argument that the intervention was “a case of a lawful 
armed humanitarian intervention for which there is a compelling necessity. ”140 
Ultimately, although it had the potential to shed light upon the legal validity of 
humanitarian intervention, a chance to clarify the position was lost following the 
events in Kosovo when the ICJ found that it did not have jurisdiction in these cases.141 
Similarly to Belgium, the UK argued: 
 
The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Under present circumstances in Kosovo, 
there is convincing evidence that such a catastrophe is imminent. … 
 
Every means short of force has been tried to avert this situation. In these 
circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming 
humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force now 
proposed is directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and is the 
minimum judged necessary for that purpose.142 
 
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo found that NATO’s intervention was legitimate, but not legal.143 Such a 
decision raises a fundamental quandary when it comes to the choice between illega l ity 
and inaction. However, the Commission did seem to put a limit on this when it said: 
 
Such a conclusion is related to the controversial idea that a “right” of humanitarian 
intervention is not consistent with the UN Charter if conceived as a legal text, but that 
it may, depending on context, nevertheless, reflect the spirit of the Charter as it relates 
to the overall protection of people against gross abuse. Humanitarian intervention may 
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also thus be legitimately authorized by the UN, but will often be challenged legally 
from the perspective of Charter obligations to respect the sovereignty of states.144 
 
2.3.4 The United Kingdom’s ‘Norm-Entrepreneurship’ and the International 
Reaction 
 
The UK has been, by far, the strongest advocate of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the 
post-Cold War era. As well as using it as the argument for NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo, the UK has put forward its position on the doctrine on many other occasions. 
On the 22nd of April 1999, then-Secretary of State for Defence Mr George Robertson 
made a policy statement in support of a legal use of military action in exceptiona l 
circumstances to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.145 In 2000, this position developed 
into a more principled approach to build humanitarian intervention into more of a 
‘doctrine’, and ideas were put to the UK Parliament and the UN Secretary-Genera l, 
suggesting a range of criteria that should be adhered to for the use of force in pursuit 
of humanitarian intervention.146 
Whilst supporting the limited use of force unilaterally, but nevertheless calling 
for the possibility of acting should the situation arise, the UK Government reasserted 
these principles in a set of Policy Guidelines in 2001.147 But even more recently, the 
UK renewed its support for humanitarian intervention in the context of the Syria crisis 
in 2013. When considering limited military airstrikes against the Syrian Regime in 
response to chemical weapons attacks on its own population, the UK set out its legal 
justification if it were to carry out such strikes, specifically addressing the issue of 
unilateral action in the following terms: 
 
If action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be permitted under 
international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the 
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overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and disrupting the 
further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Such a legal basis is available, 
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, provided three conditions are 
met…148 
 
What is striking about this entry from the UK Government is the explicit reference to 
the fact that it would be willing to act even if the Security Council is blocked. This is 
striking because, through the years of arguing for this right to intervene, there has been 
no indication as to how it would fit within the UN Charter’s existing internationa l 
peace and security system. Furthermore, there has been little by way of addressing 
fears as to whether this would have any effect upon the system’s integrity and 
effectiveness. In 1999, then- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan aired these concerns 
when he asked, “is there not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfec t, 
yet resilient, security system created after the second world war, and of setting 
dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who 
might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances?”149 
This concern was echoed by the UK’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Select Committee, which asked the government to clarify its position on the legality 
of acting without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. These questions were 
outlined and answered in Written Evidence to the Committee, Hugh Robertson MP of 
the FCO.150 Specifically, the Committee highlighted the Independent Internationa l 
Commission on Kosovo’s conclusion that the NATO intervention in the 1990s was 
illegal but legitimate. In response to this, Robertson stated that: 
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20/10/2017). 
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The Government’s position has not changed in light of the report of the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo. It did not agree with the Commission’s view 
that NATO’s action in Kosovo in 1999 was illegal. The Government does not consider 
the Commission, while made up of experts, to be authoritative. Its views are not 
binding in any way, but represent the views of its independent members.151 
 
Therefore, even in the face of experts, the UK clearly believes that humanitar ian 
intervention has always been legal. In fact, Robertson’s evidence suggests that the UK 
relied on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention on three occasions, those being: (i) 
in protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991; (ii) in maintaining the No Fly Zones 
in Northern and Southern Iraq from 1991; and (iii) in using force against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to Kosovo in 1999.152 
 On the specific issue of acting without Security Council authorisation, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee asked for an assessment of the implications of such action. 
Again, the Government’s position was reiterated: 
 
The position of the Government is that intervention may be permitted under 
international law in exceptional circumstances where the UN Security Council is 
unwilling or unable to act in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe subject to the 
three conditions set out above. The Government does not consider that this has 
adverse implications for the UN.153 
 
In April 2014, the House of Commons Defence Committee produced a report on the 
very topic of intervention,154 and expressed concern that “it is unclear to what degree 
the UK Government’s interpretation of the legal position is accepted by either the 
international community or the general public in the UK.”155 It called upon the 
Government, in its next National Security Strategy, to set out in detail the principles 
                                                 
151 Ibid, at 4. 
152 Ibid, at 3. 
153 Ibid, at 5 (emphasis added). 
154 UK House of Commons Defence Committee, Intervention: Why, When and How? Fourteenth Report 
of Session 2013-14, Volume I, 28th April 2014, available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/952/952.pdf> (accessed 
20/07/2014). 
155 Ibid, para [38], page 26, and para [49], page 29. See also, UK House of Commons Defence 
Committee, Intervention: Why, When and How? Fourteenth Report of Session 2013 -14, Volume II 
(Written Evidence), 28th April 2014, available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/952/952vw.pdf > (accessed 
20/07/2014). 
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of its legal position, including its relationship with the UN Charter, international law 
and (as shall be discussed in the next Chapter) the concept of the responsibility to 
protect.156 In the Government’s response to the report,157 it noted its recommendation 
and then directed the Defence Committee back to Hugh Robertson’s evidence to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee detailing the Government’s legal position, and so the 
discussion came full circle.158 
 The UK’s attempts have been met with scepticism and rejection by a majority 
of States. Most notably, the Group of 77 outright rejected the existence of a ‘right’ to 
humanitarian intervention, stressing that it had “no legal basis in the United Nations 
Charter or in the general principles of international law.”159 This has also been the 
long-standing position of the Non-Aligned Movement, as declared in 2004 for 
example: 
 
The Ministers reaffirmed the Movement’s commitment to enhance international 
cooperation to resolve international problems of a humanitarian character in full 
compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, and, in this regard, they reiterated 
the rejection by the Non-Aligned Movement of the so-called “right” of humanitarian 
intervention, which has no basis either in the Charter of the United Nations or in 
international law.160  
 
This outright rejection of a right to humanitarian intervention has been repeated on 
several occasions by the Non-Aligned Movement.161 In this light, the UK’s assertions 
                                                 
156 Ibid, at para [49,], page 29. 
157 UK House of Commons Defence Committee, Intervention: Why, When and How?:Government 
Response to the Committee’s Fourteenth Report of Session 2013-14, Fourth Special Report of Session 
2014-15, 29th July 2014, available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence/581/581.pdf> (accessed 
09/09/14). 
158 Ibid, at page 5. 
159 Group of 77, Declaration of the South Summit, (10th-14th April 2000, Havana, Cuba), at [54], 
available at <http://www.g77.org/summit/Declarat ion_G77Summit.htm> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
160 Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final Outcome Document: XIV Ministerial Conference of the Non-
Aligned Movement (Midterm Review)’, (17-19 August 2004), (on file with the author), at paras [8] and 
[295]. 
161 See, for example: Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final Document of the 12th Conference of Heads of 
State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries’, (29 August – 3 September 1998, Durban, South 
Africa) Annexed to UN Doc A/53/667—S/1998/1071, at para [8]; Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final 
Outcome Document: 13th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non -Aligned  
Movement’, (24-25 February 2003, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), Annexed to UN Doc A/57/759–
S/2003/332, para [16], [354]; Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final Outcome Document: 14th Summit  
Conference of Heads of State or Government of The Nonaligned Movement’, (11-16 September 2006, 
Havana, Cuba) Doc NAM 2006/Doc.1/Rev.3, at para [249]; Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final Outcome 
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seem quite lonely in a world that, in political terms, is much larger than when the UN 
Charter came into existence. The need to protect a nation’s sovereignty in the 
international forum remained central to those States involved in the Group of 77 or the 
Non-Aligned Movement, and so a vaguely-defined ‘right’ of humanitar ian 
intervention, with an unclear position in international law, was unlikely to gain any 
sort of widespread recognition.  
 
2.4 Conclusions on Humanitarian Intervention 
 
The forgoing discussion highlights the very tense and controversial divide between 
the honourable call to intervene in the face of horrific atrocities and the fundamenta l 
need to uphold the law. Although humanitarian intervention has grown to incorporate 
a principled approach, with important criteria added to the ‘doctrine’, this is clearly 
not enough – the doctrine has not gained the requisite support either in practice or in 
the opinio juris of States to create such a right in customary international law.  
 
3. Between Illegality and Inaction 
 
A new era of international cooperation may have come about in the 1990s, but the 
post-Cold-War attitudes towards intervention on humanitarian grounds remained split. 
States still found it difficult to balance the cries for help from innocent civilians – 
suffering from unconscionable atrocities – with the principles of non-intervention, 
State sovereignty and the prohibition of force. Even when humanitarian motives were 
presented, there are questions as to whether the noble goal to protect was in fact their 
primary goal to protect. The international community is therefore faced with a very 
serious problem: how to respond to a threat or crises of mass atrocities in a way that 
is both appropriate and legal, particularly when the only body with the power and 
                                                 
Document: XV Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement’ (16 July 
2009) Doc NAM2009/FD/Doc.1, at para [440]; Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final Outcome Document: 
16th Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement’, (26-31 August 2012, 
Tehran, Iran) Doc NAM 2012/Doc.1/Rev.2, at para [598]; Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final Outcome 
Document: 17th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement’ (17 – 18 
September 2016, Island of Margarita, Venezuela) Doc NAM 2016/CoB/Doc.1. Corr.1, available at:  
<http://namvenezuela.org/?page_id=6330> (accessed 20/10/2017), at para [777]. 
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authority to do so – the UN Security Council – fails to act, or is paralysed by an abuse 
of the veto power.162 
As is evident from the previous historical examples, noting Kosovo and 
Rwanda in particular, such difficulties arise from the temperamental relationship  
between morality and legality, coupled with the fundamental and important need to 
uphold the rule of law in all circumstances. Although there is this moral obligat ion 
that calls upon the world to respond to mass atrocities, it would undermine the very 
foundations of our legal principles and systems to respond in such a way that is in 
itself illegal. In his Millennium Report as Secretary-General, Kofi Annan addressed 
this critical issue, and he asked a very significant question: 
 
I … accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital 
protection to small and weak States. But to the critics I would pose this question: if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations 
of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?163 
 
Canada responded to the Secretary-General’s call, and sponsored the establishment of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS] – a 
Commission tasked with addressing the legal and practical issues of intervention. The 
resulting report was entitled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’,164 to which we shall now 
turn. 
 
                                                 
162 For a further discussion of the paralysis of the Security Council, and the role of the veto power in 
this regard, See Chapter II, Section 3.2.2. 
163 Report of the Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First 
Century, (27 March 2000) UN Doc A/54/2000, at para [217]. 
164 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
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II 
The Birth of the Responsibility to Protect 
 
Introduction 
 
In an attempt to address the tense relationship between intervention and State 
sovereignty, the Government of Canada founded the International Commission on 
Intervention on State Sovereignty (the ICISS). In the wake of the Kosovo intervention, 
the Commission produced a report which proposed an innovative approach to both 
sovereignty and intervention - the Responsibility to Protect.1 This Chapter will outline 
the Commission’s proposed responsibility, and will assess the internationa l 
community’s adoption of this at the 2005 World Summit, outlining the primary 
responsibilities of the State and the secondary responsibility of the internationa l 
community. The subsequent implementation of the responsibility will be demonstrated 
by a comparison of two cases – the military intervention by the internationa l 
community in Libya, compared to the inaction and deadlock in response to the crisis 
in Syria. These cases are raised to introduce the problem at the heart of this thesis – 
the inaction or paralysis of the UN Security Council. The Chapter will then address 
the legal implications of this newly-recognised responsibility, assessing the legal 
status of the responsibility to protect in international law, and raising the question as 
to whether this responsibility leaves room to continue beyond the inaction of the 
Security Council.  
 
1. The ICISS Report 
1.1 Changing the Debate 
 
The first major contribution of the Commission was to shift the language of the debate 
from ‘humanitarian intervention’ to ‘the responsibility to protect’. The ICISS 
recognised that the language of a ‘right to intervene’ was unpopular with the less 
                                                 
1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
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powerful States, including the Global South, and that even humanitarian aid agencies 
had taken issue with the use of the word ‘humanitarian’ in a way that was essentially 
‘militarising’ or aggressive.2 But their decision to avoid this language was not just one 
of semantics or political sensitivity, but an important move in reconceptualising the 
issue of intervention and its relationship with State sovereignty.3 
One of the most pressing tasks for the ICISS was to even attempt to balance 
the relationship between the moral duty to prevent or halt atrocities with this legal 
principle granting a State its sovereignty. As the Secretary-General had said, “surely 
no legal principle – not even sovereignty – can ever shield crimes against humanity. ”4 
But the Commission made a ground-breaking decision to address this issue by 
redefining sovereignty as responsibility – as opposed to the traditional notion of 
sovereignty as power, as noted by the Commission itself.5 Not only did this help to 
alter the language into something less confrontational, it also evolved the general 
approach to humanitarian crises towards something significantly more pro-active. 
This idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ in this context can be attributed to 
the work of Francis Deng.6 The Commission utilised this idea to shift the concentration 
of the debate to a duty to protect, focussing upon the broader issues involved with 
situations of humanitarian catastrophes rather than just the interveners and the 
intervention itself.7 It was suggested that the responsibility to protect “resides first and 
foremost with the State whose people are directly affected” by the crisis in question. 8 
This, the Commission said, reflects not only position of international law, but also the 
practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive difference.9 Rather than 
focus just on intervention, the responsibility to protect seeks to put the onus on the 
domestic authorities who may be better placed to take action at a much earlier stage to 
prevent domestic issues from turning into conflicts or other situations that might 
increase the risk of atrocities from taking place. 
                                                 
2 ICISS Report (n.1), at para [1.40]. 
3 Ibid, at para [1.41]. 
4 Report of the Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First 
Century, UN Doc A/54/2000, 27th March 2000, at para [219]. 
5 ICISS Report (n.1), Chapter 2, [2.4]. 
6 FM Deng, et al, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, (Brookings Institution 
Press 1996). 
7 ICISS Report (n.1), para [2.29]. 
8 Ibid, para [2.30]. 
9 Ibid. 
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Noting that this position might not always offer a solution in all circumstances, 
the Commission suggested that a residual responsibility also lies with the broader 
international community.10 It was put forward that: 
 
This fallback responsibility is activated when a particular state is clearly either 
unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual 
perpetrator of crimes or atrocities; or where people living outside a particular state are 
directly threatened by actions taking place there. This responsibility also requires that 
in some circumstances action must be taken by the broader community of states to 
support populations that are in jeopardy or under serious threat.11 
 
These positions later became the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ responsibilities that were 
accepted by the international community.12 One would praise the Commission for 
taking this approach. Not only does it seem logically sound, this approach ensures that 
the most appropriate action taken by the most appropriate actors – it comes with a 
significantly lesser threat (inherent in a doctrine of humanitarian intervention) that the 
sovereignty of a State, or even the underpinnings of the UN Charter, would be wrongly 
disregarded. 
The ICISS anticipated that this new approach would incorporate a 
responsibility to protect: human rights, generally;13 human security;14 in response to 
civil war, or circumstances of a failed State;15 and, in response to natural disasters or 
environmental catastrophe.16 It should be noted, however, that this scope is also 
significantly wider than what was eventually accepted by the international community, 
where only atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing were adopted as part of the responsibility to protect.17 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid, para [2.31]. 
11 Ibid, (emphasis added). 
12 See Section 2.2. 
13 ICISS Report (n.1), at [2.16]-[2.20]. 
14 Ibid, at [2.21]-[2.23]. 
15 Ibid, at [4.40]. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See TG Weiss, “R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit,” (2006) 24 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 741, at 750, who labels the World Summit Outcome as ‘R2P-Lite’. 
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1.2 A Focus on Peace 
 
Most importantly, the ICISS looked beyond intervention and stressed a continuum of 
responsibilities that focussed on the prevention of mass atrocities and humanitar ian 
disasters. It established: (i) a ‘Responsibility to Prevent’, addressing root and direct 
causes of both internal conflict and other crises that put populations at risk;18 (ii) a 
‘Responsibility to React’, responding to situations with the necessary and appropriate 
measures including, in extreme cases, military intervention;19 and (iii) a 
‘Responsibility to Rebuild’, providing full assistance with the necessary 
reconstruction, recovery and reconciliation to further prevent such crises from 
reoccurring.20  
 In terms of the ‘Responsibility to Prevent’, the Commission stressed that the 
focus on preventing atrocities should come well before the point of simply reacting 
early to a crisis. In this sense, the responsibility to prevent addresses risk factors 
ranging from an outbreak of unrest to the ‘root causes’ of tensions that may include 
the lack of respect and protection of human rights.21 Therefore, this part of the 
responsibility concentrates on actions available well before the manifestation of a 
humanitarian crisis – much unlike the position of a ‘right’ to intervene. 
 The guidance from the Commission in this respect was very comprehens ive. 
Taking note of the UN’s growing commitment to conflict prevention,22 and the (then) 
recent steps taken in this field,23 the ICISS called for an incorporation of the 
responsibility to protect in peaceful methods of prevention. A number of methods of 
support were suggested, reflecting what one would describe as ‘preventive diplomacy’ 
– a range of peaceful political processes overseen by the UN’s Department of Politica l 
Affairs.24 This, essentially, encompasses an enhanced capacity-building role for the 
international community, aimed at: increasing respect and protection of human rights 
and the rule of law; addressing the ‘root causes’ of potential conflict; providing support 
                                                 
18 Ibid, Chapter 3. 
19 Ibid, Chapter 4. 
20 Ibid, Chapter 5. 
21 Ibid, Chapter 3 generally, and [3.1]-[3.3]. 
22 Ibid, [3.5]-[3.9]. 
23 See e.g. Report of the Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, (7th June 2001) UN Doc 
A/55/985–S/2001/574. 
24 UN Department of Political Affairs, <http://www.un.org/undpa/en> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
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for advancing good governance; or ‘good offices’ missions and mediation efforts to 
promote peaceful dialogue or reconciliation.25  
Additionally, the ICISS said that the responsibility to prevent calls for a better 
‘Early Warning’ capacity, bearing in mind particular risk factors connected to the 
responsibility to protect.26 In terms of more direct measures of prevention, the 
Commission also made suggestions that included: positive or negative economic 
inducements;27 political and diplomatic deployments;28 the involvement of the 
International Criminal Court;29 and, a limited role for military action for prevention in 
the form of preventive deployment.30 
The ‘Responsibility to Rebuild’ is very similar in the tools that it utilises. 
Under this part of the responsibility to protect, the ICISS emphasised the importance 
of the work that follows an intervention. In this sense, “there should be a genuine 
commitment to helping to build a durable peace, and promoting good governance and 
sustainable development.”31 The Commission acknowledged that this part of the 
responsibility may call for years of work, even if the mass atrocities have been 
completely averted.32 Working for durable peace therefore requires a number of tasks 
including: diplomatic peacebuilding; peacekeeping for the maintenance of security; 
the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of militia or armed forces; and, 
above all, justice and reconciliation for the victims of atrocity crimes.33   
It is clear from all of these examples that the ICISS foresaw a much greater 
involvement for peaceful processes and diplomatic solutions than was acknowledged 
by the debate on humanitarian intervention. Of course, humanitarian intervention was 
always said to be an option of ‘last resort’, but it is a particular strength of the ICISS 
report that it acknowledges the alternatives and puts forward such guidance on 
peaceful measures, instead of simply concentrating on the ‘intervention’ aspect of 
responding to atrocities. 
 
 
                                                 
25 ICISS Report (n.1), at [3.3]. 
26 Ibid, at [3.10]-[3.17]. 
27 Ibid, at [3.27]. 
28 Ibid, at [3.26]. 
29 Ibid, at [3.28]-[3.30]. 
30 Ibid, at [3.32]. 
31 Ibid, at [5.1]. 
32 Ibid, at [5.2]. 
33 Ibid, Chapter 5 generally. 
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1.3 Intervening with Caution 
 
While the Commission’s push for focus on the more peaceful measures in preventing 
and halting mass atrocities is welcomed and applauded, the continuously-debated legal 
position of intervention against a State’s sovereignty, independence, and territoria l 
integrity – either using forcible or non-forcible means – is the central focus of this 
thesis. In this regard, the ICISS did make some notable remarks about the 
‘Responsibility to React’ that are of crucial importance to our discussion. 
 The general emphasis was on the need to take every action short of coercive 
measures or military force before any such intervention is taken.34 When this becomes 
difficult, the Commission stated: 
  
When preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a 
state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary 
measures by other members of the broader community of states may be 
required. These coercive measures may include political, economic or judicia l 
measures, and in extreme cases – but only extreme cases – they may also 
include military action. As a matter of first principles, in the case of reaction 
just as with prevention, less intrusive and coercive measures should always be 
considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.35 
 
What is interesting about the ICISS position is that it outlines measures short of force 
that would be preferable – measures, such as sanctions and embargos, that could still 
impose upon a State’s sovereignty and independence.36 Such measures are still 
coercive in nature, but do not come with the risks of military action, and so they are 
certainly to be considered before any intervention of a military kind.  
However, the Commission did warn that “these non-military measures can be 
blunt and often indiscriminate weapons and must be used with extreme care to avoid 
doing more harm than good – especially to civilian populations.”37 In the more 
extreme cases, if the need and necessity does arise to resort to force, the ICISS 
                                                 
34 ICISS Report (n.1), at [4.3]. 
35 Ibid, at [4.1]. 
36 Ibid, at [4.6]-[4.9]. 
37 Ibid, at [4.5]. 
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suggested six criteria to be undertaken before such action is taken.38 Those criteria 
called for: (i) intervention to be authorised by the right authority; (ii) a just cause for 
intervention; (iii) those who intervene do so with the right intention; (iv) any milita ry 
action to be of a last resort; (v) proportional means so that the intervention is the 
minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question; and (vi) the 
intervention must have reasonable prospects of succeeding. 
It is not the aim of this thesis to assess this legitimacy criteria. Instead, this 
thesis concentrates largely on the general legality of the measures being proposed. For 
now, it is worthwhile to note what the Commission said about the right authority 
criterion. Considering that the bedrock principles of the non-use of force and non-
intervention are stipulated by Article 2(4) and Article 2(7) of the UN Charter 
respectively, the Commission noted the primary role of the UN Security Council as 
the ‘right authority’ for authorising interventions.39 However, the Commission also 
noted the problems that have been aired about the Security Council. Firstly, the issue 
of the veto was considered, while highlighting the current unrepresentative make-up 
of the Council, and deploring the unconscionable the possibility of one veto-holding 
State “overriding the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern.”40 
Related to this, the political will of the Security Council was underlined as 
another potential block to the necessary decisions being made, as was the case in 1994 
regarding Rwanda. Considering this, the Commission warned that any inaction by the 
Security Council would undermine not only the Council itself, but the UN security 
system as a whole.41 
And so, the Commission asked – what alternative authorities are there when 
the Security Council fails to act? This is a question that is at the heart of this thesis, 
and the fact that the ICISS considered it in their seminal report to the responsibility to 
protect, binds this issue to the emerging concept in such a way that makes it one of the 
most important questions surrounding the Security Council today. 
The Commission considered two possible alternatives – each of which will be 
examined, analysed, and tested in light of the wider questions of international law 
throughout this thesis. One possibility was action through the General Assembly. 42 
                                                 
38 Ibid, at [4.10]-[4.16]. 
39 Ibid, at [6.2]-[6.6]. 
40 Ibid, at [6.20]. 
41 Ibid, at [6.22]-[6.27], and [6.36]-[6.40]. 
42 Ibid, at [6.29]-[6.30]. 
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More specifically, it was suggested that a Recommendation could be made through 
the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure43 following an Emergency Special Session, 
providing a high degree of legitimacy, if supported by Member States, to the cause for 
an intervention (although, in the view of the Commission, not any legal authority).44  
Another possibility considered was collective action by regional organisat ions 
under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Questions were raised as to whether regiona l 
organisations could act within the defining boundaries of their members, and whether 
approval from the Security Council could be granted after action had been taken.45 
Thirdly, the Commission gave a warning as to the implications of the Security 
Council’s inaction. Most crucially, the Commission warned: 
 
… if the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility in conscience-shocking 
situations crying out for action, then it is unrealistic to expect that concerned states 
will rule out other means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency of these 
situations.46 
 
2. Response to the ICISS Report 
2.1 Calls for Recognition 
 
The first notable response to the ICISS report came from the Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. This Panel produced a report  
in 2004 that recognised the emergence of a ‘responsibility to protect’.47 In particular, 
the Panel stated: 
 
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility 
to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a 
last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or 
serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments 
have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.48 
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44 ICISS Report (n.1), [6.29]-[6.30]. 
45 Ibid, at [6.31]-[6.35]. 
46 Ibid, at [6.39]. 
47 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, (New York, UN Publications, 2004). 
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As Chhabra and Zucker note,49 the High-Level Panel seems to have omitted mass 
starvation, civil war and natural disasters from the atrocities covered by the ICISS’s 
version of the responsibility to protect.50 But what is most notable about the Panel’s 
position is that it refers to the responsibility to protect as an ‘emerging norm’, 
suggesting that it might become a rule of customary international law in the future, 
and therefore a legally-binding duty.51  
 The Panel also put forward a set of legitimacy criteria, similar to those put 
forward by the ICISS, recommending that the Security Council should always address 
them when considering an intervention.52 Interestingly, these criteria did not address 
the ICISS’s ‘right authority’ criterion, but the Panel did recommend that individua l 
States should also subscribe to their legitimacy criteria, while stopping short of 
addressing the issue of Security Council inaction.53 The Security Council has not 
adopted any of these, nor any other similar criteria. 
 Kofi Annan produced his own report,54 pushing for more momentum within 
the international community on the endorsement of the responsibility to protect, also 
describing it as an ‘emerging norm’.55 Equally, he repeated the call for the Security 
Council to adopt a Resolution setting out legitimacy principles that it should use as 
guidance when deciding whether to authorise a use of force or intervention.56 These 
calls were the final push for the international community to adopt the responsibility to 
protect, with the Secretary-General aiming for the 2005 World Summit as the perfect 
opportunity to do so. 
 
2.2 The 2005 World Summit – Recognising the Responsibility to Protect 
 
In the run up to the 2005 World Summit, international dialogue on the responsibility 
to protect as a concept intensified. At first, there was hesitance on the part of those 
                                                 
49 T Chhabra & JB Zucker, “Defining the Crimes”, in J Genser et al (eds), The Responsibility to Protect: 
The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time , (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
50 Ibid, at 40. 
51 The legal nature of the responsibility to protect is considered below, Section 4. 
52 A More Secure World (n.47), at [207]. 
53 Ibid, at [209]. 
54 Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
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55 Ibid, at [135]. 
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who had previously rejected a ‘right’ to humanitarian intervention. For example, the 
Non-Aligned Movement’s position, put forward by the representative of Malaysia, 
expressed concern that the responsibility to protect had similarities with ‘humanitar ian 
intervention’, and it was suggested that any development of the concept should 
concentrate on its relationship with the principles of non-intervention and State 
sovereignty.57 On the other hand, States such as Canada sought to quell such fears 
when addressing the General Assembly debate, reiterating that the aim was not to 
“argu[e] for a unilateral right to intervene in one country whenever another country 
feels like it,” emphasising that the responsibility to protect is not a license for 
intervention, but “an international guarantor of international accountability.”58 
 Through these concerns and disagreements, eventually the internationa l 
community united unanimously and accepted its own version of the responsibility to 
protect at the 2005 World Summit. The text of this ground-breaking recognition is 
worth reciting in full: 
 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act 
in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage 
and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability. 
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, 
in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this 
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, 
on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
                                                 
57 Statement by Ambassador Radzi Rahman (Malaysia) on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, at 
the Informal Meeting of the Plenary of the General Assembly Concerning the Draft Outcome Document , 
21st June 2005, at [4.(g)(i)] available at 
<http://www.un.int/malaysia/GA/59th%20GA/59GA21JUNE05.pdf> (accessed 20/10/17). 
58 Prime Minister Paul Martin (Canada), UNGA Verbatim Record, 5th Plenary Meeting, 59th Session 
(22nd September 2004), UN Doc A/59/PV.5, at 31. 
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manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly 
to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, 
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to 
commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out.59 
 
The first noticeable difference between the international community’s acceptance of 
the responsibility to protect and the original version promoted by the ICISS is that it 
has a defined scope encompassing ‘genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and ethnic cleansing’.  The ICISS approach was significantly wider in that it also 
sought to apply the responsibility to other humanitarian situations such as: gross 
violations of human rights; response to civil war; circumstances of a failed State; and 
in response to natural disasters or environmental catastrophe.60 
 Remaining intact, however, is the structure of the responsibilities themselves. 
As the Outcome Document states, each individual State has the responsibility to 
protect its populations – this is the primary responsibility on the domestic State. The 
States of the world then agreed that the international community should encourage 
and help States to exercise this responsibility. More crucially, however, the Outcome 
goes on to state that the international community also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect 
populations – this forms the first part of the secondary responsibility on the 
international community. The second part of this secondary responsibility comes when 
peaceful measures prove to be inadequate and the national authorities are ‘manifest ly 
failing’ in their primary responsibility to protect. Here, the ‘manifest failure’ threshold 
seems to replace the ICISS’s threshold of ‘unwilling or unable’, and the question 
remains as to whether this has any effect on the ‘activation’ of this part of the 
international community’s secondary responsibility. As the Outcome states, action in 
response to such a manifest failure would be taken through the Security Council. 
                                                 
59 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, in UNGA Res 60/1, 15th September 2005, UN 
Doc A/RES/60/1, at [138]-[139]. 
60 See above. 
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3. Implementation of the World Summit Outcome 
3.1 The Secretary General’s Reports  
 
One of the most notable contributions to the development of the responsibility to 
protect is arguably that of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s annual reports on the 
matter.61 From 2009, the Secretary General released annual reports on different 
aspects of the responsibility to protect, often forming the basis for consideration in 
informal interactive dialogues of the General Assembly.62  
In his first report,63 the Secretary-General introduced a ‘Three-Pillar’ approach 
to implementing the responsibility to protect. Pillar I of this approach reflects the 
protection responsibilities of the State – i.e. the State’s primary responsibility to 
protect its own populations.64 Pillar II is the international community’s responsibility 
to give assistance to States in their primary responsibilities, and to build their 
capacities in being able to do so.65 Finally, Pillar III is the ‘timely and decisive 
response’ required by the international community to respond collectively when a 
State is manifestly failing to protect in accordance with Pillar I.66 This approach 
highlights the broad scope of the responsibility, and therefore the equality of each 
Pillar, demonstrating that the responsibility to protect is not just another way of 
framing or expanding a ‘right’ to intervention. The ICISS’s sequential method, on the 
other hand – utilising a framework of the responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild 
– seems to fit more with the principled and doctrinal approach that this thesis aims to 
take, and can be more illustrative in how the tools and methods of each Pillar overlap. 
Nevertheless, while the focus of this thesis, by its concentration on coercive and 
forceful methods of intervention, is more concerned with the responsibility to react – 
and thus by implication ‘Pillar III’ of the Secretary-General’s framework – 
comparisons shall still be made to the methods of prevention where necessary. This is 
not an attempt to make any of these Pillars of ‘unequal length’ – i.e. the thesis does 
                                                 
61 Subsequently continued by the most recent UN Secretary General, António Guterres. 
62 Although there are no detailed official UN Records for these meetings, see a collection of official 
statements compiled at: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Summaries of UN General 
Assembly Interactive Dialogues on R2P’, (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 
2017), available at: <http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/897> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
63 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect , (12th January 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/677. 
64 Ibid, para [11], and section II. 
65 Ibid, para [11], and section III. 
66 Ibid, para [11], and section IV. 
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not consider Pillar III any more important than Pillars I and II. As the Secretary 
General argues: 
 
If the three supporting pillars were of unequal length, the edifice of the responsibility 
to protect could become unstable, leaning precariously in one direction or another. 
Similarly, unless all three pillars are strong the edifice could implode and collapse. 
All three must be ready to be utilized at any point, as there is no set sequence for 
moving from one to another, especially in a strategy of early and flexible response.67 
 
Subsequent reports of the Secretary-General have often concentrated on the prevention 
of atrocity crimes, or international capacity building in this respect.68 When the 
Secretary-General did discuss methods that might be utilised to implement Pillar III 
more generally,69 these were largely discussed as methods that may be utilised 
‘through the Security Council’, as provided for in the World Summit Outcome itself. 70 
However, in his first report, the Secretary-General did acknowledge the ability of the 
General Assembly to take ‘collective measures’,71 but this was subsequently 
contradicted in his 2016 Report72 where he stated, “While only the Security Council 
has the authority to mandate coercive means, deadlock in that body should never be 
used as an excuse for general inaction.”73 
Finally, when taking stock of ten years of the responsibility to protect since the 
2005 World Summit, the Secretary-General made two important points.74 Firstly, 
                                                 
67 Ibid, para [12]. 
68 See, Report of the Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to  Protect, 
(14th July 2010) UN Doc A/64/864; Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: State 
Responsibility and Prevention , (9th July 2013) UN Doc A/67/929–S/2013/399; Report of the Secretary-
General, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance and the Responsibility to 
Protect, (11 July 2014) UN Doc A/68/947–S/2014/449; Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention , (10 August 2017) UN Doc A/71/1016–
S/2017/556. 
69 See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive 
Response, (25th July 2012) UN Doc A/66/874–S/2012/578; Report of the Secretary-General, The Role 
of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, (18th June 
2011) UN Doc A/65/877–S/2011/393. 
70 World Summit Outcome (n.59), at para [139]. 
71 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect  (n.63), at [56], also acknowledging its ability to 
recommend ‘sanctions’ at [57]-[58]. 
72 Report of the Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next Decade of the Responsibility 
to Protect, (22 July 2016) UN Doc A/70/999–S/2016/620. 
73 Ibid, para [46]. 
74 Report of the Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect, (13 July 2015) A/69/981–S/2015/500. 
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addressing common perceptions that Pillar III was solely concerned with the use of 
force, he stated: 
 
This perception needs to be countered. First, the choice is not between inaction and 
the use of force. Non-military tools have made a tangible difference in responding to 
the commission of atrocity crimes and preventing their escalation. Second, even in 
intractable situations characterized by continuing violence, international actors have 
attempted to fulfil their responsibility to protect through political, diplomatic and 
humanitarian means. These efforts may at times have fallen short of delivering a long-
term protective environment, but they have succeeded in saving lives. Finally, in some 
circumstances it may not be judged possible to employ force for protection purposes 
without potentially causing more harm than good.75 
 
Secondly, he made perhaps one of the most important acknowledgements of them all 
when he confirmed that “The Security Council has too often failed to live up to its 
global responsibility, allowing narrower strategic interests to impede consensus and 
preclude a robust collective response.”76 It is in this context that this thesis discusses 
the responsibility to protect beyond the UN Security Council, acknowledging that the 
framework does not only provide for the use of force, but also non-coercive measures.  
 
3.2 Implementation by the Security Council 
3.2.1 Recognition and Implementation 
 
According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, as of September 
2017, the responsibility to protect has been invoked by the UN Security Council in 64 
resolutions.77 In one of its first Resolutions citing the responsibility to protect, the 
Council “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 139 and 139 of the 2005 World 
                                                 
75 Ibid, at [38]. 
76 Ibid, at [44]; for consideration of instances where the Security Council has failed in its responsibility 
to protect, see Chapter III generally. 
77 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: A Background 
Briefing’, (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 2017), 
<http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p-background-briefing-2017.pdf >, (accessed 20/10/2017) at 
3. 
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Summit Outcome Document”.78 This was repeated in several other thematic 
Resolutions.79  
The Security Council often also reaffirms a State’s primary responsibility to 
protect when addressing situations. The most notable example of this is the Council’s 
response to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s threat of committing atrocity crimes in 
Libya in 2011. Gaddafi responded to a popular rise of protests against his leadership 
by cracking down on those who supported his removal from power, labelling these 
protestors ‘cockroaches’, and publically vowing to track them down ‘house by house’ 
and kill them.80 The Security Council responded to this crackdown by expressing 
“deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to 
hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of 
the Libyan government”.81  
The Council recalled Libya’s responsibility to protect its population,82 referred 
the situation to the International Criminal Court, and adopted a selection of coercive 
measures including travel bans, arms embargos, and asset freezes.83 Subsequently, 
when the violence continued, the Security Council authorised Member States, under 
Chapter VII, to take all necessary measures (excluding a foreign occupation force) to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack, as well as all 
necessary measures to enforce a no-fly zone.84 
This response to the threat of mass atrocities has been hailed by Zifcak85 as the 
first coercive intervention authorised by the Security Council and undertaken pursuant 
                                                 
78 UNSC Res 1674 (2006), 28 April 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1674(2006), para [4]. 
79 See, for example: UNSC Res 1894 (2009), 11 November 2009, UN Doc S/RES/1894(2009) at 
preamble para [7]; UNSC Res 2117 (2013), 5 December 2013, UN Doc S/RES/2117(2013), at preamble 
para [17]; UNSC Res 2150 (2012), 16 April 2014, UN Doc S/RES/2150(2014), at para [1]; UNSC Res 
2170 (2014), 15 August 2014, UN Doc S/RES/2170(2014), at preamble para [15]; UNSC Res 2171 
(2014), 21 August 2014, UN Doc S/RES/2171(2014), at preamble para [7] and operative para [16];  
UNSC Res 2185 (2014), 200 November 2014, UN Doc S/RES/2185(2014), at preamble para [23];  
UNSC Res 2220 (2015), 22 May 2015, UN Doc S/RES/2220(2015), at preamble para [11]; UNSC Res 
2250 (2015), 9 December 2015, UN Doc S/RES/2250(2015), at para [8]; UNSC Res 2286 (2016), 3 
May 2016, UN Doc S/RES/2286(2016), at preamble para [20]; UNSC Res 2349 (2017), 31 March 2017, 
UN Doc S/RES/2349(2017), at para [12]. 
80 See, Kareem Fahim and David D Kirkpatrick, ‘Qaddafi’s Grip on the Capital Tightens as Revolt 
Grows’, (The New York Times, 22 February 2011),  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/africa/23libya.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 
20/10/2017). 
81 UNSC Res 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, UN Doc S/RES/1970(2011), preamble para [2]. 
82 Ibid, preamble para [9] 
83 Ibid. 
84 UNSC Res 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, UN Doc S/RES/1973(2011), at [4] and [8]. 
85 S Zifcak, “The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria”, (2012)13 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 59. 
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to the responsibility to protect.86 Similarly, the Secretary-General believed this 
Resolution “affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s 
determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated 
upon them by their own government .”87 
Unfortunately, when NATO’s bombing campaign to protect civilians morphed 
into one of regime change, this raised the question as to whether NATO went beyond 
the Security Council’s authorisation.88 Russia and China in particular warned against 
any arbitrary interpretation of the Resolution and any actions going beyond those 
mandated by the Council – highlighting also the consequences of civilian deaths that 
arose from NATO’s targeting of certain facilities.89 On the other hand, Thakur 
reasoned that if the Resolution’s restrictions had been respected, then the civil war and 
the international intervention could well have been longer and more lives could have 
been lost in the long run.90  
While NATO’s operation might be seen as implementing the responsibility to 
react to atrocity crimes, it became apparent that the subsequent, and equally important, 
responsibility to rebuild was not sufficiently implemented. In 2013, the Secretary-
General noted that because of the lack of operational capability in Libya’s defence and 
police forces, revolutionary brigades continued to play a key role in providing 
security.91 Moreover, “a considerable number of revolutionary fighters are not willing 
to surrender their weapons to State authorities and be absorbed into official State 
security structures or resume civilian life.”92  Furthermore, a 2016 investigation by the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights found that widespread 
                                                 
86 Ibid, at 61. 
87 UNSG Press Release, ‘Secretary-General Says Security Council Action on Libya Affirms  
International Community’s Determination to Protect Civilians from Own Government’s Violence ’, (18 
March 2011) Press Release SG/SM/13454-SC/10201-AFR/2144, available at: 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13454.doc.htm> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
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this point, Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response , 
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Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, (28 January 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/19/68.  
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violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law were 
still rife.93 
These failures, and the arguments against NATO’s conduct in Libya, have also 
enhanced strong divides over the crisis in Syria, as we shall now address. 
 
3.2.2 The Problem of Security Council Inaction – The Situation in Syria 
 
The most fundamental flaw with relying solely on the Security Council for any robust 
response to a crisis is demonstrated by its inability to act in the Syrian crisis since 
2011.94 From simple protests, followed by a crackdown on civilians, to an all-out civil 
war, the situation in Syria has deteriorated from the beginning of the crisis in March 
2011.95 Human Rights Watch reported in 2017 that the death-toll from the Syrian crisis 
reached 470,000 people in February 2016.96 In that time, the Human Rights Council’s 
Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria (CoI) reported on allegations of war 
crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and the use of chemical weapons against 
civilians, committed by both the Syrian regime, and some rebel factions, including the 
terrorist group ISIL (or Da’esh) that utilised the crisis to build a stronghold in Syria.97 
As early as 2012, the Inquiry determined: 
 
                                                 
93 Human Rights Council, Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on Libya, (15 February 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/47, at [60]-[65]. 
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96 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017: Events of 2016 (HRW, 2017), available at: 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf> (accessed 
20/10/2017), at 571. 
97 See, generally, the Reports of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic: A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (23 November 2011); A/HRC/19/69 (22 February 2012);  
A/HRC/21/50 (15 August 2012); A/HRC/22/59 (5 February 2013); A/HRC/23/58 (4 June 2013);  
A/HRC/24/46 (11 September 2013); A/HRC/25/65 (12 February 2014); A/HRC/27/60 (13 August 
2014); A/HRC/28/69 (5 February 2015); A/HRC/30/48 (13 August 2015); A/HRC/31/68 (11 February 
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The Government has manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect the population; 
its forces have committed widespread, systematic and gross human rights violations, 
amounting to crimes against humanity, with the apparent knowledge and consent of 
the highest levels of the State. Anti-Government armed groups have also committed 
abuses, although not comparable in scale and organization with those carried out by 
the State.98 
 
In the most recent report by the Commission of Inquiry, it determined that “Violence 
throughout the Syrian Arab Republic continues to be waged in blatant violation of 
basic international humanitarian and human rights law principles, primarily affecting 
civilians countrywide.”99  
The Security Council’s response to this crisis has been abysmal – unable to 
take any robust action, or follow up on its demands with any sort of coercive measure, 
having been paralysed by the veto of Syria’s ally, Russia. For example, a draft 
resolution in October 2011 would have condemned the “grave and systematic human 
rights violations and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities”, and 
also threatened the use of sanctions.100 Russia and China vetoed this based upon, 
among other things, NATO’s over-interpretation of the authorisation granted in 
response to the Libyan crisis.101 In particular, Russia argued: 
 
The international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security 
Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future 
actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect…102 
 
The US representative responded strongly against Russia’s arguments: 
 
Let there be no doubt: this is not about military intervention; this is not about Libya. 
That is a cheap ruse by those who would rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than 
stand with the Syrian people.103 
 
                                                 
98 Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, (22 February 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/19/69, at [126]. 
99 Report of CoI on Syria (n.95), at 1. 
100 UNSC Draft Resolution of 4th October 2011, UN Doc S/2011/612, at [1] and [11]. 
101 UNSC Verbatim Record, 6627th Meeting (4th October 2011), UN Doc S/PV.6627, at 4-5. 
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This bickering between the Permanent Five continued on most occasions that the 
situation in Syria was discussed in the Security Council, as did the pattern of Russia 
(sometimes backed up by China) vetoing any robust Resolution that either cited 
Chapter VII, or made demands to the Syrian authorities. Up until the time of writing 
this thesis, Russia had vetoed nine draft resolutions.104 These included attempts to, for 
example: refer the situation to the International Criminal Court;105 condemn and 
demand an end to human rights violations;106 demand humanitarian access and a cease 
in aerial bombing in certain areas;107 to mandate humanitarian ceasefires;108 and to 
adopt sanctions following an investigation into the use of chemical weapons.109 These 
all took place in the face of evidence and allegations of crimes against humanity, and 
widespread human rights violations by the Syria regime and certain opposition 
forces.110 
The Council did unite on occasion, for example to establish a small UN 
Supervision Mission in Syria [UNSMIS] with an envoy led by former-Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to help implement a Six-Point Plan111 to achieve a ceasefire and 
the path to peace.112 Unfortunately, severe hostilities and the lack of adherence to the 
proposed ceasefire meant that UNSMIS had to withdraw from Syria before the 
peacemaking plan could be implemented.113 Equally, other Resolutions adopted by the 
Council114 were left either unheeded or unimplemented.115 
                                                 
104 See, UNSC Draft Resolutions, and corresponding UNSC Verbatim Records detailing the veto and 
debate therein: Draft Resolution S/2012/77, Meeting S/PV.6711 (4 February 2012); Draft Resolution 
S/2012/538, Meeting S/PV.6810 (19 July 2012); Draft Resolution S/2014/348, Meeting S/PV.7180 (22 
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with 300 unarmed military observers, and overseen by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping  
Operations (DPKO): DPKO, “UNSMIS: Mission Profile”, 
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113 See, UNSC Verbatim Record, 6826th Meeting (30th August 2012), UN Doc S/PV.6826. 
114 See, for example, the authorisation of passage of humanitarian aid in UNSC Res 2258 (2015), 22 
December 2015, UN Doc S/RES/2258(2015). 
115 See, for example, Report of the CoI on Syria (A/HRC/31/68), at para [148]. 
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Because of this lack of unanimity of the Permanent Members, the Security 
Council has largely been paralysed and incapable of implementing its responsibility 
to protect in the face of the manifest failures of Syria during its civil war and the 
unconscionable atrocities that have taken place there. Much of Russia and China’s 
blocking of the Council goes against the very will of the international community, as 
evidenced through Resolutions of the General Assembly, where the Assembly itself 
has deplored “the failure of the Security Council to agree on measures to ensure 
compliance of Syrian authorities with its decisions”.116 Noting the repeated 
encouragement by the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights for the Security Council to refer the situation to the International Crimina l 
Court, the Assembly finally established its own “International, Impartial and 
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the 
Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.”117 
Therefore, the situation in Syria highlights a very serious problem with the 
implementation of the responsibility to protect when interests of Permanent members 
of the Security Council may be involved. It is not necessary to understand why the 
Security Council is deadlocked – the point is it is failing in its responsibility to protect 
by failing to respond appropriately, and allowing a crisis to spiral out of control. In 
these situations, we must understand whether the responsibility to protect continues 
beyond this paralysis, or whether it ceases with the Council’s inaction. 
 
4. The Legal Status of the Responsibility to Protect 
4.1 A Norm of Customary International Law? 
 
The legal nature of the responsibility to protect is a question that is best addressed at 
this stage, albeit conceptually, to take note of the divergence of opinion that exists 
regarding the concept’s legal status. This thesis adopts the position that the 
responsibility itself is a moral undertaking and a useful conceptual framework for 
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implementing existing international obligations. It has the potential to develop into a 
rule of customary international law in future, but only if States implement the 
responsibility through practice, and accept it as a legal principle through the requisite 
opinio juris.118 
In his first report on the responsibility to protect, the UN Secretary General 
suggested that the responsibility to protect is based upon pre-existing principles of 
international law. 119 In particular, the Secretary General stressed: 
 
… the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome are firmly 
anchored in well-established principles of international law. Under conventional and 
customary international law, States have obligations to prevent and punish genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. … It should also be emphasized that actions 
under paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome are to be undertaken only in 
conformity with the provisions, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations. In that regard, the responsibility to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces, 
the legal obligations of Member States to refrain from the use of force except in 
conformity with the Charter.120 
 
The Secretary General also suggested in a later report that, “The responsibility to 
protect is a concept based on fundamental principles of international law as set out, in 
particular, in international humanitarian, refugee and human rights law.”121 While it is 
clear that the obligations to prevent and publish certain crimes, such as genocide, 
clearly exist in international law,122 it is not clear whether the Secretary General 
believes there exists a general obligation to protect, or to act in the face of such 
atrocities. In other words, it is not clear whether he also considers the elements of the 
responsibility to take timely and decisive action as originating from pre-existing 
international obligations. Such an assertion may have traction with regard to the 
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General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention , (10 August 2017) 
UN Doc A/71/1016–S/2017/556, at para [9]-[17]. 
122 See. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (adopted 9 
December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277; s ee also a detailed discussion in 
Chapter V, Section 2.3. 
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responsibility to maintain international peace and security, but this will be discussed 
in Chapter III. 
Of course, this is different from the responsibility to protect in and of itself 
having the status of a binding legal doctrine. In terms of the nature of the concept 
itself, there are some interesting characteristics that come to light. The Summit 
Outcome document was adopted as a General Assembly Resolution, a non-binding 
instrument forming a ‘recommendation’ according to Article 10 and Article 13 of the 
Charter.123 As mentioned above, prior to the World Summit Outcome, the 
responsibility to protect had been described by the High-Level Panel, and then-
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, as an ‘emerging norm’. Some States, Russia for 
example, disagreed with this position, arguing that it presupposes that there is wide 
support within the international community for such a norm.124 However, since then, 
the World Summit Outcome was adopted – a unanimous declaration from the 
international community on the existence of the responsibility to protect. The ICJ has 
recognised in the past that General Assembly Resolutions, although not legally-
binding in themselves, may provide evidence of an existing opinio juris.125 It could 
well be argued, therefore, that the World Summit Outcome provides evidence of an 
existing opinio, or acceptance, by the international community.126 However, the 
second criterion for customary international law, a general State practice, is still 
required for a law of custom to exist. In the case of the responsibility to protect, there 
is much disagreement as to whether such practice exists.127 
 Of course, the responsibility to protect was later endorsed by the Security 
Council in Resolution 1674 (2006).128 Here, the Council ‘reaffirmed’ the 
commitments to the responsibility to protect.129 This may be a significant step forward, 
even if it is simply a mere ‘reaffirmation’ of the concept, as Burke-White notes: 
                                                 
123 This is in contrast to the legally-binding nature of Security Council ‘decisions’ under Article 25. 
124 UNGA Verbatim Record, 87th Plenary Meeting, 59th Session (7th April 2005), UN Doc A/59/PV.87, 
at 6  (Russian Federation), 
125 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996) [1996] 
ICJ Reports 226 at [70]. 
126 See e.g. WW Burke-White, “Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect”, in Genser et al (eds), The 
Responsibility to Protect: the Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time , (Oxford University  
Press, 2011), at 22-24. 
127 Ibid. See also, Alex J Bellamy and Ruben Reike, “The Responsibility to Protect and International 
Law,” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 267; Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: 
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?”, (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 99. 
128 UNSC Res 1674 (2006), 28th April 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1674. 
129 Ibid, at [4]. 
58 
 
 
While the Council’s language in Resolution 1674 falls short of a formal decision 
requiring that member states implement the Responsibility to Protect, it is part of an 
ongoing process of legalization. At the very least, the Council’s reaffirmation of the 
Responsibility to Protect strengthens the claim that member states have legal duties 
to advance the political commitment contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
Outcome Document.130 
 
In light of the above, it seems that the responsibility to protect is a notion that could 
rightfully be described as an ‘emerging norm’, but perhaps not in the sense that it has 
legally binding force as a standalone concept. The use of that phrase is not to guarantee 
that it will become a norm of international law one day, but is an acknowledgment of 
the fact that it might, and it is certainly capable of becoming such should the 
international community demonstrate a general practice required for customary 
international law. This reiterates the importance of the concept, and the significance 
in the ICISS’s change in the terms of the debate. The responsibility to protect has, 
even at this stage, come closer to being more widely accepted than the so-called 
‘doctrine’ or ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention ever did. And so, even at this early 
stage of this thesis, it is worth noting the future possibilities that the responsibility to 
protect has in store for shifting a ‘lack of political will’ into a duty to do the right 
thing.131  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
It is clear that the responsibility to protect has great potential in providing a framework  
of tools and guidance that may be used to identify the actors responsible for protecting 
populations form atrocities, and the means they may utilise to implement their 
responsibilities. Unfortunately, inaction remains a very clear limitation of this 
framework. As has been the case with the crisis in Syria, where the Security Council 
is blocked by a permanent member – for whatever reason – and the crisis to be 
addressed is left to spiral into unconscionable suffering, the responsibility does not 
                                                 
130 Burke-White (n.126), at 30-31. (emphasis added) 
131 On this possibility, see A Peters, “The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect,” (2011) 8 
International Organizations Law Review 15. 
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provide any further guidance as to who is responsible for moving a solution to the 
crisis forward. 
The secondary responsibility of the international community to take peaceful 
measures is indeed a continuing part of the responsibility to protect, but this is only 
relevant insofar as those peaceful means remain adequate. Therefore, this thesis will 
now go on to address the situation where peaceful means are inadequate, and assess 
the consequences of Security Council inaction on the responsibilities of the wider 
international community. 
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III 
The Responsibility to Protect and the  
United Nations Security Council 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This Chapter addresses the responsibility to protect in situations where the UN 
Security Council fails to act. To do so, it establishes that there is a connected 
relationship between the responsibility to protect and the responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Where a humanitarian crisis 
involving the threat or commission of atrocity crimes constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security, the responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security is engaged. This Chapter assesses the legal nature of this responsibility, in 
order to determine whether the Security Council is under an obligation to act in 
response to such threats to the peace. By doing so, the Chapter sheds light on what a 
‘failure’ of the Security Council‘s responsibilities might look like, and therefore 
whether there are any legal consequences to inaction. 
With reference to Article 39 of the UN Charter, this Chapter argues that the 
responsibility of the Security Council includes a legal obligation on the Council, at the 
very least, not to ignore situations that fall within the maintenance of peace and 
security. Where the Security Council fails to act in these situations, the responsibility 
for the maintenance of peace reverts to the actors with residual responsibility in this 
regard. Therefore, in situations where the responsibility to protect and the 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security overlap, the 
responsibility to protect could merge with this legal responsibility and continue 
beyond the Security Council in the event of failure. This possibility is introduced as 
the ‘tertiary’ responsibility to protect. However, this would only be possible if other 
actors with residual responsibility have the legal competences and powers to 
implement such a responsibility, as will be determined in subsequent Chapters. 
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1. The Role of the United Nations Security Council 
  
We have seen in the previous Chapter that the responsibility to protect involves a 
primary responsibility on the State and a secondary responsibility on the internationa l 
community to assist with this or, where the State with primary responsibility is 
manifestly failing to protect, to respond to the threat or existence of mass atrocities 
directly. The key provision of the World Summit Outcome, paragraph 139, details this 
secondary responsibility, dealing with the Secretary-General’s Pillars II and III, 
relating respectively to international assistance and capacity building, and the need for 
a “timely and decisive response” when the requisite criteria are met that necessitates 
such action.1 Since the provision makes reference to Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the 
Charter, it is clear that the Security Council has an important – if not central – role in 
both Pillars II and III of the responsibility to protect. This is because the powers 
contained in those Chapters can be utilised in scenarios beyond just enforcement 
action under Chapter VII. For example, powers of the Security Council under Chapter 
VI in particular relate to the peaceful settlement of disputes – methods of diplomacy, 
mediation, and even adjudication that can form the basis of important strategies both 
before and after a crisis, i.e. in the prevention of a crisis, or rebuilding of a society 
after a crisis. 
 However, the focus of this Chapter will be the powers and responsibilities of 
the Council of a coercive or forcible nature, which are required by the responsibility 
to protect if peaceful means are inadequate. As has been explained earlier, such 
coercive or forcible methods, for the purpose of this thesis, involve methods and 
powers that would otherwise infringe upon the principles of non-intervention and the 
prohibition the use of force had they not been utilised without the proper legal 
authority. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect , UN Doc A/63/677, 
12th January 2009, at 8-9 and section IV. 
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2. The Responsibilities of the Security Council 
2.1 The Responsibility to Maintain International Peace and Security 
 
Generally, the Security Council has an overall responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. In fact, the Charter places primary responsibility 
upon the Security Council for this function, as provided by Article 24(1): 
 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
 
The legal nature of the responsibility to maintain international peace and security, to 
this author’s knowledge, has not been thoroughly determined. There has been no 
definitive study on the matter, nor any clear opinio juris from States on whether this 
specific responsibility is, quite simply, a legal obligation. Yet, Article 24(1) is a legal 
provision within the UN Charter, and even refers to the Security Council ‘carrying out 
its duties under this responsibility’. 
Hans Kelsen2 offered an interpretation of this specific provision,3 suggesting 
that it “means nothing else but that the Charter confers upon the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the achievement of the general purpose of the United 
Nations.”4 In defining this ‘responsibility’, Kelsen views the provision as conferring 
a legal competence on the Security Council, rather than imposing a legal duty.5 In this 
sense, he argues that the word ‘duties’ in the provision is incorrect, and should instead 
be interpreted to mean that the Charter grants ‘functions’ to the Council.6 Kelsen’s 
reasoning for this is based upon his general theory that there is no legal obligat ion 
without sanction,7 and he accordingly argues: “Since there is no provision for a 
                                                 
2 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New 
York, Fredrick A Praeger 1950). 
3 For his general discussion see ibid, at 279-295. 
4 Ibid, 283. 
5 Ibid, 285. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See ibid, at 154, where Kelsen argues that “…the function determined by the legal order is the content 
of a legal obligation only if the legal order provides a sanction for the non-performance of the function.” 
He further suggests that “it makes no legal difference whether the Charter stipulates that an organ ‘may’ 
or that an organ ‘shall’ perform a definite function.” This is incompatible with the intentions of the 
drafters of the Charter, as discussed below. 
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sanction which might be executed against the Security Council—or any other organ 
of the United Nations—the Charter does not impose ‘duties’ upon these organs but 
confers functions or powers upon them.”8 Kelsen further reasons that the heading 
under which Article 24 is presented is titled ‘Functions and Powers’, not ‘Duties’.9 
Unfortunately, Kelsen’s arguments are not convincing. ‘Duty’ has a very 
different meaning to ‘function’, and there is no logical way to accept that is what the 
drafters of the Charter could have meant by this – it is too much of a stretch beyond 
the ordinary meaning of the phrase. Furthermore, there is no reason why implementing 
a legal duty to maintain international peace and security cannot be a ‘function’ of the 
Security Council.  
Other authors read Article 24(1) as granting primary ‘authority’ for the 
maintenance of peace and security. For example, Sarooshi10 argues that Member 
States have ‘conferred’ (or, in his view, ‘delegated’ via the Charter) powers onto the 
Security Council through Article 24(1).11 In doing so, Sarooshi also suggests that this 
is a delegation of a discretionary power, because, he argues, “The ability of States to 
act in the area of maintaining international peace and security is a right and not an 
obligation. Thus, the Security Council has clearly inherited a discretionary right to act 
to restore international peace and security, but not an obligation to act.”12 Abass13 
similarly interprets Article 24(1) as transferring ‘power’ to the Security Council.14 
However, Abass reads this as being conditional upon the Council abiding by 
obligations also imposed by the provision itself.15 
Delbrück16 considers the phrase ‘primary responsibility’ to be a problematic 
one,17 but does not investigate in depth the possibility of this imposing a legal 
obligation on the Security Council. Instead, the references in the provision to ‘duties’ 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. See also, Ibid, at 288-289. 
10 D Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the 
UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). 
11 Ibid, at 26-31. 
12 Ibid, his footnote 113. 
13 A Abass, Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond Chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter (Hart, 2004). 
14 Ibid, at 131-139; another author who interprets ‘primary responsibility’ to reference a division of 
competences includes:  N White, ‘The Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity’, (2000) 5(1) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 27, at 29. 
15 Ibid, at 136, and see also a further discussion of this below. 
16 K J Delbrück, “Article 24”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Oxford, 2nd ed, 2002). 
17 Ibid, at 445. 
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under the responsibility are dismissed simply as an ‘unfortunate choice’ of words.18 
Delbrück cites Kelsen in support of the argument that the Charter is ‘an order of 
competences’, not duties.19 Finally, Delbrück argues that the final phrase in Article 
24(1), according to which the Member States ‘agree that in carrying out its duties 
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’, is legally erroneous 
and superfluous.20 
Again, this line of analysis is not convincing. It is quite something to suggest 
that a phrase in a legally-binding Charter is ‘erroneous and superfluous’. If States have 
agreed to a certain provision, one should interpret that accordingly and not dismiss it 
out of hand, no matter how unique or unorthodox it may be. Equally, to suggest the 
use of the word ‘duties’ is incorrect without any indication from the preparatory works 
that the resulting interpretation was not intended dismisses the very basic principles 
of treaty interpretation. 
One aspect of this provision worth noting is the phrasing of the French version 
of the text. Here, the last phrase of Article 24(1) which reads in the English version 
“and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council 
acts on their behalf”, reads in the French version: 
 
et reconnaissent qu'en s'acquittant des devoirs que lui impose cette responsabilité le 
Conseil de sécurité agit en leur nom. 
 
While the English text refers to “duties under this responsibility”, the French version 
translates to “duties imposed by this responsibility”.21 This provides some very 
convincing evidence that the wording of the provision was intended to have a 
mandatory character, and the responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security imposed duties upon the Security Council.  
To further investigate this possibility, and identify what ‘duties’ this 
responsibility might involve, this Chapter will investigate the obligations of the 
Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter. But first, it is necessary to determine 
how and when the responsibility to protect could engage this responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
                                                 
18 Ibid, at 448, footnote 27. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, at 449. 
21 Author’s own translation, emphasis added. 
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2.2 Situations of Overlap with the Responsibility to Protect 
 
Humanitarian crises, falling within the scope of the responsibility to protect, may also 
reach a threshold whereby they become a concern for the maintenance of internationa l 
peace and security. The ‘triggers’ for the latter responsibility may be considered those 
that determine whether the Security Council has jurisdiction to utilise its coercive 
powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, those of ‘threats to the peace’, ‘breaches of 
the peace’, or ‘acts of aggression’ as outlined in Article 39. Therefore, if one can 
determine that humanitarian crises leading to or involving the commission of atrocity 
crimes reach at least the threshold of a ‘threat to the peace’, then the responsibility to 
protect overlaps with the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council also became 
concerned with Iraq’s repression of its own civilian population. In Resolution 688 
(1991),22 the Council was “gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian 
population”,23  condemning this repression and determining that “the consequences of 
which threaten international peace and security in the region.”24 The Council also 
demanded that Iraq end its repression, and hoped that dialogue could be opened to 
ensure that these citizens’ human and political rights were respected, “as a contribution 
to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region”.25 
Here, the Council clearly recognised that the repression of civilians and human 
rights could contribute to a threat to international peace and security. However, when 
the situation in the former Yugoslavia continued to deteriorate, the Council adopted 
Resolution 808 (1993)26 and expressed alarm at reports of ‘widespread violations of 
international humanitarian law’ and the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’.27 It accordingly 
determined that this situation constituted a threat to international peace any security. 28 
Similarly, when the situation in Rwanda spiralled towards genocide, the 
Security Council was initially “disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering”, and 
                                                 
22 UNSC Res 688 (1991), 5 April 1991, UN Doc S/RES/688(1991).  
23 Ibid, preamble para [2]. 
24 Ibid, operative para [1]. 
25 Ibid, operative para [2]. 
26 UNSC Res 808 (1993), 22 February 1993, UN Doc S/RES/808(1993). 
27 Ibid, preamble para [6]. 
28 Ibid, preamble para [7]; see also UNSC Res 827 (1993), 25 May 1993, UN Doc S/RES/827(1993), 
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), preamble pa ras [3]-
[4]. 
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was “concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to 
peace and security in the region”.29 In June 1994, the Council determined that “the 
magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region”.30 When establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, the Council reiterated its concern at the reports of genocide “and other 
systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have 
been committed in Rwanda”,31 and determined that this situation continued to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security.32 
Furthermore, in 1996, the Security Council made clear its concern “at the 
continued deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation in Burundi that has 
been characterized in the last years by killings, massacres, torture and arbitrary 
detention, and at the threat that this poses to the peace and security of the Great Lakes 
Region as a whole”.33  
In its more general and thematic resolutions, the Security Council has also 
determined general types of crises that can constitute threats to international peace and 
security. For example, in Resolution 1314 (2000),34 concerning children and armed 
conflict, the Council noted “that the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or 
other protected persons, including children, and the committing of systematic, flagrant 
and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, 
including that relating to children, in situations of armed conflict may constitute a 
threat to international peace and security”.35 The Security Council repeated this 
determination in the context of its general debate on civilians in armed conflict.36 
Subsequent to the adoption of the responsibility to protect at the 2005 World 
Summit, when the Security Council responded to the threat of atrocities in Libya in 
2011, initially “Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, 
including the repression of peaceful demonstrators,”37 and considering that the attacks 
                                                 
29 UNSC Res 918 (1994), 17 May 1994, UN Doc S/RES/918(1994), preamble para [18]. 
30 UNSC Res 929 (1994), 22 June 1994, UN Doc S/RES/292(1994), preamble para [10]. 
31 UNSC Res 955 (1995), 8 November 1994, UN Doc S/RES/955(1994), preamble para [4]. 
32 Ibid, preamble para [5]. 
33 UNSC Res 1072 (1996), 30 August 1996, UN Doc S/RES/1072(1996), preamble para [3]. 
34 UNSC Res 1314 (2000), 11 August 2000, UN Doc S/RES/1314(2000). 
35 Ibid, para [9]. 
36 UNSC Res 1296 (2000), 19 April 2000, UN Doc S/RES/1296(2000), para [5]; See also UNSC Res 
1894 (2009), 11 November 2009, S/RES/1894(2009), at para [3]. 
37 UNSC Res 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, UN Doc S/RES/1970(2011), preamble para [2]. 
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against civilians could amount to crimes against humanity.38 In Resolution 1973 
(2011),39 the Council reiterated the responsibility of Libya to protect its population, 40 
and determined this situation in Libya to “continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security”.41 Concerning crimes against humanity, although not 
explicitly referenced as a specific threat to international peace and security, there was 
a general consensus among States to regard these atrocities as such during a Security 
Council debate on the issue of peace and justice in October 2013.42 
More recently, in response to the situation in Syria, the Security Council has 
determined that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.43 In 2014, the Council, while reaffirming the 
responsibility of Syria to protect its populations,44 determined that the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in Syria constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.45 Regarding the acts of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL, also known as Da’esh), the Security Council also made an unprecedented 
determination in this regard in Resolution 2249 (2015).46 
These determinations by the Security Council clearly reveal that situat ions 
involving atrocities relevant to the responsibility to protect, including genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, constitute threats to 
international peace and security. Moreover, it is also clear that gross and systematic 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law may, in certain 
circumstances, constitute such a threat. Therefore, in these situations, the 
responsibility to protect also engages the responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid, preamble para [6]. Not that the Security Council took action under Chapter VII in this resolution 
but did not determine any new threat to the peace, or recall any such subsequent determination, within  
the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. 
39 UNSC Res 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, UN Doc S/RES/1973(2011). 
40 Ibid, preamble para [4]. 
41 Ibid, preamble para [21]. 
42 See generally the views of States in UNSC Verbatim Record, 6849th Meeting (17 October 2012), UN 
Doc S/PV.6849, and see also UN Doc S/PV.6849 (Resumption 1). 
43 UNSC Res 2118 (2013), 27 September 2013, UN Doc S/RES/2118(2013), preamble para [3], [13], 
and operative para [1]. 
44 UNSC Res 2165 (2014), 14 July 2014, UN Doc S/RES/2165(2014), preamble para [12]. 
45 Ibid, preamble para [18]. See also UNSC Res 2191 (2014), 17 December 2014, UN Doc 
S/RES/2191(2014), preamble para [19]. 
46 UNSC Res 2249 (2015), 20 November 2015, UN Doc S/RES/2249(2015), preamble para [5]. 
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3. Security Council Obligations under the Charter 
 
To determine both the legal nature of the responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and the legal consequences of a failure therein, it is 
necessary to investigate whether the Charter imposes any specific obligations on the 
Security Council, so as to further indicate the nature of the responsibility conferred.  
By identifying such obligations, and how the Council may fail in them, we can also 
determine the legal consequences of inaction. 
As will be discussed below, many authors, and indeed States themselves, have 
opined that the Security Council is not under any obligation to act in a particular way, 
but has a wide discretion to use its powers as it sees fit. However, before the Council 
can utilise its coercive and enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, it 
must make a determination under Article 39. From the outset, the importance of 
Article 39 should not be underestimated. Article 39 is significant not only as a gateway 
to Chapter VII enforcement measures, but also as a catalyst for the implementation of 
the primary responsibility of the Security Council under Article 24. 
Specifically, Article 39 provides that: 
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
 
There are two parts to this provision: (i) determining the nature of a situation, and (ii) 
making recommendations or decisions. Firstly, concentrating on the opening words of 
the provision, the Security Council ‘shall determine’ the existence of a threat to peace 
etc. This formulation uses mandatory language, and thus imposes an obligation upon 
the Security Council to determine such a threat. However, does this mean that Security 
Council must make a determination where a threat to the peace actually exists? For 
example, such an interpretation would oblige the Security Council, where a threat to 
the peace exists, to make a determination that the threat is a threat and then, as per the 
second part of the provision, “make recommendations, or decide…” to act in a certain 
way.  
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In light of these possibilities, we must determine which interpretation is correct 
by looking to the practice of the Council and academic commentary on this matter. By 
doing this, we may also understand the nature of the Security Council’s general 
responsibilities for peace and security and its responsibility to protect, and by 
extension, the legal consequences of a failure by the Security Council of its 
responsibilities. 
 
3.1 Article 39: Discretion to Determine? 
 
On many occasions, States have opined that a determination under Article 39 must be 
made prior to the Council using its enforcement powers under Chapter VII, and this 
is now a seemingly settled interpretation.47 During the discussion of the Spanish 
Question in 1946, the Security Council formed a sub-committee to determine the scope 
of Article 39 and whether the situation in Spain at the time could fall under that 
provision.48 In its report,49 the sub-committee determined: 
 
Although the activities of the Franco regime do not, at present, constitute an existing 
threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter and therefore the 
Security Council has no jurisdiction to direct or to authorize enforcement measures 
under Article 40 or 42, nevertheless such activities do constitute a situation which is 
a potential menace to international peace and security and which therefore is a 
                                                 
47 See, for example: UN Office of Legal Affairs, Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, 
(1945-1954) Vol II, at 366-376 (hereinafter, Repertory); Repertory, Supplement No 3 (1959 - 1966), 
Vol II, at 228-231; UNSC Verbatim Record, 35th Meeting (18th April 1946), UN Doc S/PV.35 (Official 
Record), at 184-185 (United Kingdom); UNSC Verbatim Record, 1129th Meeting (10th June 1964), UN 
Doc S/PV.1129(OR) at para [21] (Indonesia); UNSC Verbatim Record, 1131st Meeting (15th June 
1964), UN Doc. S/PV.1131(OR), at para [89] (United Kingdom); UNSC Verbatim Record, 1264t h  
Meeting (19th November 1965), UN Doc S/PV.1264(OR), at para [13] (Jordan); UNSC Verbat im 
Record, 1340th Meeting (16th December 1966), UN Doc S/PV.1340(OR) at para [32]-[33] (Uruguay), 
and para [11] (Jordan) [calling for such a determination to be explicit, not merely by reference to Art icle  
39 alone]; UNSC Verbatim Record, 3453rd Meeting (8th November 1994), UN Doc S/PV.3453 at p.3 
(France); UNSC Verbatim Record, 5474th Meeting (22nd June 2006), UN Doc S/PV.5474 at p.17 
(Russia), and at p.30 (Mexico); UNSC Verbatim Record, 5500th Meeting (31st July 2006), UN Doc 
S/PV.5500 at p.3 (United States). 
48 UN Department of Political Affairs, UNSC Repertoire 1946-1951, Chapter XI, Consideration of 
Articles 39-40, (UN: New York, 1954) at 423-427, available at: 
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/46-51_11.pdf#page=5> (accessed 20/10/2017) emphasis 
added. 
49 UNSC (Sub-Committee), “Report of the Subcommittee on the Spanish Question appointed by the 
Security Council on 29 April 1946” (1 June 1946) UN Doc S/75. 
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situation ‘likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’ 
within the meaning of Article 34 of the Charter.50 
 
Some have argued that in the actual making of a determination, the Security Council 
has discretion in deciding what constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression.51 This is quite unlike the position of the sub-committee, where it 
clearly stated that the Security Council could not make a determination where a threat 
to the peace did not exist.52 Our first question to address, therefore, is whether there 
are any limits on the discretion of the Council to make determinations under Article 
39. 
During the debates surrounding the Spanish Question, Poland had argued that 
the Security Council “is free within the purposes and principles of the Organisation to 
determine whether a situation” falls within Article 39.53 Discussing the sub-
committee’s report, France agreed that the Charter allowed for action in response to 
potential threats, but noted that the real question was on the Council’s reliance on 
either Article 39 or Article 34, “according to whether the threat is more or less remote, 
or more or less imminent.”54 Australia even went as far as to say that there was no 
disagreement with Poland’s legal interpretation of Article 39 – rather, the 
disagreement was based upon one of evidence and the facts of that particular case.55  
 Therefore, even at the outset of the Council’s practice, there seemed to be 
support for a wide discretion to determine a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39. Yet 
this discretion, while it may exist, cannot be unlimited. Firstly, there is the fundamenta l 
clause in Article 24(2) that requires the Council to act in accordance with the Purposes 
                                                 
50 Ibid, at p.14 para [30], see also para [18], where it states: “Before direct action under Article 41 or 42 
can be ordered, the Charter requires that the Security Council mast determine under Article 39 the 
existence of a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.” 
51 See, e.g. JA Frowein and N Krisch, “Article 39”, in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford, 2nd ed, Vol I, Oxford University Press 2002), at 719-720 and 726-
727; see also GH Oosthuizen, “Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is 
Unbound by Law”, (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549-563, who makes the suggestion 
that such a discretion could be absolute. 
52 Supra, (n.50). 
53 Sub-Committee Report (n.49), Reservations, p.19-20. 
54 UNSC Verbatim Record, 44th Meeting (6th June 1946), UN Doc S/PV.44 (OR), at 322. 
55 UNSC Verbatim Record, 47th Meeting (18th June 1946), UN Doc S/PV.47 (OR), at 375-376. 
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and Principles of the Charter.56 Secondly, as highlighted by De Wet,57 the use of vague 
terms such as ‘threat to the peace’ in Article 39 cannot remove them from the ambit 
of legal interpretation, which in and of itself implies that the discretion cannot be 
unlimited.58 De Wet suggests that if an unbound discretion had been intended, a 
distinction between the three situations in Article 39 would have been obsolete. 59 
Further, Martenczuk60 suggests that an unlimited discretion under Article 39 would 
put at risk the “carefully crafted balance of competences in the Charter.”61 In this 
sense, Martenczuk argues that the powers in Chapter VI and VII of the Charter are 
distinct and would become obsolete if the Council were free at any given time to 
declare the provisions of Chapter VII applicable.62 
 More extremely, another argument suggests that if the Council’s discretion 
was limitless in determining the existence of a situation under Article 39, then its 
involvement in the affairs of Member States could be unfettered.63 In this regard, 
Martenczuk states: 
 
Clearly, neither had the Member States intended the Council to constitute a sort of 
world government, nor would the Council be equipped to fulfil such a role. The view 
that the Council enjoys an unlimited discretion under Article 39 could lead to patently 
dysfunctional results.64 
 
Although such a situation is unlikely to transpire, both politically and realistically, and 
especially in light of the veto power and voting procedures of the Council, this 
argument makes a very important point – the Council’s powers are so extreme by their 
own nature that the discretion to use them must have come with legal limitations. If 
the Council could be said to enjoy an unlimited discretion in making a determination 
under Article 39, then it seems contradictory for the Council to be under an obligat ion 
                                                 
56 See, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY] Prosecutor v. Tadić 
(Jurisdiction) Case IT-94-1AR72, (2nd October 1995) at [29]; and see D Schweigman, Authority of the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International 
Court of Justice (Kluwer Law International, 2001), at 186-189. 
57 Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council  (Oxford, Hart 2004). 
58 Ibid, at 136. 
59 De Wet (n.57), at 137. 
60 B Martenczuk, “The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons 
from Lockerbie?”, (1999) 10(3) European Journal of International Law  517-547. 
61 Martenczuk (n.60), at 542. 
62 Martenczuk (n.60), at 542. 
63 De Wet (n.57), at 137, and 176-177; Martenczuk (n.60), at 542. 
64 Martenczuk (n.60), at 542. 
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to make such a determination prior to using its powers in the first place. Frowein and 
Krisch do concede this point, suggesting that there must be some meaning to the terms 
‘threat to the peace’, ‘breach of the peace’ and ‘act of aggression’.65  
This author submits that the Council’s discretionary threshold must, at a 
minimum, stay within the object and purpose of the UN Charter, and the ordinary 
meanings of the terms in Article 39, as required by the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.66 As Tzanakopoulos argues: 
 
[T]he Council cannot term anything and everything a ‘threat to the peace’, subject 
only to reaching political consensus, otherwise the prerequisite of such a 
determination in Article 39 would be devoid of any meaning. As such, the Council 
has discretionary power to select any of the possible alternative meanings of the term 
‘threat to peace’, as long as these remain, but do not exceed, the interpretative radius 
of the provision.67 
 
Thus, it could be said that the Security Council has an objective minimum threshold to 
adhere to when exercising its discretion, based upon the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the 
terms in accordance with Article 31(1) of the VCLT. As with the practice cited above 
concerning humanitarian crises, over time this objective minimum threshold may 
change to accommodate the wider range of threats that the world has witnessed 
emerging over the years. What was not a foreseeable threat in 1945 may now be a 
more apparent threat in today’s world. This change over time is also in line with the 
VCLT, since Article 31(3)(b) calls for subsequent practice to be taken into account in 
the interpretation of a treaty where that practice establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation. 
But then we have the question as to what happens when a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression does exist and can be objectively determined 
to be so. Considering the ‘ordinary meaning’ of those terms, and the ‘object and 
purpose’ of the UN Charter, must the Security Council determine a situation to be one 
that falls under Article 39 in such circumstances?  
                                                 
65 Frowein and Krisch (n.51), at 719-720. 
66 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23rd May 1969, entered into force 27th January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331 [VCLT], Article 31(1); for a similar argument, see A Tzanakopoulos, 
Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions (Oxford, Oxford  
University Press, 2011) 61-62; see also Schweigman (n.56), at 266. 
67 Tzanakopoulos (n.66), at 61-62.  
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3.2 Article 39: An Obligation to Determine? 
 
Like there is a minimum objective threshold preventing the Council from going below 
the meaning of a threat to the peace, this must also indicate a threshold at which the 
Council cannot ignore the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms in Article 39. Where a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression exists, it is argued here 
that the Council must determine the existence of that situation to be so. Regarding the 
responsibility to protect, this could indicate an obligation to determine whether the 
threat or commission of atrocity crimes constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’. 
During the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945,68 some States argued that action 
by the Council under Article 39 should be automatic. Upon the appointment of 
subcommittee to clarify the meaning of ‘determine’ in Article 39, Uruguay urged that 
it should be made clear that the Council would, automatically, “determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace” and not do so solely at the urging of an interested 
party.69 In other words, Uruguay was calling for a determination to be made by the 
Council where a situation actually existed and was objectively identifiable. 
In a similar vein, several States called for a definition of aggression, and even 
a list of actions that would entail Council action automatically.70 However, these 
recommendations were abandoned, mainly because the opposing States said that it 
would be impossible to list all situations that would constitute aggression, and also 
favouring a Security Council discretion to decide when an act of aggression had been 
performed.71 States argued that any attempt to make Council action automatic would 
be dangerous, for it might force premature applications of enforcement measures. 72 
Ultimately, the drafting committee decided: 
 
                                                 
68 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation  (Multi-volume, New 
York, United Nations 1945) – Cited as UNCIO. 
69 Report of Eighth Meeting of Committee III/3, (18th May 1945), Doc.391 III/3/19, 12 UNCIO 334, at 
335. The Subcommittee eventually produced a draft document in Draft by Subcommittee of Proposals 
for Amending Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Chapter VIII, B, (21st May 1945) Doc 478, III/3/B/1, 12 UNCIO 
657, but a Chinese amendment was later favoured instead (see below).  
70 Report of Ninth Meeting of Committee III/3 , (19th May 1945) Doc 442, III/3/20, 12 UNCIO 341. A 
Bolivian proposal to insert a definition of aggression was defeated at the Tenth Meeting of Committee 
III/3, (23rd May 1945) Doc 502, III/3/22, 12 UNCIO 348-349. 
71 12 UNCIO 341, at 342. 
72 12 UNCIO 341, at 342. 
74 
 
… to adhere to the text drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks and leave to the Council the 
entire discretion as to what constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or 
an act of aggression.73 
 
Of course, the existence of this discretion is undeniable. However, it must be asked 
whether the Council’s discretion is affected by its previous practice, or indeed the 
practice of other bodies who make any determinations relevant to acts under Article 
39.  
This question is particularly interesting in light of the Definition of 
Aggression,74 which has been recognised by the International Court of Justice as 
forming part of customary international law.75 There is no clear rule of precedent in 
the Security Council, and so it cannot be said that the Council is bound by its own 
previous practice directly. Yet it is arguable that the Council must acknowledge the 
current state of customary international law relevant to the interpretation of the terms 
in Article 39, and such developments in the law may of course originate from the 
Council’s own determinations. In this sense, the Council’s discretion to decide does 
not necessarily imply that it has discretion to ignore such acts all together. Indeed, the 
preparatory debates revealed a specific desire for the Council to be able to react 
swiftly, without delay, to any relevant situation, with the fundamental object and 
purpose of maintaining and restoring international peace and security.76  
 Nevertheless, Frowein and Krisch suggest that the Security Council “is under 
no obligation to make a determination under Art. 39, even if it considers that a threat 
to or breach of the peace exists – Art. 39 empowers, but does not oblige the [Security 
Council] to act.”77 This argument results in the contradictory result that the Council is 
bound to make such a determination where it wishes to act, but is not bound to make 
a determination where it does not wish to act and a situation such as a threat to the 
                                                 
73 Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, (10th June 1945) Doc 881, III/3/46, 12 UNCIO 502, at 505 (emphasis 
added). 
74 UNGA Res 2214(XXIX), Definition of Aggression, 14th December 1974, UN Doc 
A/RES/3314(XXIX). 
75 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA)  
(Merits), Judgment of 27th June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14 [Nicaragua Case], at para [195]. 
76 See, for example, Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, 12 UNCIO 502, supra (n.73) at 503, where it was 
said that “the application of enforcement measures, in order to be effective, must above all be swift,” 
when rejecting the possibility of a procedure requiring the General Assembly to ratify Security Council 
action. 
77 Frowein and Krisch (n.51), at 719. 
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peace actually does exist.78 In this regard, Gill79 argues “the wide margin of discretion 
the Council enjoys in carrying out its responsibilities and the practice of the Security 
Council over nearly half a century make it clear that the Council is not under any legal 
obligation to decide whether a given situation falls within the terms of Article 39”.80 
This is less convincing when we consider why Article 39 uses mandatory 
language such as ‘shall’ when referring to both the act of ‘determining’ and the 
decision to make recommendations or take measures under Articles 41 and 42. As 
Martenczuk highlights, a textual analysis of Article 39 has only been adopted by a 
small number of commentators.81 During the drafting of the Charter, a Chinese 
amendment was adopted that reflects the substance of what became Article 39 (save 
for some structural and grammatical differences).82 The language of the relevant 
provision stated that “The Security Council should determine … and should make 
recommendations or decide upon …”83 The word ‘may’ was used in the second 
paragraph of the amendment, whch eventually became Article 40, and the use of this 
word was explained as leaving “to the discretion of the Council whether to take 
provisional measures or whether to proceed immediately to final action.”84 It is vital 
to note the emphasis that this explanation puts on the use of the word ‘may’ as 
indicating discretionary language. It is curious that the amendment therefore did not 
use the same word ‘may’, but rather ‘should’, in the context of the Council 
determinations. 
 The Coordination Committee, tasked with ensuring there was a consistent use 
of language throughout the Charter during the drafting process, substituted the words 
‘should’ in the Chinese amendment, with the word ‘shall’ – reflecting the fina l 
outcome of the provision as Article 39. This decision to use ‘shall’ is not expressly 
addressed in relation to Article 39 directly,85 but the Coordination Committee 
                                                 
78 Frowein and Krisch still support the position that the Council must still have determined the existenc e 
of a threat to the peace etc. before it can act under Chapter VII: Ibid at 726-727. 
79 TD Gill, “Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercis e 
its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter”, (1995) 26 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 33 
80 Ibid, at 40 (emphasis in original). 
81 Martenczuk (n.60), at 540 (footnote 123), and 543-544. 
82 Report of Fourteenth Meeting of Committee III/3 , (26th May 1945) Doc 628, III/3/33, 12 UNCIO 379, 
quoting Doc WD 36. 
83 Ibid (emphasis added). 
84 12 UNCIO 379, at 380. 
85 See Report of Thirteenth Meeting of Coordination Committee, (10th June 1945), WD 256, CO/107, 
17 UNCIO 69-71, on the Coordination Committee discussing what became Article 39. 
76 
 
discussed elsewhere the significance of the word ‘shall’ in the Charter. In particula r, 
discussions of the committee indicated numerous times that ‘shall’ was to indic ate 
mandatory language or an obligation, whereas ‘may’ indicated discretion.86 More 
importantly, the Coordination Committee expressly discussed the reasons behind 
changing ‘should’ to ‘shall’ in the context of other Charter provisions when it was 
said: 
 
[T]he introductory phrase of the article established an obligation and that therefore 
the Technical Committee's word ‘should’ would be better translated by ‘shall’ than 
by ‘may’.87 
 
Noting this, the fact that the final wording of Article 39 uses mandatory language such 
as ‘shall’ clearly indicates the presence of an obligation. Interestingly, the requirement 
that the Council “shall determine the existence of” a threat to the peace makes no 
qualification that this should be done as a prerequisite to using its Chapter VII powers 
– Article 39 simply does not state that requirement explicitly.  
This ‘gateway’ interpretation of Article 39 seems more like a logical by-
product of two obligations that come under the same Article. The obligation ‘to 
determine’ is joined by a mandatory ‘and’ to the obligation to ‘make 
recommendations, or decide’ upon enforcement measures. The key here is that the two 
obligations on the Council are separate, but nevertheless dependent on the other being 
carried out – i.e., if a determination is made, then recommendations or decisions must 
also be made. Conversely, if a recommendation or decision within the meaning of 
Article 39 is to be made, then the Council must also determine the existence of a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. This much is clear from the use 
of the words “shall determine … and shall make recommendations, or decide…”.88 
With this interpretation, the ‘gateway’ prerequisite of a determination under Article 
39 fits, and makes much more sense. But this also implies that there also exists two 
independent, but exclusively linked, obligations on the Security Council.  
                                                 
86 See, for example, discussions in: Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of Coordination Committee , (13th 
June 1945), WD 289, CO/117, 17 UNCIO 89, at 92; Report of Twenty-Sixth Meeting of Coordination 
Committee, (25th July 1945), WD 426, CO/190, 17 UNCIO 180, at 182; see also, Report of Twenty-
Ninth Meeting of Coordination Committee, (21st August 1945), WD 429, CO/193, 17 UNCIO 212. 
87 Report of Fourteenth Meeting of Coordination Committee, (13th June 1945), WD 288, CO/116, 17 
UNCIO 77, at 78. 
88 Emphasis added. 
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 The existence of obligations in Article 39 has also been noted by Hans Corell, 
former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel of the United 
Nations, who during an address in 2001 interpreted Article 39 in the following light, 
stating: 
 
Of particular importance is Article 39 of the Charter. Under this provision, the 
Security Council shall decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with the 
Charter (Articles 41 and 42), to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
This means that the Council has a right out obligation to act. The question is whether 
the Council can find a common position when the need arises.89 
 
Specifically, on the subject of humanitarian crises and mass atrocities, Corell has also 
argued: 
 
In such situations, under Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council has an 
obligation to determine what measures should be taken in accordance with the Charter 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. If the members of the Council 
bow in unity to this obligation, they will also in unity realize that it is more effective 
to take measures at an early stage in order to prevent that the situation deteriorates and 
necessitates intervention by coercive means.90 
 
Of course, Corell was speaking in a personal capacity in both instances. Nevertheless, 
the arguments are illuminating further still when Corell acknowledges the existence 
of the Security Council’s discretion in its determinations alongside the obligatory 
nature of Article 39.91  
                                                 
89 Hans Corell, “To intervene or not: The dilemma that will not go away” , (Conference on the Future 
of Humanitarian Intervention, Duke’s University, Durham, North Carolina, 19th April 2001), at 4, 
available at: <http://www.un.org/law/counsel/english/duke01.pdf>, (accessed 20/10/2017), emphasis 
in original. See also, Hans Corell, “Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect”, (International Network 
of Universities, Workshop on Humanitarian Intervention Malmö University, Malmö, 4th March 2010), 
available at: <http://www.havc.se/res/SelectedMaterial/20100304responsibilitytoprotect.pdf >, 
(accessed 20/10/2017). 
90 Hans Corell, “From Territorial Sovereignty to Human Security”, (Canadian Council of International 
Law, 
1999 Annual Conference, Ottawa, 29th October 1999), available at: 
<http://www.un.org/law/counsel/ottawa.htm>, accessed (accessed 20/10/2017). 
91 Corell (2001) (n.89), at 10. 
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In theory, if the word ‘shall’ imposes an obligation to ‘act’ in the second part 
of Article 39,92 it must also impose an obligation to ‘determine’ in the first part of the 
provision. To understand this consequence, we must first understand what an 
‘obligation to determine’ may entail under Article 39, and what the Security Council 
may be required to do to adhere to this. In turn, this also helps to indicate what a failure 
of the Security Council’s responsibility may look like. 
 
3.2.1 A Duty to Detect? 
Commentators and practice within the Council have often utilised the concept of ‘a 
determination’, i.e. a noun describing the action of either declaring or deciding that a 
situation meets a certain threshold. This may be compared to the ‘legal’ definition of 
the word ‘determination’, where a ‘determination’ is a decision or judgment akin to 
that of a court or other authority.93 This is different to the factual definition of 
‘determine’, which involves the establishment or discovery of a certain set of facts.94  
This could indicate that the obligation to determine might be considered one 
where the Council must monitor a situation and continue to use its Chapter VII powers 
until all threats to international peace and security are eradicated. In other words, the 
Council would have to constantly determine the nature of situations that may threaten 
international peace and security.  
If it is such a continuous obligation, then the ‘determination’ would not be a 
‘declaration’ at all, but instead would require the act of continuously assessing facts, 
constantly monitoring threats, and establishing the particular nature of a situation. The 
key issue here is whether the ‘obligation to determine’ also includes a duty to 
investigate potential crises. 
 Alexander Orakhelashvili95 assesses the duties of the Security Council in this 
regard, but bases his analysis upon the existence of the Council’s discretion rather than 
                                                 
92 This obligation to ‘act’ will be further discussed in detail below, Section 3.3. 
93 Oxford Dictionary Definition (Oxford University Press), available at: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/determine (accessed 20/10/2017); see also 
Oxford  
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Oxford University Press) available at: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/determine (accessed 20/10/2017).  The French 
text of the Charter uses ‘constate’, the imperative form of the verb ‘constater’, which may also have 
the effect of a formal declaration, but also has an alternative definition meaning ‘to establish’ or ‘to 
find’ or ‘to note’. 
94 Ibid. 
95 A Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (Oxford, OUP, 2011). 
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the existence of an obligation to determine per ce.96 He makes the argument that any 
discretion in law comes with a number of requirements, one of those being the 
requirement that the use of such discretion is justified: 
 
An essential requirement for the valid exercise of discretion is that the organ in 
question has to specify in an open and transparent manner what specific objective its 
policy aims to achieve and how the conduct of the relevant legal persons adversely 
affects it.97 
 
Thus, Orakhelashvili comes close to advocating for a duty to investigate when he 
discusses the requirements of exercising discretion in law. In particular, he argues: 
 
Discretion must be exercised lawfully, that is in regular form and procedure, free of 
an error of law or fact or a misuse of authority, and by taking all essential facts into 
consideration.98 
 
This author is more compelled to accept that any duty on the Council to investigate or 
establish the facts of a situation is more strongly connected to the existence of an 
obligation to determine under Article 39 rather than originating from the discretion 
that the Council has in deciding what constitutes a situation under Article 39. Indeed, 
apart from the purported requirement to refer to facts when exercising discretion, 
Orakhelashvili goes on to suggest that there is also a requirement of ‘genuineness’ 
when making a determination under Article 39, which seems to mirror in some ways 
the idea of the ‘minimum objective threshold’ discussed above.99 Importantly, 
Orakhelashvili suggests that to identify the ‘genuineness’ of a threat to internationa l 
peace and security, the Council must use tools at its disposal such as fact-finding.100 It 
is in this sense that a duty to investigate might be understood from Orakhelashvil i’s 
work.  
                                                 
96 Orakhelashvili (n.95), at 151-156. 
97 Orakhelashvili (n.95), at 155. 
98 Orakhelashvili (n.95), at 154. 
99 Orakhelashvili (n.95), at 155-164. 
100 Orakhelashvili (n.95), at 155-164. 
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Importantly, Orakhelashvili refers to the General Assembly’s Declaration on 
Fact-Finding,101 which declares: 
 
1. In performing their functions in relation to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, the competent organs of the United Nations should endeavour to have 
full knowledge of all relevant facts. To this end they should consider undertaking fact-
finding activities. 
… 
4. Unless a satisfactory knowledge of all relevant facts can be obtained through the 
use of the information-gathering capabilities of the Secretary-General or other 
existing means, the competent organ of the United Nations should consider resorting 
to a fact-finding mission.102 
 
Most notably, however, fact-finding is suggested to the Security Council in the 
following manner: 
 
8. The Security Council should consider the possibility of undertaking fact-finding to 
discharge effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in accordance with the Charter.103 
 
The language of this Declaration rightly suggests that fact-finding may not always be 
necessary – especially with regard to situations that may be highly publicised and well-
monitored, and thus the facts are well-known and substantiated. However, this lanuage 
does seem to suggest that fact-finding is closely linked to the Council’s primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and thus, by 
extension, Article 39. It is not controversial, therefore, to suggest that investigat ions 
and fact-finding play a significant role in the Council’s obligation to determine, and 
in certain circumstances may be required to establish the true nature of a situation and 
whether or not there exists a threat to international peace and security.  
                                                 
101 UNGA Res 46/59 (1991) Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security , 9th December 1991, UN Doc A/RES/46/59. 
102 Ibid, Annex, para [1] and [4]. 
103 Ibid, Annex, para [8]. 
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Dinstein104 accuses Orakhelashvili and other commentators of ‘conjuring up’ 
such mandatory criteria for Article 39,105 suggesting that it is intended to limit the 
broad-spectrum of discretion of the Security Council when acting under Article 39. It 
is interesting to note, therefore, that Dinstein himself has previously acknowledged 
the mandatory nature of Article 39 in the past, and explicitly highlighting the 
obligatory effect of the mandatory ‘shall’ within the provision.106  
But Dinstein’s more recent position is worth countering. This author believes 
that Article 39 does impose important obligations on the Council. But this does not 
necessarily mean that the Council’s discretion is restricted, and nor is its authority 
undermined. And this can be demonstrated by utilising the following hypothetica l 
examples. 
If the Council, in light of the findings of an investigation that it authorised, 
decided that the situation was not a threat to the peace, then it would be logically 
unlikely that such a situation would actually be a threat to the peace. As long as the 
investigations are properly undertaken (which is a different matter), those 
investigations would indicate whether there exists a situation within the meaning of 
Article 39. Such investigations may even constitute a ‘determination’ in themselves 
within the meaning of Article 39, depending on the mandate granted by the Security 
Council.  
In such a case, whether the Security Council accepts the findings of an 
investigation mandated to investigate a situation is irrelevant. The Security Council, 
by default, has fulfilled its obligation to ‘determine the existence’ of a situation under 
Article 39, and the findings of the investigation are authoritative evidence in that 
regard. Even if the Security Council ignored the findings of its own investigation, it is 
arguable that the Council has already met its obligation to ‘determine the existence’ 
of that situation under Article 39.107 
If, however, the Council heard another UN investigation – on behalf of the 
Human Rights Council or the General Assembly, for example – there would still be 
an obligation on the Council under Article 39 to make its own determinations. It may 
                                                 
104 Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge, 5th Ed, Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
105 Dinstein (n.104), at 309, para [821]. 
106 See Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge, 3rd Ed, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), at 255. 
107 Of course, it would be highly unlikely that the Security Council would disregard the outcome of one 
of its own investigations. 
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choose to accept the outcome of a UN investigation and endorse them in that sense, 
thus meeting its obligations to ‘determine’. However, it may also choose not to accept, 
on the basis of such investigations and the facts presented therein, that a situation is a 
threat to the peace, or otherwise under Article 39, provided that it votes as a Council 
to do so.108 The opinion of the Security Council that a situation does not meet the 
threshold of Article 39, even where another body such as the General Assembly has 
determined otherwise, should not automatically be considered as violating Article 39. 
The Security Council is the organ most suitably placed and specialised to make such 
determinations, and its decisions therein should be assumed to be correct and within 
its authority. Only questions of procedure can query this, such as the guiding principles 
of investigatory bodies or the internal principles of the UN designed to ensure 
independence and integrity. As put forward in the Declaration on Fact-Finding, for 
example: 
  
3. Fact-finding should be comprehensive, objective, impartial and timely. 
… 
25. Fact-finding missions have an obligation to act in strict conformity with their  
mandate and perform their task in an impartial way. Their members have an obligation 
not to seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any authority other 
than the competent United Nations organ. They should keep the information acquired 
in discharging their mandate confidential even after the mission has fulfilled its task. 
... 
27. Whenever fact-finding includes hearings, appropriate rules of procedure should 
ensure their fairness.109 
 
If such standards are not met, then the question would be different. However, such 
questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. If the Council’s procedures and 
investigations meet the highest standards integrity and other general principles, the 
substantive outcomes of its determinations should be given their proper weight as 
those from the body with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  
                                                 
108 Of course, the action or inaction of the Council in response to such investigations may also be 
relevant to the second part of Article 39 which requires recommendations or decisions to take measures, 
as shall be discussed below. 
109 Declaration on Fact-Finding (n.101), Annex, para [3], [25] and [27]. 
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If, however, the Security Council is unable to agree with the opinion of another 
organ, due to the veto of a permanent member, and thus the paralysis of the Council 
generally, then there may be room to argue that the Council is thus unable to fulfil its 
primary responsibilities in this regard. 
 
3.2.2 Conclusions on an Obligation to Determine under Article 39 
 
Considering the above analysis, this author submits that the obligation on the Council, 
in light of an objectively-identifiable threat, is to establish whether this threat exists.110 
This could include such a duty to investigate, for example, utilising fact-find ing 
missions to determine whether the facts match the threshold of a threat to the peace.111 
Alternatively, it could imply a duty to hear the evidence of other UN investigat ions 
relating to a situation. Of course, one would not go further than advocating the 
possibility of a ‘duty to investigate’, simply because these are the only duties that seem 
logically connected to the wording of Article 39, and the purposes advocated by the 
drafters of the Charter.   
 
3.3 Article 39: An Obligation to Act? 
 
We have seen that Article 39’s mandatory language imposes an obligation in the first 
part of the provision. Applying much of the logic and analysis that we have just 
covered, we may determine the meaning of the second part.  
 The second obligation requires the Security Council to “make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” But this does not 
seem to be an obligation to take specific action. As discussed above, the drafters of 
the Charter were cautious to impose any restrictions or requirements on how the 
Council should act, out of fear that the imposition of sanctions may be premature or 
inappropriate, and so called for the Council to have some discretion in its decisions to 
act. 
                                                 
110 For further discussion of such ideas, see M Selkirk, “Judge, Jury and Executioner – Analysing the 
Nature of the Security Council’s Authority Under Article 39 of the UN Charter”, (2000-2003) 9 
Auckland University Law Review 1101, at 1107 onwards; Compare, Dinstein, (n.104) at 309-310, para 
[823]. 
111 Ibid. 
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But we must distinguish between discretion in deciding the type of action it 
decides to take, and discretion in deciding whether to act at all. Article 41 provides 
that “The Security Council may decide” on non-forcible measures.112 This gives the 
Security Council the option to impose sanctions. Critically, the word “may” has been 
specifically inserted to give the Council the option to take such measures, or not, as it 
determines appropriate, based upon the use of the word “may” throughout the Charter 
being used for the purposes of demonstrating the existence of discretion. 
Equally, Article 42 states: 
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.113 
 
Like Article 41, this provision also utilises the word “may” in giving the Security 
Council the power to utilise military measures.  
 Thus, a decision “as to what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42”, as required by Article 39, at the very least gives the Council a 
choice between these two provisions. It cannot therefore be said that Article 39 
requires the Council to take specific action in certain circumstances. In other words, 
the Council cannot be compelled to use force or impose sanctions. 
However, based upon the obligatory language of Article 39, this author 
believes that the discretion of the Council cannot extend to a decision to not take any 
action whatsoever. Instead, Article 39 requires the Security Council to choose to make 
recommendations or, take action under Article 41 or 42, as it sees fit. Or, if the Council 
deems necessary, it may do both. In other words, if the Security Council has 
determined that international peace and security is in such a state where it requires 
maintenance or restoration, the Council must decide between: (i) making 
recommendations for its maintenance or restoration; (ii) acting as it sees fit under 
Article 41 or 42; or (iii) both. It cannot, and must not, do nothing. 
 
                                                 
112 Emphasis added. 
113 Emphasis added. 
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3.3.1 An Obligation to Act in Council Practice 
 
Although an explicit acceptance of this interpretation has not been widespread, is has 
however found occasional support throughout the lifetime of the Security Council. 
Statements during the situation in Southern Rhodesia showed support for the primary 
obligations of the Security Council under Article 39. In particular, Argentina declared: 
 
We believe that, when action in the content of Chapter VII of the Charter is involved, 
the Security Council’s primary obligation under Article 39 is to determine “the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and 
then to decide on whatever measures it considers appropriate.114  
 
Although this statement was made in support of an argument to clearly and expressly 
reference Article 39 when making a determination, what is notable is the suggest ion 
that ‘to decide on whatever measures it considers appropriate’ is part of the Security 
Council’s primary obligation under Article 39. This was supported by Japan, who 
made this interpretation much clearer when it was said: 
 
… [M]y delegation fully shares the view of the representative of Argentina [1332nd  
meeting] that it is the primary obligation of the Council, under Chapter VII, Article 
39 of the Charter, to determine “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression”, and then to decide on whatever measures are 
appropriate.115 
 
Finally, during the same situation, France, although arguing against making a 
determination under Article 39 in this situation, when referring to the legal obligat ions 
on the Council, said: 
 
                                                 
114 UNSC Verbatim Record, 1332nd Meeting (9th December 1966), UN Doc S/PV.1332(OR), at para 
[55] (Argentina). 
115 UNSC Verbatim Record, 1333rd Meeting (12th December 1996), UN Doc S/PV.1333(OR), at para 
[47] (Japan), emphasis added. 
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… the Council, once this threat has been established, would, on the basis of Chapter 
VII of the Charter, have to adopt various measures, which Governments … would be 
requested to apply…116 
 
While these statements during the situation in Southern Rhodesia do not support an 
obligation to undertake specific measures, they do suggest that the Security Council 
must at least do something in light of Article 39.  
This idea that the Security Council has duties, and thus must not do nothing, is 
generally supported by statements made during the very early practices of the Security 
Council. During the Council’s deliberations regarding the Palestine Question in early 
1948, there was some debate as to whether a breach of the peace within Palestine 
would be the same as a ‘breach of the peace’ in Article 39.117 The UK argued that 
Article 39 referred only to a threat to or breach of international peace, and that since 
Palestine had no international status, the situation could not therefore fall within the 
meaning of Article 39.118 However, the US disagreed with this, and highlighted that 
the word ‘any’ in the context of ‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace…’ 
includes ‘international’ and all other kinds of threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, or acts of aggression.119 
In explaining that interpretation of Article 39, the US representative said the 
following: 
 
I would claim that that word was substituted with great care and with full 
understanding of its importance, so that the Security Council, having found “any 
threat to the peace”, might be able to proceed to the inquiry with respect to the 
application of remedies, or a prevention of that further step of extension of the 
conflagration into a breach of international peace, for this Article further says “and 
shall make recommendations…”; then we strike something astonishing – the 
distinctive “or” – “or decide what measure shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”. 
 
                                                 
116 UNSC Verbatim Record, 1277th Meeting (9th April 1966), UN Doc S/PV.1277(OR), at para [90] 
(France), (emphasis added). 
117 See, generally, discussions in UNSC Verbatim Record, 296th Meeting (18th /19th May 1948), UN 
Doc S/PV.296 (Official Records). 
118 Ibid, at 2-4 (United Kingdom). 
119 Ibid, at 6-10 (United States). 
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This is a great responsibility. This is where a change occurs in the Charter. From being 
a quasi-judicial body, the Security Council becomes political and executive. The 
Council is no longer limited to recommendations, but can announce decisions and 
order their implementation.120 
 
In support of this, the US representative made some very important constitutiona l 
statements that highlight the fundamental nature of Article 39. First, the US declared 
the general nature of the obligation: 
 
First of all, the Security Council has a duty that is laid down in Chapter VII, and which 
we claim it cannot evade or avoid. The facts being perfectly clear, graphically 
described as a condition of warfare, how can the Security Council avoid this duty 
proscribed by Article 39 of the Charter?121 
 
Secondly, the US further supported this by expanding upon the nature of the 
‘obligation to determine’, arguing: 
 
We do not have to determine, as suggested by the representative of the United 
Kingdom, who is the aggressor, who is at fault, if both parties are at fault, or which 
one is more at fault than the other. But as the guardians of the peace of the world, it is 
our primary duty to find out, under Article 39, whether there exists any threat to the 
peace. That is the limit, the boundary, of the duty which the resolution offered by the 
United States delegation asks the Security Council to perform.122 
 
The final notable statement during this situation was made by France, but this time 
regarding the obligation to determine rather than the obligation to act. The 
representative of France made a point of highlighting the particular language used in 
the Articles of Chapter VII detailing the Council’s powers compared to the language 
of Article 39 – notably highlighting the mandatory language in Article 39 compared 
to the permissive or discretionary language in the other provisions.123 The French 
representative put forward his interpretation, stating: 
                                                 
120 Ibid, at 7 (United States). 
121 Ibid, at 6 (United States). 
122 Ibid, at 9 (United States) (emphasis added). 
123 UNSC Verbatim Record, 310th Meeting (29th May 1948), UN Doc S/PV.310 (Official Records), at 
33-34 (France). 
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… [U]nder the provisions of the Charter, the Council has no power of appraisal at the 
time when the existence of a threat to the peace is determined. … [I]n my opinion, 
since a certain state of affairs has to be recorded if the facts are established, the 
recording must take place. 
… 
But as regards the determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, I personally 
consider that, if the threat is certain – and this is a case where, in my opinion, it is 
certain, where no one can doubt that it exists – it is the duty of the Security Council 
to declare it.124 
 
This interpretation is in line with the idea that the Council, when faced with undeniab le 
and established facts that a situation is, objectively, a threat to the peace or otherwise, 
must make such a determination. The caveat in this interpretation is that the facts must 
be established and, as discussed above, this may well be done through the Council’s 
own investigations, thus already meeting its obligation to ‘determine’ whether a 
situation under Article 39 exists. 
More recently, when the discussion of the responsibility to protect was on the 
minds of States, more important statements were made with regard to this idea that the 
Council is compelled to act in certain situations. For example, in “the Boston Letter”, 
the United States wrote to the United Nations when the relevant paragraphs of the 
World Summit Outcome were being drafted, to highlight that the Council has never 
been under an obligation to act in a certain way. The letter said: 
 
[W]e note that the Charter has never been interpreted as creating a legal obligation for 
Security Council members to support enforcement action in various cases involving 
serious breaches of international peace. Accordingly, we believe just as strongly that 
a determination as to what particular measures to adopt in specific cases cannot be 
predetermined in the abstract but should remain a decision within the purview of the 
Security Council.125 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 Letter from Ambassador Bolton to UN Member States Conveying U.S. Amendments to the Draft 
Outcome Document Being Prepared for the High Level Event on Responsibility to Protect, 30 th August 
2005, available at 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05%5b1%5d.pdf >, at 1 
(hereinafter “The Bolton Letter”). 
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This statement helps us to identify the limits to any interpretation of an obligat ion 
under Article 39. Like it was discussed during the drafting of the Charter that the 
Council was not under an obligation to take specific enforcement action, this letter 
from the US rightly highlights that the decision on what type of action to take is for 
the Security Council itself to determine. And therein lies the outer limits of the 
Security Council’s obligation to act. It must at the very least make recommendations, 
or decide on measures under Articles 41 or 42. 
At the same time, there is also no widespread support for the contrary argument 
– that the Council may ignore situations that threaten international peace. The 
maintenance of international peace and security is a fundamental purpose of the United 
Nations, and the purpose of taking ‘effective collective measures’ to protect this has 
even been highlighted in Article 1 of the Charter itself. To argue that there is scope for 
the Security Council to do nothing in response to such a situation would go against the 
very fabric of the Charter and the Organisation in which it belongs. Indeed, even the 
Council itself has been conscious of its duty to act. In Resolution 294 (1971), the 
Council was explicitly ‘[c]onscious of its duty to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to international peace and security and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression.’126  
Therefore, when faced with any situation of a threat to the peace, breach of the  
peace, or acts of aggression, the Security Council must take what action it sees fit, but 
it is not enough for it to simply remain indecisive or silent. 
 
4. The Inaction of the Security Council 
4.1 Legal Consequences of Paralysis 
 
By identifying the Security Council’s obligations relating to its responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security, one may more confidently determine when the 
Security Council has failed in its responsibilities. The main revelation from the above 
is that the Council is not free to remain silent or accept inaction. It has a duty to do 
something. Although the use of the veto alone would not likely amount to such a 
failure, the systematic abuse of this veto which causes the paralysis of the Council, 
                                                 
126 UNSC Res 294 (1971), 15th July 1971, UN Doc S/RES/294(1971), preamblular para [5]. 
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especially in the face of a situation that can be objectively-determined to engage its 
responsibilities,127 can indeed cause the Council to fail in its obligations under Article 
39, and therefore its responsibilities under the Charter. 
It will be recalled that Article 24(1) confers ‘primary’ responsibility on the  
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has been 
recognised by the ICJ in Certain Expenses128 that this responsibility may be ‘primary’, 
but it is not ‘exclusive’.129 In this regard, the ICJ recognised the existence of a 
‘residual’ responsibility (in this case for the General Assembly) for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.130  
Therefore, when it can be objectively determined that the Council has failed in 
its responsibilities, these responsibilities may then be assumed by the actor determined 
to have ‘secondary’ responsibility in this regard. Thus far, in terms of the responsibility 
for peace and security, it seems widely accepted that the General Assembly has a 
residual responsibility. In this regard, White argues that “it is the General Assembly, 
and also to a lesser extent, the International Court of Justice, two other principal organs 
of the UN, that have subsidiary competence in the field of international peace and 
security, not states acting unilaterally or multilaterally.”131 The question is whether, in 
the event of failure, this residual responsibility becomes the ‘new primary’ 
responsibility. It is submitted that this depends upon the legal competences and powers 
of the actor assuming responsibility. 
It may be certainly possible that this responsibility ‘reverts’ back to States as 
a collective, or the international community as a whole. This conforms to the idea that 
States ‘delegated’ or ‘conferred’ responsibility onto the Security Council via Article 
24(1).132 Much of the hesitation and rejection of this is often in response to the 
interpretation of ‘responsibility’ as ‘power’ or ‘competence’, and therefore the idea is 
rejected based upon the (seemingly correct) assumption that the internationa l 
community as a whole does not possess a collective ‘police power’ that would seem 
                                                 
127 For example, based on a fact-finding mission established by another UN organ. Or, where the 
Permanent Member blocking action may be considered a ‘party to a dispute’ under Article 27(3), it  
must abstain from the vote, allowing the Council to establish such an investigation under Chapter VI 
without being subject to that Member’s veto. 
128 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion 
of 20 July 1962) [1962] ICJ Rep 151 (hereinafter Certain Expenses). 
129 Certain Expenses (n.128), at 163. 
130 This is discussed in detail in Chapter VI, Section 1.1. 
131 White (n.14), at 29. 
132 Sarooshi (n.10) at 28-31; Abass (n.13) at 135-136. 
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to result from this interpretation.133 Indeed, White highlights the flaw in the argument 
when he notes “the idea of rights reverting back to states in the event of Security 
Council inaction assumes that they possessed such rights before 1945, and that they 
could claim them back based on a perception of Security Council inadequacy.”134  
However, by interpreting responsibility to mean ‘duty’, these concerns are very 
much alleviated. The reverting of responsibility back onto the internationa l 
community would be reverting a duty to respond in a way that they are legally able to 
do so. It is not reverting substantive legal powers. The consideration of which 
institutions or actors have competence to implement this responsibility is important in 
determining the legal powers, if any, that are available to do so. While this resumption 
of responsibility necessitates that the legal duty to act in response to threats to 
international peace and security continues in this residual responsibility, this does not 
necessarily imply that the legal powers of the Security Council also move with it. 
Indeed, the powers of the Security Council to act are recognised as separate from the 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security itself, as indicated in Article 
24(2) where it specifically establishes that “The specific powers granted to the 
Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, 
VIII, and XII.”135 
Indeed, no matter what powers States possessed before the UN Charter, it is 
now very clear that the unilateral use of force beyond the United Nations is prohibited 
by both custom and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.136 Therefore, any implementation 
of the responsibilities assumed by the international community must remain in 
accordance with the UN Charter, and any legal powers they already possess. 
Importantly, this resumption of responsibility also indicates that in situat ions 
where the responsibility to protect overlaps with the responsibility to mainta in 
international peace and security, there is a convincing possibility of the responsibility 
to protect ‘piggybacking’ this continuation of the legal duty and existing beyond the 
Security Council. 
 
                                                 
133 Although, for the counter argument, see Sarooshi (n.10) at 28-31, and footnote 108, referring to the 
‘right’ of states to take action to maintain international peace; see also Abass (n.13) at 136, who argues 
that the use of these police powers can only be used on a collective basis (e.g. through regional 
organisations), because they were originally possessed on such a collective basis. 
134 White (n.14), at 29; again, see Sarooshi, ibid, who argues that this right long existed before 1945. 
135 Emphasis added. 
136 See Chapter IV generally. 
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4.2 A Continuum of Responsibility – the Tertiary Responsibility to Protect 
 
This author submits that, in the event of a failure of a primary responsibility, this 
responsibility may be fully assumed by the actors who are accepted to have a residual 
responsibility in this regard. Accordingly, when considering responsibilities as 
‘duties’ – whether moral or legal, depending on the context and responsibility itself – 
there is a continuum of responsibility whereby a failure does not result in the 
responsibility ceasing to exist, but instead continues to be assumed by the next actor 
with residual responsibility.  
Coupling the responsibility to protect with the responsibility to mainta in 
international peace and security necessitates that the responsibility to protect must also 
exist on a ‘residual’ basis like the responsibility to maintain peace and security, in 
situations where the two overlap and therefore there is at least a threat to internatio na l 
peace and security that engages these two responsibilities. This creates such a 
‘continuum’ of responsibility whereby the responsibility to protect endures beyond the 
inaction of the Security Council. This continuation of responsibility is termed, for the 
purposes of this thesis, the ‘tertiary’ responsibility to protect. 
In terms of the framework and guidance of the responsibility to protect, it has 
been established that the primary responsibility to protect lies with the State itself, and 
that the international community have a secondary responsibility to protect to assist 
and build capacity, acting through the UN Security Council in response to manifes t 
failings of the State concerned. 
The challenge with investigating residual responsibilities is identifying the 
actor who assumes responsibility following a failure. Importantly here, it is the 
international community’s responsibility to protect when it acts through the UN 
Security Council. This is confirmed by the responsibility to protect as found in the 
World Summit Outcome itself, where States declared: 
 
“… we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter…”137 
 
                                                 
137 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, in UNGA Res 60/1, UN Doc A/RES/60/1, 15th September 
2005, at [139], emphasis added. 
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The Secretary-General has noted that Pillar II of the responsibility to assist and build 
capacity of States “is an ongoing responsibility to use peaceful means to protect 
populations.”138 Accordingly, where the Security Council fails, it would seem that the 
international community still maintain their secondary responsibility to assist and 
build capacity. However, responsibility to take a timely and decisive response in 
accordance with Pillar III must also continue beyond the Security Council’s inaction. 
As the Secretary-General pointed out, “Faced with imminent or ongoing atrocity 
crimes, we must never ask ‘whether’ to respond or expect others to shoulder the burden 
for us; instead, we must ask ‘how’ we can assist in a collective response.”139 
In this regard, the Secretary-General was of the opinion that peaceful tools are 
available to protect populations, including “fact-finding, monitoring, reporting and 
verification; commissions of inquiry; public advocacy; quiet diplomacy; arbitration, 
conciliation and mediation; community engagement; humanitarian assistance and 
protection; the protection of refugees and displaced persons; civilian and technica l 
assistance; and consent-based peacekeeping.”140 However, the World Summit 
Outcome clearly speaks of taking action through the Security Council “should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”141 Therefore, the continuation of the international community’s 
responsibility to take peaceful measures does not help with the continuation of the 
Pillar III responsibility to take timely and decisive action when peaceful means are 
inadequate, and there are failures in situations that necessarily require such coercive 
measures to prevent or halt mass atrocities.142 
The responsibility to protect, as restated in the World Summit Outcome, 
clearly identifies a residual responsibility of the international community. However, 
where the responsibility to maintain international peace and security is engaged, this 
responsibility may not always automatically revert to the international community. As 
the ICJ noted, the General Assembly also has a residual responsibility to mainta in 
                                                 
138 Report of the Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next Decade of the 
Responsibility to Protect, (22 July 2016) UN Doc A/70/999–S/2016/620, at [45]. 
139 Ibid, at [46]. 
140 Ibid, at [47]; see also, Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and 
Decisive Response, (25th July 2012) UN Doc A/66/874–S/2012/578, para [22] and [27]. 
141 World Summit Outcome (n137), at [139]. 
142 See also, Timely and Decisive Response, ibid, at [31]; See also reference to the failures in Syria in, 
Report of the Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect, (13 July 2015) A/69/981–S/2015/500, at [62]. 
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international peace and security.143 Therefore, there may be an extra step before the 
responsibility to maintain peace and security leaves the United Nations. While the 
responsibility to protect is automatically assumed by the international community 
upon failure of the Security Council, the responsibility for maintaining peace and 
security does not necessarily do the same, unless it can also be demonstrated that the 
General Assembly also remains inactive and does not assume its residual 
responsibilities.144 
Interestingly, the ICJ also recognised, in the Construction of a Wall case,145 
that the General Assembly had a secondary competence in this regard.146 What this 
perhaps indicates is that the legal competence of an actor can indicate that it also has 
a responsibility to exercise that competence and vice versa, but that ‘responsibil ity’ 
and ‘competence’ are not necessarily the same thing. Nevertheless, logically speaking, 
it would make no sense for an actor to have a residual responsibility, but no 
competence to implement it.  
Therefore, to establish that the tertiary responsibility to protect exists and 
continues beyond the action of the Security Council, we must first establish that the 
relevant actor has a legal competence to implement it. This could include a 
competence relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. This actor 
must also be capable of acting where the body with primary responsibility (often with 
more legal powers) has failed in its responsibilities. In the end, there would be no legal 
value to a tertiary responsibility to protect where this was not legally capable of being 
implemented. 
This thesis will continue to conduct this investigation into who the most 
relevant actors would be to implement the tertiary responsibility to protect. If there are 
any, then the tertiary responsibility does exist and does continue beyond the UN. If 
there are no competent actors, then the responsibility to protect fails with the UN 
Security Council’s inaction. 
 
 
 
                                                 
143 Certain Expenses (n.128), at 163. 
144 See Chapter VI, Section 1.4. 
145 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory  (Advisory 
Opinion of 9 July 2004) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 (hereinafter Construction of a Wall). 
146 Construction of a Wall (n.3), at para [26]. 
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5. Conclusions 
This Chapter has argued that the responsibility to protect becomes linked to the 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security where the 
relevant situation becomes a threat to the peace. In such circumstances, it also becomes 
a legal responsibility of the UN Security Council.  
This author believes that Article 39 is the embodiment of the Council’s primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security from Article 24 
in the context of enforcement measures in Chapter VII. In other words, Article 39 was 
put into the Charter to explicitly detail what the role of the Security Council is in 
situations regarding a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression. 
Article 39 embodies the general and procedural duties of the Council in light of 
situations that are brought to its attention that are possible threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression – situations that move beyond the threshold 
of being ‘likely to endanger international peace and security’.147 When this happens, 
the Council must determine whether the threat, breach, or act of aggression exists, and 
then make the political decisions necessary to either make the recommendations it 
deems appropriate or decide upon measures in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. 
This formulation of Article 39 suggests that the provision is more than just a 
procedural requirement of a determination, but an obligation to investiga te, 
substantiate, and decide whether a situation requires appropriate action under Chapter 
VII. It empowers, but also obliges, the Security Council to fulfil its primary 
responsibility for international peace and security, and gives it clear instructions on 
how to go about that. The obligation to ‘determine’ requires the analysis of facts, 
evidence, and the legal thresholds of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and 
acts of aggression. It is, ultimately, so much more than a simple requirement to 
acknowledge that a situation fits within the Council’s jurisdiction – Article 39 is, quite 
simply, an obligation to take such situations seriously and act accordingly.  
When the Council fails to adhere to these obligations, its primary responsibility 
may be assumed by the actor with residual responsibility. This residual responsibility 
can only be assumed by that actor where they have the legal powers and competences 
to implement. Therefore, to investigate whether the responsibility to protect continues 
in a tertiary form in these circumstances, the subsequent Chapters will investiga te 
                                                 
147 See e.g. Articles 33, 34 and 37 of Chapter VI of the Charter. 
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whether there is room in the fundamental principles of non-intervention and the 
prohibition of force for action to be taken beyond the Security Council. If there are 
legal avenues within these principles, it must then be determined whether the actor 
with residual responsibility is capable of implementing this tertiary responsibility to 
protect. By establishing whether these legal avenues exist, we establish the legal space 
available for the tertiary responsibility to protect to fill. 
 
97 
 
IV 
A Tertiary Responsibility and Forcible Measures 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The use of force to implement the responsibility to protect is arguably the most 
controversial aspect of the responsibility. It is a tiny part in a vast framework of 
measures to prevent and supress atrocity crimes, yet it seems to receive the most 
attention, and this may well have the potential to undermine the success of the 
responsibility to protect in the long-term. Nevertheless, in a thesis focussing on the 
use of forcible and coercive measures as part of the responsibility to protect beyond 
the deadlock of the Security Council, this topic must be addressed.  
This Chapter will address the prohibition of force, as outlined in Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter, in the specific context of humanitarian crises. As will be shown, 
there are many authors who seek to dilute this fundamental principle in favour of 
finding undesirable loopholes in the rule, such as the so-called right of humanitar ian 
intervention. With the aim of investigating whether there is room for a tertiary 
responsibility to protect beyond the Security Council, this investigation naturally led 
to the question as to whether force itself could be used beyond the Council. Since the 
authorisation of the Security Council has long been considered the only ‘exception’ to 
the prohibition of force, alongside the right of self-defence, the answer seemed to be 
clear from the outset. However, there were still questions surrounding the use of force 
by the UN General Assembly, and indeed by regional organisations, without the direct 
participation of the Security Council. 
During the research for this Chapter, this author looked back to the origina l 
intentions of the drafters of the UN Charter, and has uncovered revealing intentions 
and nuances in the debates therein that can clarify the doctrinal operation of the 
prohibition of force. In particular, instead of interpreting Article 2(4) as prohibiting all 
uses of force, with the powers of the Security Council and the right of self-defence as 
‘exceptions’ to this, it is argued that the prohibition was only ever one outlawing 
unilateral uses of force, and the so-called ‘exceptions’ are in fact circumstances that 
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were never precluded by the prohibition in the first place. This may seem a semantic 
distinction, but the effects of this original interpretation are more substantive, and may 
indicate a number of legitimate avenues for the use of military action through the UN 
General Assembly which will be addressed in Chapter VI. 
By further clarifying the legality and role of measures beyond the Security 
Council, this Chapter continues to shed light on the viability of a tertiary responsibility 
to protect. 
 
1. The Prohibition of Force 
1.1 The Sources of the Prohibition 
 
Article 2 of the UN Charter states that “The Organization and its Members, in pursuit 
of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles.” Article 2(4) stipulates: 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
 
Many commentators have considered the meaning of ‘force’ and what types of 
coercive action may be included in its definition.1 Others have considered the meaning 
of ‘international relations’ and how far this restricts the scope of the prohibition to the 
use of force between states, compared to using force to intervene in internal matters 
such as civil wars, or against non-state actors.2 The focus of this Chapter, however, is 
on the scope of the prohibition between States in general and its relationship with the 
circumstances where force is lawful. 
                                                 
1 See for example: T Ruys, “The Meaning of ‘Force’ and the Boundaries of Jus ad Bellum: Are 
‘Minimal’ Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?”, (2014) 108(2) American Journal 
of International Law 159-210; B Asrat, The Prohibition of Force under the UN Charter: A Study of Art 
2(4), (Iustus Förlag, 1991), at 39-41, and 94-138; A Randelzhofer, “Article 2(4)”, in B Simma (ed), The 
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), at 117-121; O 
Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International 
Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012), at Chapter 2. 
2 See for example, Randelzhofer (n.1), at 121-123; Corten (n.1), at 127-135. 
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The prohibition of force is also a recognised rule of customary internationa l 
law. The International Court of Justice [ICJ] in the Nicaragua Case3 noted the 
existence of this prohibition in custom and explained the interplay between the 
prohibition as a treaty-based rule, and as a customary rule. The Court reasoned that 
although these principles would certainly overlap, they maintained a separate 
existence.4  
Importantly, the Court rejected any argument that these rules were identica l, 
stating: 
 
The Court has not accepted this extreme contention, having found that on a number 
of points the areas governed by the two sources of law do not exactly overlap, and the 
substantive rules in which they are framed are not identical in content.5 
 
In fact, the Court noted that there are some areas where the scope of the two 
prohibitions certainly diverge, such as in the realm of self-defence where Article 51 
of the Charter requires acts of self-defence to be reported to the UN Security Council, 
potentially rendering a use of force that does not comply with this rule unlawful, 
whereas there is no such comparable rule in custom.6 The reason for maintaining a 
separate existence between customary law and treaty law was inherent in the very 
nature of that case – different rules may be applied in different contexts, and may even 
be subject to different institutional tools by which they can be given effect or 
enforced.7 But, the Court was sure to emphasise that the two rules did flow from a 
common point.8 
The Court looked to several declarations of the UN General Assembly for 
evidence of opinio juris, and to shed light on the customary principle of the prohibit ion 
of force.9 For example, the Court looked to the Friendly Relations Declaration10 as 
                                                 
3 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA)  
(Merits), Judgment of 27th June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14 [hereinafter ‘Nicaragua Case’]. 
4 Nicaragua Case (n.3), at para [174]-[176]; see also Yoram Dinstein War, Aggression and Self-Defence 
(Cambridge, 5th Ed, Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 94, para [252] onwards.  
5 Nicaragua Case (n.3), at para [181]. 
6 Nicaragua Case (n.3), at para [175]-[176]; see also para [181]. 
7 Nicaragua Case (n.3), at para [178]. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Nicaragua Case (n.3), at para [184], [188]-[195]. 
10 UNGA Res 2625(XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations , 24th 
October 1970, UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV), Annex. 
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evidence of opinio juris establishing customary international law relating to the 
prohibition of force.11 In this declaration, States proclaimed and expanded upon many 
principles of international law. Most relevantly, the declaration proclaimed: 
 
The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.12 
 
Clearly, this is almost a word for word duplication of the principle that exists in Article 
2(4). We may assume, therefore, that the pronouncements that followed this princip le 
in the declaration might also aid the interpretation of the prohibition in the Charter, 
notwithstanding the application of specific mechanics of the Charter regime. This 
follows the rules of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties,13 which is now also 
considered to reflect customary international law,14 where any subsequent agreement 
or practice of States can be taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty 
provision.15 Thus, certain declarations by the General Assembly relating to this 
principle may shed light on the types of force prohibited, or the circumstances in which 
such force is prohibited by that principle.  
It is worth noting some particular duties that the Friendly Relations 
Declaration considered as falling within this general principle of the prohibition of 
force. For example: the violation of existing international borders by force; the 
organisation of irregular forces for incursion into the territory of a State; and the 
prohibition of illegal occupation, acquisition, or recognition of territory seized by 
force.16  
These declarations, while not conclusively determined to be customary 
international law individually,17 certainly provide some evidence as to what States 
                                                 
11 Nicaragua Case (n.3), at para [191]. 
12 Friendly Relations Declaration  (n.10), Annex, Principle 1. 
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23rd May 1969, entered into force 27th January 
1980)) 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
14 See, e.g., Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment of 3rd February 1994, [1994] 
ICJ Reports 6, at para [41]; see also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar 
and Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (Qatar v Bahrain), Judgment of 15th February 1995, 
[1995] ICJ Reports 6, at para [33]. 
15 VCLT (n.13), Article 31(3)(a)-(b). 
16 Friendly Relations Declaration  (n.10), Annex, Principle 1.  
17 The ICJ has declared some provisions of the Declaration as reflecting custom, but it is unclear whether 
it considers all of the provisions to be such: see, Armed Activities On The Territory Of The Congo 
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believe to be prohibited by the customary prohibition of force. It is clear, however, 
that this regime of declarations is much more specific than the basic language of 
Article 2(4). Yet, what the declarations do not explain is how they fall within that 
particular language. For example, is the use of force to violate international boundaries 
illegal because it is against the territorial integrity of a State; because it is against the 
political independence of a State; or, because it is inconsistent with the purposes of 
the United Nations? Of course, violating international boundaries through force might 
be rendered illegal because they constitute more than one of these forms of prohibited 
violence. What is important to recognise is that these declarations do not give us any 
specific answers as to how the prohibition itself functions. 
 
1.2 Common Interpretations of Article 2(4) 
 
There are two main competing interpretations of Article 2(4) that are worth 
highlighting from the outset.18 The first approach reads the prohibition in its widest 
possible sense, treating it as a ‘general prohibition’ of the threat or use of force in 
international relations. In other words, it is said to apply to all but ‘internal’ uses of 
force – a blanket ban – leaving no room or flexibility for new exceptions to arise 
through State practice or custom.19 According to this view, all uses of force outside of 
self-defence are a violation of Article 2(4), unless specifically authorised by the 
Security Council. This position relies on the same reading of Article 2(4) as this 
‘general prohibition of force’, with the powers of the Security Council in Chapter VII 
of the Charter as the ‘exceptions’ to this general rule. Accordingly, the use of force by 
or on behalf of the Security Council would be covered in principle by the primary rule 
in Article 2(4), but excluded by an exception in a secondary rule elsewhere in the 
Charter.  
The second approach interprets Article 2(4) much more narrowly. 
Accordingly, the prohibition is open to further exceptions beyond the commonly 
                                                 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda), Judgment of 19th December 2005, [2005] ICJ Reports 168, 
at paras [162] and [300]. 
18 For an overview of these competing approaches, see for example: Corten (n.1), at 4-27; C Gray, 
International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford, 2nd Edn, Oxford University Press, 2008), at 30-31; L 
Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force: International Law, Jus ad Bellum, and the War on Terror  
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010), at 5 – 9. 
19 Corten highlights this in the context of an overall restrictive approach to interpreting customary 
international law: see Corten (n.1), at 5 and 15-27. 
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accepted roles of self-defence and the powers of the Security Council – and is said to 
include the so-called right of unilateral humanitarian intervention. This position 
generally relies on the suggestion that the use of force is lawful if: (i) it does not violate 
the territorial integrity of the State; (ii) it does not jeopardise the political independence 
of the State; and (iii) that the use of force itself is conducted in a manner consistent 
with the Purposes of the UN Charter. Those who advocate for this position argue, for 
example, that the use of force could be legal where it does not result in a ‘territoria l  
conquest or political subjugation’ and thus does not violate the territorial integrity or 
political independence of the target State,20 so long as it is also in pursuit of, or 
consistent with, the Purposes of the UN under Article 1 of the Charter. Such a purpose, 
some argue, may include the protection of human rights.21  
Therefore, we have two extremes in interpreting Article 2(4) – an all-
encompassing prohibition (the ‘wide interpretation’) or a prohibition that is qualified 
and leaves room for lawful uses of force (the ‘narrow interpretation’).22 
 
1.3 Legal Problems of Article 2(4) 
1.3.1 Article 2(4) and the Powers of the Security Council 
 
It is obvious that the UN Charter allows the Security Council to use force. We know 
this because Article 42 of the Charter, for example, grants the Council following 
power: 
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
                                                 
20 FR Tesόn, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality  (New York, 2nd edn, 
Transnational Publishers, 1997), at 151. 
21 Tesόn (n.20), at 152-157.  
22 Dinstein refers to the first all-encompassing interpretation as ‘the non-restrictive scope of the 
prohibition’ - Dinstein (n.4), at 89-91, [240]-[244]; However, this is not to be confused with the 
methodology of interpreting customary international law that Corten refers to as the ‘restrictive 
approach’- Corten, (n.1): However, quite confusingly, the phrase ‘restrictive interpretation’ is 
sometimes used to describe interpretations of Article 2(4) that attempt to specifically restrict the scope 
of that provision, and thus have the opposite effect to the all-encompassing interpretation: see, for 
example, S Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law  
(Oxford, OUP, 2001), at 48-51. 
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Because of the ability of the Security Council to use force, supporters of the ‘wide 
interpretation’ of Article 2(4) arrive at the simple conclusion that this power is an 
exception to the prohibition.23 However, although these provisions refer to the use of 
force, they do not provide any explicit exception that limits the application of Article 
2(4).24  
The Security Council is bound by Article 24(2) to ‘act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles’ of the Charter when exercising its powers. The ‘Principles’ 25 
include the prohibition of force, and respect for the principle of sovereign equality,26 
which includes respect for territorial integrity and political independence – according 
to discussion during the drafting of the Charter,27 and the Friendly Relations 
Declaration.28 
Herein lies an inherent contradiction in the wide interpretation of the 
prohibition of force – if Article 2(4) really was a blanket ban on force, it would mean 
that the Charter would require the Council, when using its powers, to act in accordance 
with a Principle that essentially excludes the type of force foreseen in those very 
powers.  
There are, however, arguments that seek to explain this contradict ion. 
Carswell, for example, offers a solution based upon an interpretation of Article 2(4) 
itself, while maintaining a wide interpretation of the prohibition.29 He suggests that 
the prohibition only applies to Members of the UN, rather than the Organisation or the 
Security Council itself.30 This is based upon the fact that Article 2(4) refers to “all 
Members…” refraining from the threat or use of force. In this regard, Carswell also 
goes on to suggest that a consequence of the Security Council delegating powers to 
Member States for enforcement action is that those States are acting on behalf of the 
UN Organisation and thus are not captured by Article 2(4).31 He therefore stresses that 
                                                 
23 See note 18. 
24 Unlike, for example, Article 2(7) on non-intervention which does provide for an explicit exception 
referring to Chapter VII of the Charter. 
25 Article 2, UN Charter. 
26 Article 2(1), UN Charter. 
27 See below, Section 2. 
28 Friendly Relations Declaration (n.10), Annex, Principle 6. 
29 AJ Carswell, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution”, (2013) 18(3) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 453-480. 
30 Carswell, (n.29), at 461-462. 
31 Ibid. 
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“as long as the actions of UN States can be ascribed to the Security Council, they are 
the actions of the UN Organization as such and are not captured by Article 2(4).”32 
There are some fundamental problems with this interpretation. First, it ignores 
the effect of Article 48 of the Charter. Article 48 requires: 
 
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of 
the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 
 
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly 
and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are 
members.33 
 
The intention of Article 48 does not seem to be to stipulate the actor to which the use 
of force should be attributable to when undertaking enforcement action. But, by 
requiring Member States to directly undertake this action, or to do so through their 
membership of other international organisations, it clearly indicates who must 
undertake the use of force to carry out binding Council decisions.34 While Article 48 
may have been inserted with the intention of utilising the armed forces that were 
originally to be provided to the UN under special agreements in accordance with 
Article 43, since such agreements never transpired, Article 48 as a standalone 
provision certainly leaves room for States to use force without necessarily being under 
the formal command of the Security Council. In other words, Article 48 remains 
compatible with the Council’s recent practice of authorising Member States to use 
force, rather than commanding them to do so.35 
Carswell’s argument also disregards the fact that, in authorisations to use force  
by the Security Council, the Member State concerned may not be under any chain of 
command linking the conduct of a State’s national forces to the United Nations. 
                                                 
32 Ibid, at 461. 
33 Emphasis added. 
34 Such ‘decisions’ are binding by virtue of Article 25 of the Charter, where Members agree to ‘accept’ 
and ‘carry out’ these decisions. 
35 For an interesting overview of this practice, see, N Blokker, “Is the Authorisation Authorized? Powers 
and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and 
Willing’”, (2000) 11(3) EJIL 541-568; see also, Gray, (n.18), at 254, and 327-369; J Frowein and N 
Krisch, “Article 42”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford, 2nd 
ed, 2002), at 754-759.  
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According to the International Law Commission’s [ILC] commentaries to the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations:36  
  
… [the] conduct of military forces of States or international organizations is not 
attributable to the United Nations when the Security Council authorizes States or 
international organizations to take necessary measures outside a chain of command 
linking those forces to the United Nations.37 
 
Carswell’s argument that the Council’s powers are ‘delegated’ when authorisat ions 
are made, and thus actions are attributable only to the Security Council,38 seems 
unconvincing in light of the ILC’s commentary – for the Commission specifica lly 
excluded attribution to the UN in cases of authorisations.39 Similarly, while it is not 
the intention of this Chapter to go into the debate surrounding the attribution of 
conduct for UN-controlled forces such as those utilised for Peacekeeping,40 one would 
argue that it is a legal fiction to suggest that a Member State would not be ‘using force’ 
for the purposes of Article 2(4) simply because those actions might be attributable to 
the UN for the purposes of determining legal responsibility for other internationa lly 
wrongful acts.41  
In all cases of forcible action by the Council, Members will always be the ones 
‘using’ such force. Thus, there is a question as to whether this force, even though 
authorised or ordered by the Council, is consistent with the Members’ obligat ions 
under Article 2(4). Considering this, as well as being obliged itself to act in accordance 
with the Principles in Article 2, there also seems to be an indirect obligation on the 
Council not to order Members to do something that likewise would not be in 
                                                 
36 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisation s, with Commentaries’, 
available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf > 
(accessed 01/10/2017); also included in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Sixty-Third Session’, (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011) UN Doc A/66/10, from 69;  
see also UNGA Res 66/100, Responsibility of International Organisations, 9th December 2011, UN 
Doc A/RES/66/100, Annex. 
37 ILC Commentaries (n.36), at 16. 
38 Carswell (n.29), at 10-11; for an overview of this position, see also D Sarooshi, The United Nations 
and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter 
VII Powers (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), at Chapters 1 and 4, and 164-165. 
39 ILC Commentaries (n.36), at 16. 
40 The ILC Commentary succinctly outlines this debate: ILC Commentaries (n.36), at 19-26. 
41 See ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (n.36), Article 7; ILC 
Commentaries, (n.36), at 22-25, where it is suggested that attribution of conduct for joint operations 
should be based upon a factual criterion. 
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accordance with those Principles.42 After all, could it be said that the Council was 
acting ‘in accordance’ with such Principles if it allowed or encouraged Members to 
violate or ignore them?43 
And so, the wide interpretation of Article 2(4) cannot explain why Members 
using force on behalf of the Council is consistent with the prohibition. Still, there is 
merit in Carswell’s general logic that Article 2(4) simply does not include the powers 
of the Security Council within its scope. As we shall discuss below, this was the 
original intentions of the drafters of the Charter – they just meant it differently to how 
Carswell interpreted the provision. 
 
1.3.2 Jus Cogens and the ‘Exceptions’ to Article 2(4) 
 
A second paradox with the wide interpretation of Article 2(4) comes from its status as 
a jus cogens norm. It is widely accepted that Article 2(4) is also a norm of ‘jus cogens’ 
– a peremptory norm of general international law.44 Although some might question 
this point,45 it is not the purpose of this Chapter to investigate this, so we will proceed 
on the assumption that the prohibition is jus cogens.  
Article 53 of the VCLT states: 
 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm 
of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.  
 
                                                 
42 States have also suggested that all the principles in Article 2 must be respected by both Members and 
the Organisation: seem UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States’ (16 November 1964) UN Doc A/5746, 
para [218]. 
43 Such an authorisation might be considered a ‘derogation’ from a jus cogens norm, if Article 2(4) 
really was an all-encompassing prohibition: see below.  
44 See, e.g. Nicaragua Case (n.3), at [190]; Corten gives a very detailed overview of the state practice 
and opinio juris to this effect; Corten (n.1), at 200-213; see also, Asrat (n.1) at 51-52; Gray (n.18) at 
30; Dinstein (n.4), at 105-107. 
45 See, e.g. Green (n.55), below. 
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This provision sheds light on what jus cogens might look like.46 The key characterist ic 
for our purposes is that ‘no derogation is permitted’ by a jus cogens norm. According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, a ‘derogation’ is the “partial abrogation or repeal of 
a law, contract, treaty, legal right, etc,”47 and the Oxford Advance Learner’s 
Dictionary defines a ‘derogation’ as “an occasion when a rule or law is allowed to be 
ignored.”48  
On the other hand, an ‘exception’ is defined as: “Something that is excepted; 
a particular case which comes within the terms of a rule, but to which the rule is not 
applicable; a person or thing that does not conform to the general rule affecting other 
individuals of the same class.”49 This definition suggests that an exception must first 
come within the terms of a rule – i.e. a lawful use of force must first be one that is 
generally covered by the prohibition in question (the primary rule), but is excluded 
from the scope of that prohibition by another corresponding rule (a secondary rule).  
To explain, Helmersen uses the following definition of ‘exception’: “a special 
situation excluded from the coverage of an otherwise applicable rule.”50 Helmersen 
also argues that ‘exceptions’ are not the same as ‘derogations’ for the purposes of jus 
cogens: 
 
Exceptions limit the scope of rules. This means that an apparent derogation that is 
covered by an exception is not a derogation, since it regulates something that is outside 
the scope of the rule. For example, rule A prohibits X, Y and Z, but has an exception 
in rule B that says it does not cover Y. If two states conclude a treaty that allows Y 
between them, the treaty is not a derogation from rule A. Nor is the treaty a derogation 
if rule A by its scope covers only X and Z.51 
 
                                                 
46 While a norm of jus cogens is found in ‘general international law’, the fact that the prohibition of 
force is also found in Article 2(4) is enough for us to address its interpretation in light of its 
corresponding jus cogens status. After all, Article 2(4) is the most authoritative manifestation of the 
rule purported to be jus cogens. 
47 Oxford English Dictionary definition (Oxford University Press), available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/50657 (accessed 01/06/2017). 
48Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Oxford University Press), available at: 
http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definit ion/english/derogation  (accessed 01/06/2017). 
49 Oxford English Dictionary definition (Oxford University Press), available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/65724 (accessed 01/06/2017). 
50 S T Helmersen, “The Prohibition of Force as Jus Cogens: Explaining Apparent Derogations”, 61(2) 
Netherlands International Law Review 167, at 175. 
51 Helmersen (n.50), at 176. 
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If we follow Helmersen’s logic, the ‘exceptions’ to the prohibition of force might be 
found in separate rules that limit the scope of the prohibition itself. Therefore, Article 
51 of the Charter might be a separate rule allowing for self-defence, and likewise with 
the powers of the Security Council in Chapter VII. 
The problem is that, while ‘exceptions’ are not always the same as 
‘derogations’,  any treaty provision which provides for a power or right which could 
allow a generally-applicable jus cogens rule to be ignored could be considered as such 
a ‘derogation’ if that treaty-based norm does not also have a corresponding status of 
jus cogens.52 In other words, the ‘exceptions’ to Article 2(4) – if it was an all-inclus ive 
prohibition – must also have the status of jus cogens so that they are not derogations 
from that jus cogens rule. This is based upon the fact that, when the prohibition of 
force became jus cogens, it attained a ‘separate’ status within ‘general internationa l 
law’. From that point on, according to Article 64 of the VCLT, any existing treaty 
provision which is in conflict with a newly-established norm of jus cogens becomes 
void and terminates. How, then, can the provisions of the UN Charter allowing for the 
use of force be reconciled with the fact that Article 2(4) has attained such a status? 
Linderfalk53 argues that this is because “the relevant jus cogens norm cannot possibly 
be identical with the principle of non-use of force as such. If it were, this would imply 
that whenever a State exercises a right of self-defence, it would in fact be unlawfully 
derogating from a norm of jus cogens.”54  
Green55 and Linderfalk offer an explanation by suggesting that the jus cogens 
prohibition of force must also contain the exceptions of the Charter built into the rule 
                                                 
52 Helmersen seems to suggest that having a corresponding rule in customary law is enough: ibid, at 
176-177, 180. However, this would suggest that a simple loophole of jus cogens would be for a group 
of states to establish a customary rule between them so as to avoid a ‘treaty -based derogation’, and 
cannot be reconciled with the fact that ad-hoc consent to an act prohibited by a jus cogens rule is also 
considered a derogation: see, ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally  
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’, available at: 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> (accessed 01/06/2017);  
also included in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty -Third  
Session’, (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), UN Doc A/56/10, Article 26, and para [6];  
reproduced in [2001] (Vol II, Part Two) Yearbook of the International Law Commission , from 31. Thus, 
it seems more logical to argue that any exception to a jus cogens rule must also have the status of jus 
cogens. 
53 U Linderfalk, “The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever 
Think About the Consequences?”, (2007) 18(5) EJIL 853-871. 
54 Linderfalk (n.53), at 860. 
55 J Green, “Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force,” (2011) 32 
Michigan Journal of International Law  215. 
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itself.56 To support this, they both construct possible versions of the prohibition that 
might reflect the norm in jus cogens by broadly defining the norm itself to encompass 
the exceptions to the prohibition.57 For example, Green suggests the jus cogens version 
of the prohibition might say: 
 
The use of armed force directed against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state or which is in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the U.N. is prohibited other than when it is employed in a necessary and 
proportional manner in response to an armed attack by another state against a member 
of the UN or when authorized by the Security Council under Article 42 of the UN 
Charter, following a threat to the peace and breach of the peace or an act of aggression 
as determined by the Security Council.58 
 
Both Green and Linderfalk note the impracticalities and unattractiveness of this 
approach.59 Notwithstanding their lack of drafting perfection, these suggestions are in 
line with the idea that the prohibition of force includes the relevant ‘exceptions’ within 
its scope, so as to ensure that any treaty-based provision reflecting those exceptions 
are not derogating from an all-inclusive prohibition of force. Linderfalk and Green are 
essentially creating their own qualified version of Article 2(4), and this could work so 
long as those qualifications (i.e. the powers of the Security Council, the right of self-
defence) are capable of having the status of jus cogens too.60 
Orakhelashvili takes a much more extreme step, suggesting jus ad bellum as a 
whole is jus cogens, arguing: “if the very prohibition of the use of force is peremptory, 
then every principle specifying the limits on the entitlement of States to use force is 
also peremptory.”61 Green disagrees with this argument, even if we were to envisage 
a ‘jus cogens network’ of norms relevant to jus ad bellum, because for many of the 
rules within the jus ad bellum it might be difficult to make a case for their peremptory 
status.62  
                                                 
56 Linderfalk (n.53), at 860; Green (n.55), at 229-230; see also a discussion of this issue in, A de Hoogh, 
“Jus Cogens and the Use of Armed Force”, in M Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force 
in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
57 Green (n.55), at 232-233, especially footnote 82; Linderfalk (n.53), at 860-867.  
58 Green (n.55), at 234. Linderfalk (n.53), at 867, see also 860 and 865, also suggests similarly  
unnatractive alternatives . 
59 Ibid. 
60 See below on why this author believes this is not possible. 
61 A Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2008), at 50 – 51. 
62 Green (n.55), at 231; see also, de Hoogh (n.56), at 1172. 
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Unfortunately, neither Orakhelashvili’s argument nor Green and Linderfa lk ’s 
approaches are very convincing, because they require us to accept the assertion that 
the powers of the Security Council also have the status of jus cogens, as we shall now 
discuss.  
 
1.3.2.1 Security Council Powers as Jus Cogens? 
 
The powers of the Security Council in Chapter VII of the Charter must also at least 
form part of customary international law to achieve jus cogens status.63 This would be 
inherently difficult if non-Member States have not accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Security Council so as to create such a customary rule. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Helmersen, where he suggests: 
 
An exception reflecting Article 42 would have to be created by state practice and 
opinio juris. With the existence of the UN Charter, UN member states using force on 
the basis of the Charter would simply be obeying the Charter, and not simultaneously 
generating state practice in favour of the existence of a concurrent customary rule. 
State practice would have to be generated by non-members.64 
 
If non-Member States cannot be bound by the jurisdiction of the Security Council, no 
‘exception’ to the jus cogens prohibition of force allowing for such powers can exist 
as part of any construction of the jus cogens rule itself, because that ‘exception’ is not 
capable of binding States as a whole.  
In custom, it is unlikely that there exists any comparable rule binding all States 
to the powers of the Security Council, especially in the scenario where a State has not 
signed up to the UN Charter.65 Even in the General Assembly declarations, the lawful 
uses of force are given effect by statements such as: 
 
                                                 
63 Linderfalk (n.53), at 863-864. 
64 Helmersen (n.50), at 183-184. Indeed, Helmersen rightly highlights that this also explains why the 
reporting requirement of self-defence does not exist in customary international law: see Helmersen  
(n.50), at 184; also Nicaragua Case (n.3), at para [200]. 
65 See, e.g., the VCLT Article 34, on treaties creating obligations for third states. 
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Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in 
any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use 
of force is lawful.66 
 
These limitations in the declarations stipulate that those provisions in the Charter 
remain unaffected – not that they are also exceptions for States who have not signed 
the Charter. There is no obvious customary exception explicitly allowing the Security 
Council to use force as a standalone customary power. 
In fact, there is much more evidence to the contrary that suggests non-Members 
are in fact not bound by the Security Council’s decisions. The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion 
on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia67 acknowledged that non-
Members of the UN were not bound by Articles 24 or 25 of the Charter – the key 
provisions granting the Security Council its powers, and requiring States to accept and 
act in accordance with its decisions.68 Additionally, as Vitzthum highlights,69 before 
Switzerland became a Member of the UN it decided autonomously whether or not to 
participate in measures adopted by the Security Council.70 Similarly, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, whilst a non-Member during the situation concerning Southern 
Rhodesia, voluntarily participated in sanctions as called for by resolutions such as 
Resolution 232 (1966)71 – but still maintained that it was participating in these 
sanctions “in spite of the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a Member 
of the United Nations.”72 
 
 
                                                 
66 Friendly Relations Declaration  (n.10), Annex, Principle 1, para [13], see also operative para [2], 
“General Part”; compare also UNGA Res 2131(XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty , 21st 
December 1965, UN Doc A/RES/2131(XX), at para [8]. 
67 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)  (Advisory Opinion), Opinion of 21st 
June 1971, [1971] ICJ Reports 16. 
68 Ibid, at para [126], 
69 WG Vitzthum, “Article 2(6)”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Oxford, 2nd ed, 2002). 
70 Ibid, at 143-144 and the positions cited therein; see also Helmersen (n.50), at 184. 
71 UNSC Res 232 (1966), 16th December 1966, UN Doc S/RES/232(1966), at para [6], Compare this 
with para [7] of the same Resolution which only requires Members of the UN to carry out the decision 
in accordance with Article 25. 
72 See, Note by the Secretary General, transmitting Note Verbale dated 17th February 1967 from the 
Acting Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany, 20th February 1967, UN Doc S/7776, 
at 3; see also Vitzthum (n.69), at 143. 
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1.3.2.2 Self-Defence as Jus Cogens? 
 
Self-defence is referred to in Article 51 of the Charter. It is not an explicit exception 
to Article 2(4) itself. Rather, as evident in the opening words of the provision,  
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair…”, one could say that Article 51 is a 
‘limited’ exception to the whole Charter, due to the fact that the exception itself 
maintains the jurisdiction of the Security Council over the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and in fact even goes further still to require that any 
“[m]easures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council.” 
Furthermore, Article 51 refers to a State’s ‘inherent’ right of self-defence. This 
phrasing has been determined by the ICJ to indicate the existence of the right in 
international customary law.73 Based upon this interpretation, the Charter gives effect 
to a customary law rule, whilst also binding its Members to the limitation it places 
upon the use of the customary right as it maintains the jurisdiction of the Security 
Council. 
By its existence in customary international law, one could certainly infer that 
the right of self-defence is capable of achieving the status of jus cogens. Consequently, 
the right could also theoretically form part of any general construction of the jus 
cogens rule and not necessarily a derogation that would render the rule unlawful. But, 
whether self-defence can be said to have jus cogens status is far from clear, with 
commentators offering opposing views on this matter, particularly in light of the 
absence of any declaration by States.74 
Furthermore, if the right of self-defence had jus cogens status, and therefore 
could not be derogated from, the limitation imposed in Article 51 of the UN Charter 
that self-defence only applies until the Security Council steps in to take necessary 
measures to maintain or restore peace and security must also be explained.75 This is 
clearly a restriction of the right of self-defence for Members of the UN, and we 
                                                 
73 Nicaragua Case (n.3), at para [193]. 
74 Dinstein suggests that it is unclear whether self-defence has jus cogens status: Dinstein (n.4), at 
192-1933, para [509]; Kahgan, on the other hand, argues that it does: C Kahgan, “Jus Cogens and the 
Inherent Right to Self-Defence”, (1997) 3 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law  767, at 791 (see 
footnote 105), see also 824-827. 
75 On this point, see de Hoogh (n.56), at 1173. 
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therefore run into the same problem regarding the powers of the Security Council 
being unable to obtain jus cogens status. 
 
1.3.2.3 Other Explanations of the Jus Cogens Legal Problem 
 
One argument seeking to explain the jus cogens problem suggests that jus cogens does 
not require a rule to be recognised as such by all States – but simply a vast majority 
of States – notwithstanding the fact that Article 53 of the VCLT refers to jus cogens 
being accepted by States ‘as a whole’.76 In this sense, Kahgan makes the following 
argument: 
 
Obviously, no norm could realistically be considered a principle of general 
international law if it did not, at a minimum, meet the criteria of acceptance and 
adherence required for customary international law. However, whether a norm has 
been denominated or identified as customary international law should not frustrate, 
eliminate, or immunize its categorization and recognition as a norm of an even more 
profound nature, such as jus cogens. That inquiry requires assessment of the extent of 
recognition and acceptance such as would cause its elevation to the status of general 
international law, whereby it would bind even nonconsenting states.77 
 
Unfortunately, Kahgan goes too far here. There is a fundamental difference between: 
(i) a State accepting that a norm they are already bound by constitutes jus cogens; and, 
(ii) a State not consenting to be bound by that rule altogether. The fact that a State may 
not have signed up to the UN Charter, and thus not yet consented to the jurisdiction of 
the Security Council, is crucial to this point. Article 53 of the VCLT specifically states 
that jus cogens ‘is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted… etc.’78 Surely, 
no matter what the threshold or legal test for ‘elevating’ a norm into one of jus cogens 
and being recognised as such by the international community as a whole, a rule must 
actually bind all of that international community in the first place?79 
                                                 
76 See e.g., Kahgan (n.74), at 775-776. 
77 Kahgan (n.74), at 776 (emphasis in original). 
78 Emphasis added. 
79 Unfortunately, this is a question about jus cogens that remains a topic of debate, and it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to address it here. For further discussion of this issue, see for example: M Byers, 
“Conceptualising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules”, (1997) 66 Nordic 
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Even leaving such debates aside, the only other alternative would be to argue 
that the UN Charter is some form of ‘world constitution’ – a supranational authority 
that transcends the sovereignty of States with the ability to bind non-Members.80 
However, this is not a viable solution either. It is more widely accepted in the literature 
that the UN has no such status, and there has not been any authoritative indication of 
this being the case by the international community.81 
Finally, another alternative could be to suggest that the jus cogens version of 
the prohibition is one which prohibits only the use of force not authorised by the 
Security Council, or not in self-defence in response to an armed attack.82 This position 
certainly alleviates the problems outlined, and is very closely linked to the 
interpretation preferred by this Chapter’s findings, as outlined below. However, the 
statements by States accepting the jus cogens nature of the prohibition do not refer to 
such a precise formulation – the preference, as outlined by Corten, is to treat Article 
2(4) itself as the jus cogens principle, or at least the formulation found within that 
provision.83 Any alternative formulation also creates a distinction between Article 2(4) 
and the jus cogens version of the norm – a distinction that has never been recognised 
by States, and is not compatible with the practice that accepts Article 2(4) as having 
jus cogens status.84 
In light of these arguments, there are two possibilities. Either the prohibit ion 
of force is not a blanket ban on force at all, and allows for the Security Council’s 
powers and self-defence within the rule itself, or Article 2(4) is not a norm of jus 
cogens. Based upon the wide acceptance of the status of the prohibition as jus cogens, 
the answer certainly does not seem to be the latter. 
                                                 
Journal of International Law 211, at 220-229; U Linderfalk, “The Creation of Jus Cogens – Making  
Sense of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention”, (2011) 71 ZaöRV 359-378, available at: 
<http://www.zaoerv.de/71_2011/71_2011_2_a_359_378.pdf> (accessed 01/10/2017); D Dubois, “The 
Authority of Peremptory Norms in International Law: State Consent or Natural Law?”, (2009) 78 
Nordic Journal of International Law 133-175; MW Janis, “The Nature of Jus Cogens”, (1988-1987) 3 
Connecticut Journal of International Law  359. 
80 Linderfalk (n.53), at 863-864. 
81 See, e.g. J Frowein and N Krisch, “Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace 
and Acts of Aggression”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary  (Oxford , 
2nd ed, 2002), at 715; see also Vitzthum, n.69, at 146-148. On the other hand, see: B Fassbender, “The 
United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community”, (1998) 36 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 529; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its 
Fundamental Problems (New York, Fredrick A Praeger 1950), at 107-110. 
82 Similar arguments suggest that the jus cogens version of the prohibition only covers illegal uses of 
force or aggression: see, e.g. de Hoogh (n.56), at 1173-1175; see also Helmersen (n.50), at 185-186. 
83 See Corten (n.1), at 200-213. 
84 Ibid. 
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As we shall now explore, the very wording of Article 2(4) is sufficient to 
provide for these ‘exceptions’ built within the rule itself. 
 
2. The Original Interpretation of Article 2(4)  
2.1 Recourse to the Preparatory Works of the Charter 
 
Article 32 of the VCLT allows recourse to the preparatory works of a treaty as a 
supplementary means of interpretation to either confirm an interpretation based on 
Article 31 or to determine the true meaning when the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms 
(i) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or, (ii) leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
The ordinary meaning of the terms in Article 2(4), especially ‘territoria l 
integrity’ and ‘political independence’, have never been thoroughly deciphered. This 
is primarily because they are not ‘ordinary terms’ in themselves – they are, of course, 
constructions of legal principles adopted by States with many different politica l 
underpinnings. Even if some of the interpretations of those terms can be accepted, 
especially when they result in the wide interpretation of Article 2(4), they may well 
lead to manifestly absurd results such as the inherent contradictions just outlined. 
Therefore, there is a great need to revisit the preparatory works of the Charter 
to either confirm interpretations of Article 2(4), or determine its meaning. 
 
2.2 Explaining the Construction of Article 2(4): The Drafters’ View 
 
The ‘Dumbarton Oaks Proposal’ is the proposal put forward for debate as a basis for 
a new International Organisation by the original inviting parties at the United Nations 
Conference on International Organisation85 at San Francisco in 1945. The Article 2(4) 
equivalent, before the Proposals were debated and amended, read very simply: 
 
                                                 
85 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation  (Multi-volume, New 
York, United Nations 1945) – Cited hereinafter as UNCIO.  
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All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
Organization.86 
 
This original proposal, in its construction, is quite clear in that it maintains the 
possibility of States using force on behalf of the Security Council, as per the Charter, 
and in self-defence, assuming that these types of force are ‘consistent’ with the 
purposes of the Organisation. Rather than outlawing simply the threat or use of force, 
the original proposal sought to outlaw only force that was ‘inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Organisation’.  
If the prohibition of force was meant to preclude all threats and uses of force 
in international relations, the drafters of the provision could have simply required all 
members “to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations 
against any state”. But, as Simon87 points out, the drafters did not do this – they went 
on to specify that it was force against ‘territorial integrity’, ‘political independence’, 
and in a manner ‘inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN’ that were specifica lly 
prohibited. Similarly, Schachter88 argues that such additions must logically qualify the 
prohibition of force, or else they are redundant.  
Based upon this logic, we can say that the only qualification in the origina l 
proposal for Article 2(4) was the phrase precluding force ‘inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the UN.’ By extension, this suggests that the original proposal allowed for 
force consistent with the Purposes of the UN. It was meant to allow for lawful uses of 
force in the way that it was constructed, and this was explicitly noted by some States 
during the drafting of the Charter.89 There seems to be no obvious reason why this 
would change when further terms were added to strengthen the prohibition itself, 
especially when no explicit exception was inserted to counteract the effect of such 
terms.90 
                                                 
86 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organisation , Doc 1, G/1, 3 UNCIO 1, at 3 
(Chapter II, para 4).  
87 Steve G Simon, “The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention”, (1993-1994) 
24 California Western International Law Journal  117, at 131. 
88 O Schachter, “International Law in Theory and Practice: A general Course in International Law”, 
(1982) 178 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International  9, at 140. 
89 See for example, Verbatim Minutes of the Second Meeting of Commission I, (20th June 1945), Doc 
1123, I/8, 6 UNCIO 65, at 68-69 (Peru). 
90 See above, n.24. 
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One of the most-cited debates during the drafting of the Charter comes from 
the Eleventh Meeting of Committee I/1, on 4 June 1945.91 In this meeting, there was 
extensive discussion of the possibility of the provision being interpreted as allowing 
some forms of unilateral force beyond self-defence, especially if argued that such force 
was ‘consistent with the purposes of the organisation’.92 In particular, the delegate of 
Norway felt that the language of the provision, which at the time reflected essentially 
the final version of Article 2(4) bar some minor amendments, did not reflect 
satisfactorily its intentions. Norway thus called for it to be made very clear that the 
prohibition “did not contemplate any use of force, outside of action by the 
Organization, going beyond individual or collective self-defense.”93 To suggest that 
the provision’s intentions did not contemplate such force, while maintaining the 
possibility of action by the UN and in self-defence, necessarily and logically suggests 
that Norway certainly considered those lawful uses of force as being recognised by 
Article 2(4) itself. In fact, the Norwegian representative even went as far as to suggest 
the removal of the terms ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ to make 
this purpose clear, considering that these principles could already be said to be 
protected elsewhere in the Charter and under international law generally.94 
In reply – and very crucially – the delegate of the United Kingdom agreed with 
the reasoning of the Norwegian delegate, but insisted on the fact that “the wording of 
the text had been carefully considered so as to preclude interference with the  
enforcement clauses of [Chapter VII] of the Charter.”95 Furthermore, the UK 
explained the addition of ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ through an 
Australian amendment as using “most intelligible, forceful and economica l 
language.”96 
This evidences an interpretation, at least on the part of Norway and the UK, 
that Article 2(4) itself allows for the use of force as provided for in the Charter, and in 
self-defence. However, this is also the meeting where the delegate of the United States 
is widely and famously cited as arguing that “the intention of the authors of the origina l 
text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive prohibition; the phrase 
                                                 
91 Eleventh Meeting of Committee I/1 , (5th June 1945), Doc 784, I/1/27, 6 UNCIO 331. 
92 Ibid, at 334-335. 
93 Ibid, at 334. 
94 6 UNCIO 331 (n.91), at 334-335. 
95 Ibid, at 335. 
96 Ibid. 
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‘in any other manner’ was designed to insure that there should be no loopholes.”97 It 
is this key phrase that is often cited by commentators to support the wide interpretat ion 
of Article 2(4), and thus the view that it is an absolute blanket ban on force.98 
At first glance, this seems to reveal an apparent divergence between the 
positions of the UK and the US in this meeting. However, considering the fact that 
these States were both a leading part of the drafting of the original Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals, and the US is clearly referring to language that was already within that 
original proposal, it seems unlikely that their statements on this issue would be 
fundamentally incompatible. Logically, it can’t be possible for the prohibition to be 
all-encompassing with no loopholes, while at the same time allowing for the use of 
force by the Security Council through its ‘consistency’ with the Purposes of the UN. 
As just highlighted, the original proposal could not have been absolute either.99 
Instead, it seems more plausible that the US was referring to ‘no loopholes’ in 
the ‘absolute all-inclusive prohibition’ of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the Charter, while clearly leaving room for the requisite in-built 
‘loopholes’ of self-defence and the powers of the Security Council. It is in this context 
that this statement of the United States should be understood. 
This is especially true in light of the subsequent report of the Rapporteur to 
this very committee.100 This report made an explicit and special note in relation to 
Article 2(4), to alleviate the concerns of Norway, to state: 
 
The Committee likes it to be stated in view of the Norwegian amendment to the same 
paragraph that the unilateral use of force or similar coercive measures is not 
authorized or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted 
and unimpaired. The use of force, therefore, remains legitimate only to back up the 
decisions of the Organization at the start of a controversy or during its solution in the 
way that the Organization itself ordains. The intention of the Norwegian amendment 
is thus covered by the present text.101 
 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 See e.g. Chesterman (n.22), at 49-50. 
99 See text at n.88 and surrounding discussion. 
100 Report of Rapporteur of Committee 1, Commission I, (9th June 1945), Doc 885, I/1/34, 6 UNCIO 
387. 
101 Ibid, at 400 (emphasis added). 
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There could be no clearer or more authoritative statement that it was the intentions of 
the drafters of this very provision that Article 2(4) itself: (i) outlawed the use of 
unilateral force; but (ii) maintained the possibility of using force in self-defence, and 
as per the powers of the UN Security Council.  
This recognition is also referred to elsewhere during the drafting. When 
discussing an amendment by New Zealand to add another ‘Principle’ to the Charter 
which would have required active resistance by States to acts of aggression, which 
was ultimately rejected, Australia noted that Article 2(4) “was not entirely negative 
but implied the positive use of force.”102 
It is argued on this basis that Article 2(4) was carefully constructed in a way 
so as to acknowledge the lawful uses of force recognised under the Charter, whilst also 
maintaining a wide prohibition in instances of unilateral action beyond the 
Organisation. This shuts down any argument for the extreme narrow interpretat ion, 
but also indicates the prohibition is not as far-reaching as the wide interpretation. 
Yet, since the drafting of the Charter, we have seen that this interpretation of 
Article 2(4) has not been explicitly acknowledged, or at least not investigated in full.103 
Unfortunately, the result is a very complicated and complex working of the provision, 
due to the competing balance between protecting States from unilateral force as far as 
possible, while still maintaining the possibility of Security Council enforcement 
action. This was once described by Peru during the drafting of the Charter as “an 
awkward, unhappy, equivocal wording.”104 Peru also noted that the delegate of 
Norway described it as illogical, ‘because it comprises two negations.’105 But the 
delegates nevertheless still emphasised the original purpose of the provision in still 
leaving room for UN-sanctioned force.106 
 
                                                 
102 Twelfth Meeting of Committee 1, Commission I, (6th June 1945), Doc 810, I/1/30, 6 UNCIO 342, at 
346. 
103 However, Perkins interprets Article 2(4) as prohibiting only unilateral uses of force, but of course 
does not further investigate the wider implications of this beyond his arguments surrounding 
‘counterintervention’. See JA Perkins, “The Right of Counterintervention”, (1987) 17 Ga. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 171, at 198-199 (in particular footnote 90); See also Brownlie (n.107), at 268, where Brownlie 
suggests that the final part of the prohibition requiring ‘inconsistency with the Purposes of the UN’ 
might well explain the legality of the actions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
but does not further investigate this possibility. 
104 Verbatim Minutes of the Second Meeting of Commission I, (20th June 1945), Doc 1123, I/8, 6 UNCIO 
65, at 68-69 (Peru). 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid, at 68. 
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2.2.1 The Drafters’ View of Territorial Integrity and Political Independence 
 
Ultimately, Article 2(4) refers specifically to ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘politica l 
independence’. Referring to the preparatory works of the Charter, Brownlie argues 
that ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ were inserted at the insistence 
of smaller States to offer very specific guarantees or protections under the prohibit ion, 
and not to restrict the prohibition of force.107 Notwithstanding such ‘specific 
guarantees’, Brownlie argues that the terms do not qualify the prohibition of force.108 
Respectfully, this author disagrees, in part, with Brownlie’s interpretation of the 
preparatory debates, for the following reasons. 
It was evident from some discussions that there was a clear intention for the 
Security Council itself to be bound by these principles. Particularly revealing is a 
Czechoslovakian proposal which explicitly considered the Security Council to be 
bound to respect ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’.109 The proposal 
was suggested in the context of what became Article 24, where the Council is required 
to act in accordance with the Principles of the Charter. The Czechoslovakian proposal 
clearly considered the Council to be bound by such principles, and suggested that there 
should be a provision for a situation to be referred to the General Assembly if measures 
were required that would infringe upon those principles. In full, the proposal stated: 
 
Should the Security Council come to the conclusion that international peace and 
security can be maintained only by measures not in conformity with these 
fundamental principles (respect for the territorial integrity and political independence 
of States-members), and especially by territorial changes, the matter should be laid 
before the Assembly. At the request of any party to the dispute, the question shall also 
be laid before the Assembly. In these cases the Assembly should decide by a two-
thirds majority vote.110 
 
                                                 
107 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1963), at 266-267. 
108 Ibid, at 267. 
109 See Document Table on Chapter VI Sections B, C, and D, (15th May 1945), Doc 360, III/1/16, 11 
UNCIO 766, at 770 (citing Doc 2 G/14 (b), p.2). 
110 Ibid, emphasis added. 
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However, the proposal was withdrawn, with the Czechoslovakian representative 
suggesting that it was merely an ‘observation’ that the Security Council was bound to 
respect territorial integrity and political independence elsewhere in the Charter.111 
A discussion of this very issue arose following a Norwegian amendment to the 
Charter that would have required the Council to abide by certain principles when 
settling a dispute.112 The proposal required that “no solution should be imposed upon 
a state of a nature to impair its confidence in its future security or welfare.”113 Norway 
expanded upon this proposal, referring to the Czechoslovakian proposal for support, 
and sought assurances relating to the powers of the Security Council that States’ 
territorial integrity and political independence should be protected, particularly in the 
application of coercive actions and sanctions.114 Norway made clear that its proposal 
was made with a view to establishing rules of conduct for the Security Council.115 
Rejecting Norway’s proposal, States pointed out that the Security Council was 
already bound by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. The United Kingdom 
said that its purpose was already served by the Purposes in Article 1 of the Charter, 
where it is required that the Organisation was to “bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes…”116 In other words, the UK was suggesting that, 
when settling an international dispute – especially following the use of enforcement 
measures to restore or maintain peace and security – the Council must act in 
accordance with justice and international law. 
Norway replied that there was no problem connected with the Council’s pacific 
settlement of disputes, but with its coercive action, where the Council has at its 
disposal ‘overwhelming powers’.117 In response, the United States attempted to 
reassure Norway by arguing that the Purposes and Principles of the Charter 
“constituted the highest rules of conduct”, and stated simply that Article 24 of the 
                                                 
111 Continuation of the Report of the Activities of Committee III/1 Concerning Sections A, B, C, and D 
of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, (14th June 1945), Doc WD 313, III/1/51, 11 UNCIO 
555, at 557; see also Summary Report of Thirteenth Meeting of Committee III/1 , (24th May 1945), Doc 
555, III/1/27, 11 UNCIO 375, at 378. 
112 See proposal at (n.109), 11 UNCIO 766, at 770 (citing Doc 2 G/7 (n)(1), p.4). 
113 Ibid. 
114 Thirteenth Meeting of Committee III/1  (n.111), 11 UNCIO 375 at 378-379. 
115 Ibid, 378. 
116 Ibid, emphasis added. 
117 Ibid. 
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Charter just simply was not the right place to put Norway’s amendment.118 The US 
argued: “Furthermore, the Charter had to be considered in its entirety and if the 
Security Council violated its principles and purposes it would be acting ultra vires.”119 
Finally, the Australian delegate noted the importance of Norway’s amendment, 
but insisted that its proper place was “in another part of the Charter to which Australia 
had proposed an amendment that all nations should refrain from threat or use of force 
against one another.” He argued: 
 
This idea, as well as the Czechoslovak desire for guarantees of independence and 
territorial integrity, was concerned with the same basic question as the Norwegian 
amendment, but belonged in an earlier section of the Charter.120 
 
This is a fundamental revelation. Australia’s statement suggests that Norway’s aim for 
the Security Council to respect the Purposes and Principles of the UN is achieved 
through its own amendment to Article 2(4) – an amendment which added the terms 
‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ to that provision.121  
Furthermore, for those still not convinced that the Security Council is obligated 
to act in accordance with Article 2(4), there can be no doubt that it must act in 
accordance with Article 2(1) – which provides for the principle of sovereign equality, 
on which the Organisation itself is based. During the drafting of this provision, it was 
made very clear that the principle of sovereign equality includes respect for politica l 
independence and territorial integrity.122 By being required to act in accordance with 
this Principle in Article 24, the Security Council is bound to respect the territoria l 
integrity and political independence of all States – especially when undertaking or 
authorising enforcement action. Considering that the powers of the Security Council 
are very clearly accepted within the Charter itself, there would be no alternative but to 
accept that territorial integrity and political independence can, in some way, allow for 
enforcement measures. 
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In light of this, there are three possibilities: (i) the meanings of ‘territoria l 
integrity’ and ‘political independence’ are much more narrow than assumed; (ii) the 
scope of these principles is very wide and, thus, the Security Council’s powers are 
much more limited than assumed; or (iii) ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘politica l 
independence’ are much more dynamic principles than first thought, containing 
inherent qualifications based upon the consent of States and other rules of customary 
international law.  
The latter possibility is the most convincing, as we shall now go on to discuss 
as we investigate the consequences of the original intentions of the drafters on the 
legal and doctrinal mechanics of Article 2(4). 
 
3. The Mechanics of Article 2(4) 
3.1 Inherent Qualifications of Territorial Integrity  
 
There are two main competing interpretations of ‘territorial integrity’. There is the 
narrow interpretation, which says that territorial integrity prohibits the annexation of 
territory, or the use of force for territorial conquest. In essence, it relates only to the 
changing of borders or boundaries, and may also prohibit the illega l occupation of 
territory.  
This view is supported by authors such as D’Amato123 and Tesόn,124 who 
primarily advocate for a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Brenfors and 
Petersen,125 submit that the intention of Article 2(4) was to abolish this ‘classic’ form 
of the use of force, which they argue is not the type of force used for a ‘true’ 
humanitarian intervention.126 Brenfors and Petersen believe that “Article 2(4) was to 
be understood as covering only acts of invasions, subsequent border changes or 
abrogation of independence.”127 According to this school of thought, such invasions 
and annexations are legally distinct from forcible interventions to protect populations 
                                                 
123A D’Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect (New York, 2nd edn., Transnational 
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124 FR Tesόn, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (New York, 2nd edn, 
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from impending or ongoing atrocities, and thus do not infringe upon the principle of 
territorial integrity. 
On the other hand, there is the wide interpretation of ‘territorial integrity’, 
which conflates ‘integrity’ with territorial ‘inviolability’ – i.e. the notion that borders 
are inviolable, and thus any interference within a State itself would violate the 
territorial integrity of that State. This is supported by the likes of Chesterman, 128 
Brownlie,129 and Elden.130 
Elden highlights two alternatives for the meaning of ‘integrity’: first, the notion 
of being ‘whole’ versus being ‘fractured’, and secondly the more personality-based 
notions of respect, honour, and pride.131 These notions are closely related to the 
dictionary definitions of ‘integrity’, which include: (i) the quality of being honest and 
having strong moral principles; or (ii) the state of being whole and undivided.132 The 
latter notion is also further defined as: the condition of having no part or element taken 
away or wanting; or an undivided or unbroken state.133 
Of course, it is not possible for territory itself to ‘be honest’ or ‘have strong 
moral principles’, and so it is unlikely that the principle of territorial integrity refers to 
this “unimpaired moral state” or “freedom from moral corruption.”134 It is more likely 
that the legal use of the term refers to the wholeness of a State’s territory, and its 
borders remaining fixed and unalterable through force.  
Yet, the much wider view suggests that this ‘integrity’ of territory extends to 
the complete ‘inviolability’ of borders or boundaries. Lauterpacht is widely cited as 
suggesting that “territorial integrity, especially where coupled with politica l 
independence, is synonymous with territorial inviolability.”135 Lauterpacht, in fact, 
goes on to argue: 
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Thus a state would be acting in breach of its obligations under the Charter if it were 
to invade or commit an act of force within the territory of another state, in anticipation 
of an alleged impending attack or in order to obtain redress, without the intention of 
interfering permanently with the territorial integrity of that state.136 
 
Here, Lauterpacht seems to be suggesting that the intention of a State, and how it 
directs its use of force, is irrelevant to the protection of territorial integrity. If territoria l 
integrity was synonymous with territorial inviolability, and did prohibit any act of 
force within territory or any incursion into territory regardless of the intention, then 
even the use of force for the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf 
of the UN would be included within this definition. That, by extension, would imply 
that Article 2(4) really was an ‘absolute’ prohibition of force, because any force 
foreseen by the UN Charter would be captured by this phrase ‘territorial inviolability’.  
Similarly, Chesterman dismisses any restrictive interpretation of Article 2(4), 
suggesting that a narrow view of territorial integrity would demand an ‘Orwellian’ 
construction of those terms.137 It is not entirely clear what Chesterman means by this, 
but his argument is based upon a similar assertion previously put by Schachter,138 who 
states: 
 
The idea that wars waged in a good cause such as democracy and human rights would 
not involve a violation of territorial integrity or political independence demands an 
Orwellian construction of those terms. It is no wonder that the argument has not found 
any significant support.139 
  
When arguing this point, Schachter briefly defines territorial integrity as “the right of 
a state to control access to its territory.”140 However, Schachter himself concedes the 
possibility of a limited intervention to save lives, which he terms as a ‘limited rescue 
mission’, but maintains that “it is difficult to extend that argument to justify an armed 
invasion to topple a repressive regime.”141 Therefore, even with the more restrictive 
interpretations of Article 2(4), there are more nuanced understandings of territoria l 
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integrity that must be investigated. Of course, we must be careful not to stretch or 
abuse the meaning of these terms to justify uses of force on potentially duplicitous 
grounds. But this does not mean that we should ignore the effect of those terms 
altogether. 
Rejecting overly-wide interpretations, and the link to territorial inviolabil ity, 
Bowett insists on giving ‘territorial integrity’ its plain meaning, arguing that: “The 
rights of territorial integrity and political independence have never been absolute, but 
always relative to similar rights in other States, so that ‘integrity’ has always been a 
more accurate term than ‘inviolability’.”142 Bowett’s argument certainly calls for a 
more doctrinal and nuanced investigation into these terms. 
Indeed, the very possibility of the Council being bound itself by territoria l 
integrity and political independence, whether through Article 2(4), or through the 
principle of sovereign equality in Article 2(1) of the Charter, leads us to consider the 
possibility of these terms having inherent qualifications.143 This implies that the 
principles themselves are limited in scope by a voluntary relinquishment of 
sovereignty by the State, or by reason of existing rights of other States. In other words, 
a State consents to circumstances normally affecting territorial integrity or politica l 
independence, thereby limiting the application of those principles. By this analysis, it 
is submitted that enforcement measures find their compatibility with the principles of 
territorial integrity and political independence through qualifications inherent within 
the principles themselves, rather than through overly-narrow interpretations of 
situations that might usually fall within their scope. 
This issue becomes particularly clear when we consider the use of milita ry 
occupation by the Security Council. Territorial integrity clearly prohibits the unlawful 
military occupation of a States’ territory.144 However, is it possible to occupy territory 
lawfully, thus rendering such an occupation outside of the scope of territorial integr ity? 
For example, if one considers an agreement between State A and State B, for State A 
to have a military base on the territory of State B, could we consider this consent as a 
voluntary limitation of State B’s right of territorial integrity in those particula r 
circumstances? A similar theory might be applied to UN Peacekeeping, where States 
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consent to the presence, and sometimes occupation, of peacekeepers within its 
territory.145 
We also know that States can voluntarily change borders or boundaries through 
a peaceful settlement. It is the forcible change of borders that would violate territoria l 
integrity. The change of borders through a peaceful settlement or treaty, therefore,  
would be a valid limitation of the application of the principle of territorial integrity of 
that State. 
It is therefore submitted that the provisions of the UN Charter, as a form of 
‘permanent’ consent to the powers of the Council, constitute an inherent limitation of 
the principle of territorial integrity when applied in the context of the use of force by 
the Council.  
 
3.2 Inherent Qualifications of Political Independence 
 
Political independence, according to a relatively consistent consensus among 
commentators, refers to “the autonomy in the affairs of the state with respect to its 
institutions, freedom of political decisions, policy making, and in matters pertaining 
to its domestic and foreign affairs.”146 The Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
of States147 similarly declares: 
 
Every State has the right to independence and hence to exercise freely, without 
dictation by any other state, all its legal powers, including the choice of its own form 
of government.148 
 
Corten describes it as “a notion that implies at the very least that each State exercises 
full executive power in its territory without external interference.”149 Corten uses this 
definition to suggest that even if a use of force was not aimed at overthrowing or 
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changing the government of the target State, then it would still be incompatible with 
the concept of independence in what is most fundamental about it.150 
That leaves us to question the role that consent plays in ‘limiting’ the politica l 
independence of a State. Bowett also refers to the inherent limitations of politica l 
independence, arguing that the right of political independence is not absolute, but 
subject to the rights of other States.151  
Referring this back to the UN Charter, Bowett suggests that: 
 
Perhaps the most important limitation on the rights of political independence today is 
the right of intervention assumed by the Security Council in the general interest of the 
international community as a whole. 
… 
This means, therefore, that the right of political independence is conditional upon it 
not constituting a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ within 
the terms of Article 39.152 
 
This is a very convincing argument, especially in light of the preceding findings of 
this Chapter. Like territorial integrity, political independence also seems to be 
inherently limited by the consent of States, and any existing international law applying 
to a State.  
As explored by Bowett, a State’s political independence is also limited by the 
right of self-defence in international law.153 By the very reason of its existence, and 
being subject to pre-existing rules of international law and customary internationa l 
law, even if not a member of the UN Charter, a State must expect that any armed attack 
it conducts against a State will be subject to the right of the victim State to respond in 
self-defence. Thus, its decision to conduct an external policy of force against a State 
is not protected by its political independence, for this right has been limited by the 
very existence of the right of self-defence. 
By this analysis, it seems that ‘absolute’ territorial integrity or politica l 
independence is only possible with ‘absolute’ sovereignty. However, upon ‘entering’ 
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the international community and being subject to international law, sovereignty is 
immediately qualified. For example, any new State would be already subject to 
respecting the sovereignty of other States, which inherently limits the politica l 
independence of the new State to conduct a foreign policy of annexation and territoria l 
expansion. Those are no longer accepted practices in international law, and so are no 
longer protected by the principle of political independence so long as those laws exist.  
 
3.3 Consistency with the Purposes of the United Nations 
3.3.1 The ‘Catch-All’ Provision 
 
The final part of Article 2(4) is the restriction of force in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations. Dinstein154 considers this last sentence to be 
a residual ‘catch-all’ provision that would prohibit all other uses of force, includ i ng 
those already against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.155 In 
other words, the effect of the final provision is the same as would have been intended 
under the original Dumbarton Oaks proposal. 
In support of this, Dinstein cites Lachs,156 who originally conceded in 1980 
that the final sentence is “at first sight a residual ‘catch-all’ provision”, 157 however 
Lachs continued to suggest that “it may render the operation of the Article more 
specific, since it serves to prohibit the substitution of a forcible solution for any process 
decided upon by the United Nations, in pursuance of its purposes, for the settlement 
of a particular issue.”158 
Corten is more explicit in suggesting that the final sentence is an objective 
prohibition of any force used in a manner inconsistent with the stated Purposes of the 
UN.159 Similarly, Chesterman agrees that this provision is inclusive of all uses of force 
whether or not they violate the territorial integrity or political independence of a 
State.160 
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3.3.2 The Purposes of the UN 
 
The Purposes of the UN are found within Article 1 of the Charter, and include the 
maintenance of international peace and security through effective collective measures 
in Article 1(1).  
Tesόn argues that unilateral action – humanitarian intervention in particular – 
can survive this ‘purposes’ test, noting that a primary purpose of the UN is the 
promotion of human rights.161 To support this, Tesόn cites Article 1(3) of the UN 
Charter, which emphasises that a Purpose of the United Nations is: 
 
To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; 
 
Tesόn argues that the promotion of human rights is just as important as the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and so the use of force to remedy 
serious human rights deprivations – in the form of humanitarian intervention – is in 
accordance with the Purposes of the UN.162 Unfortunately, his argument is 
fundamentally flawed. Chesterman criticises Tesόn’s interpretation as stretching the 
words of the Charter too far – and highlighting that, in Article 1(3), the Purpose is to 
achieve international cooperation in its aims, while promoting and encouraging  
respect for human rights.163 Indeed, using the word ‘protect’ rather than ‘promote’ 
could have granted a stronger mandate in enabling States to defend human rights. 
Simons notes this point, and the fact that the proposal to use the word ‘protect’ was 
ultimately rejected out of fear that it would raise hopes of going beyond what the UN 
could achieve effectively.164 Emphasising this, Chesterman argues that there is no 
room in this provision to allow for a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention.165 
 Even so, Simon alludes to the possibility that the Charter creates a fundamenta l 
obligation on States to respect and protect human rights, purportedly giving a 
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unilateral humanitarian intervention the consistency with the Purposes of the Charter 
that Article 2(4) requires.166 
I do not find this persuasive for the following reasons. First, if we consider 
unilateral uses of force – i.e. force without the authorisation of the UN – it might be 
suggested that any such unilateral measures inherently threaten international peace 
and security, are ineffective for this purpose, and are not sufficiently ‘collective’ for 
the purposes of Article 1(1). Secondly, the rarely-cited Article 1(4) could provide a 
strong basis for arguing that unilateral action is inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
Charter. This Purpose is for the UN to be “a center for harmonising the actions of 
nations” for the attainment of the other Purposes of the UN . This author submits that 
unilateral action would also be inconsistent with the purpose of harmonising the 
collective maintenance of international peace and security, since the Security Council, 
as stated in Article 24, acts on behalf of Member States in its responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Action through the United Nations is 
the only way to harmonise the actions of the nations in response to a crisis – and any 
unilateral action would clearly be inconsistent with that aim. 
 
4. Force Beyond the Security Council? 
4.1 Questions Concerning Action by the General Assembly 
 
The interpretation of Article 2(4) based upon the analysis above may have implicat ions 
on explaining the legality of the use of force by the UN General Assembly. In 1950, 
due to deadlock in the Security Council, the General Assembly adopted the Uniting 
for Peace procedure.167 In short, this purportedly allowed the General Assembly to 
recommend enforcement action beyond the Security Council. 
One recommendation to use force was passed outside of this procedure by the 
General Assembly in relation to the Korean War.168 But the Uniting for Peace 
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Resolution itself has only been used rarely and almost exclusively for peacekeeping 
missions, which of course are based on the consent of States anyway.169 
But, this analysis of Article 2(4) may explain the ability of the General 
Assembly to recommend force. However, this would only be the case if: (i) the 
General Assembly has the requisite competences under the Charter to do so, i.e. so 
that the force would not infringe political independence or territorial integrity,170 and 
(ii) it remains in conformity with the Purposes of the United Nations. These are 
questions that remain to be more rigorously examined in Chapter VI. In terms of 
conformity with the Purposes of the United Nations, based on the analysis above, there 
seems to be no reason to suggest that a Resolution by the General Assembly 
recommending the use of force, so long as it is competent to do so, would not 
‘harmonise the actions of nations’ in accordance with Article 1(4) any less than an 
‘authorisation’ by the Security Council itself to do the very same thing. Both methods, 
it seems, are consistent with the Purposes of the Charter in Article 1, and so in 
accordance with the terms of Article 2(4), hence demonstrating that the General 
Assembly may well also have the power to recommend force in accordance with its 
competences and procedures.  
 
4.2 Questions Concerning Regional Enforcement 
 
Finally, this analysis might be of use to investigate certain forms of treaty-based 
‘consent’ to use force in Regional Organisations. For example, in Article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union,171 the AU has agreed to take enforcement 
action against States in response to possible acts of genocide etc. Questions have been 
raised as to whether this could be a form of treaty-based consent.172 If so, this could 
                                                 
169 See, e.g. Report of the Secretary-General, Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the 
Establishment and Operation of the Force, (9th Oct 1958) UN Doc A/3943, at [13]-[19], [154]-[193];  
see also, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, (2008, New York), at 31. 
170 See, e.g. N White and N Tsagourias, Collective Security: Theory, Law, and Practice (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 100-114; N White, “The Relationship between the UN Security  
Council and General Assembly in Matters of International Peace and Security,” in Marc Weller (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force In International Law  (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2015). 
171 Constitutive Act of the African Union, (adopted 11th July 2000, entered into force on 26th May 2001) 
2158 UNTS 3. 
172 For a thorough overview of this, and debates surrounding Article 4(h) in general, see D Kuwali and 
F Viljoen (eds), Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive 
Act (Routledge, 2014). 
133 
 
form a treaty-based limitation of territorial integrity and political independence, and 
thus pass the first hurdle of conformity with Article 2(4). 
However, such action may still require the authorisation of the Security 
Council, as this requirement still exists separately under Chapter VIII of the Charter 
within Article 53(1). Olivier Corten suggests that this may be possible, since Regiona l 
Organisations are to be construed as within the ‘control’ (for want of a better word) of 
the Security Council itself.173 
Thus, this Chapter’s interpretation of Article 2(4) still upholds the 
longstanding belief that unilateral uses of force, without the authorisation of the United 
Nations, are a violation of the prohibition, having based this interpretation upon 
authoritative statements to this effect during the drafting of the Charter. The difference 
with Regional Organisations is that, although members of such arrangements may 
have limited their political independence and territorial integrity through treaty-based 
consent, the Regional Organisation’s actions must still be consistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations (which do not allow for such unilateral action), and the 
additional requirement contained in Article 53(1) that no enforcement action may be 
taken without Security Council authorisation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated, through an in-depth analysis of the prohibition of force 
in international law, that there are potential gaps in this rule whereby action could be 
taken to implement the tertiary responsibility to protect. However, this interpretat ion, 
based upon the preparatory works of the Charter, does not allow for unilateral uses of 
force such as humanitarian intervention. 
Therefore, the use of force remains legal only when: (i) it does not violate the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a State, which could be inherently 
limited or qualified by the prior-consent of that State or a rule of customary 
international law; and (ii) it is consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, 
which implies that any unilateral action beyond the UN would be illegal. 
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Having established the legal space for the tertiary responsibility to protect, it 
is left to determine whether this responsibility can be implemented by the relevant 
actors, which will be discussed in Chapter VI.
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V 
 
A Tertiary Responsibility and Non-Forcible Measures 
 
Introduction 
 
This Chapter will apply the theory of a tertiary responsibility to protect to the legality 
of non-forcible, but still coercive, measures beyond the Security Council. Primarily, 
the Chapter will be concerned with the use of ‘sanctions’ – defined broadly as 
encompassing economic sanctions such as asset freezes and trade restrictions, as well 
as other coercive methods.  
To do so, this Chapter will address the contours of the principle of non-
intervention in customary international law. It finds that the principle of non-
intervention does not prohibit the use of certain coercive methods, regardless of one’s 
interpretation of ‘intervention’, so long as the intervention is not ‘essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction’ of a State. It argues that any norm of international law 
allowing for coercive measures or sanctions is, by definition, not within such 
‘domestic jurisdiction’ of a State, nor is it an intervention in the ‘internal or external 
affairs’ of that State because a State’s competences in those affairs are inherently 
‘limited’ or by the voluntary relinquishment of sovereignty in the acceptance of, or 
being subject to, such a rule of international law. Therefore, the thesis takes the 
position that the only measures that could be legally permissible are those provided 
for in international law itself, specifically as found in the doctrine of countermeasures, 
allowing proportionate measures in response to prior breaches of internationa l 
obligations. 
Addressing countermeasures, the limitations of the doctrine as a method of 
implementing a tertiary responsibility to protect are considered, particularly focussing 
on the question of whether actors not directly injured by a prior breach of an 
international obligation may take measures in response to breaches of obligations erga 
omnes, as relevant to the responsibility to protect. By addressing this alternative legal 
avenue beyond the Security Council, it finds further legal space for the tertiary 
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responsibility to protect to fill, providing more evidence of the concept’s viability and 
utility. 
 
1. The Principle of Non-Intervention 
 
We have seen that the UN Charter recognises the principle of non-intervention in a 
limited form in Article 2(7), where it states: 
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. 
 
This principle relates directly to the United Nations, preventing it from acting within 
the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of a State. A similar, all-encompassing, principle of non-
intervention is also recognised in customary international law as applying to all States 
– as evidenced in several General Assembly Resolutions. For example, the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, “[r]eaffirming the principle of non-
intervention,”1 insists that: 
 
… direct intervention, subversion and all forms of indirect intervention are contrary 
to these principles and, consequently, constitute a violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 2 
 
It also declares: 
 
No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in 
the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention 
                                                 
1 UNGA Res 2131(XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty , (21st December 1965) UN Doc 
A/RES/2131(XX), Preamble. 
2 Ibid, Preamble. 
137 
 
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.3 
 
The Declaration on Friendly Relations introduces the general principle as:  
 
The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter.4 
 
Importantly, the Declaration on Friendly Relations also reiterates that “No State or 
group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”5 This declaration 
clarified that such interventions were a violation of international law6 – rather than 
simply being ‘condemned’ as they were in the earlier declaration. The Internationa l 
Court of Justice has accepted that this declaration was representative of customary 
international law.7  
During the drafting debates of the Friendly Relations Declaration, there were 
opposing views as to whether the principle of non-intervention left room for coercive 
measures beyond the Security Council. A proposal by the United Kingdom included 
the ultimately-prevailing phrase prohibiting ‘intervention in matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any other State’.8 Commentary to this proposal explained that 
“‘intervention’ connotes in general forcible or dictatorial interference.”9 Importantly, 
however, the UK’s commentary stressed that: 
 
In considering the scope of ‘intervention’, it should be recognized that in an 
interdependent world, it is inevitable and desirable that States will he concerned with 
and will seek to influence the actions and policies of other States, and that the 
                                                 
3 Ibid, para [1] (emphasis added). 
4 UNGA Res 2625(XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations , (24 
October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/2625 (XXV), Annex, principle 3 [Emphasis added]. 
5 Declaration on Friendly Relations (n.4), principle 3. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA)  
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (Nicaragua Case), at 106-107, para [202]; Case Concerning Armed  
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment of 
19th December 2005, (2005) ICJ Reports 168, at para [162]. 
8 See, UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly  
Relations and Co-operation among States’ (16 November 1964) UN Doc A/5746, at 110-111. 
9 Report of the Special Committee (1964) (n.8), at 111. 
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objective of international law is not to prevent such activity but rather to ensure that 
it is compatible with the sovereign equality of States and self-determination of their 
peoples.10 
 
This difference between ‘intervention’ and legitimate ‘influence’ was addressed in the 
pursuing debates. There were suggestions that intervention could be practiced by the 
processes of diplomacy, and where the coercive nature of an act of interference 
rendered that act an ‘intervention’.11 On the other hand, one representative suggested 
that there was a difference between ‘permissible’ and ‘impermissible’ intervention. 12 
This was supported by others, who suggested that they must be careful not to 
categorise as intervention action which would form part of normal diplomatic 
activities, and supported the idea that at least some forms of ‘pressure’ could be 
permissible.13 
In the 1966 session, an attempt was made by some States to include the 
recognition of a freedom of States to seek to influence the policies and actions of other 
States “in accordance with international law and settled international practice.”14 This 
was argued as not allowing for intervention, but to allow necessary influence in 
accordance with the law, for example to try to encourage States to follow policies 
consistent with the maintenance of international peace and security or the fulfilment 
of human rights.15 However, this was seen by others as possibly legitimis ing 
intervention, and was therefore unacceptable, so the focus should therefore be on 
defining not when influence was lawful, but when influence was most certainly 
unlawful.16 
When considering the meaning of ‘domestic jurisdiction’, it seemed generally 
accepted that this included both internal and external decisions of a State,17 and the 
only exception was where “such jurisdiction was restricted by obligations undertaken 
                                                 
10 Ibid, at 111. 
11 Ibid, at 125. 
12 Ibid, at 125. 
13 Ibid, at 126. 
14 UNGA, ‘Report of the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States’, (27 June 1966) UN Doc A/6230, at para [329]-
[333]. 
15 Report of the Special Committee (1966) (n.14), at paras [331]. 
16 Ibid, at paras [333]. 
17 Hence why the language prohibiting intervention in the ‘internal or external affairs’ of a Sta te was 
maintained in both Declarations. 
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by one State towards other States.”18 This also implied that because of rights and 
obligations emerging in customary international law or treaty, “the domestic 
jurisdiction of States in the legal sense had been continually reduced as the real interest 
of States in the territory of others had been recognized and given legal protection.”19 
While there was disagreement about how the inclusion of a reference to prohibit ing 
intervention in the ‘external affairs’ of a State might have unduly restricted legitima te 
interference on the international plain,20 this did not seem to be fully settled after two 
subsequent sessions of the Special Committee did not touch upon the principle due to 
a lack of time,21 and there were no detailed recorded discussions of the principle in the 
final negotiations of the Friendly Relations Declaration.22 
These fundamental questions continue to be debated in academic literature. 
Early work by Thomas and Thomas detailed the stark contrasts in academic opinion. 23 
They highlight the divide between arguments that suggest even the slightes t 
interference in a State’s affairs, such as a mere correspondence or criticism regarding 
a State’s actions, could amount to unlawful intervention, compared to arguments in 
favour of a strict application of the principle to only forcible and dictatoria l 
interference.24 
Thomas and Thomas reject the notion that a State could only be subject to 
pressure or coercion through the use of force, believing the approach to be too 
narrow.25 According to their view, actions taken by a State to ‘impose its will’ upon 
another, with attempts to ensure compliance with this will, are an intervention.26 They 
refer to a State’s “supreme authority to control all persons and things within its 
boundaries subject only to rules of general international law and obligations assumed 
                                                 
18 Report of the Special Committee (1964) (n.8), at 123-124. 
19 Report of the Special Committee (1964) (n.8), at 124. 
20 See, for example, Report of the Special Committee (1966) (n.14), at paras [306]-[307]; See also, 
UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly  
Relations and Co-operation among States’, (26 September 1967) UN Doc A/6799, at [343]-[348]. 
21 See, UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States’, (1968) UN Doc A/7326, para [204]; UNGA, 
‘Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations  
and Co-operation among States’, (1969) UN Doc A/7619, para [15]; UNGA, ‘Report of the Special 
Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relat ions and Co-operation among 
States’, (1970) UN Doc A/8018, at para [19]-[22]. 
22 Report of the Special Committee (1970) (n. 21), at para [58]-[59]. 
23 AW Thomas and AJ Thomas, Jr, Non-Intervention: The Law and its Import in the Americas (Dallas, 
Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), at 68. 
24 Thomas and Thomas (n.23), at 68; for an overview of the contrasting legal positions between scholars 
prior to the Friendly Relations Declaration, see ibid at 75-78. 
25 Thomas and Thomas (n.23), at 68. 
26 Thomas and Thomas (n.23), at 68-69, 72. 
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by international treaty.”27 They thus seem to accept the underlying exception that a 
State’s freedom from intervention can be subject only to rules of international law. 
However, their position may be a little more nuanced than this. Thomas and Thomas 
argue that ‘intervention’ should not just include ‘illegal’ intervention, but also that 
which might be considered ‘legal’ intervention. They suggest that although classifying 
differently acts of the same character might allow for ‘all intervention’ to be 
condemned categorically and unequivocally under this interpretation, this perhaps 
“complicates a problem that is already confused”, and so they argue it may be better 
to classify all acts of the same nature as ‘intervention’ and then recognise that certain 
interventions are legal by international law.28  
If this was the accepted interpretation of the principle, the phrase referring to 
intervention in the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of a State would not limit the principle at 
all. As we have seen above, the Declaration on Friendly Relations clearly considers 
‘domestic jurisdiction’ to include the internal and external affairs of a State, and 
Thomas and Thomas rightly note that “no valid distinction can be made between 
intervention in internal and external affairs.”29 Notably, the ‘affairs’ of a State, whether 
internal or external, could still be limited by those international agreements or treaties 
Thomas and Thomas refer to, or even customary international law itself.  
In more recent research, Aloupi30 maintains that it is unclear what is included 
in the principle of non-intervention, and that its limits and precise extent are open to 
debate.31 Taking a clear stance on the interpretation of non-intervention, Aloupi 
supports the position that the prohibition is limited to those issues that are within the 
‘domestic jurisdiction’ of States, or where the exercise of its discretionary powers are 
not limited in any way by customary or conventional international law.  32  
                                                 
27 Thomas and Thomas (n.23), at 68, (emphasis added). 
28 Thomas and Thomas (n.23), at 70-71; although, see at 72, where they suggest that advice, or official 
communication requesting a State not to take certain action would not necessarily constitute an 
‘intervention’. 
29 Thomas and Thomas (n.23), at 70. 
30 N Aloupi, “The Right to Non-intervention and Non-interference”, (2015) 4(3) Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 566. 
31 Aloupi (n.30), at 570-571. While Aloupi refers to non-intervention as both a ‘right’ and a 
‘prohibition’, this thesis draws no distinction and treats non -intervention as a principle of international 
law. 
32 Aloupi (n.30), at 573-575; while Aloupi distinguishes between non-interference and non-
intervention, this thesis does not adopt such a position, and instead treats ‘non -interference’ as falling  
within the principle of non-intervention as was adopted in the Friendly Relations Declaration . 
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This view is certainly consistent with the viewpoints of many States that were 
outlined during the drafting of the Friendly Relations Declaration, but we must at least 
identify what forms the basic makeup of a State’s ‘domestic jurisdiction’ or what 
might be protected as part of its ‘internal or external affairs’. Indeed, the Internationa l 
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case made some attempt to expand upon this when 
it suggested that: 
 
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each 
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these 
is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation 
of foreign policy.33 
 
Interestingly, the ICJ went on to say that “Intervention is wrongful when it uses 
methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.”34 
It may seem that this leaves room for coercion involving choices no longer 
within the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of a State, but such a conclusion would perhaps miss 
the point. For example, regarding the responsibility to protect, the fact that a State, in 
the eyes of international law at least, no longer has the sovereign power commit mass 
atrocities that would amount to breaches of international obligations including war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, does not automatically imply that 
coercion may be used against that State with regard to such obligations just because 
the crimes themselves are no longer exclusively within the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of 
a State. That State may have surrendered jurisdiction over the legality of those crimes, 
but it would not have surrendered its ability to make the decisions that would be 
subject to coercive methods from other States – at least not by reference to those 
crimes alone. This is because the methods of coercion we shall go on to discuss do not 
directly relate to the actual atrocities at hand, but instead relate to the ability of a State 
to govern its day-to-day activities, such as international travel, trade, its financ ia l 
assets, and securing its economy. The atrocities are clearly unlawful under 
international law, and that is a legal aspect no longer exclusively within the ‘domestic 
jurisdiction’ of the State – however, being subject to coercive measures does not 
                                                 
33 Nicaragua Case (n.7), at para [205]. 
34 Nicaragua Case (n.7), at para [205] (emphasis added). 
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automatically follow from these international obligations.35 Before we consider 
whether international law does permit such action, we must first address how the 
coercive methods in question may first seemingly fall foul of our general principle.  
 
1.1 Coercion and ‘Sanctions’ 
 
Since this chapter is concerned with ‘coercive’ measures short of force, it is firstly 
necessary to determine what types of action would be included in this analysis, and 
whether and how they could fall foul of the principle of non-intervention. These are 
methods short of force which undoubtedly have coercive effects, but their 
compatibility with non-intervention, or other rules of international law, seem at odds. 
Therefore, we must address the extent to which so-called ‘economic coercion’ is either 
prohibited or permitted in international law. 
Some coercive methods might be justified on the basis that they form part of 
the sovereign discretion of a State taking such measures, such as domestic legislat ion 
or executive acts within the territory of that State. Actions falling into the latter 
category have been labelled acts of ‘retorsion’. The International Law Commiss ion 
has described such acts as “‘unfriendly’ conduct which is not inconsistent with any 
international obligation of the State engaging in it” which may be in response to an 
internationally wrongful act by another State.36 Dawidowicz also highlights this 
distinction,37 but notes the inherent problem that in the absence of adequate 
documentation, it may be difficult to assess whether or not a unilateral coercive 
measure taken by a State actually affects rights of the target State so as to correctly 
categorise it as an act of retorsion or otherwise.38 The ILC suggested that’s acts of 
retorsion “may include the prohibition of or limitations upon normal diplomatic 
relations or other contacts, embargoes of various kinds or withdrawal of voluntary aid 
programmes.”39  
                                                 
35 But whether other rules of international law permit such coercive measures, and thus render those 
measures outside the scope of the domestic jurisdiction of a State, and thus the principle of non -
intervention, is discussed further below. 
36 See ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries), below (n.186), at 128 para [3]. 
37 M Dawidowicz, “Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State 
Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and their Relationship to the UN Security Council” (2006) 
77 BYIL 333, at 349. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries), below (n.186), at 128 para [3]. 
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Acts of retorsion, by definition, would fall outside the scope of this thesis. That 
is not to say such acts could not be ‘coercive’ in nature, such as the use of ‘coercive’ 
diplomacy. But this is where we must be careful with the language we use to describe 
such measures since, as we have seen above, ‘influence’ might be legitimate, but 
‘coercion’ may not without legal justification. 
 
1.1.1 Economic Coercion in Customary International Law 
 
The use of ‘sanctions’ has been a source of controversy in international law, especially 
the use of ‘unilateral sanctions’.40 The Friendly Relations Declaration did refer to the 
use of measures for coercion when it declared: 
 
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.41 
 
This part of the declaration was set out within the principle of non-intervention, and 
certainly seems to indicate that economic coercion would be prohibited within that 
principle. However, the declaration does seem to limit this to economic coercion that 
has the aim of subordinating the exercise of a State’s sovereign rights, and securing 
advantages from that State. 
From this point, economic coercion remained an issue of concern for States, 
especially against developing nations. For example, a similar general principle was 
adopted in Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974.42 
Subsequently, States regularly reiterated their rejection of unilateral coercive 
measures, and unilateral economic measures especially, through the regular adoption 
of UN General Assembly Resolutions from as early as 1983, through to 2016.43 These 
                                                 
40 ‘Unilateral sanctions’, for the purposes of this thesis, refers to the use of sanctions by States or an 
International Organisation outside a multilateral framework such as the UN Security Council, or a 
Regional Treaty, where there use may be explained by the prior consent of the Member States. 
41 Friendly Relations Declaration  (n.5), at Principle 3, para [2]; This was also reiterated in the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention  (n.1), para [2]. 
42 See Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted in UNGA Res 3281 
(XXIX) Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (12 December 1974) UN Doc 
A/RES/3281(XXIX), Annex. 
43 See, UNGA Resolutions titled ‘Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion 
against developing countries’ (1983-1996) or ‘Unilateral economic measures as a means of political 
and economic coercion against developing countries’ (1998-2016): UNGA Res 38/197 (20 December 
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Resolutions regularly denounced the use of economic or political coercion against 
developing States. 
From 1983, developed States such as the US, the UK, Australia, France, Italy, 
Norway, and Japan consistently voted against these resolutions.44 By 1997, the US 
was alone in voting against the resolutions when other developed nations switched to 
simply abstaining instead.45  There were a small number of instances where other 
States would join the US in voting against the Resolutions, but these were not 
accompanied by any explanation of their votes in the General Assembly meetings. 46 
By 2007, Israel joined the US in being the only two States that consistently voted 
against the resolutions, right up to the most recent instance in 2016.47 
Explanations of these votes were rare. At the first vote, the representative of 
the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of Eastern European States, argued that 
nothing could justify measures of economic coercion, that they were opposed to the 
UN Charter, the Friendly Relations Declaration, and run counter to the norms and 
practices of international law.48 
In 1999, Russia used the vote as an opportunity to condemn sanctions taken by 
the US the European Union against Yugoslavia.49 Russia argued: 
 
                                                 
1983) UN Doc A/RES/38/197; UNGA Res 39/210 (18 December 1984) UN Doc A/RES/39/210;  
UNGA Res 40/185 (17 December 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/185; UNGA Res 41/165 (5 December 
1986) UN Doc A/RES/41/165; UNGA Res 44/215 (22 December 1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/215;  
UNGA Res 46/210 (20 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/210; UNGA Res 48/168 (22 February 
1994) UN Doc A/RES/48/168; UNGA Res 50/96 (2 February 1996) UN Doc A/RES/50/96; UNGA 
Res 52/181 (4 February 1998) UN Doc A/RES/52/181; UNGA Res  54/200 (20 January 2000) UN Doc 
A/RES/54/200; UNGA Res 56/179 (24 January 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/179; UNGA Res 58/198 (30 
January 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/198; UNGA Res 60/185 (31 January 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/185;  
UNGA Res 62/183 (31 January 2008) UN Doc A/RES/62/183; UNGA Res 64/189 (9 February 2010) 
UN Doc A/RES/64/189; UNGA Res 66/186 (6 February 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/186; UNGA Res 
68/200 (15 January 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/200; UNGA Res 70/185 (4 February 2016) UN Doc 
A/RES/70/185. 
44 See, for example, voting records in: UNGA Verbatim Record, 104th Plenary Meeting (20 December 
1983) UN Doc A/38/PV.104 (OR), at 1682; UNGA Verbatim Record, 119th Plenary Meeting (17 
December 1985) UN Doc A/40/PV.119, at 32; UNGA Verbatim Record, 98th Plenary Meeting (5 
December 1986) UN Doc A/41/PV.98, at 11. 
45 See, UNGA Verbatim Record, 77th Plenary Meeting (18 December 1997) UN Doc A/52/PV.77, at 7-
8. 
46 For example, Germany and the Marshall Islands joined the US in voting against in 1999, UNGA 
Verbatim Record, 87th Plenary Meeting (22 December 1999) UN Doc A/54/PV.87, at 7; Uganda voted 
against with the US and Israel in 2009, UNGA Verbatim Record, 66th Plenary Meeting (21 December 
2009) UN Doc A/64/PV.66, at 12. 
47 See UNGA Verbatim Record, 78th Plenary Meeting (19 December 2007) UN Doc A/62/PV.78, at 10, 
for the first instance of Israel voting against; and see UNGA Verbatim Record, 81st Plenary Meeting 
(22 December 2015) UN Doc A/70/PV.81, at 5-6, for the most recent vote.  
48 UNGA Verbatim Record A/38/PV.104 (n.44), at 1683, para [26]. 
49 UNGA Verbatim Record A/54/PV.87 (n.46), at 8. 
145 
 
The use of such economic measures, which are not sanctioned by the Security 
Council, and the imposition of compliance with them on third States — which is 
incompatible with the United Nations Charter and generally recognized principles of 
international law — contradict the basic principles of the system of multilateral trade 
and undermine the processes of settlement. They also seriously destabilize the 
situation in the Balkan region.50 
 
Russia also stressed its position on the unacceptability of the unilateral use of 
economic measures ‘aimed at a specific country that harm the economic interests of 
others.’51 There was no counter to this from the States taking those measures at the 
time. Only in 200552 and 200753 the US did defend its voting position, rejecting the 
Resolutions, and arguing that “every sovereign State has the right to decide with whom 
it will or will not trade”.54 The US suggested that the resolution was “aimed at 
undermining the international community’s ability to respond effectively to acts that 
by their very nature and enormity are offensive to international norms.”55 If there were 
no consequences for such actions, the US argued, offending States would have no 
incentive or reason to abandon them.56 It was put that unilateral and multilate ra l 
economic sanctions “can be an effective means to achieve legitimate foreign policy 
objectives” and that they “constitute an influential diplomatic tool.”57 In 2007, the US 
went even further to argue: 
 
Every State has the sovereign power to restrict or cut off trade or other commerce with 
particular nations when the State believes it is in its national economic or security 
interest to do so or when it serves values about which the nation feels strongly. The 
suggestion that there is any international legal prohibition against such a right is at 
best fatuous. That is why so many countries have abstained from supporting the 
resolution today.58 
 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 UNGA Verbatim Record, 68th Plenary Meeting (22 December 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.68, at 7-8. 
53 UNGA Verbatim Record A/62/PV.78 (n.47), at 11-12. 
54 UNGA Verbatim Record A/60/PV.68 (n.53), at 7. 
55 UNGA Verbatim Record A/60/PV.68 (n.53), at 7. 
56 UNGA Verbatim Record A/60/PV.68 (n.53), at 8. 
57 UNGA Verbatim Record A/60/PV.68 (n.53), at 8. 
58 UNGA Verbatim Record A/62/PV.78 (n.47), at 11. 
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Although the US rejected the existence of a ‘legal prohibition’ to take ‘legitimate ’ 
unilateral sanctions, the resolutions themselves only seemed to establish a general 
position that economic coercion was illegal when inconsistent with the UN Charter or 
a violation of another rule of international law. They are silent on the possibility of 
international law providing for a legal justification for such action, but crucially, they 
leave open such a possibility.  
The series of resolutions were often accompanied by Reports of the Secretary 
General on the matter, detailing individual States’ concerns at the imposition of such 
measures by more developed States, most of which suggested that such measures were 
incompatible with international law or the UN Charter.59 On a few occasions however, 
the reports did address the legal position explicitly, some by reference to expert 
groups. In 1987, the report acknowledged that international law did not explic it ly 
cover the issue of unilateral coercive economic measures at that time, and that there  
was no generally agreed interpretation when it came to discussions about the 
prohibition of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter possibly providing a basis for a 
prohibition of economic coercion.60 In 1989, the Secretary General attached a report 
by a panel of experts convened by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)61, which was clear in suggesting that international law 
lacked a clear consensus as to when such unilateral measures were improper.62 By 
1995, the legal issues were framed by focussing on the principles of non-intervention 
and non-discrimination, and the report concluded that the strict observation of these 
basic principles establishes a generally applicable rule prohibiting the application of 
coercive economic measures ‘as instruments of intervention, including any attempts 
at an exterritorial application of coercive economic measures.’63 The report did 
                                                 
59 See, for example, Report of the Secretary General, ‘Adoption and effects of economic measures taken 
by developed countries as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries’ 
(1984) UN Doc A/39/415. See also, Reports of the Secretary General, ‘Economic Measures as a means 
of political and economic coercion against developing countries’: (1986) UN Doc A/41/739; (1987) 
UN Doc A/42/660; (1989) UN Doc A/44/510; (1995) UN Doc A/50/439; (1997) UN Doc A/52/459. 
See also, Reports of the Secretary General, ‘Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and 
economic coercion against developing countries’: (1999) UN Doc A/54/486; (2001) UN Doc A/56/473;  
(2003) UN Doc A/58/301; (2005) UN Doc A/60/226; (2007) UN Doc A/62/210; (2009) UN Doc 
A/64/179; (2011) UN Doc A/66/138; (2013) UN Doc A/68/218; (2015) UN Doc A/70/152. 
60 Report of the Secretary General (1987) A/42/660 (n.59), at 7, para [23]-[24]. 
61 Report of the Secretary General (1989) A/44/510 (n. 59), Annex. 
62 Ibid, at 7, para [4]. This conclusion was repeated in Note by the Secretary -General, ‘Economic 
Measures as a means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries’, (25 October 
1993), UN Doc A/48/535, at para [2]. 
63 Report of the Secretary General (1995) A/50/439 (n. 59), at 13-14, para [45]. 
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recognise, however, that there were evolving norms of international law that may 
allow for the legitimate use of such unilateral measures.64 
Subsequently, the 1997 report considered it now ‘generally accepted’ that 
international law prohibits, as a general rule, “the use by one State of economic 
coercion against another State”, and also highlighted a number of allowable exceptions 
and circumstances that they labelled ‘legitimacy indicators’.65 This time, the report 
highlighted a lack of consensus and controversy surrounding the applicatio n of 
domestic measures which have extraterritorial effects.66 In other words, there seemed 
to be growing concern about measures of ‘retorsion’, apparently within the interna l 
sovereignty of a State, having potentially unlawful effects beyond that State’s 
jurisdiction.67 
Finally, 1999 was the final instance where the Secretary General’s Report 
made use of a panel of experts to explicitly address the legal position.68 The experts 
largely reaffirmed the previous report, and this time seemed readier to accept the 
doctrine of countermeasures as an exception to the general rule, but did highlight some 
concern at certain measures which were being imposed against developing States, such 
as US legislation imposing measures against Cuba, Iran, and Libya.69 
Unfortunately, States’ responses to these legal opinions, as detailed in these 
and subsequent Secretary General Reports, did not explicitly address the legal 
exceptions outlined in any detail, if at all. Only recently did one State address the 
doctrine of countermeasures in this context, when Brazil disputed “the interpretat ion 
that unilateral sanctions act as ‘countermeasures’ to induce a State to end the 
infringement of certain norms of international law.”70  
This repetitive rhetoric surrounding ‘unilateral economic coercion’ can also be 
seen separately from in the General Assembly, where some large blocs of States have 
declared ‘unilateral sanctions’, generally, to be illegal. For example, the Non-Aligned 
Movement has rejected, on multiple occasions, the use of ‘unilateral coercive 
measures’ or sanctions. 
                                                 
64 Report of the Secretary General (1995) A/50/439 (n. 59), at para [46]-[47], see also a discussion of 
the early work of the International Law Commission on countermeasures at para [29]. 
65 Report of the Secretary General (1997) A/52/459 (n. 59), at 20 para [72], and 21-22 paras [76]-[78]. 
66 Report of the Secretary General (1997) A/52/459 (n. 59), at para [72], [79]-[81]. 
67 Report of the Secretary General (1997) A/52/459 (n. 59), at para [79]-[81]. 
68 Report of the Secretary General (1999) A/54/486 (n. 59), at 9-10 paras [48]-[50]. 
69 Ibid, see also Section 2. 
70 Report of the Secretary General (2013) A/68/218 (n. 59), at 6 (Brazil). 
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Most recently, the Movement referred to ‘unilateral economic sanctions’ as a 
measure which could “undermine international law and international legal 
instruments”.71 In this regard, the Movement undertook to “refrain from recognising, 
adopting or implementing such measures” which “seek to exert pressure on Non-
Aligned Countries – threatening their sovereignty and independence, and their 
freedom of trade and investment – and prevent them from exercising their right to 
decide, by their own free will, their own political, economic and social systems”.72 
Importantly, this condemnation seemed limited to “where such measures or laws 
constitute flagrant violations of the UN Charter, international law, the multilatera l 
trading system as well as the norms and principles governing friendly relations among 
States.”73 This was also the case in the Movement’s separate declaration, where 
‘unilateral sanctions’ were directly condemned, but particularly referred to as 
unilateral coercive measures “in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and 
international law, particularly the principles of non-intervention, self-determination 
and independence of States subject of such practices.”74 
The Movement also declared that such unilateral measures by a specific State 
or group for political and economic purposes “violates the Charter of the United 
Nations and undermines international law and the rules of the World Trade 
Organization and also severely threatens freedom of trade and investment, and 
constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of other countries.”75 This issue was 
also referred to within the context of human rights, when the Movement declared that 
the use of such unilateral coercive measures could “hinder the wellbeing of 
populations of the affected countries and … create obstacles to the full realization of 
their human rights.”76 
Earlier summits of the Non-Aligned Movement similarly declared their 
opposition to unilateral sanctions, but again these condemnations referred to such 
measures “where such measures or laws constitute flagrant violations of the UN 
                                                 
71 Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final Outcome Document: 17th Summit of Heads of State and Government  
of the Non-Aligned Movement’ (17 – 18 September 2016, Island of Margarita, Venezuela) Doc NAM 
2016/CoB/Doc.1. Corr.1, available at:  <http://namvenezuela.org/?page_id=6330> (accessed 
20/10/2017), at paras [21] and [21.4]. 
72 XVII NAM Final Outcome, (n.71), at para [21.4]. 
73 XVII NAM Final Outcome, (n.71), at para [21.4]. 
74 Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Declaration of the XVII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
Non-Aligned Movement’, (17-18 September 2016) Doc NAM2016/CoB/Doc.11, at p 4 para [6]. 
75 XVII NAM Final Outcome, (n.71), at para [600]. 
76 XVII NAM Final Outcome, (n.71), at para [750.2]. 
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Charter, international law, the multilateral trading system as well as the norms and 
principles governing friendly relations among States”,77  or much simply referring to 
just those sanctions “in contradiction with international law and the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter.”78  
Similarly, a recent joint declaration by Russia and China,79 in the wake of the 
crises in Syria and Ukraine,80 stated: 
 
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China share the view that good 
faith implementation of generally recognized principles and rules of international law 
excludes the practice of double standards or imposition by some States of their will 
on other States, and consider that imposition of unilateral coercive measures not based 
on international law, also known as “unilateral sanctions”, is an example of such 
practice. The adoption of unilateral coercive measures by States in addition to 
measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council can defeat the objects and 
purposes of measures imposed by the Security Council, and undermine their integrity 
and effectiveness.81 
 
There are a few interesting points about this statement. Firstly, it does not categorically 
declare every imposition of unilateral sanctions illegal – it carefully refers to unilatera l 
coercive measures ‘not based on international law’, but unhelpfully labels these as 
‘unilateral sanctions’. The latter part of the statement indeed does warn against the 
practical effects that sanctions taken beyond the UN Security Council might have on 
existing UN sanctions, but it does not clarify whether Russia and China view this 
practice as illegal. 
                                                 
77 Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Declaration of the XVI Summit of Heads of State or Government of the 
Non-Aligned Movement’, (30-31 August 2012, Tehran) Doc NAM 2012/Doc.7, at p 6 para [8], 
(hereinafter “The Tehran Declaration”); see also, Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Final Outcome Document: 
16th Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement’, (26-31 August 2012, 
Tehran, Iran) Doc NAM 2012/Doc.1/Rev.2, at para [24.4], and para [468]; and, Non-Aligned  
Movement, ‘Final Outcome Document: XV Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non -
Aligned Movement’ (16 July 2009) Doc NAM2009/FD/Doc.1, at para [18.4]. 
78 See, for example, Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Sharm El Sheikh Summit Declaration: 15th Summit  
Conference of Heads of State and Government if the Non-Aligned Movement’, (15-16 July 2009, 
Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt) Doc NAM2009/SD/Doc.4, at 3. 
79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘The Declaration of the Russian Federat ion 
and the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law’, (25 June 2016) Press 
Release No 1202-25-06-2016, available at: <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news / -
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698/> (accessed 20/10/2017) (hereinafter Russia-
China Declaration). 
80 See below for sanctions in this context. 
81 Russia-China Declaration (n.79), at para [21]. 
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Dupont82 also highlights the widespread opposition to such unilate ra l 
measures, but also notes the concerns over the ‘improper use’ of measures of 
retorsion.83 For example, Dupont refers to a position paper by China and the Group of 
77 at the 13th United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.84 This joint 
paper called for a study into unilateral economic, financial or trade measures, contrary 
to international law and WTO rules. China and the Group of 77 considered such 
measures to “hinder market access, investments, freedom of transit, and the welfare of 
the population of the affected countries,”85 and called upon the Conference to 
“strongly urge States to refrain from enacting and implementing unilateral economic, 
financial or trade measures that are not in accordance with international law or the 
Charter of the United Nations and that hamper the full achievement of economic and 
social development as well as trade, particularly in developing countries.”86 While 
Dupont highlights these calls as improper measures of ‘retorsion’, it is clear from the 
statements themselves that they are referring to measures which are illegal – and not 
necessarily those which are inherently lawful. 
The Group of 77 and China’s proposals were incorporated into the ‘Doha 
Mandate’,87 where the Conference did urge States to refrain from “promulgating and 
applying any unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance with 
international law and the Charter of the United Nations”88 but also called for 
‘addressing’ non-tariff measures including unilateral measures “where they may act 
as unnecessary trade barriers.”89 While this does not disallow measures usually 
considered retorsion, as addressed by Dupont, it does certainly highlight a hesitance 
for the imposition of certain legal measures which may have negative practical effects 
on trade. 
                                                 
82 P-E Dupont, “Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran”, 
(2012) 17(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 301-336. 
83 Dupont (n.82), at 316. 
84 Dupont (n.82), at 316; see, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Group of 77 and 
China Position Paper: Position paper of the Group of 77 and China on the draft outcome document for 
the thirteenth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD-XIII ) 
Doha, Qatar’, UNCTAD-XIII (Doha, 12-16 April 2012) (27 October 2011) UN Doc TD/455. 
85 Group of 77 and China Position Paper (n.85), at para [45]. 
86 Group of 77 and China Position Paper (n.85), at para [45]. 
87 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘The Doha Mandate’, UNCTAD-XIII (Doha, 
21-26 April 2012) (31 May 2012) UN Doc TD/500/Add.1.  
88 The Doha Mandate (n.87), at para [25]. 
89 The Doha Mandate (n.87), at para [25]. 
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However, a clear divide seems to have emerged at the most recent UNCTAD 
conference. The ‘zero document’ of that conference, which was the starting point for 
negotiating the final outcome, did incorporate these previous sentiments urging States 
to refrain from unilateral coercive measures contrary to international law.90 This was 
later revised to strengthen the negotiating text, adding references to the most recent 
UN General Assembly Resolution91 and also condemning the effect of such unilate ra l 
measures as having ‘a destabilizing effect on the global economy’ and highlighting 
that they “artificially create dividing lines in the sphere of international economic 
relations and are a means of unfair competition on the world market.”92 However, 
these references to the General Assembly Resolution and the stronger language were 
deleted from the final text, settling only for a version nearly identical to that adopted 
in the previous Doha Mandate.93 
The Group of 77 and China again issued a declaration in this context,94 but this 
time their language was much stronger than their previous Position Paper: 
 
We stress that unilateral coercive measures and legislation are contrary to 
international law, international humanitarian law, the United Nations Charter, the 
norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States and the rules and 
principles of the World Trade Organization. These measures impede the full 
achievement and further enhancement of the economic and social development of all 
countries, particularly developing countries, by imposing unconscionable hardships 
on the people of the affected countries.95 
 
Here, the declaration is unequivocal in establishing that unilateral coercive measures, 
in their view, are contrary to international law from the outset. This time, there is no 
restriction of their condemnation to only measures which are illegal – instead, the 
position seems to be that all unilateral coercive measures are illegal generally.  
                                                 
90 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Pre-Conference negotiating text’, 
UNCTAD-XIV (Geneva, 12 February 2016) UN Doc TD/XIV/PC/1, at para [31]. 
91 UNGA Res 70/185 (n.43). 
92 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Pre-Conference negotiating text, revised’, 
UNCTAD-XIV (Geneva, 13 June 2016) (16 June 2016) UN Doc TD(XIV)/PC/1/Rev.1, at para [50]. 
93 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Nairobi Maafikiano – From Decision to 
Action: Moving towards an Inclusive and Equitable Global Economic Environment for Trade and 
Development’, UNCTAD-XIV (Nairobi, 17-22 July 2016) (5 September 2016) UN Doc TD/519/Add.2, 
at para [34]. 
94 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Ministerial Declaration of the Group of 77 
and China to UNCTAD XIV’, UNCTAD-XIV (Nairobi, 17-22 July) (12 July 2016) UN Doc TD/507. 
95 Groups of 77 and China Ministerial Declaration (n.94), at para [16]. 
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The declaration also firmly rejected “the imposition of laws and regulat ions 
with extraterritorial impact and all other forms of coercive economic, financial and 
trade measures, including unilateral sanctions against developing countries.”96 While 
this clearly expresses opposition to what Dupont categorised as measures of retorsion 
– it does not express an opinion on whether such measures are, or should be, contrary 
to international law. Yet, the earlier references to ‘legislation’ being contrary to 
international law, are possibly a nod towards this. 
Taking all of this evidence collectively, these statements, coupled with the 
resolutions of the General Assembly, are not incorrect. However, they are certainly 
misleading. Unilateral sanctions, without justification, seem to be illegal in general 
terms – but this depends on the ‘sanction’ imposed.97 Indeed, all of these statements 
might even be taken as supporting a general principle that ‘sanctions’ are prima facie 
unlawful because they interfere with the principle of non-intervention, constitute 
economic coercion, or otherwise, in the absence of a legal justification. Yet, they do 
not necessarily shed light on whether they consider there to be any legal justificat ions 
for their use – they simply do not touch upon this issue. What is clear, however, is the 
fact that ‘unilateral sanctions’ are indeed likely to fall foul of the principle of non-
intervention, or the corollary of this principle prohibiting economic coercion.98 
Carter has argued that “economic sanctions themselves are rarely, if ever, 
unlawful”,99 and rejects that a rule of customary international law has emerged 
prohibiting economic coercion, noting the efforts of developing and non-aligned 
States in the General Assembly and elsewhere, but considering that they have been 
unsuccessful in establishing a general rule prohibiting economic sanctions.100 
To support this, Carter cites the ICJ’s decision in the Nicaragua Case, where 
the court addressed certain economic measures by the US against Nicaragua, 
concluding quite simply that “the Court has merely to say that it is unable to regard 
such action on the economic plane as a breach of the customary- law principle of non-
                                                 
96 Groups of 77 and China Ministerial Declaration (n.94), at para [39]. 
97 For a similar analysis, see, DH Joyner, ‘International Legal Limits on the Ability of States to Lawfully  
Impose International Economic / Financial Sanctions’, in in N Ronzitti (ed), Coercive Diplomacy, 
Sanctions and International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 2016), at 194-199. 
98 Although, see, A Tzanakopoulos, “The Right to be Free from Economic Coercion”, (2015) 4(3) 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law  616. 
99 BE Carter, “Economic Sanctions”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law  (Online 
edn, April 2011), at para [32]. 
100 Carter (n.99), at para [29]-[32]. 
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intervention.”101 Carter also refers to the 1993 Note by the UN Secretary General,102 
part of the series of Reports and expert conclusions discussed above, which concluded 
that “there is no clear consensus in international law as to when coercive measures are 
improper, despite relevant treaties, declarations, and resolutions adopted in 
international organizations which try to develop norms limiting the use of these 
measures.”103 
Carter’s conclusions are slightly misleading here. The ICJ did consider the 
US’s action as compatible with the principle of non-intervention, but this can be 
explained on the basis that those measures were merely methods of retorsion, and did 
not constitute prohibited economic coercion. Nicaragua had argued that the US’s 
cessation of economic aid and 90% reduction in the sugar quota for US imports from 
Nicaragua, and a trade embargo, were ‘indirect’ interventions in the internal affairs of 
Nicaragua.104 The ICJ admitted it did not have jurisdiction over questions of the 
compatibility of the trade measures with multilateral treaties, due to the US’s 
multilateral treaty reservation in that case.105 However, the measures Nicaragua 
complained about in the first place were measures within the US’s jurisdiction – 
measures which counsel for Nicaragua had admitted were not unlawful in 
themselves.106 
Thus, the ICJ’s rejection of Nicaragua’s argument cannot be interpreted as a 
rejection of the existence of a prohibition of economic coercion, or that economic 
coercion does not fall within the principle of non-intervention – such an assertion 
would go directly against the widely-accepted Friendly Relations Declaration itself. 
The only inference we may confidently draw from that case is that the measures 
adopted by the US were either not ‘interventions’, or if they were then they were not 
interventions in the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of Nicaragua.  
In terms of Carter’s reference to the 1993 Note of the Secretary General, 
unfortunately this point omits the subsequent reports in this series which eventually 
noted that it was ‘generally accepted’ that a rule prohibiting economic coercion existed 
                                                 
101 Nicaragua Case (n.7), at para [244]. 
102 Note by the Secretary General (1993) A/48/535 (n.62). 
103 Carter (n.99), at para [30]; see also Note by the Secretary General (1993) A/48/535 (n.62), at para 
[2]. 
104 Nicaragua Case (n.7), at para [244]. 
105 Nicaragua Case (n.7), at para [245]. 
106 Nicaragua Case (n.7), at para [244]. 
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in international law.107 While it is true that there is no general rule prohibiting 
‘economic sanctions’ specifically, there can be no doubt that there is a prohibition of 
‘economic coercion’ by virtue of the principle of non-intervention. The legality of 
economic sanctions, as widely addressed in the series of expert reports for the 
Secretary General on this issue, is based upon the exceptions to that general rule. The 
question is, therefore: what ‘economic sanctions’ constitute unlawful ‘economic 
coercion’, and then when do such coercive measures find justification in internationa l 
law? 
Of course, the law is more nuanced than this general rule, and indeed not all 
‘sanctions’ would fall within this general prohibition of intervention. Thus, before we 
consider what circumstances render the taking of sanctions lawful in international law, 
we must consider the specific types of coercive action at issue. These include: asset 
freezes; travel bans; trade embargos or restrictions; and the suspension of internationa l 
agreements. 
 
1.2 Methods of Coercion 
1.2.1 Asset Freezes  
 
Asset freezes involve the blocking of any use or disposition of assets, includ ing 
financial assets such as bank accounts. These are typically targeted at officials of State 
who have assets within the jurisdiction of a State taking ‘coercive’ measures, but can 
sometimes target assets specifically owned by the target State itself. At first glance, it 
may seem that asset freezes, taking place within the jurisdiction a State taking such 
measures, are inherently lawful by virtue of the sovereign discretion of that State, so 
long as the freezes are consistent with the internal laws of that State.  
However, it has been argued that asset freezes, because they can target assets 
belonging to another State, generally fall foul of the principle of non-intervention. For 
example, Criddle108 argues that the freezing of foreign assets by a State constitutes a 
form of intervention.109 He suggests that these measures purposefully interfere in the 
domestic affairs of a target State, undermining their political independence and 
“transgressing legal protections for the fair and equitable treatment of foreign 
                                                 
107 See above. 
108 EJ Criddle, ‘Humanitarian Financial Intervention’, (2013) 24(2) EJIL 583. 
109 Criddle (n.108), at 584. 
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investment.”110 Accordingly, the fact that a State may operate exclusively within its 
own territorial jurisdiction when it freezes foreign assets “does not absolve it of 
international responsibility because the purpose and effect of its actions are 
transparently interventionist: to subordinate a foreign state and its assets to the host 
state’s superintendent power.”111  
Criddle tried to draw a distinction between acts of retorsion and acts of 
‘wrongful intervention’, utilising his ‘wrongful means theory’ to suggest that only acts 
that are prima facie wrongful under international law constitute wrongful 
intervention.112 His theory proposes that asset freezes constitute a form of wrongful 
expropriation, falling foul of the principle of non-intervention, because they fall foul 
of the ‘international minimum standard’ of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ in 
International Investment Law.113 For this, Criddle is referring to a possible customary 
international law obligation that he says includes respect for due process (e.g., access 
to justice, non-arbitrariness) and good faith (e.g., consistency, transparency, non-
arbitrariness, respecting reasonable expectations).114 
While it is unclear whether such legal standards derive from the principle of 
non-intervention itself, it cannot be denied that similar standards have been recognised 
in international agreements, meaning that these obligations may well exist separately 
to the principle of non-intervention too. For example, Bothe argues115 that restrictions 
on money transfers fall within the regulatory regime of the International Monetary 
Fund,116 and when relating to financial services may fall within the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services.117  
In particular, Article VIII(2)(a) of the IMF agreement prohibits Members from 
imposing “restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current 
international transactions” without IMF approval. In 1952, the IMF clarified that 
“Article VIII, Section 2(a), in conformity with its language, applies to all restrictions 
                                                 
110 Criddle (n.108), at 584. Criddle calls this ‘humanitarian financial intervention’ when the measures 
are used ‘to promote cosmopolitan humanitarian values  abroad.’ 
111 Criddle (n.108), at 591-592. 
112 Criddle (n.108), at 592. 
113 Criddle (n.108), at 592. 
114 Criddle (n.108), at 592. 
115 M Bothe, ‘Compatibility and Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes’, in N Ronzitti (ed), Coercive 
Diplomacy, Sanctions and International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 2016), at 37. 
116 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 1944 (Adopted 22 July 1944, entered into 
force 27 December 1945) 2 UNTS 39, as amended. 
117 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 
January 1995), 1869 UNTS 183. 
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on current payments and transfers, irrespective of their motivation and the 
circumstances in which they are imposed.”118 Article VIII(3) also stipulates that 
Members shall not engage in “any discriminatory currency arrangements” except as 
authorised by the IMF or in particular cases stipulated by the Agreements. Bothe notes 
that no practice seems to have arisen where the IMF has allowed such action.119  
In terms of the GATS framework, Article II provides for the ‘Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment’ whereby Members shall accord to services and service suppliers of 
any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords any other country. 
On the face of it, it does indeed seem that financial measures such as asset freezes 
could fall foul of this general principle. 
These provisions do seem to provide, at the very least, a basis for suggest ing 
that financial restrictions such as asset freezes, if they do not in the circumstances 
violate the general principle of non-intervention, then they may still violate popular 
agreements that States taking such measures may have agreed to. Of course, not all 
States may be members of the IMF or the WTO, but at the same time it is not possible 
to provide an exhaustive account of all bilateral agreements providing for similar trade 
or investment rights. Depending on the circumstances of a dispute, these particula r 
types of financial measures are likely to fall foul of such obligations owed by one State 
to another. In any case, there is still a convincing argument that they may constitute 
economic coercion and thus fall foul of the principle of non-intervention. 
 
1.2.2 Travel Bans 
Travel bans are decisions on allowing or disallowing persons to enter the territory of 
the State imposing restrictive measures. Often, this can affect the ability of target-State 
officials to conduct business within the territory of that State, or even to attend 
international political events that are held within that territory, making diplomacy and 
international affairs more difficult for the target-State. Generally, these may be acts of 
retorsion – as Bothe points out,120 there is a human right to leave a country,121 but there 
                                                 
118 IMF Decision No. 144-(52/51) (14 August 1952), available in IMF, Selected Decisions and Selected 
Document of the International Monetary Fund, (Thirty-Eighth Issue, Washington, 29 February 2016), 
at 573-574.  
119 Bothe (n.115), at 37. 
120 Bothe (n.115), at 39. 
121 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (adopted 15 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976), 999 UNTS 171, available in UNGA Res 2200 (XXI) International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
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is no corresponding right to enter a country other than in the case of the non-refoulment 
of refugees, or perhaps even the right of return for refugees.122  
Nevertheless, on occasion, such bans may fall foul of an internationa l 
agreement or treaty which, for example, calls for States to allow each other’s offic ia ls 
into the others territory for the purposes of a cooperation agreement. Recently, for 
example, when the US took restrictive measures against Russia following the events 
in Ukraine, Russia argued123 that the cancelation of events and bilateral meetings 
related to nuclear energy were a violation of Article IV(3) and Article X(1) of the 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Nuclear- and Energy-
Related Scientific Research and Development.124 It is unclear whether individuals who 
would have attended such meetings were subject to the travel bans imposed by the US.  
Still, the point is clear that some bilateral agreements such as this could well 
provide a basis for suggesting that travel bans may in certain circumstances fall foul 
of international obligations,125 but each restriction can only be judged on a case-by-
case basis depending on the bilateral or multilateral agreements agreed upon by the 
States involved. 
 
1.2.3 Trade Restrictions or Embargos 
 
Trade restrictions or embargos on imports or exports are often used as ‘sanctions’ to 
coerce another State into changing a particular course of action. Bothe argues that 
there is no general rule of customary international law forbidding trade restrictions, 
and nor is there any general right to ‘commercial intercourse’.126 Similarly, the ICJ in 
Nicaragua opined that a trade embargo does not necessarily fall foul of the princip le 
                                                 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  (16 December 1966) UN 
Doc A/RES/2200(XXI), Annex, Article 12(2). 
122 Bothe (n.115), at 39. 
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<http://government.ru/en/docs/24766/> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
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126 Bothe (n.115), at 35; for a similar point, see Carter (n.99), at para [29]-[32], who is of the view that 
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of non-intervention,127 and that a State “is not bound to continue trade relations longer 
than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment or other specific legal 
obligation.”128  
However, States have increasingly agreed to principles relating to trade. The 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs,129 and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services,130 alongside the creation of the World Trade Organization, establish a 
number of general principles of world trade that, on the face of it, may seem to be 
violated by the imposition of certain trade restrictions or embargos. Bothe suggests 
that more than 90% of international merchandise trade is covered by the GATT 
regime.131 
Article I of GATT provides for the Most-Favoured-Nation rule, reflecting that 
discussed above in the GATS regime, instead essentially providing that contracting 
parties should afford all other contracting parties the same favourable treatment or 
terms on imports and exports. Any ‘sanction’ which restricts or bans such trade would 
be a very clear prima facie breach of this provision, since a State being sanctioned is 
very clearly being treated less favourably than other contracting parties in this regard. 
It has also been pointed out that trade restrictions and bans could also fall foul of 
Article XI(1), which provides that: 
 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of 
the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of 
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. 
 
While it was suggested by the ICJ in Nicaragua that measures such as a trade embargo 
did not, at that point, violate the principle of non-intervention, it was unable to 
                                                 
127 Nicaragua Case (n.7), at para [244]-[245]. 
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pronounce on the application of GATT to those measures due to a lack of jurisdict ion.  
The Court did, however, decide that the trade embargo imposed by the US was 
contrary to the object and purpose of the US-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation 1956,132  and in particular violated Article XIX on that 
agreement on the equal treatment of commercial vessels in both States.133 This of 
course indicates that even if a State is not a member of the WTO or GATT, certain 
trade measures could still be inconsistent with bilateral agreements adopted between 
the target State and the State imposing restrictive measures. 
 Without seeking to settle the issue as to whether trade embargos constitute 
economic coercion or unlawful intervention on the face of it, it is also clear that States 
taking such measures against another State when they are both members of the WTO 
and GATT, such measures would be a prima facie breach of these obligations. 
 
1.2.4 Intentional Suspension of Treaty Obligations 
 
In certain circumstances, States may suspend the application of an internationa l 
agreement between itself and a target State to impose certain coercive measures – or 
sometimes as a coercive measure itself. This type of action may by justified via Article 
60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,134 which allows agreements to 
be suspended or terminated but only where there is a ‘material breach’ of that treaty.135 
Such a material breach requires either: (i) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by 
the present Convention; or (ii) the violation of a provision essential to the 
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.136 
However, the suspension of an international agreement may take place without 
there actually being a material breach of that agreement by the target State in the first 
place. For example, an agreement might be suspended by an imposing State in 
retaliation for the breach of a separate obligation by the target State.137 This type of 
action would fall outside of the scope of Article 60 VCLT, and may only be justified 
                                                 
132 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
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160 
 
by legal justifications elsewhere in general international law, in particular the doctrine 
of countermeasures in certain circumstances, as will be discussed below.138 
Indeed, when it comes to measures taken in response to the threat or 
commission of mass atrocities under the responsibility to protect, States may not 
necessarily suspend the treaties that provide for some of those obligations, such as 
regional human rights instruments, or even the Genocide Convention.139 Such a 
suspension would likely have little to no effect on coercing the State responsible – 
firstly, the target State would have already breached that instrument itself; and, 
secondly, such treaty obligations do not provide many, if any, direct political or 
economic advantages to that State which would compel a State in breach of such 
obligations to cease their course of action in favour of protecting those benefits. For 
example, the ICJ recognised the absence of such individual advantages and 
disadvantages in the Genocide Convention in its Advisory Opinion140 on reservations 
to that treaty: 
 
In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; 
they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely the accomplishment of 
those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the convention. Consequently, in 
a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages and 
disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance 
between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by 
virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its 
provisions.141 
 
Coercive measures have focussed on economic or trade matters, and treaties protecting 
populations from atrocities do not themselves provide these economic rights or duties 
that have been used as tools to pressure other States. Therefore, if a State does decide 
to suspend or ‘violate’ a treaty obligation to coerce another, it would not necessarily 
                                                 
138 For the difference between suspension and the ‘breach’ of an obligation via countermeasures, see 
ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries), below (n.186), at 128 para [4]. 
139 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (adopted 9 December 
1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 (hereinafter referred to as the Genocide 
Convention); Even then, such suspensions, according to Article 60(5) VCLT, “do not apply to 
provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian 
character”. 
140 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951) [1951] ICJ Rep 15. 
141 Reservations to the Convention on Genocide (n.140), at 23 (emphasis added), 
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suspend the treaties relevant to the breach in the first place, and so such a suspension 
would not fall within Article 60 of the VCLT.  
 
1.3 Legal Justifications 
 
Legal justifications available for the taking of coercive measures depend upon the 
measures imposed, and the international agreements between the disputing States. In 
terms of the collective security framework, we have seen that such measures may be 
taken by Member States of the UN when this action is authorised or imposed by the 
Security Council under Article 41 of the UN Charter.142 In other cases, measures may 
be permissible by an agreement between the States themselves, perhaps as part of an 
agreement between Member States of a regional organisation.143 However, such 
regional instruments would not apply when the regional organisation seeks to take 
coercive measures against a non-member, for example. Therefore, it is worth 
highlighting in brief the possible legal justifications for truly ‘unilateral’ coercive 
measures before embarking on our analysis of the law of countermeasures. 
In terms of restrictive trade measures, for WTO and GATT Members the 
security exceptions in Article XXI of GATT permit a Member ‘to take any action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests’144 
which either: (i) relates to fissionable materials or the materials form which they are 
derived;145 (ii) relates to arms, ammunitions, and related trade for supplying a milita ry 
establishment;146 or (iii) is ‘taken in time of war or other emergency in internationa l 
relations’.147 More generally, GATT also excludes ‘any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of internationa l 
peace and security.’148 Article XIV bis of GATS provides for largely the same security 
                                                 
142 See also, Natalino Ronzitti, ‘Sanctions as Instruments of Coercive Diplomacy: An International Law 
Perspective’, in N Ronzitti (ed), Coercive Diplomacy, Sanctions and International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 
2016), at 15-16; see also, Thomas and Thomas (n.23), at 205-207. 
143 See Chapter VI, Section 2.3.1. See also, Ronzitti (n.142), at 16-17; Thomas and Thomas (n.23), at 
210-212 on the Organisation of American States. 
144 GATT, Article XXI(b). 
145 GATT, Article XXI(b)(i). 
146 GATT, Article XXI(b)(ii). 
147 GATT, Article XXI(b)(iii). 
148 GATT, Article XXI(c).  
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exceptions in relation to services, except for a requirement that the Council for Trade 
in Services must be informed of such measures when taken and terminated.149 
Most relevant to our current debate relating to the prevention and cessation of 
mass atrocities, measures taken ‘in time of war or other emergency in internationa l 
relations’ seems to be the most appropriate fit. However, this must still be action which 
the State ‘considers necessary’ for the protection of its own ‘essential security 
interests’. The first concern here is that action taken to protect populations of other 
States may not always be necessary to protect the national security interests of the 
State taking such measures. Secondly, we must also consider what we mean by 
‘necessary’ action, and what standard we must apply to this. 
Neuwirth and Svetlicinii150 highlight the fact that these provisions refer to 
actions Members ‘consider necessary’, and rightly question whether this provides for 
a self-judging test.151 They highlight the ICJ’s decisions in Nicaragua and Oil 
Platforms,152 where bilateral agreements provided for similar exceptions that allowed 
parties to take measures ‘necessary’ to protect the essential security interests of the 
State concerned.153 In Nicaragua, the ICJ noted that there was a difference in the 
wordings of Article XXI of GATT and Article XXI(1)(d) of the bilateral agreement 
between the US and Nicaragua, where GATT referred to action which a party 
‘considers necessary’ for its national security, yet the 1956 US-Nicaragua Treaty 
referred simply to ‘necessary’ measures and not those ‘considered’ by a party as 
such.154 It was on this basis that the Court considered itself to have jurisdiction over 
determining the nature of the measures it was considering.155 The Court then also 
considered what affect this construction would have on the substantive interpretat ion 
of that provision, it made clear that because it used the word ‘necessary’ instead of the 
                                                 
149 GATS, Article XIV bis (2); but see in relation to GATT Article XXI: GATT Council, Decision 
Concerning Art XXI of the General Agreement , (2 December 1982) L/5426, which suggested that 
‘contracting parties should be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under 
Article XXI’. 
150 R Neuwirth and A Svetlicinii, ‘The Economic Sanctions over the Ukraine Conflict and the WTO: 
“Catch-XXI” and the Revival of the Debate on Security Exceptions’, (2015) 49(5) Journal of World  
Trade 891. 
151 Neuwirth & Svetlicinii (n.150), at 903-908 generally. 
152 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Judgment) 
[2003] ICJ Rep 161. 
153 In Nicaragua, it has been detailed above that this related to the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (n.132), Article XXI(1)(d); In Oil Platforms this related to the Treaty of Amity, Economic 
Relations and Consular Rights 1955 (adopted 15 August 1955, entered into force 16 June 1957) 284 
UNTS 93, Article XX(1)(d); see Neuwirth & Svetlicinii (n.150), at 906. 
154 Nicaragua (n.7), para [222]. 
155 Nicaragua (n.7), para [222]-[223]. 
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phrase ‘considers necessary’, the assessment was not “purely a question for the 
subjective judgment of the party.”156 In Oil Platforms, the Court made the same 
assessment relating to Article XX of the Iran-US bilateral agreement, and cited this as 
the reason why the necessity of the measures therein could be assessed by the Court.157 
Although the ICJ did not, of course, pronounce on the interpretation of the 
corresponding GATT or GATS provisions, its judgments might be utilised by those 
arguing that those provisions are self-judging because of the remarks by the ICJ on the 
phrase ‘considers necessary’. However, Neuwirth and Svetlicinii highlight the very 
real possibility that, if this was the case, the risks of abuse of these provisions is very 
real.158 Even so, they point out that the self-judging nature of these provisions have 
never been expressly confirmed by a WTO Panel or even previously under the 1947 
GATT dispute settlement system.159 When the US’s measures against Nicaragua were 
reviewed within the previous GATT framework, although the US excluded an 
examination of its reliance on Article XXI from the terms of reference of the panel, 
the panel did raise concerns about the possible self-judging interpretation of the 
provision, questioning how such an interpretation could ensure that it is not invoked 
excessively or for purposes other than those set out in the provision itself.160 
In the end, with no authoritative decision on the matter, and coupled with the 
inherent ambiguity of the underlying concepts within the precision such as ‘essentia l 
security interests’, Neuwirth and Svetlicinii concede that the reviewability of Article 
XXI of GATT, and by extension Article XIV bis of GATS renders its application to 
measures uncertain in many cases. Therefore, we cannot say for sure whether coercive 
methods in response to mass atrocities, under a tertiary responsibility to protect, would 
fit within these exceptions. It would still be useful, then, to explore further lines of 
enquiry relating to other possible legal justifications beyond the WTO regime. Of 
course, in any case, not all coercive measures are exclusively related to trade. 
In relation to asset freezes, we have seen that the IMF may approve members 
taking restrictions on current transactions and payments. In the 1952 IMF decision,161 
                                                 
156 Nicaragua (n.7), para [282]. 
157 Oil Platforms (n.152), at para [43]. 
158 Neuwirth & Svetlicinii (n.150), at 904-906. 
159 Neuwirth & Svetlicinii (n.150), at 906. 
160 United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua (13 October 1986) L/6053, available at: 
<https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240197.pdf> (accessed 20/10/2017) at para 
[5.17]. 
161 IMF Decision No. 144-(52/51) (n.118). 
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it was considered that, in terms of restrictions imposed for the preservations of nationa l 
or international security, the IMF “does not, however, provide a suitable forum for 
discussion of the political and military considerations leading to actions of this 
kind.”162 It thus took the policy decision that a member intending to impose restrictions 
not authorised by Article VII(3)(b) or Article XIV(2) of the IMF Agreement, should 
notify the Fund before imposing such restrictions whenever possible.163 The decision 
also makes clear that such restrictions must be solely related to the preservation of 
national or international security, but such a decision is “in the judgment of the 
member” concerned.164 The decision then stipulated that “Unless the Fund informs the 
member within 30 days after receiving notice from the member that it is not satisfied 
that such restrictions are proposed solely to preserve such security, the member may 
assume that the Fund has no objection to the imposition of the restrictions.”165 
Although such an avenue is possible through the IMF, the asset freezes, as 
outlined above, may still be subject to the principle of non-intervention for non-
members. Of course, even for members of the IMF, there does not seem to have been 
any instance where the Fund has allowed such measures.166 
Of course, the exceptions in these particular WTO and IMF regimes only apply 
as a defence to prima facie breaches of the rights and duties of those regimes therein 
– they do not provide a standalone legal justification for the breach of another 
international obligation, for example either in general international law, such as the 
principle of non-intervention, or a bilateral treaty provision between the relevant 
parties.167 In other words, although coercive measures may violate the GATT, GATS 
or IMF agreements, if they also violate the principle of non-intervention, then further 
justification may be required beyond the exceptions in those specialist regimes that 
would only render them compatible with the obligations in those regimes. Of course, 
as we addressed above, the principle of non-intervention would not be necessarily 
violated if the exceptions to these regimes apply, because such matters are no longer 
within the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of that State by virtue of their membership of such 
                                                 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid, operative para [1]. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Bothe (n.115), at 37. 
167 This, of course, does not apply where a treaty explicitly provides for the taking of such measures in 
response to threats to peace and security or otherwise, as may be found in regional security 
arrangements (see Chapter VI, Section 2.3.1) or even in the UN Charter itself (see Chapter VI, Section 
1.3.1). 
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bodies, and their consent to the relevant security exceptions. This ‘limitation’ of 
‘domestic jurisdiction’, however, is restricted to coercive measures being in 
accordance with the exceptions discussed above. If they are not, and the exceptions do 
not apply or have been exceeded, the principle of non-intervention still applies, and 
any legal justification for these measures must be based upon the residual rules of 
customary international law – in particular, the doctrine of countermeasures. 
It is, however, clear that these exceptions, either to the lex specialis treaty 
regimes, or to the principle of non-intervention in general, have their limits. Coercive 
measures in response to mass atrocities cannot always be justified under these regimes 
– for example, these exceptons do not provide for the legaity of such measures in cases 
when the Security Council is paralysed, and has failed in its responsibilities to protect 
and maintain international peace and security; where the measures under GATT or 
GATS are not necessary to protect the security interests of a State, but are nevertheless 
considered necessary for some other reason; or where the measures by a regiona l 
organisation are taken against a non-member, and therefore cannot be justified on the 
basis of their founding instrument alone. 
Nevertheless, there may still be avenues that States and regional organisat ions 
may take to justify legally the taking of such coercive measures. This avenue is 
provided by the doctrine of countermeasures. 
 
2. Countermeasures 
2.1 Basic Legal and Procedural Requirements 
 
In a sense, the doctrine of countermeasures acts as a legal ‘defence’ that renders lawful 
a breach of an international obligation that would be, of course, otherwise unlawful. 
To further understand the limitations of any kind of coercive measure, we must 
investigate the scope of the law of countermeasures, and how far this doctrine may be 
utilised to adopt coercive measures beyond the Security Council. 
The lawfulness of the taking of countermeasures in certain circumstances has 
been recognised for many years. Early practice of international legal proceedings, such 
as the arbitration decision in the Air Services case,168 recognised at the very least the 
                                                 
168 Case concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America 
and France, (Decision of 9 December 1978), (1978) 18 RIAA 417-493. 
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ability of States to take certain measures against another State in response to a prior 
breach of an international obligation by that State.169 
Since then, as we shall discuss, practice and doctrine has developed to specify 
procedural and substantive limitations on the ability of States to take such measures. 
The International Law Commission worked for many years on this issue,170 where 
several draft reports and Draft Articles on State Responsibility sought to consolidate 
the historical practice on the law of countermeasures.171 
Some of the ILC’s earlier work was cited by the International Court of Justice. 
For example, in the decision in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros,172 the court recognised a 
number of conditions for taking countermeasures, including: (i) a countermeasure 
“must be taken in response to a previous international wrongful act of another State 
and must be directed against that State”;173 (ii) the injured State must call upon the 
State committing the wrongful act to “discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make 
reparation for it”;174 (iii) the countermeasure must be proportionate, or, as the court 
put it, “the effects of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury 
suffered”;175 and (iv) the purpose of the countermeasure must be to induce the 
wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under international law, and so the 
countermeasure much therefore be reversible.176 
These conditions have been further expanded upon by the International Law 
Commission in their revised Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationa lly 
Wrongful Acts.177  
Article 22 of these Articles recognises the use of countermeasures as a 
circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of an act of a State which is not in 
conformity with an international obligation towards another State, so long as those 
                                                 
169 Ibid, at 443, paras [80]-[84]. 
170 The ILC’s mandate was given in 1953 by UNGA Res  799 (VIII), Request for Codification of the 
Principles of International Law governing State Responsibility , (7 December 1953) UN Doc 
A/RES/799(VIII). 
171 For a full collection of the relevant works of the ILC on this topic from 1953-2001, see: International 
Law Commission, ‘Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission: State 
Responsibility’, (International Law Commission , 12 January 2016) 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_6.shtml> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
172 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary / Slovakia), Judgment of 25th September 1997, [1997] ICJ 
Rep 7. 
173 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (n.172), at 55, para [83]. 
174 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (n.172), at 56, para [84]. 
175 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (n.172), at 56, para [85]. 
176 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (n.172), at 56-57, para [87]. 
177 See, generally, UNGA Res 56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, (28th 
January 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/83, Annex. 
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countermeasures are in accordance with the legal safeguards laid down in Chapter II 
of Part Three of those Articles.  
Chapter II of Part Three of the Articles details further requirements 
countermeasures must meet. This includes the requirement that “[a]n injured State 
may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its 
obligations…”178, as well as a limitation of countermeasures to “the non-performance 
for the time being of international obligations of the State taking the measures towards 
the responsible State.”179 Article 49(3) confirms the requirement that countermeasures 
should be reversible, as far as possible, so as to permit the resumption of performance 
of the obligations in question. Similarly, Article 52 requires countermeasures to be 
terminated once the responsible State has complied with its relevant internationa l 
obligations.  
Article 50 sets out substantive limitations of countermeasures, ensuring that 
countermeasures cannot involve the use of force, or affect obligations such as the 
protection of fundamental rights, and norms of jus cogens. Article 51 confirms the 
requirement that countermeasures must adhere to the principle of proportionality. 
Notwithstanding some of the more procedural obligations relating to 
countermeasures, such as the condition that an injured State shall call upon the 
responsible State to comply with its international obligations, seek to negotiate, and 
notify the responsible State of its decision to take countermeasures all prior to adopting 
such measures,180 there are some more fundamental conditions on the legality of 
countermeasures that require particular scrutiny, especially in relation to the thesis at 
hand.  
The ILC’s work, both relating to the ability of States to take countermeasures, 
and also the ability of international organisations to do the same, only address the 
possibility of an injured State or organisation utilising this doctrine. Thus, the ILC 
Articles leave unanswered the question as to whether non-directly injured States or 
international organisations are able to utilise countermeasures in a situation where they 
are entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoer, but are not directly injured 
                                                 
178 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (n.177), Article 49(1). 
179 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (n.177), Article 49(2). 
180 See ILC Articles on State Responsibility (n.177), Articles 49-53 generally. 
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by their breach.181 This issue is particularly relevant when we consider whether a party 
is able to take countermeasures in response to a breach of an obligation erga omnes – 
i.e. an obligation owed to the international community at large.  
The second key issue for us to explore is the general requirement that only a 
prior breach of an international obligation may give rise to an ability to take 
countermeasures. Without delving too deeply into hypothetical scenarios, it is 
nevertheless important for this thesis to identify the types of obligations that our 
relevant institutions may respond to when breached, based upon an analysis of more 
recent State practice and the violations of international law that have been addressed 
therein.  
With reference to more recent State practice, this analysis will culminate in an 
assessment of whether breaches of obligations erga omnes may give rise to legal and 
legitimate recourse to countermeasures beyond the Security Council.  
 
2.2 Injured State or Organisation & Obligations Erga Omnes 
 
A key requirement of countermeasures, as accepted by the work of the ILC, is that 
they may only be undertaken by a State, or organisation, injured by the breach of an 
international obligation. Article 49(1) of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of 
States refers to this.182 The ILC’s more recent works on the Responsibility of 
International Organisations for Internationally Wrongful Acts183 also refers to the 
ability of International Organisations to take countermeasures. Article 51 of the IO 
Articles again makes direct reference to “an injured State or an injured internationa l 
organisation” taking lawful countermeasures.184  
However, both works of the ILC make clear that they do not attempt to answer 
the question as to whether non-directly injured parties may utilise countermeasures. 
This is evident for two reasons. Firstly, both works contain ‘saving clauses’ that 
reference the ability of such non-directly injured parties to take lawful measures to 
invoke the responsibility of a wrongdoing party where they are entitled to do so. For 
example, Article 57 of the IO Articles clarifies: 
                                                 
181 See Section 2.2. 
182 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (n.177), Article 49(1). 
183 See, generally, UNGA Res 66/100, Responsibility of International Organisations, (9th December 
2011) UN Doc A/RES/66/100, Annex. 
184 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (n.183), Article 51(1). 
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This Chapter does not prejudice the right of any State or international organization, 
entitled under article 49, paragraphs 1 to 3, to invoke the responsibility of another 
international organization, to take lawful measures against that organization to ensure 
cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or 
organization or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.185 
 
Secondly, the commentaries accompanying both works explain that the Commiss ion 
did not have enough evidence of State practice at the time to make an assessment either 
way on this question. In the commentaries accompanying the State Responsibil ity 
Articles,186 the Commission conducts a detailed review of the available State practice 
at the time, and concludes that: 
 
[T]he current state of international law on countermeasures taken in the general or 
collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse and involves a limited number 
of States. At present, there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States 
referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the collective interest.187 
 
Therefore, the Commission decided that it was not appropriate at that time to include 
a provision on whether non-directly injured parties may utilise countermeasures, but 
instead adopted the saving clause which ‘reserves the position and leaves the 
resolution of the matter to the further development of international law.’188 
In the commentaries accompanying the IO Articles, 189 it is similarly stated that 
the ILC was not intending to decide either way on the question as to whether non-
                                                 
185 Article 54 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility also contains a similar provision relating to 
the taking of lawful measures by States, against responsible States.  
186 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries’, available at: 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> (accessed 20/10/2017);  
also included in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty -Third  
Session’, (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), UN Doc A/56/10, reproduced in [2001] (Vol 
II, Part Two) Yearbook of the International Law Commission , from 31. 
187 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries) (n.186), at 139, Article 54 Commentary, 
para [6]. 
188 Ibid. See discussion below for the various positions of States prior to the adoption of this saving 
clause by the ILC. 
189 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisation, with Commentaries’ , 
available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf > 
(accessed 10/20/2017); also included in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Sixty-Third Session’, (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011) UN Doc A/66/10, from 69. 
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injured States or international organisations, who are entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of another international organisation, would have the right to resort to 
countermeasures.190 The Commission again bases this decision upon the fact that 
practice in this area, at the time of writing, was limited and sparse, and examples of 
such countermeasures actually being taken against an international organisation were 
not found.191 It was still emphasised, however, that this lack of practice did not 
necessarily imply that the law prohibited such countermeasures either.192 
Although the IO Articles address only the issue as to whether States or 
international organisations may take countermeasures against another international 
organisation in detail, the Commission pointed out in its commentary that the IO 
provisions refer to international law for the conditions concerning countermeasures 
taken against States by an international organisation.193 The ILC suggests that one may 
apply by analogy the conditions for countermeasures set out in the Articles on State 
Responsibility.194  
We may therefore continue the work that the ILC has started and determine 
whether, since the ILC’s latest edition of its work in 2011, further State practice has 
emerged to answer the issue of non-directly injured parties taking countermeasures.  
 
2.2.1 The International Law Commission’s Position on ‘Injured States’ 
 
The ILC in 2001 made a distinction between ‘injured’ States, and those entitled to 
‘invoke’ responsibility for the purpose of determining who was entitled to utilise 
countermeasures.195 Article 42 of the State Responsibility Articles deals with the right 
of an injured State to invoke responsibility, where the obligation breached is owed to 
that State individually, or to a group of States including that State. Where there is an 
obligation owed to a group of States, or the international community as a whole, 
                                                 
190 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (Commentaries) (n.189), at 89, Article 
57 Commentary, para [2]. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (Commentaries) (n.189), at 47, Article 
22 Commentary, para [2]. 
194 Ibid. Further discussion on the ability of International Organisation to take countermeasures, 
especially concerning Member States of that organisation, is set out below. 
195 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries) (n.186), at 137, Article 54 Commentary, 
para [1]. 
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Article 42 requires the breach to: (i) specifically affect that State;196 or (ii) be of such 
a character as radically to change the position of all States owed that obligation with 
regard to the further performance of that obligation.197  
According to the Commission, a breach of an obligation owed directly to a 
State individually ‘injures’ that State concerned, seemingly by virtue of that breach 
alone.198 This is the case whether the obligation is owed on a bilateral basis based upon 
a bilateral treaty, a multilateral treaty owing obligations to a specific State, or 
originating from a principle of general international law that establishes bilatera l 
obligations owed directly by one State to another.199 The key factor is that the 
obligation is somehow owed on an individual basis to the State.  
When addressing ‘collective obligations’ – obligations owed not to one State 
individually but to a group of States or the international community as a whole – the 
Commission determined that a State must be ‘specifically affected’ to be injured by a 
violation of such an obligation.200 When considering the meaning of being 
‘specifically affected’ the Commission stated: 
 
This will have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the object and 
purpose of the primary obligation breached and the facts of each case. For a State to 
be considered injured, it must be affected by the breach in a way which distinguishes 
it from the generality of other States to which the obligation is owed.201 
 
When addressing Article 42(b)(ii), where a breach injures the State parties when it ‘is 
of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which 
the obligation is owed,’ the Commission suggests that this deals with a special 
category of obligation, a breach of which must be considered as affecting per se every 
State owed the obligation.202 Examples given by the Commission include a 
                                                 
196 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (n.177), Article 42 (b)(i). 
197 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (n.177), Article 42 (b)(ii). 
198 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (n.177), Article 42(a); See also ILC Articles on Responsibility 
of States (Commentaries) (n.186), at 118, Article 42 Commentary, para [6]-[10]. 
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200 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries) (n.186), at 119, Article 42 Commentary, 
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disarmament treaty or a nuclear-free zone treaty.203 This type of obligation is 
summarised as a “treaty where each party’s performance is effectively conditioned 
upon and requires the performance of each of the others.”204 With such obligations, 
the Commission considered that all State parties must be individually entitled to react 
to a breach, whether or not a State party is particularly affected or has suffered any 
quantifiable damage.205 
Obligations protecting the collective interests of the international community 
as a whole have been recognised by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction, where all States 
are said to have a legal interest in their protection.206 However, the ILC made it clear 
that Article 42(b)(ii) must be narrow in scope,207 excluding the possibility of every 
obligation that may be considered erga omnes from falling within the scope of this 
injury test, and seemingly only considering a State ‘injured’ in such circumstances 
when they satisfy the aforementioned ‘radically affected’ test. 
On first reading, it might seem unclear why such a distinction is necessary – 
after all, if an obligation is owed to a State, whether through a multilateral treaty or 
via an obligation erga omnes, why would one not consider that State ‘injured’ or 
‘affected’ due to a breach of that obligation? 
The very specific injury threshold has two important consequences. Foremost, 
it restricts the ability of a third State to take countermeasures – a State who is not owed 
an obligation at all, nor has any recognised legal interest in the obligation. This, 
however has the effect of also disallowing the taking of countermeasures by States 
who do have a legal interest in compliance, but who may not suffer damage following 
a breach. The reason for such a distinction seems based on several considerations.  
Firstly, when the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee considered the ILC’s 
work shortly before its final draft of the Articles on State Responsibility, some States 
raised concerns that the general scheme of countermeasures, and especially 
countermeasures by non-injured States, posed a notable risk of abuse.208 Arguments 
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were put that a broad scope of discretion by non-injured States could provide a further 
pretext for power politics.209  
Some States have highlighted this inherent risk of abuse as being one of the 
main concerns with the system of countermeasures generally, but most specifica lly 
concerning the prospect of countermeasures by non-injured States, and even States 
who did support countermeasures recommended their strict regulation.210 
Some believed the risks of abuse or subjectivity were inherent in the nature of 
countermeasures, or at least in the vague approach taken by the previous drafts of the 
ILC. India, for example, as well as raising concerns about the potential for abuse, 
argued that the distinction between injured States and those ‘not directly affected’ was 
too subtle a distinction.211 Similarly, Cyprus cited the need for countermeasures to be 
narrowly defined because of this possibility of abuse.212 Cuba seemed the most 
outspoken on this point, suggesting that the lack of precision in the provisions 
proposed in the draft articles might have led to the justification of collective sanctions 
or collective interventions, and thus serve as a pretext for the adoption of unilatera l 
armed reprisals and other types of intervention.213 
While understanding the general need for countermeasures by directly injured 
States, some States feared that ‘collective countermeasures’ by non-directly injured 
States would only be used by more powerful States with their own agendas. For 
example, China suggested that only powerful States and blocs were in a position to 
take countermeasures, usually against weaker nations.214 Tanzania went further to 
argue that countermeasures were a threat to small and weak States, and raised concerns 
that countermeasures could be made punitively in order to satisfy the political and 
economic interests of the State claiming to be injured or affected.215  
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Another concern with the idea of countermeasures by non-injured parties was 
that such measures in and of themselves would be disproportionate in some cases and 
therefore contrary to one of the key safeguards of countermeasures. Germany raised 
concerns that disproportionate unilateral acts, not justified by the interest they sought 
to protect, could be disguised as countermeasures.216 Cuba was explicitly concerned 
that countermeasures by non-injured States involved more risks than benefits, and ran 
counter to the principle of proportionality.217 Similarly, China stated that “‘collective 
countermeasures’ were inconsistent with the principle of proportionality … for they 
would become tougher when non-injured States joined in, with the undesirab le 
consequence that countermeasures might greatly outweigh the extent of the injury. ”218 
There were calls from States that any countermeasures in the collective interest 
should be governed by the existing provisions of the UN Charter,219 regulated by the 
UN Security Council, or a regional organisation where appropriate. On this point, 
Libya argued: 
 
… collective countermeasures could be legitimate only in the context of intervention 
by the competent international or regional institutions. In that respect, no delegation 
of power — in other words the handing over of the right to take countermeasures to a 
group of countries which would exercise that right outside any constitutional 
framework based on international legitimacy — would be acceptable. Recourse to 
collective countermeasures must not turn into collective reprisals, in other words 
action with political aims.220 
 
These concerns led to Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, to conclude that the thrust 
of the governments’ response to the insertion of a provision allowing ‘collect ive 
countermeasures’ by non-injured States, even in response to breaches of obligat ions 
erga omnes, was that such a provision had “no basis in international law and would be 
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destabilizing”.221 Tams,222 on the other hand, does not come to the same conclusion – 
he believes the views of States during the Sixth Committee debates were much more 
nuanced than Crawford observed.223  
While accepting that States did raise these concerns over abuse and 
subjectivity, and some States were certainly against the idea of countermeasures by 
non-injured States, Tams suggests that a greater majority of States accepted the basic 
idea that all States could respond to serious erga omnes breaches by way of 
countermeasures.224 The concerns some raised, he suggests, were to highlight the need 
for further restrictions or modifications of the proposals.225  
Indeed, Tams was right to highlight this fact – there were a considerable 
number of States who saw the utility in such countermeasures. Even the representative 
for Costa Rica, who expressly declared that he would have preferred a complete ban 
on the use of countermeasures because of fears of a power imbalance, welcomed the 
proposals of the ILC, stating that “since the international community did not yet have 
a central authority to enforce the fulfilment of States’ obligations, the usefulness of 
countermeasures must be acknowledged.”226 
However, even for those States who did not support countermeasures by non-
directly injured States, some of their concerns may be alleviated in a number of ways. 
Firstly, relating to the argument that collective countermeasures would render their 
utility disproportionate, this concern seems misplaced. Logically speaking, if 
additional measures by non-injured States were taken, and those measures, measured 
collectively in addition to any countermeasures taken by the State directly injured by 
the prior breach, rendered the response disproportionate, then this would imply that 
those collective measures were not countermeasures, because they fell short of the 
principle of proportionality.  
It is also unconvincing that any additional non-injured State countermeasure, 
in every situation, would render the application of countermeasures automatica lly 
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disproportionate, as seemed to be suggested by China.227 While it is impossible to 
hypothesise on every breach of an erga omnes obligation, it may well be the case that 
collective measures are indeed an appropriate response to a serious breach of 
international law. This is certainly not an inconceivable possibility. The point is, the 
proportionality of the measures depends on the breach itself and the measures 
proposed in response.  
We shall identify which obligations may fall within the scope of non-injured 
party countermeasures below, but first we must assess the practice of States on the 
point as to whether such parties have standing to react to breaches of obligations erga 
omnes. 
 
2.2.2 Pre-2011 State Practice 
 
Practice on non-injured party countermeasures before 2011, when the ILC released its 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, has been covered in great 
depth on numerous occasions and in several detailed studies,228 and it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to repeat such assessments in detail. But it is necessary to outline 
the position of some commentators who assess pre-2011 practice differently to the 
ILC, before examining more recent practice to determine whether there has been any 
development in international practice since then. 
To recall, the ILC described State practice on countermeasures by non-injured 
parties in response to breaches of obligations erga omnes as limited and sparse.229 
Special Rapporteur Crawford similarly described such practice as ‘embryonic ’,230 
‘selective’,231 and dominated by the practice of ‘Western States’232 (rather than a 
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general practice, as required to establish a generally-applicable norm of customary 
international law).233 
On the point that the State practice was allegedly limited, embryonic and 
selective, Dawidowicz makes the point that the ILC itself only identified six example s 
of such practice on third-party / non-injured State countermeasures, whereas 
Dawidowicz himself provides twenty-seven examples of practice, and five statements, 
that he says strongly suggests that State practice is neither limited nor embryonic.234  
Indeed, the ILC did provide six examples of State practice, and two examples 
of ‘other cases’ where States “similarly suspended treaty rights in order to exercise 
pressure on States violating collective obligations. However, they did not rely on a 
right to take countermeasures, but asserted a right to suspend the treaty because of a 
fundamental change of circumstances.”235 Crawford provided the very same 
examples.236 Even so, some of the additional examples that Dawidowicz highlighted 
are worth mentioning, particularly for their very close relevance to themes in this 
thesis. 
Firstly, Dawidowicz refers to the Iranian hostage crisis at the US embassy in 
Tehran in 1979-1980.237 This example is particularly relevant because an attempt was 
made to adopt a UN Security Council Resolution which would have imposed a total 
trade embargo and political sanctions on Iran.238 However, this resolution was vetoed 
by the Soviet Union.239 In response, European Community States and others 
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unilaterally suspended all commercial contracts with Iran that were entered into after 
the date of the hostage taking.240 While Dawidowicz recognises that these actions are 
likely to be categorised as measures of retorsion, because Iran was not a member of 
GATT and there were purportedly no violations of any bilateral agreements, he does 
highlight that statements made by the European Parliament and Council of Ministe rs 
suggested that the possibility of adopting countermeasures in this situation was 
implied.241 
Looking to the statements referred to,242 there was certainly an explicit 
statement of willingness to implement the measures that were provided for in the draft 
resolution that did not pass at the Security Council.243 This, of course, does indicate a 
willingness to go beyond the Security Council in this situation. As Frowein notes, “It 
is not absolutely clear whether the implementation of this decision amounted to a 
neglect of otherwise applicable rules of public international law,”244 and so it cannot 
be said for sure that this was an expression on the legality of non-injured State 
countermeasures. Tams suggests that the Council of Ministers took the view that 
general international law “permitted the imposition of coercive measures” in this 
case.245 However, such a statement was not made explicitly or in those terms, either 
by the Council or by the European Parliament.246 The Foreign Ministers of the Nine, 
however, did seek to impose the sanctions ‘in accordance with international law.247 
While it is unclear whether this calls for only actions that would be ‘in accordance 
with international law’ or is evidence that they consider any such sanctions to be so, it 
is certainly clear that the European Community considered it legitimate to impose 
sanctions against Iran. 
Dawidowicz argues that, on the basis of the test for international custom 
requiring evidence of a widespread acceptance of the practice of States, although 
practice may be dominated by Western States it is not limited to these States.248 
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Importantly, Dawidowicz asserts that even the Group of 77 – a group very clearly in 
favour of a general prohibition of coercive measures and unilateral sanctions, as 
discussed above – had expressed support, albeit implicitly, through a number of 
positions and declarations they have taken.249 Dawidowicz refers to the situation in 
South Africa in the 1960s,250 noting that the Second Conference of African 
Independent States recommended that all African States institute a trade embargo 
against South Africa in response to its policy of apartheid.251 A simila r 
recommendation was made by the Non-Aligned Movement in 1964, which called 
upon all States to boycott all South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods, 
and also to deny airport and overflying facilities to aircraft and port facilities to ships 
proceeding to and from South Africa.252 Most relevantly, the UN General Assembly 
also adopted a Resolution requesting such a trade embargo,253 for which most 
developing nations voted in favour, and most developed nations either voted against 
or abstained.254 
Dawidowicz notes that, in the absence of any rights under general internationa l 
law or specific treaty commitments, such measures may be regarded as ‘retorsion’, yet 
many States were already parties to GATT, and so he argues “the call for a trade 
embargo in the resolutions expressed at least a willingness to contemplate a prima 
facie violation of international law.”255 He also argues that none of the States who took 
such measures invoked the security exceptions in Article XXI of GATT, and although 
no justifications made based upon general international law or countermeasures either, 
this instance may provide support for State practice that non-injured parties may take 
such countermeasures.256 Such action was taken before the UN Security Council 
finally recommended,257 and then subsequently requested under Chapter VII of the 
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Charter in 1977,258 that certain sanctions be imposed, and indeed the action itself was 
unrelated to the actual sanctions requested by the Security Council therein. Therefore, 
as Dawidowicz argued, it could be suggested that States did not at this time consider 
the Security Council to be the exclusive bearer of “a right to respond to serious 
breaches”,259 or perhaps even as having the sole legal competence to do so. 
 
2.2.3 Post-2011 State Practice 
 
Since 2011, and especially following the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, State practice in this 
area has arguably increased exponentially. As deadlock crept into the UN Security 
Council from 2011 concerning the Syrian crisis, and the subsequent situation in 
Ukraine in 2014, States seemed to have no choice but to move beyond the UN. 
The following analysis will focus on three cases that are particularly relevant 
to the thesis at hand. As well as addressing situations where States have acted beyond 
the level of measures called for by the UN Security Council, we shall also focus on 
situations where the Security Council has been faced by deadlock in recent years, and 
where States have taken it upon themselves to impose their own countermeasures 
collectively in response to these situations. In focus, we shall address States’ init ia l 
reactions to the situation in Libya, measures adopted following Security Council 
deadlock over Syria, and we shall point out a number of instances where regiona l 
organisations such as the European Union260 have taken measures against non-
Member States particularly with regard to the situation in Ukraine. 
 
Libya (2011) 
As discussed in Chapter II, the international response to impending atrocities in Libya 
in 2011 was one of the starting hopes that the responsibility to protect would be put 
into practice. Notwithstanding some of the overstretches of military action, and a lack 
of practical planning for the aftermath, some States did take economic and coercive 
action short of force even before the UN Security Council imposed its own sanctions.  
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US President Barak Obama issued an Executive Order261 on 25th February 
2011 which found that Colonel Muammar Qadhafi had taken ‘extreme measures 
against the people of Libya’ including ‘wanton violence against unarmed civilians’, 
and declared a national emergency in response to the ‘deterioration in the security of 
Libya and pose a serious risk to its stability, thereby constituting an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States’.262 
The Order imposed asset freezes on Libyan government officials and others close to 
Qadhafi.263 
This action was taken before the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1970 
the following day, which among other things imposed travel bans, arms embargos, 
asset freezes, and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court.264 
Therefore, the US would have needed a legal basis in international law to impose the 
asset freezes, but the US did not explicitly provide one. 
Similarly, on the 22nd February 2011, the League of Arab States suspended the 
Libyan delegation from the organisation.265 As will be assessed below in relation to 
Syria, there seems to be no basis for such action in the organisations founding 
document, and so this action by the Arab League could be considered unlawful, unless 
there is some justification elsewhere, such as in the law of countermeasures. 
 
Responses to the Situation in Syria (2011 – Present) 
The general outline of the situation in Syria and the deadlock faced by the Security 
Council has been set out in Chapter II.266 However, it is necessary to asses in some 
detail States’ reactions to the situation beyond Council deadlock, and how this may 
indicate a development of State practice relating to non-injured State countermeasures.  
The United States first imposed unilateral measures in response to the 
emerging crisis in Syria in April 2011. US President Barak Obama extended a previous 
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executive order, which initially established a sanctions programme against Syria in 
2004,267 by a new executive order freezing assets against targeted individuals and 
entities.268 This executive order justified the measures on the grounds that “the 
Government of Syria’s human rights abuses, including those related to the repression 
of the people of Syria … constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the nationa l 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”269 
The European Union also adopted its own framework of measures in May 
2011, starting with action that included an arms embargo, travel bans and asset 
freezes.270 In deciding on these measures, the Council of the EU cited its ‘grave 
concern about the situation unfolding in Syria and the deployment of military and 
security forces in a number of Syrian cities’,271 and based its decision on the ‘violent 
repression against the civilian population in Syria.’272 
Additional restrictive measures were then decided upon by the Council of the 
EU, adding an embargo of oil imports and exports from Syria to the measures.273  This 
was accompanied by a partial suspension of the Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Economic Community and the Syrian Arab Republic274 by the Council.275 
The Council justified this decision by stating that “the Union considers that the current 
situation in Syria is in clear violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter 
which constitute the basis of the cooperation between Syria and the Union.”276 The 
Council then went on to refer to the international obligations it considered breached, 
stating: 
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Considering the extreme seriousness of the violations perpetrated by Syria in breach 
of general international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter, the 
Union has decided to adopt additional restrictive measures against the Syrian 
regime.277 
 
What is crucial about this line of reasoning is that fact that the Council did not 
expressly consider Syria to have breached the Cooperation Agreement itself, but 
separate principles of international law that ‘constitute the basis’ of that cooperation. 
This suggests that the legal basis for suspending the agreement is not Article 60 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.278  As detailed above, the suspension of a 
treaty requires a ‘material breach’ of that instrument, and such a material breach 
requires either: (i) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; 
or (ii) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or 
purpose of the treaty.279 
The problem is, with the Cooperation Agreement in question, there seems to 
have been no material breach or violation of such a provision. The “common desire of 
the Parties to maintain and strengthen friendly relations in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter” that the Cooperation Agreement is ‘based 
on’,280 as the Council put it, may be a political and diplomatic purpose of the 
agreement, but it is by no means a legal requirement of that agreement itself because 
the obligations therein do not derive from, and are not specifically required by, any 
provision of that treaty. The Preamble certainly refers to this desire to uphold these 
principles through the agreement,281 but such obligations themselves are found in 
separate sources of international law. 
Article 42 of the agreement does allow for action “which it considers essential 
to its security in time of war or serious international tension.” But this has not been 
invoked by the EU. Nor did the Council specifically justify the legality of the 
suspension on grounds of Article 60 of the VCLT. In fact, there are a number of 
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indicators which certainly seem to suggest that it is the law of countermeasures that 
the Council is utilising as a legal basis for this action.  
Firstly, this decision, and subsequent decisions expanding the suspension of 
the agreement, 282 emphasise that the suspensions were taken ‘until the Syrian 
authorities put an end to the systematic violations of human rights and can again be 
considered as being in compliance with general international law and the principles 
which form the basis of the Cooperation Agreement.’283 This particularly highlights 
the intended temporary nature of the measures, giving the Syrian Government the 
opportunity to comply with its international obligations to have the measures 
reversed.284 Secondly, these decisions specifically require Syria to be notified of the 
decision to suspend the treaty. 285 Additionally, the decisions were intended to be 
limited in nature, stating that ‘the suspension should aim at targeting the Syrian 
authorities only and not the people of Syria, [and] the suspension should be limited. ’ 286 
In terms of the oil embargo, this was justified on the fact that since “crude oil and 
petroleum products are at present the products whose trade most benefits the Syrian 
regime and which thus supports its repressive policies, the suspension of the 
Agreement should be limited to crude oil and petroleum products”.287  
These limitations on the suspension suggest the Council was at least aiming to 
act in conformity with the procedural and substantive conditions for the taking of 
countermeasures.288 The fact that this is a measure taken by an internationa l 
organisation, not ‘directly injured’ by Syria’s violations of the outlined obligations, 
suggests that the EU considers such measures to be available by such parties in these 
circumstances, specifically in response to these violations of international obligations. 
                                                 
282 See, for example, Council Decision 2012/123/CFSP of 27 February 2012 amending Decision 
2011/523/EU partially suspending the application of the Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Economic Community and the Syrian Arab Republic [2012] OJ L54/18, extending the suspension to 
allow for restrictions on gold, precious metals and diamonds. 
283 Council Decision 2011/523/EU (n.275), at preamble para [11]; Council Decision 2012/123/CFS P 
(n.282), preamble para [2]. 
284 As consistent with the requirements set out above, see Section  2.1. 
285 Council Decision 2011/523/EU (n.275), Article 2; Council Decision 2012/123/CFSP (n.282), Article 
2.  
286 Council Decision 2011/523/EU (n.275), preamble para [12]; see also Council Decision 
2012/123/CFSP (n.282), preamble para [4]. 
287 Council Decision 2011/523/EU (n.275), preamble para [12]; a very similar wording was used in 
reference to the restrictions on old, precious metals and diamonds  in Council Decision 2012/123/CFS P 
(n.282), preamble para [4]. 
288 As consistent with the requirements set out above, see Section 2.1. 
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Conclusions of the European Council in October 2011 determined that the EU 
would impose further and more comprehensive measures against the Assad regime ‘as 
long as the repression of the civilian population continues.’289  
However, so-called ‘Western States’ were not the only bloc to adopt measures 
in response to the crisis in Syria. The Arab League took unprecedented action in 
November 2011 when it firstly suspended Syria from the organisation on 12 th 
November,290 and then subsequently imposed ‘sanctions’ against it on 27th 
November.291 
These measures, although termed ‘sanctions’ in the media292 and in State’s 
remarks about them,293 are not ‘sanctions’ in the sense that they have been adopted as 
part of a multilateral treaty or institution that has the power to take such measures 
against its members. The Arab League’s founding Pact294 does not grant the 
organisation any powers to take ‘sanctions’ or other coercive measures short of force, 
and so it cannot be said that Syria may be bound by such actions on the basis of its 
consent to this instrument.  
Syria argued at the UN Security Council that: 
 
It considers the resolution adopted by the meeting of the Council of the League of 
Arab States a violation of its national sovereignty, a flagrant interference in its internal 
affairs and a blatant violation of the purposes for which the League of Arab States 
                                                 
289 European Council, ‘Conclusions of 23 October 2011’, (CO EUR 17/CONCL 5) EUCO 52/11, 
Document Number ST 52 2011 REV 1, at para [17].    
290 League of Arab States, Council Resolution 7438 (Extraordinary Session, 12 November 2011), 
available at: 
<http://www.lasportal.org/ar/councils/lascouncil/Pages/LasCouncilMinistrialDetails.aspx?RID=61> 
(in Arabic) (accessed 20/10/2017). 
291 League of Arab States, Council Resolution 7442 (Extraordinary Session, 27 November 2011), 
available at: 
<http://www.lasportal.org/ar/councils/lascouncil/Pages/LasCouncilMinistrialDetails.aspx?RID=58> 
(in Arabic) (accessed 20/10/2017). 
292 See, for example, ‘Syria unrest: Arab League adopts sanctions in Cairo’, (BBC News, 27 November 
2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15901360> (accessed 20/10/2017); Neil 
MacFarquar and Nada Bakri, ‘Isolating Syria, Arab League Imposes Broad Sanctions’ (New York Times  
27 November 2011), available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/world/middleeast/arab -
league-prepares-to-vote-on-syrian-sanctions.html> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
293 See, for example, UNSC Verbatim Record, 6710th Meeting (31st January 2012), UN Doc S/PV.6710 , 
at p 3 (Qatar), p 24 (Russia), p 25 (China). Incidentally, France also referred to the EU measures 
imposed on Syria as ‘sanctions’ in this meeting: at p 15 (France). 
294 Pact of the League of Arab States (adopted 22 March 1945, entered into force 10 May 1945) 70 
UNTS 237, English translation from 248. 
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was established. It is also a violation of article 8 of the Charter of the League of Arab 
States.295 
 
Article 8 of the Pact requires that every member State respect the “form of government 
obtaining in the other States of the League”, and to “recognise the form of government 
obtaining as one of the rights of those States”, and furthermore for States to pledge 
“not to take any action tending to change that form.” Exclusion of Members is to be 
taken  under Article 18 of the Pact, which provides that “The Council of the League 
may consider any State that is not fulfilling the obligations resulting from this Pact as 
excluded from the League, by a decision taken by a unanimous vote of all the States 
except the State referred to.” However, Resolution 7438 of the Council only seems to 
‘suspend’ Syria, and even considering this language the resolution was not adopted 
unanimously. Dawidowicz also highlights a similar point in relation to the suspension 
of Libya, arguing that Article 18 only allows for such action when the Member State 
is ‘not fulfilling the obligations’ under the Pact, and that since the Pact “does not refer 
to any obligation incumbent upon Arab League Member States to comply with 
international human rights and humanitarian law”, the suspensions could not be 
justified under the Pact.296 
The League can take binding decisions on States where there is a dispute 
between two or more Members,297 or where there is an act of aggression by one 
Member against another.298 However, there is no provision in the Pact to determine 
the powers of the League in a situation reflecting that in Syria at the time. In fact, the 
Pact itself makes clear that in cases where decisions are reached by a majority, ‘shall 
only bind those that accept them’.299 Therefore, there is no way that the resolutions 
passed by the Council in the Arab League could bind Syria legally – thus any measures 
taken against it cannot be ‘institutional sanctions’ rendered lawful by its prior consent.   
                                                 
295 UNSC Meeting 6710 (n.293), p 12 (Syria). 
296 M Dawidowicz, ‘Third-Party Countermeasures: A Progressive Development of International Law?’, 
(Questions of International Law, 30 June 2016) <http://www.qil-qdi.org/third-party-countermeasures -
progressive-development-international-law/> (accessed 20/10/2017); See also, in relation to the Syria 
suspensions, M Dawidowicz, “Third-Party Countermeasures: Observations on a Controversial 
Concept”, in Christine Chinkin et al, Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), at 348 and 361. 
297 Article 5, Arab League Pact. 
298 Article 6, Arab League Pact. 
299 Article 7, Arab League Pact. 
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Nor can these measures be considered as acts of retorsion. The key feature of 
acts of retorsion is that they are inherently lawful, but unfriendly. The actions taken 
by the Arab League, especially the freezing of Syrian Government assets, are to be 
considered as unlawful acts under general international law requiring some basis in 
custom or otherwise to render them lawful. 
Therefore, on what other basis could the actions of the Arab League be taken 
if not customary international law, and in particular the law of countermeasures? With 
no basis in the Arab League Pact, the law of countermeasures would be the only other 
option – and that would require us to accept that States may take such measures in 
situations where they are not directly injured.  
 
Responses to the Situation in Ukraine (2014 – Present) 
When Russia invaded and annexed Crimea from Ukraine, there was internationa l 
outcry that the incident was an act of aggression, and violated the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and political independence of Ukraine, rendering it also a gross 
violation of the UN Charter.300 With Russia having a permanent seat and a veto on the 
Security Council, it might be considered impossible to take any action in response to 
this through the UN, whether by sanctions or otherwise, owing to the near-certainty 
that Russia would block such action against it.  
The European Union was early to respond when the situation was still 
developing, before Crimea was formally ‘annexed’, but it was clear that there was a 
presence of troops on the peninsula, new ‘leaders’ in Crimea had called for a 
referendum on the future status of the territory, and the situation was developing 
quickly. In a statement, EU Heads of State called for Russia and Ukraine to rectify the 
situation quickly and for negotiations to produce results ‘within a limited 
timeframe’.301 The Heads of State then warned that if no results were produced, the 
EU will decide on measures such as travel bans, asset freezes and the cancellation of 
                                                 
300 See, for example, statements in UNSC Verbatim Record, 7144th Meeting (19th March 2014), UN 
Doc S/PV.7144. 
301 European Council, ‘Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine’, (Brussels, 6th March 
2014), available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2014/03/06/> 
(accessed 20/10/2017), at para [5]. 
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an upcoming EU-Russia summit.302 They also said that the EU ‘has a special 
responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in Europe.’303 
When the Crimean ‘referendum’ went ahead anyway, the EU responded the 
next day when the Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions on the developing 
situation.304 The Council rejected the legitimacy and legality of the referendum, 
deploring the developments as violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territoria l 
integrity.305 The Council expressed its regret that a resolution in the UN Security 
Council was blocked by a Russian veto,306 emphasising that constructive dialogue was 
still possible, and warning against any annexation by Russia of Crimea which it would 
consider as a violation of international law.307 On the same day, the Council of the EU 
once again acted within its Common Foreign and Security Policy framework and 
imposed ‘restrictive measures’ on Russia, placing travel restrictions and asset freezes 
on both Russian and Crimean officials.308 
The UN General Assembly issued a Resolution stating that the referendum had 
no validity,309 and called upon States not to recognise the result.310 The Resolution 
‘welcomed’ the efforts of “other international and regional organizations to assist 
Ukraine in protecting the rights of all persons in Ukraine”, but did not specifica lly 
highlight whether this was directed at the EU measures.311 The EU Foreign Affairs 
                                                 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid, para [3]; This was also reiterated later in: European Council, ‘Conclusions on Ukraine  approved 
by the European Council’, (Brussels, 20 March 2014), available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141707.pdf> (accessed 
20/10/2017), at para [8]. 
304 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting 
(Brussels, 17 March 2014), available at:  
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141601.pdf> (accessed 
20/10/2017). 
305 Conclusions of 17 March 2014 (n.304), at para [1]. 
306 Conclusions of 17 March 2014 (n.304), at para [3]. 
307 Conclusions of 17 March 2014 (n.304), at para [4]. 
308 Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of 
actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine 
[2014] OJ L 78/16; see also, Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning 
restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, so vereignty 
and independence of Ukraine [2014] OJ L 78/6; and, Council Implementing Regulation  (EU) No 
284/2014 of 21 March 2014 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive 
measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
independence of Ukraine [2014] OJ L 86/27. 
309 UNGA Res 68/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, (1 April 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/262, para 
[5]. 
310 UNGA Res 68/262 (n.309), at para [6]. 
311 UNGA Res 68/262 (n.309), at para [4]. 
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Council welcomed this resolution,312 and warned that “any further steps by the Russian 
Federation to destabilise the situation in Ukraine would lead to additional and far 
reaching consequences for relations in a broad range of economic areas”.313 The 
Council continued to condemn Russia’s stance on the matter, and also “any attempt to 
circumvent the sanctions regime”,314 further expanding its targets for restrictive 
measures,315 and calling for further trade, economic and financial measures.316 What 
is also interesting is that the Council also called on UN Member States “to consider 
similar measures in line with UNGA Resolution 68/262”, even though that resolution 
did not mention such measures explicitly.317 
The UN Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
began producing reports detailing allegations of growing violence, torture, and 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Eastern Ukraine, 
calling for independent investigations into the allegations.318 With this a growing 
concern for the EU Foreign Affairs Council in the backdrop of the annexation of 
Crimea,319 the Council decided to prohibit the import of goods originating from 
Crimea or the city of Sevastopol into the European Union.320 
                                                 
312 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting 
(Luxembourg, 14 April 2014), available at:  
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313 Conclusions of 14 April 2014 (n.312), at para [6]. 
314 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting 
(Brussels, 12 May 2014), available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/05/12/ > 
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315 Conclusions of 12 May 2014 (n.314), para [9]; See also, Council Decision 2014/265/CFSP of 12 
May 2014 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions 
undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine [2014] 
OJ L 137/9; and, Council Regulation (EU) No 476/2014 of 12 May 2014 amending Regulation (EU) 
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317 Conclusions of 12 May 2014 (n.314), para [10]. 
318 See, e.g., United Nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine’ (15 June 2014), available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15June2014.pdf> (accessed 
20/10/2017). 
319 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting 
(Luxembourg, 23 June 2014), available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/06/23/ > (accessed 20/10/2017), at para [3] and 
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320 Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP of 23 June 2014 concerning restrictions on goods originating in 
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183/70; see also, Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014 concerning restrictions on the 
import into the Union of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, in response to the illegal annexation  
of Crimea and Sevastopol [2014] OJ L 183/9. 
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When fighting in the East of Ukraine continued, and the Malaysian Airlines 
passenger flight MH17 was shot down over the area of conflict on 17th July 2014, the 
EU increased the scope of its asset freezes and travel bans to targets who supported, 
materially or financially, actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.321 Eventually, the Council targeted Russian 
financial institutions, defence, and imposed an arms embargo.322 This was further 
expanded to target the Russian oil sector.323 This Regulation expressly stated that its 
aim was to “put pressure on the Russian Government”.324 Similar measures and further 
restrictions continued to be imposed upon Russia through to 2017.325 
Dawidowicz326 is of the opinion that the financial measures imposed by the EU 
would generally fall foul of Article II of the GATS,327  providing for ‘Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment’ whereby Members shall accord to services and service suppliers of 
any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords any other country.  
He also notes that none of the security exceptions in Article XIV bis of the same 
agreement have been invoked by the EU, and therefore argues that the only 
explanation of these measures would be to accept the legality of non-injured State 
countermeasures.328 Similarly, he also argued in terms of the GATT329 that: 
                                                 
321 Council Decision 2014/475/CFSP of 18 July 2014 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning 
restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty 
and independence of Ukraine [2014] OJ L 214/28; see also Council Regulation (EU) No 783/2014 of 
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the European Union, ‘Timeline - EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine’ (European 
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326 Dawidowicz (n.296). 
327 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 
January 1995), 1869 UNTS 183. 
328 Dawidowicz (n.296). 
329 General Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947) (adopted 30 October 1947, entered 
into force 1 January 1948), 55 UNTS 187, amended by the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995), 1867 UNTS 
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191 
 
 
The limited export embargo applicable to energy-related goods also amounts to a 
quantitative trade restriction which is prima facie unlawful under Article XI GATT. 
Again, EU Member States did not invoke the national security exception in Article 
XXI GATT as possible justification for their otherwise unlawful conduct.330 
 
Of course, just because the EU does not invoke the security exceptions in GATS, or 
the similar security exceptions in GATT Article XXI, does not necessarily mean that 
they do not apply. As we discussed above, the exceptions provided for in Article XIV 
bis GATS and Article XXI GATT are quite vague and it is not clear whether they are 
to be interpreted as self-judging, or at least subject to some form of objective review 
criteria.331 If the provisions were to be interpreted objectively, the question is whether 
the actions taken by the EU are ‘necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests’, even if it could be readily accepted that the Ukraine crisis is an ‘emergency 
in international relations’. If it cannot be accepted that the EU’s essential security 
interests need protecting due to the situation in Ukraine, then the measures must be 
justified by some other means – and the most likely candidate is the law of 
countermeasures. However, if the provisions defer to the EU to consider, subjective ly, 
whether these measures are necessary, there is still a convincing argument that this 
subjective assessment must still be genuine and in good faith.332 If this were accepted, 
then it renders the security exceptions to GATT and GATS less prone to abuse, since 
the party relying on them must actually believe the exceptions apply. Based on this 
interpretation, Dawidowicz may well have a point in highlighting the lack of an 
invocation of these exceptions by the EU, because it may be used to indicate whether 
or not the EU genuinely believes that these exceptions apply. 
As discussed above,333 if one of the exceptions to GATT or applies, this renders 
the measures in question compatible with the GATT or GATS regimes in internationa l 
                                                 
entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 187; provisions of the GATT 1947, as incorporated by 
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331 See Section 1.3. 
332 See Neuwirth & Svetlicinii (n.150), at 905-906, but they highlight an argument, at footnote 93, by 
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333 See Section 1.3. 
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law, so long as they are also consistent with other general principles of internationa l 
law such as non-intervention, human rights, and the prohibition of force. 
Neuwirth and Svetlicinii discussed this issue particularly in relation to the 
measures taken in response to the Ukraine crisis.334 They highlight the ‘rational choice 
theory’ which supports the position that “states do not abuse the security exception, 
because by doing so, they would encourage other states to follow suit.”335 By 
extension, it could be argued that parties may not invoke the security exception 
explicitly, where they are really relying on it on duplicitous or contentious grounds, 
out of the same fear that other States may do the same. The reality is, if States or 
International Organisations really do want to secure the observance of human rights 
norms or the law concerning mass atrocities by utilising coercive measures, it would 
certainly be more legitimate and legally sound for them to justify their action as it is, 
rather than stretching the meaning of ‘essential security interests’ beyond its logica l 
and ordinary meaning. 
Other measures taken in response to the Ukraine crisis include simila r 
economic measures by States including the US,336 Australia,337 Canada,338 and 
Japan.339 The US Executive Orders referred to the deployment of Russian forces into 
Ukraine as ‘an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign 
policy of the United States’340 and the first Order declared a ‘national emergency’ in 
response.341 Canada’s measures viewed Russia’s actions as ‘a grave breach of 
                                                 
334 Neuwirth & Svetlicinii (n.150). 
335 Neuwirth & Svetlicinii (n.150), at 909. 
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international peace and security that has resulted or is likely to result in a serious 
international crisis.’342 
Russia adopted several ‘counter-sanctions’343 in response to these measures. 
For example, President Putin issued an executive order limiting the import of 
agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs from States who imposed 
‘economic sanctions against Russian legal entities’ and also individuals who joined 
such action.344 The latest versions of the Russian measures impose restrictions upon 
the US, the EU, Canada, Australia, Norway, Ukraine, Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, 
and Liechtenstein until 31st December 2017.345 
Similarly, Russia suspended346 its 2013 Agreement with the US on 
Cooperation in Nuclear and Energy Related Scientific Research and Development .347 
According to the official statement on this decision, Russia considered that the 
ongoing extensions of sanctions by the US against Russia “requires the adoption of 
countermeasures in relation to the US”.348 It further underscored: 
 
Under this approach, the international legal framework of cooperation with the United 
States will be preserved. Russia will preserve the possibility of resuming cooperation 
under the Agreement when that is justified by the general context of relations with the 
United States.349  
 
                                                 
342 Regulations SOR/2014-58 (n.338). 
343 The phrase ‘counter-sanctions’ is used here only to indicate the nature of Russia imposing measures 
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Based upon this particular statement, it does seem that Russia is justifying its action 
as a countermeasure within the international law meaning of that phrase. However, as 
Hofer has rightly pointed out, Russia could only rely on the doctrine of 
countermeasures if the sanctions they are responding to are illegal in the first place.350 
This is precisely the question at hand, and on the basis of the preceding analysis it does 
seem that there is growing evidence of State practice in support of non-injured party 
countermeasures. 
 
2.2.4 Preliminary Conclusion on the ‘Injured Party’ Requirement  
 
Based on the analysis above, it is submitted that the requirement that a State or 
International Organisation must be ‘injured’ before it is able to take countermeasures 
against a breach of an obligation it is owed, and has a legal interest in preserving, 
seems somewhat misplaced. It has been clear from early State practice that the party 
taking countermeasures must be a victim of a breach – but the advent of the 
requirement of ‘injury’ is unclear. Hesitance against allowing all States with a legal 
interest in preserving an obligation to enforce that obligation through countermeasures 
have consistently cited the potential for abuse as a concern. However, in the view of 
this author, it seems that the requirement of ‘injury’ as the ILC defines it goes too far 
in limiting the application of countermeasures. 
One would point out the fact that, if a State is owed an obligation by virtue of 
that obligation being owed to the international community as a whole – and that 
obligation is breached, but there is no ‘Victim State’ that has been directly injured – 
the use of countermeasures would still be subject to the requirement of proportionality. 
As addressed in relation to Libya and China’s fears above,351 there is a need to avoid 
countermeasures and the risk of abuse where there is only a ‘minor’ or ‘technica l’ 
breach of an obligation. However, it seems this concern goes too far. The requirement 
of proportionality would surely be enough of a legal stopper to prevent the use of 
countermeasures where it would be wholly disproportionate or inappropriate. To 
respond to a technical breach of an obligation with a far-reaching substantive breach 
                                                 
350 A Hofer, ‘Russia’s Unilateral Suspension of the 2013 Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation with the 
United States’, (EJIL: Talk!, 27 October 2016) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-unilateral-suspension-
of-the-2013-agreement-on-nuclear-cooperation-with-the-united-states/> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
351 See Section 2.2.1. 
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of another, in itself, would be disproportionate and therefore illegal. In other words, if 
any countermeasure would be disproportionate in response to a breach, then that must 
be a legal indication that countermeasures are legally unavailable in the first place. 
In light of more recent practice, it seems much clearer that States are of the 
position that countermeasures may be taken in response to breaches of obligat ions 
erga omnes by States not directly affected. Whether these States consider themselves 
as ‘specifically affected’ or ‘injured’ is unclear, but the countermeasures were taken 
nonetheless. 
Elagab352 highlighted this very point in 1988 when he argued that, although he 
believed there was no support in State practice at that time for countermeasures in 
response to ‘international crimes’,353 there may be a legal argument for reactions to 
obligations erga omnes: 
 
None the less, the erga omnes principle may be applied to widen the category of ‘an 
aggrieved party’ so as to include all States where the violated obligation has an erga 
omnes character. Accordingly, all States, including those which have not been injured 
directly, will be deemed to have a right to impose counter-measures against the 
perpetrator of the breach. That said, it needs, however, to be recognised that measures 
taken in such circumstances might exceed the limits of proportionality. It follows, 
therefore, that difficulties would arise when the legality of such measures is being 
considered.354 
 
This, of course, is not to say that there would be no risks of abuse if non-injured parties 
could take countermeasures freely and at their own choosing. Crawford stressed the 
balance that needs to be met, highlighting the difficulty in situations where breaches 
of human rights obligations are owed to the international community as a whole but 
affect only the nationals of the responsible State:  
 
The difficulty here is that, almost by definition, the injured parties will lack 
representative organs which can validly express their wishes on the international 
                                                 
352 O Y Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law (Oxford , 
Clarendon Press, 1988). 
353 This was a rejected category of responsibility in earlier drafts of the ILC Articles: see, for example, 
ILC, ‘Frist Report on State Responsibility by Mr James Crawford, Special Rapporteur’, (1998) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/490, at para [46]-[51], and [70]-[95]. 
354 Elagab (n.352), at 59. 
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plane, and there is a substantial risk of exacerbating such cases if third States are freely 
allowed to take countermeasures based on their own appreciation of the situation. On 
the other hand it is difficult to envisage that, faced with obvious, gross and persistent 
violations of community obligations, third States should have no entitlement to act.355 
 
Crawford is clearly stressing the difficult choice between allowing non-injured State 
countermeasures and the risks of abuse.356 Alland outlines the same concerns that 
countermeasures “may be merely a way of imposing a partial, biased and subjective 
view of international ordre public” and that “they may allow the domination of a few 
states over others to be legitimized, since countermeasures retain their self-assessed 
nature.”357 Some have argued that allowing non-injured State countermeasures would 
be ‘an invitation to chaos’ which would legitimise ‘mob-justice’, ‘vigilantism’ and 
‘power politics’.358 However, if there is a clear need to allow such action in genuine 
circumstances, there is no reason why these measures cannot be allowed with the 
requisite safeguards in place.359 Proportionality, as argued, is just one of those 
safeguards.  
Indeed, perhaps some States are right when they highlighted during the 
General Assembly’s Sixth Committee debates on this issue that collective 
countermeasures of this kind should at least be authorised by a competent internationa l 
or regional organisation.360 There was of course a clear preference by some States such 
as Mexico361 that collective measures should be taken by the UN Security Council. 
There were also cautious warnings by others that unilateral action should not be taken 
while the Security Council is seized of a matter, for the risk of undermining or 
marginalising the Security Council itself.362 Iran expressed a wider view, suggesting 
                                                 
355 Crawford, ‘Third Report’ (n.231) at para [403]. 
356 On this point, see also D Alland, “Countermeasures of General Interest”, (2002) 13(5) European 
Journal of International Law 1221-1239. 
357 Alland (n.356), at 1236. 
358 See the arguments and authors cited by Dawidowicz (n.228), at 344; see also Tams (n.222), at 199 
and 240. 
359 See on the need for safeguards for countermeasures generally see, for example, ILC, ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session’, (23 April–1 June and 2 July–
10 August 2001), UN Doc A/56/10, at 324-327, particularly para [6]; see also Alland (n.356), at 1225. 
360 See above, (n.220) and discussion therein. 
361 UNGA Sixth Committee (55th Session), ‘Summary Record of the 20th Meeting’, (14 November 2000) 
UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR.20, at para [35]-[36] (Mexico). 
362 See, UNGA Sixth Committee (55th Session), ‘Summary Record of 17th Meeting’, (14 November 
2000) UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR.17, at para [85] (Greece); and UNGA Sixth Committee (55th Session), 
‘Summary Record of 24th Meeting’, (16 November 2000) UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR.24, at para [63]-[64] 
(Cameroon). 
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that “where there had been a serious breach of an essential obligation owed to the 
international community as a whole, countermeasures must be coordinated by the 
United Nations.”363 It is not clear whether Iran meant through the Security Council, or 
whether this coordination could have been done by another competent body of the UN. 
Such institutional safeguards certainly increase the legitimacy of collective 
countermeasures. But in our case, where the Security Council has failed to respond, 
inaction could have dire consequences. As we shall discuss in Chapter VI, a 
requirement that action should be green-lit by the General Assembly may well satisfy 
the thirst for safeguards, but this of course depends upon the competencies of the 
Assembly under the UN Charter.364 Like the failure of the Security Council, the UN 
General Assembly may not always have the political will to act, or the UN in general 
may not be in a position to respond quickly enough to prevent atrocity crimes from 
taking place, whereas a regional organisation might be. The responsibility to protect 
still does not end, and so we must also consider whether action beyond the UN could 
come with sufficient safeguards to allow such emergency responses by regiona l 
organisations.365 
Leaving aside these questions for now, we must address whether there are 
grounds to accept that this category of non-injured party countermeasures has been 
accepted as a legal justification for coercive measures. The main problem, of course, 
is that State practice may indicate an implied belief that this is so, but their statements 
are not explicit or exact enough to categorically demonstrate evidence of opinio juris, 
and their actions might also be based upon purely political or moral grounds rather 
than legal ones.366 Dawidowicz seeks to explain this criticism by using what he 
describes as the ICJ’s own method for assessing the existence of opinio juris, as 
purportedly adopted by the ILC, suggesting “the method implicit in their assessment 
could be described as a process of elimination: in the absence of indications of outright 
illegality or alternative legal justifications, a particular act has been presumed lawful 
as a third-party countermeasure.”367 He goes on: 
                                                 
363 UNGA Sixth Committee (55th Session), ‘Summary Record of the 15th Meeting’, (13 November 2000) 
UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR.15, at para [17] (Iran). 
364 See Chapter VI, Section 1.3. 
365 See Chapter VI, Section 2. 
366 See, for example, points made by Crawford, where he highlights that States have sometimes had 
implied preference for alternative justifications such as grounds for the suspension or termination of 
treaties: Crawford, ‘Third Report’ (n.231) at para [396(a)]; see also Tams (n.222), at 238-239. 
367 Dawidowicz (n.228), at 412-415, particularly 415. 
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On this basis, by demonstrating that alternative and converging justifications are 
unavailable in each case, the better view is arguably that there is a presumption of 
legality attached to the generally uniform conduct assessed in this study. The view 
that prima facie unlawful unilateral coercive measures taken in defence of the most 
serious breaches of international law should be regarded as merely ‘politically 
motivated measures’ is thus not borne out by international practice.368 
 
Dawidowicz makes a very strong argument here. Indeed, Tams makes a very simila r 
point, suggesting that “in the absence of specific indications to the contrary, the 
conduct of States will be based on an accompanying legal conviction; opinio juris thus 
can usually be inferred from State practice.”369 Tams also argues politically motivated 
conduct does not necessarily lack opinio juris, because a State’s assessment of a 
situation is often still legally relevant.370 It leads one to conclude that customary 
international law may well have developed to indicate that non-injured parties may 
have standing to take countermeasures, but only in response to certain breaches of 
international obligations, and only on the basis that there are certain safeguards to 
prevent abuse. 
Even if this is not the case, there is still a convincing argument that, in cases 
of widespread or systematic atrocities such as those that come within the responsibility 
to protect, States could be considered as ‘injured’ in some sense. Therefore, the 
question becomes not whether the law of countermeasures allows non-injured parties 
to take such action, but whether breaches of certain obligations erga omnes actually 
do cause injury to a State concerned, or even the international community as a whole . 
This depends, of course, on the obligation breached – a question to which we shall 
now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
368 Dawidowicz (n.228), at 415 (footnote omitted). 
369 Tams (n.222), at 238. 
370 Tams (n.222), at 239. 
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2.3 Prior Breach of an International Obligation – Identifying the Erga Omnes 
Obligation 
 
As outlined above, one of the most fundamental requirements for countermeasures to 
be available is that there is a prior breach of an international obligation by the party 
that is to be subject to such measures. 
Considering the varieties of obligations one might expect to be breached when 
concerned with the responsibility to protect, especially in a situation where the 
Security Council has failed in its responsibilities, as discussed in Chapter III, we might 
look to violations of human rights obligations, or even the commission of the atrocity 
crimes themselves. Such obligations may be considered obligations erga omnes – 
owed to the international community as a whole.  
As mentioned above, obligations erga omnes were recognised by the ICJ in 
Barcelona Traction.371 The court said in this regard: 
 
In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are 
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States 
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes.372 
 
The ICJ gave as examples of obligations erga omnes, “the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, and of genocide … the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of 
the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination,”373 and 
also noted that such obligations may be conferred by general international law as well 
as “international instruments of universal or quasi-universal character.”374 
                                                 
371  Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited  (Belgium v Spain) 
(Judgement) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, (hereinafter Barcelona Traction) at p 32, para [33]. 
372 Barcelona Traction (n.371) at p 32, para [33]. 
373 Barcelona Traction (n.371) at p 32, para [34]; see also: East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (Judgment) 
[1995] ICJ Rep 90, at p 102, para [29], confirming self-determination as erga omnes; Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide  (Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections) [1996] ICJ Rep 595, at p 615-616, para [31], confirming the crime 
of genocide as erga omnes. 
374 Ibid. 
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Regarding the use of countermeasures in response to breaches of such 
obligations, there seems to be support in commentary for an additional safeguard, 
namely that these measures may only be used in response to widespread or serious 
violations of obligations erga omnes. Rather than allowing countermeasures for a 
simple or technical breach of an erga omnes obligation alone, this additional step 
requiring a threshold of seriousness is supported by a number of writers. 
For example, Crawford highlighted a pattern in State practice whereby, he 
supposes, the violation of an obligation had been seen to have reached a certain 
threshold.375 Tams in particular highlights States’ responses to the ILC’s earlier work, 
and determines that a general right to take countermeasures would be restricted to 
serious breaches of obligations erga omnes.376 This threshold seems to be widely 
accepted by other commentators on this issue too.377 
Tams supports this additional threshold of ‘seriousness’, and argues that it 
provides another safeguard against abuse.378 He similarly argues that States thus seem 
prepared to accept the risk of abuse inherent with non-injured party countermeasures 
in exchange for the increased possibility of responding against particularly serious 
wrongful conduct.379 
But this ‘seriousness’ threshold is evidently ambiguous and raises more 
questions than answers.380 While it is not the purpose of this thesis to investigate the 
exact threshold of when violations become ‘serious’, the ILC commentaries may 
provide some guidance. In particular, Part Two, Chapter III of the Articles on State 
Responsibility sets out some consequences for serious breaches of obligations under 
peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). Although it is not entirely clear 
whether jus cogens and obligations erga omnes (owed to the international community 
as a whole) are the same, the ILC acknowledges that there is certainly a substantia l 
                                                 
375 Crawford, ‘Third Report’ (n.231) at para [399] and [404]-[406]. 
376 Tams (n.222), at 248-249. 
377 See, for example: M Payandeh, “With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of 
the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking”, (2010) 35(2) Yale 
Journal of International Law 470, at 513; Dawidowicz (n.228), at 342, 347; Criddle (n.108), at 597. 
For a discussion of the distinction more generally, see LA Sicilianos, “The Classification of Obligations 
and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility”, (2002) 13(5) EJIL 
1127. 
378 Tams (n.222), at 250. 
379 Tams (n.222), at 251. 
380 See Tams (n.222), at 248; and also the concerns outlined by States during the ILC’s drafting of the 
ARS with regard to similar language used in Part Two, Chapter III of ARS: Crawford, ‘Fourth Report’ 
(n.221), at para [48]. 
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overlap between them.381 Therefore, this author submits that the threshold between 
serious and technical breaches of jus cogens would, by analogy, shed some light on 
what constitutes serious breaches of obligations erga omnes, notwithstanding any 
substantive difference between the two types of norm. 
With this in mind, it is useful to highlight that Article 40(2) of the Articles on 
State Responsibility suggests “[a] breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves 
a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.” When 
explaining this further, the ILC commentaries state: 
 
The word “serious” signifies that a certain order of magnitude of violation is necessary 
in order not to trivialize the breach and it is not intended to suggest that any violation 
of these obligations is not serious or is somehow excusable. But relatively less serious 
cases of breach of peremptory norms can be envisaged, and it is necessary to limit the 
scope of this chapter to the more serious or systematic breaches. Some such limitation 
is supported by State practice. For example, when reacting against breaches of 
international law, States have often stressed their systematic, gross or egregious 
nature.382 
 
The ILC further elaborated that a ‘systematic’ violation of obligations would be 
carried out in an organised and deliberate way, whereas a ‘gross’ violation would 
denote a flagrant breach, ‘amounting to a direct and outright assault on the values 
protected by the rule’, and these terms are not necessarily mutually exclusive.383 With 
some obligations, such as genocide, the ILC noted that the obligations themselves by 
their very nature require an intentional violation on a large scale, seemingly satisfying 
this ‘seriousness’ threshold automatically.384 
On this basis, particular types of obligation can now be assessed. Before this, 
however, it is worth noting that this ‘serious’ threshold does seem to be another 
clandestine manifestation of the principle of proportionality in the guise of another test 
for standing to take countermeasures. The fact that State practice seems to indicate 
                                                 
381 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries) (n.186), at 111, Part Two, Chapter III 
General Commentary, para [7]. 
382 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries) (n.186), at 113, Article 40 Commentary, 
para [7]. 
383 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries) (n.186), at 113, Article 40 Commentary, 
para [8]. 
384 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States (Commentaries) (n.186), at 113, Article 40 Commentary, 
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that States cannot take countermeasures in response to ‘minor or isolated breaches of 
obligations erga omnes’385 has resonance with the concerns outlined above that were 
expressed by other States, regarding the need to limit countermeasures to injured 
States to prevent the use of these measures against ‘technical’ breaches of obligations. 
The question as to whether such breaches must be ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’, again 
does not seem a suitable application of assessing whether States have legal standing 
to take countermeasures, but instead this question seems more relevant to whether 
those countermeasures are proportionate. This, in turn, would still assess whether the 
countermeasures were legally suitable to be taken in the first place. 
With this in mind, there may be a number of obligations that would be breached 
prior to or during the occurrence of atrocity crimes, bringing the use of 
countermeasures within the tool box of the responsibility to protect. 
 
2.3.1 Human Rights 
 
In Barcelona Traction, it is clear that the ICJ considers ‘the basic rights of the human 
person’ to constitute an obligation erga omnes.386 Ragazzi,387 for example, highlights 
this language to suggest that it is only ‘basic’ human rights that are owed erga 
omnes.388 In other words, Ragazzi reads the court’s dictum as indicating that erga 
omnes obligations do not ‘apply indiscriminately to all principles and rules protecting 
human rights.’389 On the other hand, a 1989 Resolution of the Institut De Droit 
International considered the general obligation to ensure the protection of human 
rights as erga omnes.390 While Ragazzi rejects this wider view,391 Dinstein392 supports 
it by arguing that such a distinction is “without foundation in the theory and practice 
of human rights” especially since “all human rights are interchangeably depicted as 
                                                 
385 Tams (n.222), at 248, see also at 230.  
386 Barcelona Traction (n.371) at p 32, para [34]; 
387 M Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: OUP, 2000).  
388 Ragazzi (n.387), at 140-141. 
389 Ragazzi (n.387), at 140-141. 
390 Institut De Droit International, ‘The Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non -
Intervention in Internal Affairs of States’ (Session of Santiago de Compostela, 13 September 1989), 
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391 Ragazzi (n.387), at 141. 
392 Y Dinstein, “The Erga Omnes Applicability of Human Rights”, (1992) 30(1) Archiv des 
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‘fundamental freedoms’.”393 Moreover, Dinstein argues that the Institute’s Resolution 
supports the view that all the rights deriving from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights394 are erga omnes, and argues that rights recognised subsequent to the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration may not be regarded as such.395 
Perhaps Ragazzi’s reliance on the word ‘basic’ in the ICJ’s judgment reads too 
much into the Court’s intentions. However, it is not for this thesis to settle this divide 
and determine what specific human rights obligations are erga omnes. For our 
purposes, it is enough to suggest that no matter which position prevails, the violat ions 
of human rights that would be associated with the responsibility to protect, leading to, 
or in preparation of, mass atrocity crimes, would always be violations of even the most 
‘basic’ rights. The problem, as addressed above, is identifying the threshold at which 
the ‘seriousness’ criterion exists, where ‘grave’ violations of human rights take place, 
so that countermeasures may be available. Therefore, the distinction between types of 
human rights and what particular obligation is erga omnes would perhaps not have 
much consequence in these circumstances if this ‘seriousness’ threshold still persists 
in any case. 
And so, notwithstanding these debates and subtle distinctions, it is more 
pertinent for us to concentrate on those situations where human rights violations may 
become a concern for the responsibility to protect – and that is when violations of 
human rights could evolve into the commission of genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.  
But we must also not forget that we are specifically concerned with these 
violations as part of the tertiary responsibility to protect, and thus only when the UN 
Security Council has failed or is failing in its responsibilities. As already discussed, 
the indicators that the UN Security Council might have failed in its responsibility to 
protect, or its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, would 
suggest that ‘less serious’, non-widespread violations of human rights would be more 
readily dealt with earlier.396 The tertiary responsibility to protect is less likely to be 
activated or engaged at the point of technical human rights violations, because it is 
less likely that the Security Council can be said to have failed or is failing in its 
                                                 
393 Dinstein (n.392), at 17. 
394 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948), in UNGA Res 217(A), UN 
Doc A/Res/217(III). 
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396 See Chapter III generally. 
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responsibilities. The question left open is when the Security Council could be said to 
have failed in its responsibilities when human rights violations are occurring, but the  
answer depends entirely on the circumstances of a given case and cannot be fully 
hypothesised here. 
It may seem a contradiction in terms that the responsibility to protect is 
primarily concerned with the prevention of atrocity crimes, yet it would seem that the 
tertiary responsibility to protect, and the use of countermeasures as a tool in that 
regard, comes at a point where grave violations of human rights have already occurred. 
Unfortunately, that is the only legal basis on which countermeasures beyond the 
Security Council may be utilised, indicating further that the tertiary responsibility to 
protect may be seen more as part of the ‘responsibility to react’ or ‘Pillar III’ of the 
framework. 
This is not to say that the role of prevention is excluded completely. Where 
there are serious violations of human rights that have not yet become violations of the 
atrocity crimes, countermeasures may then be utilised as a tool to prevent those crimes 
from taking place. Criddle details how financial measures may be imposed on States 
to ‘incapacitate’ them, for example by utilising asset freezes to limit the capacity of 
human rights violators.397 Criddle argues that: 
 
Even when international asset freezes do not render foreign actors financially 
incapable of violating human rights, they may shift the political dynamic within a 
target state, empowering rights-respecting factions to introduce reforms that would 
narrow the legal authority and practical capacity of state and non-state actors to violate 
human rights.398 
 
However, Criddle also notes that the law of countermeasures may prohibit States from 
permanently freezing foreign assets.399 This is because countermeasures are only 
meant to be temporary measures,400 thus Criddle writes “States may freeze foreign 
assets only temporarily to compel a target State to abandon unlawful practices and 
furnish appropriate remedies.”401 Criddle therefore rules out incapacitation as a 
                                                 
397 Criddle (n.108), at 587. 
398 Criddle (n.108), at 587. 
399 Criddle (n.108), at 597. 
400 As set out above in Section 2.1. 
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purpose of countermeasures. However, although countermeasures may only be 
imposed for the duration and until the State concerned resumes its legal obligat ions 
and ceases the relevant breach, this does not stop the use of countermeasures to freeze 
assets for a temporary incapacitation, so long as those measures are proportionate. 
Therefore, if incapacitation and coercion are possible in a given situation, serious 
violations of human rights may provide grounds for the use of countermeasures as a 
preventative tool for the responsibility to protect, incapacitating a State by freezing 
assets central to its ability to commit atrocity crimes. 
Legally speaking, these measures could in theory be available to States or other 
parties,402 before the Security Council can be said to have failed in its responsibility 
to protect or maintain international peace and security. The Security Council may be 
taking other measures, diplomatic or otherwise, of its own, yet the situation has 
crossed the threshold where serious violations of obligations erga omnes have given 
rise to the option for States to take their own proportionate countermeasures in 
response. The question in this situation is whether it is legitimate for States to do this, 
or whether their taking of countermeasures while the Security Council is still the main 
bearer of responsibility would assist, improve, or threaten the situation further. 403 
Importantly, in these cases, countermeasures would not form part of the tools of the 
tertiary responsibility to protect until the Security Council has failed or is paralysed. 
While they may be legal, they are not recommended at this point, because the tertiary 
tool box has not yet been opened. 
 
2.3.2 Atrocity Crimes 
 
A number of atrocity crimes have been recognised as erga omnes obligations. For 
example, the ICJ recognised as erga omnes the general obligation to prevent and 
punish genocide,404 as recognised in Article I of the Genocide Convention.405 In fact, 
the ICJ recognised that all rights and obligations enshrined by this Convention were 
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403 On this point, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘The Declaration of the 
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erga omnes, and these obligations to prevent and punish were not territorially limited 
by the Convention.406 
Elements of international humanitarian law are also considered obligat ions 
erga omnes. For example, the ICJ recognised in the Construction of a Wall case407 that 
Israel had violated certain obligations erga omnes, which is said to include ‘certain of 
its obligations under international humanitarian law.’408 In recognising this, the Court 
recalled its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons409 where it recognised international humanitarian law as ‘elementa ry 
considerations of humanity’410 that are “to be observed by all States whether or not 
they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute 
intransgressible principles of international customary law.”411 It was on this basis that 
the Court viewed these principles as erga omnes.412 Indeed, it seems on face value that 
the ICJ considered all of IHL as erga omnes. Whether these customary law principles 
reflect all four Geneva Conventions,413 the Additional Protocols,414 is secondary to the 
issue as to whether ‘war crimes’ in particular constitute obligations erga omnes. 
Although some have viewed any breach of international humanitarian law as 
a war crime, the more widely accepted approach is to treat only serious or grave 
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Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (adopted 8 June 
1977, entered into force 7 December 1977) 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609;  
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the adoption of an 
additional distinctive emblem (Protocol III), (adopted 8 December 2005, entered into force 14 January 
2007) 2404 UNTS 261. 
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breaches of IHL as such.415 The Geneva Conventions themselves adopt the ‘grave 
breaches’ approach for war crimes.416 ‘War Crimes’ are listed in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court417 as: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; 418 
other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict;419 serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, in 
the context of a non-international armed conflict;420 and “other serious violations of 
the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an internationa l 
character”.421 Each of these categories were accompanied by a select list of breaches 
therein, usually including acts such as wilful or indiscriminate killing, torture, and the 
taking of hostages. 
Logically, if those customary rules relating to IHL are obligations erga omnes, 
then these ‘serious breaches’ amounting to war crimes are also breaches of obligat ions 
erga omnes. Tams notes that war crimes and crimes against humanity are widely 
considered erga omnes, but authority for this is ‘not abundant’, and the ICJ’s 
judgments on such issues may be too sweeping to have general support.422 Yet he does 
highlight evidence in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and discussions during the drafting of the Vienna 
Convention that these atrocity crimes are considered jus cogens, which may provide a 
basis for arguing they are also erga omnes.423 
One could also point out the positions taken by the Commission of Experts for 
Yugoslavia when it considered crimes against humanity applicable to the conflic ts 
during the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s, seemingly on the basis that they apply in 
customary international law.424 Notably, the Commission defined crimes against 
                                                 
415 For an overview of this issue, see: R Cryer, ‘War Crimes’ in N D White and C Henderson, Research 
Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law : Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, and Jus post Bellum 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013). 
416 For example, see Geneva Convention I (n.413), Article 49 and Article 50; and more recently see 
Additional Protocol I (n.414), Article 85, with Article 85(5) referring explicitly to such grave breaches 
as ‘war crimes’. 
417 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90, since amended.  
418 Rome Statute (n.417), Article 8(2)(a). 
419 Rome Statute (n.417), Article 8(2)(b). 
420 Rome Statute (n.417), Article 8(2)(c). 
421 Rome Statute (n.417), Article 8(2)(e). 
422 Tams (n.222), at 144-145. 
423 Tams (n.222), at 145, and the extensive sources listed therein. 
424 Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) , UN Doc S/25274 (10 February 1993), para [49]. 
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humanity as ‘gross violations of fundamental rules of humanitarian and human rights 
law’ linked to a party to the conflict.425  
This author would argue, very simply, on the basis that such crimes are 
‘elementary considerations of humanity’, and so widely accepted by States, that the 
case for their erga omnes status is very strong indeed, if not inherent in their very 
nature. 
Notably, crimes against humanity also seem to have a threshold of 
‘seriousness’ built into the definition of the crime itself. No such criterion was evident 
in Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY.426 However, Article 3 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda427 required crimes against humanity to be 
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population”. Similarly, Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute requires a ‘widespread or 
systematic attack’, and Article 7(2)(a) further defines an attack against a civilian 
population to be “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack”. 
The apparent absence of the criterion in the ICTY Statute was addressed by 
the Trial Chamber,428 where the requirement of an attack against the ‘civilian 
population’ implied crimes of a collective nature,429 and was to be interpreted to imply 
that such an attack should be widespread or systematic in nature.430 The prosecution 
even argued that a ‘widespread or systematic attack’ was part of the elements of crimes 
against humanity.431 
It is clear that the atrocity crimes associated with the responsibility to protect 
already have a ‘seriousness’ threshold within their definition. Therefore, this author 
submits that the commission of atrocity crimes automatically reach the threshold of a 
‘serious’ violation of an erga omnes obligation for the purpose of non-injured party 
countermeasures. A ‘serious’ breach of an obligation that is already, by definit ion, 
‘serious’ and ‘widespread’, in this author’s view, does not have to go any further to 
                                                 
425 Commission of Experts (n.424), at para [49]. 
426 See, for the original Statute, Report of the Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, 
Annex; Statute adopted in: UNSC Res 827 (1993), 25 May 1993, UN Doc S/RES/827(1993), para [2]. 
427 UNSC Res 955 (1994), 8 November 1994, UN Doc S/RES/955(1994), and Annex: Statute of the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda. 
428 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (Merits) ICTY-94-1-T (7 May 1997). 
429 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (Merits) (n.428), at para [644]. 
430 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (Merits) (n.428), at para [646]-[647]. 
431 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (Merits) (n.428), at para [626].  
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allow the use of non-injured State countermeasures. And so, the prior-breach criterion 
for non-injured party countermeasures is established on the commission of atrocity 
crimes. 
 
2.3.2.1 The Question of the Perpetrator 
 
A critical issue to note is the target of the proposed countermeasures and the violator 
of the obligations at hand. For example, if a State is committing the atrocity crimes, 
the issue is relatively clear cut – countermeasures may be taken to coerce the State 
into ceasing such activity, or temporarily restraining the ability of the State to do so 
by freezing assets or taking other financial measures. 
However, if there is a non-State actor committing the crimes, the use of 
financial measures depends upon the circumstances at hand. Measures against the non-
State actor responsible are beyond the scope of this thesis, but there are very simila r 
legal issues in this regard as to the legal basis of States taking certain measures. 432 
Measures against the State in which the crimes are taking place also depend on a 
number of factors. If the State is failing, or has failed in its responsibility to protect, 
and the Security Council is paralysed, it depends whether the failure of the host State 
is down to their unwillingness or their inability to prevent or supress the atrocity 
crimes. In terms of genocide in particular, a breach of the obligation to prevent 
genocide by a non-State actor could provide grounds to take countermeasures against  
the failing State. However, such countermeasures would not be useful if that State is 
unable to prevent further genocide – there would be no point in coercing a State to do 
something it is unable to achieve realistically. However, if the State is simply unwilling 
to do so, and would otherwise be able to supress the atrocities, or has some influence 
over the responsible non-State actors, countermeasures could provide a useful tool for 
coercing that State into adhering with its obligations and hopefully preventing further 
crimes from taking place. 
Of course, if atrocity crimes are already being committed or are underway, this 
undermines the primary aim of the responsibility to protect to prevent such atrocities. 
Countermeasures would not be available solely on the basis that the atrocity crimes 
                                                 
432 See, generally, ND White, “Sanctions Against Non-State Actors”, in M Ronzitti (ed), Coercive 
Diplomacy, Sanctions, and International Law  (Brill Nijhoff, 2016). 
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are about to take place – there has been no prior breach yet – unless there can be said 
to have been a breach of the Genocide Convention and the erga omnes obligation to 
prevent and punish genocide. It remains unclear whether there are other specific 
obligations on States to prevent all atrocity crimes, of the same character as that within 
the Genocide Convention.433 Without an erga omnes obligation to prevent the other 
relevant atrocity crimes, genocide remains the only recognised atrocity whereby 
countermeasures could be used prior to its occurrence, without any other internationa l 
obligations being breached beforehand that could provide an alternative basis for such 
measures. 
 
3. Conclusion on Coercive Measures 
 
This Chapter has sought to demonstrate that there are legal avenues available to utilise 
coercive, non-forcible measures, such as asset freezes and trade restrictions, beyond 
the UN Security Council in response to mass atrocities. The doctrine of 
countermeasures could provide a legal basis for the taking of such measures, subject 
to the stringent legal safeguards set out therein. The more controversial issue as to 
whether these measures can be taken in response to violations of obligations erga 
omnes, by actors who have not been ‘directly injured’, is addressed by this thesis in 
the following ways: (i) firstly, much more widespread practice has emerged of the 
taking of coercive measures that are, prima facie, unlawful (and therefore would 
require justification via the law of countermeasures), supporting the claim that non-
injured party countermeasures are available as proportionate responses to violat ions 
of erga omnes obligations; and (ii), violations of these obligations, especially with 
regard to the responsibility to protect, are likely to ‘injure’ certain parties in any case, 
providing them with a legal basis for the taking of countermeasures. 
While this Chapter has sought to address some issues relating to the problem 
of countermeasures being abused by States, it is for the following discussion to 
specifically answer these issues in full. At this stage, however, it is argued that this 
problem of potential abuse further highlights the need for a division of primary, 
                                                 
433 Although UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in his first report on the responsibility to protect 
suggested that “Under conventional and customary international law, States have obligations to prevent 
and punish genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.” See, Report of the Secretary-General, 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, (12th January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677, at para [3]. 
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secondary, and tertiary responsibilities, especially given the fact that countermeasures 
may be available to some actors to utilise even before the Security Council has failed 
in its responsibilities. In this regard, although actions may be legally available, the 
compartmentalisation of different responsibilities provides further safeguards to their 
abuse by providing a clear framework as to when these measures would be availab le. 
This does not mean that they would be appropriate – only that, upon assuming their 
tertiary responsibility, that compartment of the toolbox would be opened for these 
actors to consider, whether they are competent to do so. 
Having established this alternative legal avenue, there is certainly room for the 
tertiary responsibility to protect to continue beyond the Security Council. What is left 
to address is the question as to whether this responsibility is capable of being 
implemented by those actors involved based upon their legal competencies and other 
legal limitations. Addressing this question will not only establish the viability of the 
tertiary responsibility to protect framework, but will also be used to address the 
hesitations relating to the use of countermeasures and their susceptibility to abuse 
without institutional safeguards.  
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VI 
Implementing the Tertiary Responsibility to Protect 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Having established in previous Chapters that there is scope for the responsibility to 
protect to continue beyond the deadlock of the Security Council in the form of a 
‘tertiary’ responsibility to protect, especially where the threat or act of atrocity crimes 
also engages the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
this Chapter will now investigate whether and how this responsibility beyond the 
Council may be implemented. Focussing on the questions left open in the thesis’s 
previous analysis of the legality of forcible and non-forcible coercive measures, this 
Chapter will consider the legality of these measures being utilised both within the 
United Nations framework, specifically by the General Assembly, and outside of this 
framework, by regional organisations or States individually. After all, while this thesis 
has identified possible legal avenues relating to the prohibition of force and the 
principle of non-intervention (and the doctrine of countermeasures therein), for the 
tertiary responsibility to exist, these avenues must actually be capable of being 
implemented by actors who have the competence to do so. Not only will this Chapter 
address the questions surrounding the legal competences of the relevant actors, but it 
will also consider whether the framework of a ‘tertiary responsibility to protect’ 
provides a suitable and viable avenue for implementing the responsibility to protect 
beyond the Security Council. 
As previously argued, by establishing whether there is room for the 
responsibility to protect to continue through the use of legal measures, and identifying 
the particular actors and procedures that may be utilised in this regard, then it is much 
easier to determine that the international community’s general responsibility to protect 
continues even in the face of Security Council inaction. 
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1. The Tertiary Responsibility within the UN 
 
Firstly, it is pertinent to address the possibility of the tertiary responsibility continuing 
beyond the Security Council, but still remaining within the United Nations Collective 
Security framework. In this regard, one would repeat the recognition of the ICJ in the  
Certain Expenses1 case that the responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the Charter was a 
‘primary’ but not ‘exclusive’ responsibility.2 This may be compared to the Court’s 
opinion in the Construction of a Wall case,3 where it suggested that Article 24 referred 
to a primary, but not exclusive, competence in the maintenance of international peace 
and security.4 Therefore, the court has acknowledged that both the responsibility to 
maintain peace and security, and the legal competence to do so, does not lie solely 
with the Security Council.  
Nevertheless, there is a delicate balance to be met when considering when 
these ‘residual’ responsibilities and competencies can and should be engaged. Indeed, 
the ICJ highlighted the phrase in Article 24 that the Security Council was conferred  
primary responsibility “in order to ensure prompt and effective action”, and stressed 
that “It is only the Security Council which can require enforcement by coercive action 
against an aggressor.”5 
In contrast to this, the General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace Resolution6 
recognises a very clear role for the Assembly in the maintenance of international peace 
and security, alongside the ability to recommend enforcement action. Firstly, in the 
preamble to the Resolution, the Assembly is: 
 
Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on 
behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs [the maintenance of international peace and security], does not 
                                                 
1 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion 
of 20 July 1962) [1962] ICJ Rep 151 (hereinafter Certain Expenses). 
2 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 163. 
3 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory  (Advisory 
Opinion of 9 July 2004) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 (hereinafter Construction of a Wall). 
4 Construction of a Wall (n.3), at para [26]. 
5 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 163. 
6 UNGA Res 377(V), Uniting for Peace, 3rd November 1950, UN Doc A/RES/377(V). 
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relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility 
under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.7 
 
The Resolution then went on to recognise that “such a failure does not deprive the 
General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibility under the Charter in 
regard to the maintenance of international peace and security.”8 Therefore, as 
previously established, it is clear that the General Assembly, and indeed the Member 
States,9 have a residual responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. This much is relatively uncontroversial.  
Relating this to the responsibility to protect, when a situation involving the 
atrocity crimes associated with the responsibility to protect crosses the threshold to 
become a matter for the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security,10 the General Assembly’s residual responsibility would still be engaged here. 
Therefore, there is also a role for the General Assembly in addressing the 
responsibility to protect beyond the inaction of the Security Council. 
What is controversial, however, is the extent of the role the General Assembly 
should play in implementing its residual responsibilities. The Uniting for Peace 
Resolution went further in this regard, declaring: 
 
… if the Security Council, because of a lack of unanimity of the permanent members, 
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for 
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression 
the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency 
special session within twenty-four hours of the request thereof. Such emergency 
special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any 
seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.11 
 
                                                 
7 Uniting for Peace (n.6) Resolution A, preamble para [7]. 
8 Uniting for Peace (n.6) Resolution A, preamble para [8]. 
9 On this point, see Chapter III, Section 4, and further below, Section 2. 
10 As previously established in Chapter III, Section 2.2. 
11 Uniting for Peace (n.6), Resolution A, operative para [1]. 
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This Resolution evidently envisaged a role for the Assembly to take action to mainta in 
or restore international peace and security. However, the compatibility of the Uniting 
for Peace Resolution with the Charter itself is far from clear. To determine the extent 
of this responsibility, and therefore the tertiary responsibility to protect, we must 
address the legal powers and competences of the General Assembly for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  
In this regard, this Section argues that the tertiary responsibility to protect does 
continue within the UN, establishing that the General Assembly has both residual 
responsibility and legal competent to adopt it. In terms of being capable of taking 
measures to implement this responsibility, it is argued that the General Assembly is 
both able to recommend forcible measures, and non-forcible measures in certain 
circumstances. Recommendations to use force by the Assembly render such milita ry 
measures compatible with the prohibition of force by: (i) inherently qualifying the 
principles of territorial integrity and political independence by virtue of a State’s 
consent to this power, and the purpose of the Charter in Article 1(1) to take effective 
collective measures; and (ii) rendering this action consistent with the Purposes of the 
Charter by being such an effective collective measure and harmonising the actions of 
nations for this objective. In this regard, it will be argued below that Security Council 
authorisations find their origin in the Council’s general ability to ‘make 
recommendations’ under Article 39, which explains the non-binding nature of such 
measures, and also the ability of the General Assembly to make such 
recommendations. 
Recommendations to take other coercive measures are within the scope of the 
Assembly’s general power to make recommendations for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, demonstrated by State practice, and where such 
measures violate international agreements, they would be permissible as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness when taken in accordance with the doctrine of 
countermeasures in customary international law. 
 
1.1 Legal Competences of the General Assembly 
 
There are several ways that the UN Charter grants the General Assembly a role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, but there are also a number of ways 
in which this is curtailed in favour of the Security Council’s primary role, too. In 
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particular, Article 10 grants the General Assembly the general power to ‘discuss any 
questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter’ and, subject to Article 
12,12 to ‘make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the 
Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.’ 
Article 11 further provides for particular powers in relation to the maintenance 
of international peace and security.13 This includes the ability of the General Assembly 
to discuss general principles of cooperation in this regard;14 the power to discuss ‘any 
questions’ relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and make 
recommendations therein;15 and to call the attention of the Security Council to 
situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.16 Even at the 
outset we can see that the Assembly’s powers are significantly different to those 
afforded to the Security Council – the Assembly’s powers to recommend are 
inherently non-binding, unlike the compulsory measures that may be utilised by the 
Security Council in Chapter VII and binding on Member States via Article 25.  
However, regarding the General Assembly’s specific power to make 
recommendations relating to peace and security, Article 11(2) requires that “Any such 
question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the 
General Assembly either before or after discussion.” Furthermore, Article 12 
stipulates that the Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to a 
dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions assigned to 
it in the Charter with regard to that dispute or situation.17 
Therefore, before addressing the specific measures that may be taken by the 
General Assembly to implement its tertiary responsibility to protect, these legal 
obstacles must first be addressed. 
 
1.1.1 Requirement to Refer when ‘Action’ is Required 
 
Article 11(2) could have a paralysing effect on the ability of the General Assembly to 
assume any real role in the maintenance of peace and security, especially where a 
                                                 
12 See Section 1.1.2. 
13 See also, Articles 13 and 14 relating to specific powers  to recommend measures relating to the other 
duties of the Assembly. 
14 Article 11(1). 
15 Article 11(2). 
16 Article 11(3). 
17 Article 12(1). 
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situation requires ‘action’. The requirement that a situation be referred to the Security 
Council in such cases raises some critical issues. Firstly, what does the provision mean 
by ‘action’, and would this preclude the General Assembly from ‘acting’ or 
recommending measures? Secondly, does this provision still apply even in a situation 
where the Security Council has already considered a matter or situation but has failed 
in its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and its responsibility 
to protect? 
Regarding the interpretation of ‘action’, commentators have referred to the 
ICJ’s opinion in Certain Expenses for guidance. The Court clarified that “the kind of 
action referred to in Article 11, paragraph 2, is coercive or enforcement action.”18 It 
further stated that “The word ‘action’ must mean such action as is solely within the 
province of the Security Council. It cannot refer to recommendations which the 
Security Council might make, as for instance under Article 38, because the General 
Assembly under Article 11 has a comparable power.”19 Accordingly, the Court 
suggested, Article 11(2) does not apply where the necessary action is not ‘enforcement 
action’.20 
The Court takes a very specific definition of ‘action’ here that applies precisely 
in the context of Article 11(2). It also seems evident that any ‘action’ that is availab le 
to the General Assembly by virtue of the Charter is not included within this provision 
– it refers to ‘action’ via powers that only the Security Council has. Tsagourias and 
White21 highlight that the Court makes reference to the kind of ‘action’ that is within 
the exclusive ambit of the Security Council, particularly pointing out that the Court 
said, “only the Security Council ... can require enforcement by coercive action”,22 and 
that “it is the Security Council which, exclusively, may order coercive action”.23 It is 
on this basis that they argue that it is only compulsory or binding action that is 
exclusively within the ambit of the Security Council, and because the General 
Assembly makes non-binding recommendatory measures, then there is no restriction 
on the General Assembly taking non-binding ‘action’ for the purposes of Article 
                                                 
18 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 164. 
19 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 165. 
20 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 165. 
21 N Tsagourias and ND White, Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 
2013). 
22 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 163 (emphasis added). 
23 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 163 (emphasis added); Tsagourias and White (n.21), at 104. 
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11(2).24 This argument has also been adopted by others such as Carswell25 and 
Kenny.26 
Hailbronner and Klein27 take this analysis further, to investigate the meaning 
of ‘enforcement action’ in this context, arguing: 
 
There is a decisive difference between the recommendation of enforcement action, 
and the actual taking of such measures. This is illustrated by the formal definition of 
the term ‘enforcement’, according to which the existence of an ‘enforcement action’ 
is not determined by the character of the action itself but by the binding nature of the 
measure taken. Therefore, a non-binding recommendation is not to be considered as 
‘action’, so that the GA [General Assembly] is not prevented by Art. 11(2) cl. 2 from 
recommending coercive measures. This norm only recalls the fact that the GA shall 
not take any enforcement measures binding on all member States.28 
 
The logic flowing from this argument is that the General Assembly can, in theory, 
recommend or ‘request’ the Security Council to take such binding enforcement action 
within Chapter VII of the Charter, although the Council would not be bound to do so.29  
Unfortunately, while these arguments are persuasive, they do overlook one 
important statement by the ICJ in Certain Expenses that may undermine this whole 
line of argument. In particular, later in the judgment, when the Court is considering 
the nature of UNEF30 as a peaceful measure and therefore not ‘enforcement action’, it 
sheds further light on another type of ‘action’ which it considers as belonging 
exclusively to the Security Council when it concludes: 
 
                                                 
24 Tsagourias and White (n.21), at 104-105. 
25 AJ Carswell, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution”, (2013) 18(3) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 453-480, at 474. 
26 Cóman Kenny, “Responsibility to Recommend: The Role of the UN General Assembly in the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security”, (2016) 3(1) Journal on the Use of Force and 
International Law 3-36, at 25. 
27 K Hailbronner and E Klein, ‘Article 10’ in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
28 Hailbronner and Klein (n.27), at 264-265. 
29 K Hailbronner and E Klein, ‘Article 11’, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 283. 
30 United Nations Emergency Force. 
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It could not therefore have been patent on the face of the resolution that the 
establishment of UNEF was in effect “enforcement action” under Chapter VII which, 
in accordance with the Charter, could be authorized only by the Security Council.31 
 
Based upon the assertions above, it seems a contradiction in terms that the Court 
should consider the authorisation of ‘enforcement action’ to be an exclusive power of 
the Security Council. Authorisations, by definition, do not legally oblige Member 
States to take action – they are permissible, not compulsory.32  
Furthermore, this particular provision of the judgment indicates that 
‘authorisations’ of ‘enforcement action’, according to the Court, can only be done by 
the Security Council. If non-binding, permissive enforcement measures are apparently 
exclusive to the Security Council, this may indicate that the General Assembly may 
not recommend such measures in any case. However, it is also worth pointing out that 
the Court specifically cites ‘enforcement action’ under Chapter VII in relation to this 
assertion, perhaps explaining the apparent contradiction, since it is of course only the 
Security Council that can authorise Chapter VII measures. The General Assembly 
would, if it had the power, utilise powers under Chapter IV, not Chapter VII, and so 
this assertion by the ICJ technically would not prohibit authorisations of powers found 
elsewhere in the Charter. 
Notwithstanding these substantive issues, considering the test provided by the 
ICJ for the meaning of ‘action’ within Article 11(2), it is clear that the Court 
determined this as action solely within the competence of the Security Council. What 
should be remembered, and indeed this is acknowledged by Hailbronner and Klein,33 
is that Article 11(2) is not a substantive restriction on the types of recommendations 
that the General Assembly can make, but a procedural obligation to refer a situation 
to the Security Council when ‘action’ is necessary. It does not expressly prevent the 
Assembly from ‘acting’ itself. Indeed, Article 11(4) explicitly stipulates that “The 
powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general 
scope of Article 10.” 
When considering a situation where the Security Council has already been 
made aware of a situation, and cannot act because of deadlock or a failure to uphold 
                                                 
31 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 171, (emphasis added). 
32 On this point, see discussion of the basis of ‘authorisations’ in the Charter, Section 1.2.2. 
33 Hailbronner and Klein (n.27), at 266; Hailbronner and Klein (n.29), at 283. 
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its responsibilities, Hailbronner and Klein rightly argue that the obligation on the 
Assembly to refer no longer applies.34 Similarly, this author submits that, in any case, 
such an obligation would be fulfilled once the Security Council has at least attempted 
to address the situation, because of the very fact that the obligation in Article 11(2) is 
no more than a procedural obligation to give effect to the primacy of the Security 
Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. Once the Security 
Council fails in that responsibility, there would be no need for the General Assembly 
to refer a situation that the Council has already failed to address. 
Where Article 11(2) may present a hurdle to the Assembly would be before 
the Council has had a chance to address the issue, because such a referral would 
activate the restrictions in Article 12,35 as we will discuss. However, this is very much 
the point of the provision. It is only when a referral to the Council would be futile that 
the requirement to refer becomes unnecessary. 
 
1.1.2 Exclusivity of Security Council Action under Article 12 
 
Article 12(1) of the Charter provides: 
 
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the 
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make 
any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security 
Council so requests. 
 
This clearly provides for the primacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of 
peace and security, ensuring the Assembly does not interfere while the Council is 
acting. Tsagourias and White suggest that it was settled practice in the earlier life of 
the UN that the Security Council was deemed to be ‘exercising its functions’ within 
the meaning of Article 12(1) when a particular situation was placed onto the Council’s 
agenda.36 This, they suggest, links Article 12(1) with Article 12(2) which requires the 
Secretary-General to notify the Assembly of matters that are being dealt with by the 
                                                 
34 Hailbronner and Klein (n.27), at 266. 
35 K Hailbronner and E Klein, ‘Article 12’, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 289. 
36 Tsagourias and White (n.21), at 102-103; see also, Construction of a Wall (n.3), at para [27]; and, 
Hailbronner and Klein (n.35), at 290. 
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Security Council and when the Council has ceased to deal with them - Tsagourias and 
White therefore argue that “The theory behind the list of matters which the UN 
Secretary-General submits to the GA is that it tells the GA the issues it is not allowed 
to discuss because they are receiving attention in the SC.”37 
However, the ICJ in the Construction of a Wall Opinion noted that the 
interpretation of Article 12 has evolved subsequently.38 In this regard, the Court 
referred to an opinion of the UN Legal Counsel in response to a question on the matter 
at the General Assembly’s Third Committee in 1968, where the Legal Counsel 
clarified the Assembly’s interpretation of Article 12: 
 
The matters relating to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under 
Portuguese rule were on the agenda of the Security Council and, in principle, the 
General Assembly could not make any recommendations. However, the Assembly 
had interpreted the words “is exercising” as meaning “is exercising at this moment”; 
consequently, it had made recommendations on other matters which the Security 
Council was also considering.39 
 
The ICJ further noted that the General Assembly and the Security Council increasingly 
dealt in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of internationa l 
peace and security,40 and noted that while the Council dealt with peace and security 
matters, the Assembly tended to take a much broader view and considered the wider 
humanitarian, social, and economic aspects of each situation.41 The Court therefore 
considered such practice consistent with Article 12.42 
Kenny interprets the Court’s judgment as confirming that “the prohibition of 
simultaneous action by the General Assembly and the Security Council has been 
superseded by practice.”43 But this may be an over simplification of the Court’s 
opinion. There are two observations that can be made that suggest the Court’s 
                                                 
37 Tsagourias and White (n.21), at 102. 
38 Construction of a Wall (n.3), at para [27]. 
39 UNGA Third Committee (23rd Session), ‘Official Records, 1637th Meeting’, (12th December 1968) 
UN Doc A/C.3/SR.1637, at para [9]. 
40 Construction of a Wall (n.3), at para [27]; the Court gave as examples the UN’s responses to matters 
relating to Cyprus, South Africa, Angola, Southern Rhodesia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia. 
41 Ibid; for a further examination of State practice in this regard see Hailbronner and Klein (n.35), at 
290. 
42 Construction of a Wall (n.3), at para [28]. 
43 Kenny (n.26), at 6. 
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judgment is more nuanced than this. The interpretation of ‘exercising functions’ within 
Article 12 has become much more literal over the years – the Council simply being 
‘seized’ of a matter and holding a situation on its agenda is not enough to preclude 
consideration by the Assembly. This, of course, indicates that there may still be 
instances where the Assembly may not make recommendations where they would 
undermine or go against specific measures adopted by the Security Council. The 
current interpretation of Article 12 may allow for simultaneous action or 
recommendations of a different character, but it may still preclude the same action 
taken simultaneously. 
Regarding situations this thesis is most concerned with, the restriction of 
Article 12 does not seem to be an insurmountable hurdle. If the Security Council has 
failed in its responsibilities, as established in Chapter III, and is subject to deadlock 
and inaction, then the Council cannot be considered, even remotely, to be ‘exercising 
its functions’ within the meaning of Article 12. This is especially true if one adopts 
the Assembly’s own literal interpretation as advocated by the Legal Counsel, that the 
Council is not exercising functions ‘at that moment’. In other words, Security Council 
deadlock, and failure in its responsibilities, deems any subsequent action by the 
General Assembly as consistent with Article 12, so long as the Council remains 
paralysed. 
It is in this respect that Carswell argues that the Uniting for Peace Resolut ion 
is specifically aimed at situations where Article 12(1) does not apply.44 On this point, 
he rightly rejects arguments that any veto by a permanent member stops the Council 
‘exercising’ is functions within the meaning of Article 12(1).45 Of course, Carswell is 
right in recognising that the use of the veto alone could not legitimately establish that 
the Council has ceased to function – for better or worse, the veto power is still a part 
of the collective security system,46 and the use of it consistent with Article 27(3) 
should not be regarded as leaving room for the General Assembly to step in, nor as a 
sole indicator of the Council’s failure.47 Article 12 could not be reconciled with Article 
27(3) if that were the case. As discussed in Chapter III, much more is required than 
one single use of the veto to establish Council failure. 
                                                 
44 Carswell (n.25) at 469. 
45 Carswell (n.25) at 469. 
46 In this context see Hailbronner and Klein (n.35), at 291. 
47 Carswell (n.25) at 469. 
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Unfortunately, Carswell might go too far in interpreting the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution as imposing a requirement that the veto must be at least used, and cause 
the Council to fail in its responsibilities, before the General Assembly can step in. It 
is true that the Uniting for Peace Resolution permits the Assembly to act ‘if the 
Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility’.48 However, this should not be seen as imposing a 
restriction on the General Assembly. The changes that this Resolution made to the 
General Assembly’s Rules of Procedure did not include any substantive need for 
Council failure.49 In establishing an Emergency Special Session, all that is required is 
a procedural vote of the Security Council, or a request from a majority of Members of 
the UN50 – the substantive restrictions would have to come from the Charter itself.  
Moreover, we must not forget that the Uniting for Peace resolution was a non-
binding recommendatory act of the Assembly. Other than the changes made to the 
Rules of Procedure, and perhaps any evidence of subsequent agreement or practice it 
provides for the interpretation of the Charter,51 there is no legal reason why the General 
Assembly could not adopt a subsequent ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution with alternat ive 
requirements, so long as it remains within its powers granted by the Charter. 
Indeed, following on from this, the veto and paralysis is only one way in which 
the Council may fail in its responsibilities. However, simple inaction and indifference 
in the face of atrocity crimes – as discussed in Chapter III - could indicate a very real 
failure to protect, and a failure to maintain international peace and security. Therefore, 
while it is very likely that failures of the Council will involve the use of the veto, 
Carswell’s assertion that a veto is a requirement before the General Assembly can act 
is not convincing. 
Hailbronner and Klein refer to this idea when they suggest that, although the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution does not cover non-veto failures, there seems no reason 
why, according to the philosophy behind the Resolution, the alleged ‘better judgment’ 
of the Assembly should not prevail even over an inactive majority of the Security 
Council.52 This author would take a slightly different view to Hailbronner and Klein, 
                                                 
48 Uniting for Peace (n.6), operative para [1]. 
49 See, Uniting for Peace (n.6), Annex, for the amendments to the Rules of Procedure. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) and Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, (adopted 23rd May 1969, entered into force 27th January 1980)) 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter 
VCLT] 
52 Hailbronner and Klein (n.35), at 291. 
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however, and argue that it is not the ‘better judgment’ of the Assembly which makes 
a compelling case for this, but the very fact that the Assembly has a residual 
responsibility in this regard, and that it is in fact the Assembly’s duty to at least 
consider a dispute or situation in the face of the Council’s failure. In other words, if 
the Charter allows the General Assembly to make recommendations in the face of 
Council failure, then the residual responsibility of the Assembly indicates that it 
should. Similar to the arguments made in Chapter III, this is not to dictate or determine 
how the General Assembly should act, but instead indicates on the basis of its residual 
responsibilities that it should not ignore the situation. 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, it is submitted that a failure of the 
Security Council in its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, to be established by the procedures and tests outlined in Chapter III, renders 
any subsequent action by the General Assembly compatible with the restrictions of 
Article 12.  
 
1.2 Forcible Measures 
 
The legality of the recommendation of forcible measures by the General Assembly 
depends on two factors. Firstly, it must be within the legal powers of the Assembly to 
make such recommendations. Secondly, the actual implementation of that 
recommendation must be compatible with the prohibition of force enshrined in Article 
2(4) of the Charter. While some arguments suggest that ‘recommendations’ have no 
legal effect, this author uses the analogy of Security Council ‘authorisations’, arguing 
that they themselves are based on the Council’s power to ‘recommend’ under Article 
39, and therefore that the General Assembly also has an analogous legal power to do 
the same. 
 
1.2.1 Assessing General Assembly Competences to Recommend Force 
 
As outlined above, the legal bases in the Charter that might allow the General 
Assembly to recommend the use of forcible measures would be either: (i) the general 
power in Article 10 to make recommendations to members or the UN itself concerning 
any question or matter within the scope of the Charter; or (ii) the specific power under 
Article 11(2) to make recommendations regarding any questions relating to the 
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maintenance of international peace and security. Based on a very wide reading of these 
provisions, especially Article 10 given its general nature, there seems to be no reason 
why such recommendations should not include a recommendation to take ‘effect ive 
collective measures’ to maintain or restore international peace and security, as 
recognised as a fundamental Purpose of the UN in Article 1(1).  
Nevertheless, it remains to be established whether these powers are to be 
interpreted this widely or more restrictively. It is necessary, therefore, to further 
investigate the interpretation of these powers based upon relevant practice of the 
Assembly, as well as any relevant academic and judicial commentary on the matter. 
In this regard, the ICJ recognised in Certain Expenses that “when the 
Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the 
fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that 
such action is not ultra vires the Organization.”53 Similarly, in its Namibia Advisory 
Opinion, the Court suggested that “A resolution of a properly constituted organ of the 
United Nations which is passed in accordance with that organ’s rules of procedure, 
and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presumed to have been 
validly adopted.”54 
And so, unless there is reason to rebut this presumption,55 any Resolution 
utilising or referencing the purported ability of the General Assembly to recommend 
forcible action may be referenced as evidence of an interpretation of the Assembly’s 
powers in favour of the existence of such a power.  
 
1.2.1.1 Practice Recognising a Power to Recommend Force 
 
Firstly, the most obvious example of General Assembly considering its ability to 
recommend force is the Uniting for Peace Resolution itself. As outlined above, the 
Resolution recognised that in the face of Security Council failure, “the General 
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a 
                                                 
53 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 168. 
54 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), 21st June 1971, 
[1971] ICJ Rep 16, at [20]. 
55 Construction of a Wall (n.3), at para [35]. 
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breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”56 
Henderson57 suggests that the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution, and 
the level of support for this, could be an example of an act of subsequent practice in 
the interpretation of the Charter.58 In other words, it may be used as a basis of 
interpreting the powers of the General Assembly in accordance with Article 31(3)(b) 
of the VCLT. This is not to say that there were no dissenting voices in the adoption of 
this Resolution. For example, the USSR was perhaps the strongest voice denouncing 
the legality of the Resolution.59 
Further evidence of the ability of the Assembly to recommend force may be 
found in Resolution 376(V),60 adopted prior to Uniting for Peace, in response to the 
developing situation on the Korean peninsula in 1950. This Resolution recommended 
that States take ‘all appropriate steps’ to achieve stability throughout Korea.61 Later, 
the General Assembly also passed Resolution 498(V),62 which reaffirmed the United 
Nations military action in Korea, and called upon all States to continue to assist the 
UN in taking this action.63 
These recommendations came after the Security Council initially took steps to 
recommend the use of military measures in response to an armed attack by North 
Korean forces against South Korea.64 The Security Council’s Resolutions 82 and 83 
(1950) passed while the Soviet Union was absent from the Security Council and 
therefore unable to cast its veto. However, once the USSR returned, the Security 
Council was paralysed again, compelling States to act through the General Assembly, 
and ultimately to adopt the Uniting for Peace Resolution.  
Frowein and Krisch suggest that the Security Council simply recommended 
that States act in collective self-defence in response to the armed attack by North 
                                                 
56 Uniting for Peace (n.6), Resolution A, operative para [1]. 
57 C Henderson, “Authority without Accountability? The UN Security Council’s Authorization Method 
and Institutional Mechanisms of Accountability”, (2014) 19(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
489. 
58 Henderson (n.57) at 506. 
59 See UNGA Verbatim Record, 301st Plenary Meeting (2 November 1950), UN Doc A/PV.301. 
60 UNGA Res 376(V), The Problem of Independence of Korea , 7 October 1950, UN Doc 
A/RES/376(V). 
61 UNGA Res 376(V) (n.60), para [1]. 
62 UNGA Res 498(V), Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of 
China in Korea, 1 February 1951, UN Doc A/RES/498(V). 
63 Ibid, paras [3] and [4]. 
64 See UNSC Res 82 (1950), 25 June 1950, UN Doc S/RES/82(1950); see also UNSC Res 83 (1950), 
27 June 1950, UN Doc S/RES/83(1950).  
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Korean forces.65 Others reject this position, pointing out that Resolution 83 (1950) 
does not only call upon States to repel the armed attack, but also recommends that 
States take action to restore peace and security to the area66 – a security task much 
wider than self-defence.67 With this in mind, it could be argued that the subsequent 
General Assembly Resolutions are not simply ‘reaffirming’ this right to take self-
defence, but also the necessity to take action to restore international peace and security.  
De Wet notes a fundamental issue with the possibility of the Korean action 
being labelled as a UN enforcement measure, because both Koreas were not at the 
time Members of the UN, and so the legal basis for taking enforcement action could 
only be found in general international law beyond the UN system – they had not 
consented to the powers of the UN at that time.68 
It is not for this thesis to investigate the legal basis for the UN action in Korea. 
However, it should be noted with caution that the international legal system governing 
the use of force at that time is relatively unclear. In particular, it is not clear whether 
the customary prohibition of force as it is found today had yet been established in 
custom at that time, notwithstanding that a majority of States had accepted the rule in 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Therefore, it is not clear whether there remained a legal 
basis for the UN to act based upon a separate right of customary international law that 
had not yet been extinguished by the development of Article 2(4). Furthermore, the 
Security Council itself apparently did not consider North Korea to be a State at the 
time, and so any protections afforded by such a status did not apply.69 Even the USSR 
viewed the situation as a ‘civil war’ between two competing governments.70 
What the Korean action demonstrates is a belief on the part of the General 
Assembly that it had the power to recommend the use of forcible measures. 
Notwithstanding the debate regarding the legal basis for such force, it is still clear that 
there exists a power of the Assembly to recommend the use of force. Whether these 
                                                 
65 Frowein and Krisch, “Article 39”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2002), at 727-728. 
66 UNSC Res 83 (1950), at para [6]. 
67 See, for example, Tsagourias and White (n.21), at 71-72, and at 110. 
68 E De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council  (Oxford, Hart 2004), at 
278-280. 
69 H Kelsen, “Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations”, a supplement to The Law of the United 
Nations (first published New York: FA Praeger, 1950 – reprint, Lawbook Exchange 2000, 2011), at 
933; see also UNSC Res 82 (1950), 25 June 1950, UN Doc S/RES/82(1950), at preamble para 1.  
70 UNSC Verbatim Record, 483rd Plenary Meeting (4 August 1950), UN Doc S/PV.483, at 2 (USSR). 
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recommendations are compatible with the prohibition of force will be addressed 
below. 
Further evidence of the Assembly’s powers in this regard reappeared during 
the development of the responsibility to protect itself. For example, the ICISS71 
acknowledged the possibility of utilising the General Assembly for military action in 
the face of Security Council failure.72 Subsequently, the Secretary General’s very first 
report on the responsibility to protect highlighted the Uniting for Peace procedure as 
a possible avenue for the General Assembly to authorise ‘collective measures’ to 
implement the responsibility to protect.73 
Most notably, Brazil’s “Responsibility While Protecting” initiative74 expressly 
provided in its framework that: 
 
The use of force, including in the exercise of the responsibility to protect, must always 
be authorized by the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, 
or, in exceptional circumstances, by the General Assembly, in line with its resolution 
377 (V).75 
 
These examples, taken collectively with the Uniting for Peace Resolution itself, it is 
submitted, reveal a practice that demonstrates that the General Assembly does indeed 
have a power to recommend forcible measures. 
 
1.2.2 The Legal Effect of Recommendations to Use Force 
 
Having established that there is sufficient evidence of practice in favour of a power of 
the General Assembly to recommend the use of force, we must now address the 
circumstances in which the use of this power would be compatible with the prohibit ion 
of force, and indeed whether such recommendations have any legal effect. 
                                                 
71 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
72 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) , 
at [6.29]-[6.30]. 
73 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, (12th January 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/677, at para [56], although this was notably missing from subsequent reports, and was 
seemingly contradicted in Report of the Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next 
Decade of the Responsibility to Protect, (22 July 2016) UN Doc A/70/999–S/2016/620, at [46]. 
74 See, UNGA, ‘Letter Dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the 
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General’ (11 November 2011) UN Doc A/66/551-
S/2011/701, Annex. 
75 Ibid, Annex, para [11(c)]. 
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In this regard, we must address the issue as to whether such recommendations 
could only be acted upon where there is an independent ‘legal title’ to use force – such 
as collective self-defence – or whether such recommendations in themselves have a 
‘legalising effect’ whereby they render the use of force compatible with the prohibit ion 
in Article 2(4).  
Dinstein76 argues that “when the General Assembly adopts a recommendation 
for action by States in the realm of international peace and security, such a resolution 
– while not bereft of political significance – does not alter the legal rights and duties 
of those States.”77 Similarly, Corten78 argues that “there is nothing to show that the 
General Assembly can authorise States to conduct military action in the territory of 
another State without that action being otherwise based on an autonomous legal 
title.”79 
The logic behind these positions seems to be that non-binding 
recommendations, by definition, cannot affect State sovereignty in themselves, and 
cannot provide a standalone basis for the use of force. According to this argument, 
recommendations by the Assembly do not have the effect of ‘legalising’ an otherwise 
unlawful use of force and making it compatible with Article 2(4). This immediate ly 
causes one to question: how then does a similar non-binding ‘authorisation’ to use 
force by the Security Council differ from this? If a non-binding recommendation does 
not alter the legal rights or duties of States, it would seem contradictory to suggest that 
a non-binding authorisation would have the opposite effect, because one would think 
the lack of legal effect would come from the non-binding nature of the act or 
declaration therein. 
While it is not the primary purpose of this thesis to explain the legal basis for 
Security Council authorisations to use force, it is nevertheless necessary to delve into 
this debate briefly to shed light on the General Assembly’s analogous ability to 
recommend force. To understand the legal effect of recommendations, we must also 
understand the place of ‘authorisations’ within the Charter and how these non-binding, 
permissive acts, seemingly ‘make lawful’ an otherwise unlawful use of force, and 
                                                 
76 Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge, 5th Ed, Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
77 Dinstein (n.76) at 340, para [905]. 
78 O Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International 
Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
79 Corten (n.78) at 330-331. 
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whether or not they are different to ‘recommendations’ to do the same. Based upon 
the analysis to follow, this author believes that the Security Council’s power to 
authorise force originates from its ability to ‘make recommendations’ to maintain or 
restore international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter. Therefore, by 
extension, and based upon the subsequent practice of States, a ‘recommendation’ by 
the General Assembly to do the same would logically and necessarily have the same 
legal effect in permitting the use of force. 
 
1.2.2.1 The ‘Delegation of Powers’ Debate 
 
Conflated Definitions of Authorisations and Delegations 
 
Proponents of the position that General Assembly recommendations have no legal 
effect must also explain the analogous ability of the Security Council to ‘authorise ’ 
the use of force. To do so, Corten argues, for example, that the reason Security Council 
‘authorisations’ are legal is because they are in fact ‘delegations’ of its Chapter VII 
powers.80  
Much of the theory on this issue derives from Sarooshi, whose work on the 
delegation of Security Council powers is widely cited in support of this argument. 81 
Sarooshi suggests that the power of the Security Council to delegate its powers 
originates from general international law,82 and uses this theory to explain the legality 
of recent Council resolutions allowing to Member States to use force.83 
This is despite the fact that the Security Council has consistently used the term 
“authorise” when granting States the ability to undertake military measures.84 Sarooshi 
suggests: “The Council may be using the term ‘authorization’, but what it is doing in 
substance is delegating its Chapter VII powers to Member States.”85 Chesterman86 
                                                 
80 Corten (n.78) at 331, see also 314-315. 
81 See generally, D Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The 
Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999). 
82 Sarooshi (n.81) at 16-19. 
83 Sarooshi (n.81) at 13; see also Chapter 5 generally. 
84 For an overview of the relevant practice in this regard, see Sarooshi (n.81), Chapter 5, 167 ff. 
85 Sarooshi (n.81) at 13. 
86 S Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law  (Oxford : 
OUP, 2001). 
231 
 
similarly described the Security Council’s use of the term ‘authorise’ in its resolutions 
as ‘misleading’.87 
This author, however, does not believe that the Security Council’s choice of 
language should be dismissed out of hand. For example, Sarooshi cites the European 
Court of Justice case of Meroni v High Authority88 in support of the Security Council’s 
apparent general competence to delegate its powers.89 However, even in this case, the 
general principle that powers can be delegated required such a delegation to be 
expressly provided, and leaving no room for inference: 
 
A delegation of powers cannot be presumed and even when empowered to delegate 
its powers the delegating authority must take an express decision transferring them.90 
 
The Security Council’s ‘authorisations’ similarly should not be used to imply a 
delegation. There is no clear reason why we should dismiss the language chosen by 
the Security Council itself in its resolutions – if the Security Council wished to 
delegate its powers, there is no reason to suggest it would not have done so more 
explicitly; similarly, if the Security Council simply wants to authorise and permit a 
course of action, short of the actual transfer of powers, there is no reason to disbelieve 
this. This is one reason why the delegation theory is not convincing. 
This is especially important because ‘authorisations’ and ‘delegations’ are very 
distinct legal acts, and so for the sake of legal certainty, one must be sure which the 
Security Council would be utilising. In ordinary terms, an ‘authorisation’ means “the 
action of authorising a person or thing; formal permission or approval” or “the action 
of making legally valid.”91 By contrast, to ‘delegate’ means “to entrust, commit of 
deliver (authority, a function, etc.) to another as an agent or deputy.”92 In legal 
doctrine, even Sarooshi concedes that there is a legal distinction between these two.93 
In this regard. Sarooshi submits: 
 
                                                 
87 Chesterman (n.86) at 165. 
88 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1958] ECR 133. 
89 Sarooshi (n.81) at 8-9, and 17. 
90 Meroni (n.88) at judgment para [9], and at 151. 
91 Oxford English Dictionary definition (Oxford University Press), available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13351 (accessed 20/10/2017). 
92 Oxford English Dictionary definition (Oxford University Press), available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49313 (accessed 20/10/2017). 
93 Sarooshi (n.81) at 11-12. 
232 
 
An authorization is more limited than a delegation of powers: both in terms of the 
specification of the objectives to be achieved and the qualitative nature of the powers 
transferred to achieve the designated objective. … An authorization, thus, may 
represent the conferring on an entity of a very limited right to exercize a power, or 
part thereof; or the conferring on an entity of the right to exercize a power it already 
possesses, but the exercize of which is conditional on an authorization that triggers 
the competence of the entity to use the power.94 
 
Sarooshi goes on to argue that the single distinguishing characteristic of a delegation 
of power is that it is a transfer of a power of broad discretion.95 Based on this alone, 
this distinction is evident when one considers the actual powers which the Security 
Council is purported to delegate. Those in favour of the delegation theory argue that 
the Security Council would be delegating its Article 42 powers to Member States.96 
However, Article 42 is a broad discretionary power. It refers to the Councils general 
ability to ‘take action’ using measures that amount to the use of force.97 Importantly, 
it is a broad power to take such action ‘as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.’  
In reality, when the Security Council authorises Member States to use force, it 
does so in relation to a very specific situation, and often with other limitations. It may 
give States discretion as to how the measures are implemented, such as the tactics and 
operational command that are utilised – however, this discretion is simply not broad 
enough to reflect a delegation of powers in Article 42. Therefore, the Council does not 
transfer its Article 42 powers - the Council is permitting States to use force in a specific 
situation for a specific objective; it does not grant States the general ability to use force 
for the general maintenance of international peace and security. By Sarooshi’s own 
logic, this must be a simple authorisation, rather than a delegation. 
 
                                                 
94 Sarooshi (n.81) at 12-13. 
95 Sarooshi (n.81) at 13. 
96 See, for example, E De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council  (Oxford, 
Hart 2004), at 260-264; Sarooshi (n.81) at 146-149; Corten (n.78) at 315-316; see Chesterman (n.86) 
at 165-166, and 167-169 who notes that the precise legal basis for delegation remains in d ispute, but 
offers a number of options; see also J Frowein and N Krisch, “Action with respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2002), at 712-713 who suggest the legal basis for 
delegation of these powers is Article 42 itself. 
97 Article 42 refers to ‘action by air, sea, or land forces’, and stipulates that this may include 
‘demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, o r land forces of Members of the United 
Nations.’ 
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Erroneous Definition of ‘Authorisation’ in Legal Discourse  
 
Regarding the definition of ‘authorisation’, De Wet takes a slightly different approach, 
suggesting that the term authorisation “should be reserved for situations where the 
organ creates subsidiary organs and ‘authorises’ them to perform functions which it 
may not perform itself, but which it may nonetheless authorise under the Charter.”98 
Conversely, De Wet argues that the term delegation should be reserved for situat ions 
where an organ empowers another entity to exercise one of its own functions.99 
This idea that an authorisation is restricted to functions which the authoris ing 
body may not perform itself was adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Behrami v France,100 when the court considered whether it had jurisdiction over the 
acts of members of KFOR (the ‘Kosovo Force’) during the international operations in 
Kosovo. When addressing the nature of the Security Council resolutions authoris ing 
KFOR101, the Court considered:  
 
While this Resolution used the term “authorise”, that term and the term “delegation” 
are used interchangeably. Use of the term “delegation” in the present decision refers 
to the empowering by the UNSC of another entity to exercise its function as opposed 
to “authorising” an entity to carry out functions which it could not itself perform.102 
 
The Court does not explain why it adopted this definition, but the court does later rely 
heavily on De Wet and Sarooshi’s works, among others, later in the judgment when it 
discussed and determined the basis of the Security Council’s supposed ‘delegation’ of 
power to KFOR.103  
The source of confusion seems to be the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion in Application 
for Review,104 a case De Wet and herself refers to in support of the definition of 
‘authorisation’.105 In this case, the ICJ referred to the distinction between a delegation 
and an authorisation when it considered the nature of a General Assembly subsidiary 
                                                 
98 De Wet (n.96) at 259. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Behrami v France; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway  (2007) 45 EHRR SE10. 
101 See, for example, UNSC Res 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, UN Doc S/RES/1244(1999). 
102 Behrami v France (n.100) at para [43]. 
103 Behrami v France (n.100) at paras [130] and [132]. 
104 Application for Review of Judgement No, 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal  
(Advisory Opinion), 12 July 1973, [1973] ICJ Rep 166. 
105 De Wet (n.96) at 259, see also her fn 15. 
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body’s106 power to request an Advisory Opinion of the Court. In particular, the Court 
considered the Committee’s power to be based upon an ‘authorisation’, rather than a 
‘delegation’ of the General Assembly’s own power to request an Advisory Opinion.107 
In this regard, the distinction comes down to the interpretation of Article 96 of the 
Charter, whereby Article 96(1) empowers the General Assembly to request an 
Advisory Opinion on ‘any legal question’, and Article 96(2) allows the General 
Assembly to ‘authorise’ other organs of the UN to request such opinions on ‘legal 
questions arising within the scope of their activities.’ The Court explicitly considered 
that the Committee’s power was not a delegation of the Assembly’s own broader 
power, precisely because the Committee’s powers were more limited, and so did not 
actually reflect the Assembly’s own broad competence under Article 96(1).108 Indeed, 
the Court also noted that the limited nature of the Committee’s competences also did 
not restrict the Assembly’s power to authorise such organs to request Advisory 
Opinions in Article 96(2).109  
The erroneous definition of ‘authorisation’ may originate from Sarooshi’s 
mistaken reading of the case that: “The Court found that since the General Assembly 
could not perform the same function as the Committee—the review of decisions of the 
Administrative Tribunal—the source of the Committee’s power to request an advisory 
opinion was not as a result of a delegation of the Assembly’s own power under Article 
96(1).”110 Unfortunately, Sarooshi seems to be conflating a power to review decisions 
of the Administrative Tribunal with the very distinct legal power of requesting 
Advisory Opinions – the two are not the same, and the reference the Court made to 
delegation in this regard related only to the question of the latter power. Indeed, the 
ICJ has already recognised that there is a distinction between the delegation of the 
Assembly’s own functions and the exercise of a power which creates a body with 
powers the General Assembly itself does not hold.111 The fact that the General 
Assembly did not have the power to review Tribunal decisions does not in any way 
                                                 
106 The UN Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments (hereinafter 
‘the Committee’). 
107 Application for Review (n.104) at para [19]-[23]. 
108 Application for Review (n.104) at para [20]; see also Sarooshi (n.81) at 12-13. 
109 Application for Review (n.104) at para [20]. 
110 Sarooshi (n.81) at 12; this is surprising, because Sarooshi himself immediately goes on to recognise 
the broader power available to the General Assembly compared to that conferred on the Committee.  
111 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal  (Advisory 
Opinion), 13 July 1954, [1954] ICJ Rep 47, at 61; see also Application for Review (n.104) at para [17], 
which explains the judgment of the Court in this regard.  
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affect its power to request Advisory Opinions on any legal question under Article 
96(1).  
Unfortunately, Sarooshi’s statement, and De Wet’s subsequent submiss ion 
following his analysis,112 seems to have provided the basis for misunderstanding the 
legal nature of authorisations in a number of judicial decisions, including as discussed 
in the Behrami case,113 and later also endorsed further in Al-Jedda by the UK’s House 
of Lords.114  
 
Problems with the Doctrine of Delegated Powers when applied to the Security 
Council 
 
One of the key restrictions of the general principle of delegation, as advocated by 
Sarooshi,115 is that the delegator must remain in ‘ultimate’ or ‘overall’ ‘authority and 
control’ of the exercise of the delegated powers.116 Yet, there are a few problems with 
this restriction. 
Firstly, as noted by Sarooshi himself, the very existence of the Permanent 
Five’s veto power could mean that any termination of a delegation of powers could be 
blocked, in effect meaning that the Security Council is no longer in ‘ultimate control’ 
of its delegation.117 However, Sarooshi seeks to explain this by arguing that Security 
Council delegations could terminate automatically, especially once the objectives 
determined by the Council have been achieved.118 Similarly, the ECHR in Behrami 
indicated that the veto power alone was not sufficient to conclude that the Security 
Council did not retain ultimate authority and control.119  
                                                 
112 De Wet (n.96) at 259. 
113 Behrami v France (n.100) at para [43]. 
114 See, for example, the dissenting judgment of Lord Roger of Earlsferry in the UK House of Lords 
case R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] 1 AC 332, at para [79] onwards, where Lord  
Roger seems to mistake the General Assembly’s creation of a subsidiary body with powers that it does 
not itself possess, with the authorisation of a limited power (i.e. the Committee’s limited scope to 
request Advisory Opinions) – a much broader version of which the Assembly already possesses (i.e. 
the Assembly’s power to request Advisory Opinions on any legal question). Other judges who endorsed 
the Behrami test for ‘authorisation’, based upon Sarooshi’s work, include Lord Bingham at para [21] 
and [23], and Lord Brown at para [143]. 
115 Sarooshi (n.81) at 35-41.  
116 Behrami v France (n.100) at [133].  
117 Sarooshi (n.81) at 40-41. 
118 Sarooshi (n.81) at 41, and 156-159. 
119 Behrami v France (n.100) at [134]. 
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De Wet also seeks to explain this problem by arguing that a mandate to use 
force will cease when it becomes clear that it does not enjoy the support of the majority 
of Security Council members anymore.120 In this regard, De Wet seems to suggest that 
the ‘intention’ of the Security Council might be inferred from a draft resolution that 
receives the support of a majority of members, but is vetoed by a permanent 
member.121 In other words, a draft resolution terminating the mandate, which would 
have passed but for the veto of a permanent member, may indicate the true ‘will’ of 
the Council itself. Unfortunately, this author believes De Wet goes too far to suggest 
this may result in a presumption that a mandate to use force is terminated – this would 
completely ignore the voting procedures of the Council which, for better or worse, are 
still legally binding.  
However, her argument is convincing for the point that it may indicate the will 
of the Council itself. Constructing this ‘will’ of the Security Council does help to 
understand the point that the Council itself is not the bearer of ultimate authority or 
control when it confers a mandate to use force with no point of termination or 
expiration. Indeed, this is also true when one considers the inability of the Council to 
change or edit a mandate in response to a developing situation if that is the will of the 
Council, but it such an alteration in the mandate may be vetoed. This problem of 
vetoing terminations or alterations is especially significant in the situation where the 
authorisation to use force is granted to, or includes, one of the permanent members – 
it would seem a complete legal fiction to suggest that the Security Council has overall 
authority and control when the delegate has the final say as to whether it surrenders 
power back to the delegator. As Frowein and Krisch highlight,122 in practice the 
Council enacts Chapter VII Resolutions usually for an unlimited period, and 
terminating them requires a positive decision by the Council which is still subject to 
what they call the ‘reverse veto’.  
Tsagourias and White similarly reject the argument that periodic reports 
provide a sufficient form of oversight by the Security Council, viewing this 
mechanism as too weak to amount to proper supervision.123 Moreover, they are clear 
in establishing that Security Council authorisations simply do not adhere to many of 
                                                 
120 De Wet (n.96), at 270. 
121 De Wet (n.96), at 270. 
122 Frowein and Krisch (n.96) at 714. 
123 Tsagourias and White (n.21), 291. 
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the requirements of the delegation doctrine, especially where the mandates are not 
sufficiently defined to adhere with the general criterion outlined in Meroni.124 
Moreover, more recent case law has accepted that some Security Council 
mandates simply do not provide for the ultimate authority or control of the Council. 
While the ECHR in Behrami considered the Security Council to still be in ultima te 
authority and control of KFOR, when Al-Jedda reached the ECHR it decided 
differently on the facts.125 The Court considered the Multi-National Force (MNF) in 
Iraq, authorised to “to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of 
security and stability in Iraq”,126 was not under the ‘effective control nor ultima te 
authority and control’ of the UN Security Council.127 Therefore, by extension, these 
mandates cannot be considered delegations, and so they must be simple authorisations.  
It is also worth noting the International Law Commission’s support for this decision 
in its commentaries on its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of Internationa l 
Organisations,128 and its subtle criticism of the earlier case law therein.129  
Not only does this demonstrate that ‘authorisations’ (in their ordinary 
meaning) are possible by the Security Council, but it also indicates that such 
authorisations are consistent with the prohibition of force and State sovereignty. 
 
1.2.2.2 Article 39 as the Alternative Legal Basis for Security Council 
Authorisations 
 
Having established that Security Council authorisations to use force are not 
delegations of its Chapter VII powers, the legal basis for this power to authorise must 
be found. Article 53(1) in Chapter VIII of the Charter explicitly references the ability 
of the Council to ‘authorise’ enforcement action by regional agencies or arrangements. 
                                                 
124 Tsagourias and White (n.21), 291; see Meroni (n.88) at 151-154. 
125 Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23. 
126 UNSC Res 1511 (2003), 16 October 2003, UN Doc S/RES/1511(2003), at para [13]; see also UNSC 
Res 1546 (2004), 8 June 2004, UN Doc S/RES/1546(2004), at para [9]. 
127 Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (n.125) at para [84]; see also R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for 
Defence (n.114) at paras [22]-[24] per Lord Bingham. 
128 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisation, with Commentaries’, 
available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf > 
(accessed 20/10/2017); also included in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Sixty-Third Session’, (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011) UN Doc A/66/10, from 69, 
(hereinafter DARIO Commentaries). 
129 ILC DARIO Commentaries (n.128), Commentary to Article 7, paras [10]-[13]; see also its assertion 
regarding the lack of attribution to the UN of the conduct of forces authorised by the Security Council, 
at General Commentary to Chapter II, para [5]. 
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But there is no express provision in the Charter granting the Security Council this 
power, or the power to authorise Member States generally. Thus, there must be some 
provision in Chapter VII of the Charter that leaves room for the Council to ‘authorise ’ 
action.130 This author argues that Article 39 provides for such a power. But first, we 
shall address arguments in favour of alternatives. 
Chesterman highlights one argument that the Council possesses a general 
implied power in the Charter to authorise force.131 This is based upon an assertion by 
the ICJ in the Reparation for Injuries132 Advisory Opinion, where it said: 
 
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers 
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.133 
 
Unfortunately, as Chesterman rightly notes, this view results in a complete lack of 
legal certainty about any limitations or scope of the Security Council’s powers to 
authorise force.134 Furthermore, the context of the ICJ’s statement was very specific 
to the possibility of the UN bringing claims for reparations on the behalf of its agents 
in the circumstances of that case – this is very different to implying a power to 
authorise the use of force against a Member State. As such, it would be preferable to 
investigate a basis for this power within the provisions of the Charter as opposed to a 
general inference. 
As highlighted above, some authors believe Article 42 provides a sound legal 
basis for the authorisation model. For example, Corten argues that the word ‘action’ 
in Article 42 is wide enough to cover the Council’s recent practice of authoris ing 
States to use force.135 
Of course, Article 42, as originally intended, was meant to allow the Security 
Council itself to use force, taking action by controlling the forces of UN Member 
                                                 
130 Chapter VII is specifically assigned to ‘actions relating to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, 
and acts of aggression’, and so in accordance with Article 24(2), listing the Chapters where the 
Council’s powers are found, Chapter VII would be the only logical place to find this power.  
131 Chesterman (n.86) at 168; see also, for a similar point, H Freudenchuß, ‘Between Unilateralism and 
Collective Security: Authorizations of the Use of Force by the UN Security Council’, (1994) 5 EJIL 
492-531, at 526. 
132 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 11 April 
1949, [1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
133 Reparation for Injuries (n.132), at 182. 
134 Chesterman (n.86) at 168. 
135 Corten (n.78) at 315-316. 
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States, as determined by agreements that were to be concluded on the basis of Article 
43, and as determined by the Military Staff Committee under Articles 46 and 47. As 
is well known, the Article 43 agreements were never concluded.  
In Certain Expenses, the ICJ noted that the failure to reach such agreements 
did not leave the Security Council impotent in the face of an emergency.136 It is on this 
basis that some argue that Article 42 may be interpreted to allow the Security Council 
to ‘authorise’ force, rather than take action itself.137 Nevertheless, there are still those 
who consider Article 42 as strictly confined to military action taken by the Security 
Council itself in fulfilment of the dormant security apparatus in Article 47 of the 
Charter.138 
White,139 however, while noting the plausibility of Article 42 as a legal basis 
for such action, also notes the equal plausibility of this action deriving from 
‘recommendations’ under Article 39 of the Charter.140 Article 39, as discussed in 
Chapter III, obliges the Security Council to determine the existence of threats to, or 
breaches of, the peace or acts of aggression, and then to either make recommendations 
or take decisions under Articles 41 and 42 for the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security. 
The making of ‘recommendations’ – a non-binding act – may well provide a 
basis for the Security Council’s power to authorise Member States to take milita ry 
action.141 Dinstein, for example, argues that while recommendations can only urge 
Member States to take action, “is Member States choose to heed a Council’s 
recommendation authorizing them to take measures predicated on a binding 
determination concerning the existence of a threat to the peace etc., these measures 
must be considered lawful notwithstanding their permissive character.”142 He then 
                                                 
136 Certain Expenses (n.1), at 167. 
137 See, for example, J Frowein and N Krisch, “Article 42”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2002), at 756-757; De Wet (n.96), at 260. 
138 See, for example, B Conforti and C Focarelli, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (Leiden: 
Koninklijke Brill NV, 4th edn, 2010) at 280. 
139 N White, “From Korea to Kuwait: The Legal Basis of United Nations’ Military Action”, (1998) 
20(3) The International History Review 597. 
140 White (n.139) at 605, 608, and 613; see also N D White and Ö Ülgen, “The  Security Council and 
the Decentralised Military Option: Constitutionality and Function”, (1997) 44(3) Netherlands 
International Law Review 378, at 385 and 387.  
141 But see, in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY] Prosecutor v. 
Tadić (Jurisdiction) Case IT-94-1AR72, (2nd October 1995) at [29] and [31], where the Tribunal 
suggests that recommendations in Article 39 simply reflect a continuation of those available to the 
Council concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes in Chapter VI of the Charter. 
142 Dinstein (n.76) at 306, para [814]. 
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goes on to argue that permissive action of this kind can only be anchored in Article 
39, and not Article 48.143 Indeed, referencing the arguments that Article 42 is the basis 
for Council authorisation, Dinstein also rejects this, noting that both authorisations and 
recommendations are of a non-mandatory nature and thus neither action comes within 
the rubric of Article 42.144 To him, there is no genuine distinction between an 
authorisation and a recommendation, and an authorisation is no less permissive than a 
recommendation.145 
After the Security Council first ‘recommended’ the use of military measures 
in response to the situation in Korea in 1950,146 Kelsen147 doubted whether this 
corresponded to the intentions of the drafters of the Charter.148 However, he did admit 
that the wording of Article 39 does not exclude the possibility of the Security Council 
recommending enforcement measures, and it was only if this interpretation was 
accepted that the Security Council’s Resolution doing so in Korea could be considered 
constitutional.149 
During Security Council meetings which addressed this action, the UK 
representative considered the proper legal basis to be Article 39, arguing: 
 
Had the Charter come fully into force and had the agreement provided for in Article 
43 of the Charter been concluded, we should, of course, have proceeded differently, 
and the action to be taken by the Security Council to repel the armed attack would no 
doubt have been founded on Article 42. As it is, however, the Council can naturally 
act only under Article 39, which enables the Security Council to recommend what 
measures should be taken to restore international peace and security.150 
 
Not only does this suggest actions under Article 42 were considered as actions only to 
be taken directly by the Security Council, but it supports the argument that Article 39 
                                                 
143 Dinstein (n.76) at 315, para [838]. 
144 Dinstein (n.76) at 333, para [887]. 
145 Dinstein (n.76) at 333, para [887]. 
146 UNSC Res 83 (1950), 27 June 1950, UN Doc S/RES/83(1950). 
147 H Kelsen, “Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations”, a supplement to The Law of the United 
Nations (first published New York: FA Praeger, 1950 – reprint, Lawbook Exchange 2000, 2011). 
148 Kelsen (n.147), at 932. 
149 Kelsen (n.147), at 933. 
150 UNSC Verbatim Record, 476th Meeting (7 July 1950), UN Doc S/PV.476, at 3; Reference to the 
Charter not being ‘fully in force’ seems to be a colloquial reference to the missing agreements under 
Article 43, not neceasarily the legally binding force of the Charter itself. 
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may be the proper legal basis for authorisations to use force.151 As noted by White, the 
French and US delegations also accepted this position.152 
One argument against this interpretation might be to suggest that 
recommendations are of lesser legal importance than authorisations, or that 
recommendations do not have the same ‘legalising’ effect as authorisations. However, 
if one were to consider the ordinary meaning of these terms, logic tells us otherwise. 
We have determined that an ‘authorisation’ grants official permission,153 whereas to 
recommend means to “present (a thing, course of action) to a person etc., as being 
desirable or advisable.”154 Therefore, a ‘recommendation’ involves urging a party to 
do something, and this, it is submitted, necessarily implies that the body doing the 
recommending permits such an act to be done. A recommendation, therefore, goes 
beyond a simple permission to undertake an act – it actively encourages it. It is by this 
argument that one considers a recommendation to necessarily imply a relevant 
authorisation where it is considered legal for the body in question to authorise such 
action in the first place. 
In this context, if an official body such as the Security Council recommended 
that States use force in a situation, it must necessarily follow that it permits such action, 
and therefore authorises it. This issue can be highlighted by reference to Security 
Council Resolution 2249 (2015), where the Council ‘called upon’ States to use all 
necessary measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed by terrorist group 
‘Islamic State in Syria’ or ‘Da’esh’.155 While there have been debates regarding the 
ambiguous language of this Resolution,156 some States certainly interpreted the 
Resolution as providing a legal basis in and of itself for military action notwithstand ing 
                                                 
151 See also, UNSC Verbatim Record, 486th Meeting (11 August 1950), UN Doc S/PV.486, at 6. 
152 White (n.139) at 613. 
153 See above, n.91. 
154 Oxford English Dictionary definition (Oxford University Press), available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/159715 (accessed 20/10/2017). 
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Council’s ISIS Resolution’, (EJIL: Talk!, 21 November 2015) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the -
constructive-ambiguity-of-the-security-councils-isis-resolution/> (accessed 20/10/2017); See also, A 
Lang, ‘Legal Basis for UK Military Action in Syria’, (House of Commons Briefing Paper No 7404, UK 
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242 
 
possible alternative claims of collective self-defence against the terrorist groups.157 
With this in mind, this author argues that it would be reckless for a body such as the 
Security Council, with the power to authorise the use of far-reaching measures, to 
recommend the use of forcible measures when it did not also intend to authorise such 
measures. Of course, there may be political reasons behind the ambiguous language 
of a Resolution,158 as is to be expected when it is necessary for the Members of the 
Council (especially the P5) to compromise. But, legally speaking, if the Council does 
not intend to authorise force, it should not encourage States to use such force in a way 
that suggests it is permissible to do so. 
On this basis, it is submitted that the legal basis for Security Council 
authorisations to use force is inherent in its ability to recommend force in Article 39. 
Having established this, we may now address the analogous ability of the General 
Assembly to do the same. 
 
1.2.2.3 General Assembly Recommendations 
 
Dinstein seems to accept the legality of Security Council recommendations to use 
force, but not the legality of General Assembly recommendations to do the same, 
suggesting that only a Security Council decision can validate an otherwise unlawful 
use of force.159 This returns to the debate that the non-binding nature of 
recommendations do not provide a standalone legal title to use force, a point that 
Tsagourias and White find unconvincing.160 
However, this assumes that the legality of the use of force in pursuance of a 
recommendation by a competent body is not inherent in the power to recommend force 
in the first place. Instead, it is logically preferred to consider the lawfulness of a use 
of force as based upon the consent of a State to the power of the relevant body to make 
such recommendations. In other words, the power to make recommendations in 
Article 39 may now be considered, by virtue of subsequent practice and agreement to 
the ability of the Council to authorise force, as including the power to recommend the 
                                                 
157 For an overview of the State arguments, and actions subsequent to this Resolution, see: T Ruys et al 
“Digest of State Practice: 1 July—31 December”, (2016) 3(1) Journal on the Use of Force and 
International Law 126, at 150-154. 
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use of force. If a target State has accepted such a power by virtue of their Membership 
of the United Nations, although not of a mandatory nature, it must also logically follow 
that the State accepts the consequences of the use of that power – the consequence 
being the use of force against them.  
This submission follows from the interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, 
as investigated in Chapter IV, that the use of force is legal when it is consistent with 
Article 2(4), rather than falling within a defined selection of ‘exceptions’ to a general 
rule. It is the compatibility with Article 2(4) of the General Assembly’s purported 
power to recommend force, and the use of it therein, that we shall now address.  
 
1.2.3 Compatibility with Article 2(4) 
 
On the basis of the analysis of Article 2(4) of the Charter in Chapter IV, it was argued 
that the prohibition was not an all-encompassing general prohibition of all uses of 
force, but a carefully constructed prohibition which allowed for very narrow uses of 
force where they are compatible with the prohibition itself. Therefore, the so-called 
‘exceptions’ to the prohibition of self-defence and the powers of the Security Council 
were explained not as exceptions per ce but circumstances that did not violate the 
prohibition of force. 
To be compatible with Article 2(4), Assembly recommendations, and the 
actions taken in pursuit of them, must: (i) not violate the territorial integrity or politica l 
independence of the target State; and (ii) be consistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations. 
 
1.2.3.1 Territorial Integrity and Political Independence 
 
As outlined above, territorial integrity and political independence – foundationa l 
principles of State sovereignty itself – may be inherently qualified by the consent of a 
State, or by a rule of customary international law limiting the scope of those 
principles.161 Applying this to recommendations of the General Assembly to use force, 
this power must be established as part of the Charter regime, or the use of force in 
                                                 
161 See Chapter IV, Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. 
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pursuit of such recommendations must be provided for on the basis of consent to such 
action provided elsewhere in the Charter. 
The powers of the Security Council in were explained as a form of permanent 
consent by Members to the ability of the Security Council to take or authorise such 
measures. This is quite uncontroversial, as this is clearly foreseen as one of the main 
reasons the United Nations was founded. The ability of the General Assembly to 
recommend such action, however, is not explicit, and so must be investigated. 
There are two possible bases for the consent of Members to the use of force in 
pursuance of a recommendation of the General Assembly. This could be: (i) an 
interpretation of the General Assembly’s powers under either Article 10 or Article 11 
of the Charter, based upon subsequent agreement or practice implying that the 
recommendations therein include recommendations to use force; or (ii) a general 
principle of the Charter granting effective collective measures, such as the use of force, 
when taken in accordance with the procedures and competences of the organs of the 
organisation. 
As for the first possibility, it is clear from the practice outlined above that the 
General Assembly’s powers have subsequently been considered to include the ability 
to recommend force, especially considering the Uniting for Peace resolution.162 Of 
course, this power has only been utilised in practice once, and the internationa l 
community has been hesitant to utilise the General Assembly outside of peacekeeping 
since the 1950s. The competence of the Assembly only being secondary for the 
maintenance of peace and security, it is evident that any precedents would be rare, and 
this should not necessarily reflect the international community’s support (or lack of) 
for the legality of such actions.  
The second possibility has been advocated, in a sense, by Tsagourias and 
White, when they suggest that the ‘exception’ to the prohibition of force allowing the 
Security Council to take action is not an exception just for the Council, but also for 
the “organs representing the membership of the UN in matters of peace and security” 
in general.163 In this regard, White argues that the question of which organ authorises 
action is an internal issue.164 Thus, in accordance with this argument, the legality of 
                                                 
162 See above, Section 1.2.1.1. 
163 Tsagourias and White (n.21), at 111; see also N White, ‘The Legality of Bombing in the Name of 
Humanity’, (2000) 5(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 27, at 28, and 39-41. 
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the organ taking such measures is an internal matter to be determined by the interna l 
procedures and divisions of competence within the organisation.  
While this author does not quite agree that this construction is an ‘exception’ 
to Article 2(4), it is certainly possible that the Charter itself provides a basis for the 
UN in general to have the power to use force, rather than exclusively the Security 
Council. Such an argument may be drawn out by reference to the preamble of the 
Charter, where it considers that the use of force should not be used ‘save in the 
common interest’, or indeed by Article 1(1) itself, which provides that the primary 
purpose of the United Nations is: 
 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace …165 
 
It could well be argued, on this basis, that States have consented to the role of the 
United Nations in taking forcible measures, especially since one of its main purposes 
has been explicitly regarded as taking “effective collective measures”. So long as the 
secondary rules providing for the competences and the procedures of the organs of the 
organisation are upheld, this is sufficient to render such action to be compatible with 
the inherently- limited principles of territorial integrity and political independence. 
This argument, coupled with the support outlined for the competence of the 
General Assembly to recommend force, would render such action compatible with the 
first requirement of Article 2(4). 
 
1.2.3.2 Consistency with the Purposes of the United Nations 
 
As for the second requirement of Article 2(4), prohibiting force inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations, it will be recalled from Chapter IV that this clause of 
the provision effectively prohibits all unilateral uses of force.166 It was argued therein 
that Article 1(4), detailing the purpose of the UN to be a centre for harmonizing the 
actions of nations, for the attainment of the purpose of maintenance of internationa l 
peace and security in Article 1(1), implies that any forcible measures must be 
                                                 
165 Emphasis added. 
166 See Chapter IV, Section 3.3. 
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sufficiently ‘harmonised’ and ‘collective’ to be consistent with these purposes and 
thus Article 2(4). 
Considering the very fact that action authorised by the Security Council is 
compatible with these purposes, it is also submitted here that a recommendation by 
the General Assembly can also be considered as such. Moreover, since the General 
Assembly represents every Member of the UN, the adoption of a Resolut ion 
recommending such action could certainly be considered as ‘harmonising’ the actions 
of nations, and rendering the basis of the use of force as sufficiently ‘collective’ for 
these purposes.  
 
1.2.4 Compatibility with Article 2(7) 
 
One further issue that should be addressed briefly is the compatibility of this line of 
action with Article 2(7) of the Charter. While this provision generally prevents the UN 
from intervening in the domestic jurisdiction of States, as established above, the 
consent of States to the powers of the Assembly to make these recommendations 
renders such conduct automatically outside the domestic jurisdiction of Members. 
Furthermore, the reference in this provision to Chapter VII of the Charter is of litt le 
relevance in this regard, since enforcement measures are still clearly envisioned in 
other parts of the Charter.167 Therefore, the principle contained in Article 2(7) is, at 
first glance, contradictory, but nevertheless follows the same pattern as the general 
principle of non-intervention, still requiring specific powers to justify an ‘intervention’ 
into any internal matter.168 
 
1.2.5 Conclusions on Forcible Measures by the General Assembly 
 
Considering the above, one would conclude that the General Assembly does have the 
legal power, in certain circumstances, to recommend the use of force, and the 
implementation of such a recommendation by Member States would be compatible 
                                                 
167 See, for example, Chapter VIII and of course the powers of the General Assembly itself in this 
regard. 
168 See also G Nolte, “Article 2(7)”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2002), at 156-157, and 160-168, 171; and generally, R Higgins, The Development 
of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London: Oxford University  
Press, 1963), at 64-130. 
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with the prohibition of force in Article 2(4). As such, this power could indeed provide 
an alternative measure to implement the responsibility to protect. In this sense, it is 
worth noting that this power is only compatible with the Charter’s protections 
regarding the primacy of the Security Council in Articles 11(2) and 12 where there is 
a failure of the Security Council to uphold its responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Since the use of force, as an ‘effective collective measure’, is only consistent 
with the purposes of the Charter in pursuance of the maintenance of international peace 
and security, it logically follows that the General Assembly’s power to recommend 
such measures is limited to measures specifically for the purposes of preventing or 
removing threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression.169 By 
extension, such recommendations cannot be made to, for example, prevent human 
rights abuses where those abuses do not also threaten international peace and security. 
In this sense, the Assembly might be considered under the same restraints as the 
Security Council is under Article 39. While it does not explicitly need to determine 
the existence of such threats, breaches, or acts of aggression, the powers utilised 
therein are restricted to these purposes. Therefore, the use of force by the General 
Assembly may only be a tool of implementing the responsibility to protect, where the 
prevention or suppression of atrocity crimes also engages the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Furthermore, while this identifies a legal alternative to implement the 
responsibility to protect, this does not necessarily imply that this method would be the 
most suitable, nor the most practical. While General Assembly action to maintain or 
restore peace provides an alternative basis to prevent inaction, this route would still 
require a two thirds majority of the Members States of the UN to support such 
action.170 
 
1.3 Non-Forcible Coercive Measures 
 
To assess the ability of the General Assembly to adopt other coercive measures, such 
as sanctions, asset freezes, or trade embargoes, there are a few issues we must address. 
                                                 
169 This is the phrasing used in Article 1(1) of the Charter. 
170 See Article 18(2) of the Charter, where Assembly recommendations relating to the maintenance of 
peace and security require a two-thirds majority. 
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Firstly, we must again address whether the powers of the Assembly allow such 
recommendations to be made. Secondly, the compatibility of such a power with the 
principle of non-intervention must be explained. In this regard, it is argued that the 
powers of the Assembly do indeed provide for non-forcible measures, but only in 
circumstances permitted by international law – in particular, by virtue of the doctrine 
of countermeasures. 
 
1.3.1 Assessing General Assembly Competences to Recommend Coercive 
Measures 
 
Having established that the General Assembly may make recommendations for the 
use of force for the maintenance of international peace and security, it would seem to 
follow that the General Assembly could also recommend that economic measures are 
taken. However, before such a conclusion can be drawn, we must assess the 
subsequent agreement and practice of States to establish whether the Assembly’s 
general powers to make recommendations have been interpreted to necessarily include 
the taking of such measures in the first place. 
There are a few instances where the General Assembly has urged States to take 
economic measures. For example, during the Korean crisis, the General Assembly 
established an ‘Additional Measures Committee’ to report on possible measures that 
could be taken in response to China’s intervention in Korea.171 This Committee 
produced a report which recommended a Resolution imposing a trade embargo on 
China.172 The General Assembly adopted the Committee’s suggestion in Resolution 
500 (V), recommending that every State apply an arms and strategic trade embargo on 
China and the North Korean authorities.173 
Around this time, the General Assembly also adopted several reports of the 
Coercive Measures Committee.174 This Committee produced a number of reports in 
                                                 
171 UNGA Res 498 (V), Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of 
China in Korea, (1 February 1951) UN Doc A/RES/498(V), at para [6]. 
172 UNGA, ‘Report of the Additional Measures Committee: Intervention of the Central People’s 
Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea’, (14 May 1951) UN Doc A/1799. 
173 UNGA Res 500 (V) Additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea , 18 May 
1951, UN Doc A/RES/500(V), at para [1]. 
174 The Committee was established in Uniting for Peace (n.6), operative para [11]; its reports were 
adopted by the General Assembly in: UNGA Res 503 (VI), Methods which might be used to maintain 
and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the 
Charter, 12 January 1952, UN Doc A/RES/503(VI); UNGA Res 703 (VII), Methods which might be 
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the 1950s, some of which built upon the work of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, to 
suggest routes of action and strategic measures that could be used for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.175 Importantly, throughout these reports, the 
Committee considered both the Security Council and the General Assembly to have 
the ability to take such measures, which included trade embargoes, and the suspension 
of financial relations.176 
Similarly, in response to the government of South Africa’s policy of apartheid, 
the Assembly adopted several Resolutions calling for States to take economic 
measures. For example, Resolution 1761 (XVII)177 requested States to take measures, 
including: (i) breaking off diplomatic relations with South Africa; (ii) closing powers 
to South African-flagged ships; (iii) enacting legislation prohibiting such ships from 
entering ports; (iv) boycotting South African goods and refraining from exporting 
goods, arms and ammunition to South Africa; and (v) refusing landing passage and 
facilities to South African airlines.178 
Although the Security Council also called upon States to adhere to a volunta ry 
arms embargo,179 the General Assembly also reiterated further calls for such action, 
including calling upon States to “take effective economic and other measures”, 
following developments in Namibia and South Africa’s occupation of the territory 
therein. 180 Later, towards the early 1980s, the General Assembly announced its 
disappointment that the Security Council had failed to take further economic and other 
sanctions, under Chapter VII of the Charter, against South Africa as the policy of 
                                                 
used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee , 8 April 1953, UN Doc 
A/RES/703(VII); UNGA Res 809(IX), Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen 
international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: report 
of the Collective Measures Committee, 4 November 1954, UN Doc A/RES/809(IX). 
175 See, UNGA, ‘Report of the Collective Measures Committee’, (1951) UN Doc A/1891; UNGA, 
‘Report of the Collective Measures Committee’, (1952) UN Doc A/2215; UNGA, ‘Report of the 
Collective Measures Committee: Methods which might be used to Maintain and Strengthen 
International Peace and Security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter’, (30 
August 1954) UN Doc A/27130-S/3283. 
176 See, for example, Collective Measures Committee’s 1st Report (n.175), paras [41]-[166] generally. 
177 UNGA Res 1761 (XVII), The policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa , 6 November 
1962, UN Doc A/RES/1761(XVII). 
178 Ibid, para [4]. 
179 See, for example, UNSC Res 181 (1963), 7 August 1963, UN Doc S/RES/181(1963); UNSC Res 
182 (1963), 4 December 1963, UN Doc S/RES/182(1963); and UNSC Res 191 (1964), 18 June 1964, 
UN Doc S/RES/191(1964); although this was later replaced by a mandatory arms embargo under 
Chapter VII of the Charter in UNSC Res 418 (1977), 4 November 1977, UN Doc S/RES/418(1977), at 
para [2]. 
180 UNGA Res 2871 (XXVI), Question of Namibia, 20 December 1971, UN Doc A/RES/2871(XXVI) , 
para [6(d)]. 
250 
 
apartheid continued and further caused the situation to deteriorate.181 The Assembly 
therefore adopted its own recommendations, calling for numerous types of action, 
including economic and other measures, as well as calling for the Security Council to 
adopt mandatory sanctions.182 The General Assembly reiterated these detailed calls 
for specific measures and action in further Resolutions.183 
The General Assembly’s recommendations regarding South Africa were cited 
by the Panel of Experts in the Secretary General’s 1997 report on economic measures  
in support of the position that such recommendations were a ‘legitimacy indicator’ for 
the imposition of coercive economic measures.184 The Panel considered such 
recommendations as legitimate where the measures were taken in response to ‘clear 
violations of international law.’185 
Dawidowicz explains186 that some of these measures might usually be 
considered measures of retorsion, but largely they conflict with other obligations, such 
as those under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).187 Therefore, 
these recommendations by the General Assembly could demonstrate an opinion on the 
part of States that the Assembly can recommend measures that would conflict with 
other obligations in international law. Crucially, Dawidowicz highlights that these 
recommendations were taken in response to breaches of international obligations – in 
particular, erga omnes obligations.188 Thus, while this practice of States demonstrates 
that there is certainly a power for the General Assembly to recommend coercive, non-
                                                 
181 UNGA Res 34/93, Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa , 12 December 1979, UN 
Doc A/RES/34/93, at Section C, preamble para [3] and [4]. 
182 UNGA Res 34/93 (n.181), at Section A, para [12], [14]; Section D generally detailing an arms 
embargo; Section F, detailing an oil embargo; and Section Q, welcoming State’s unilateral measures 
ceasing investments and loans in South Africa. 
183 See, for example, UNGA Res 35/206, Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa , 16 
December 1980, UN Doc A/RES/35/206, particularly Section C, paras [1]-[6]; also UNGA Res 36/172, 
Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa , 17 December 1981, UN Doc A/RES/36/172. 
184 Report of the Secretary General, Economic Measures as a means of political and economic coercion 
against developing countries, (14 October 1997) UN Doc A/52/459, at para [76(d)]. 
185 Ibid. 
186 M Dawidowicz, “Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State 
Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and their Relationship to the UN Security Council” (2006) 
77 BYIL 333, at 352-353. 
187 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947) (adopted 30 October 1947, entered 
into force 1 January 1948), 55 UNTS 187, amended by the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995), 1867 UNTS 
154, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) (adopted 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 187; provisions of the GATT 1947, as incorporated by 
GATT 1994, hereinafter simply referred to as ‘GATT’ 
188 Dawidowicz (n.186), at 354. 
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forcible measures,189 it does not demonstrate clearly whether the recommendations 
themselves have a ‘legalising’ effect on the action in question, as might be the case 
regarding recommendations to use force.  
 
1.3.2 Legal Basis for Recommendations to Adopt Coercive Measures 
 
It is clear from the practice of the General Assembly that it considers itself able to 
recommend or request that States adopt coercive economic measures for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. However, the practice does not 
demonstrate whether these recommendations provide a legal basis for the taking of 
such measures, or whether the measures must be based upon another foundation in 
customary international law. 
 
1.3.2.1 A General Legal Basis under the UN Charter 
 
It might be argued that this power has the same effect as the power to recommend 
force, as discussed above, and so such measures would be rendered legal on a simila r 
basis. The question here is not just whether the legal basis renders the measures 
compatible with the principle of non-intervention, but also whether they can trump 
other existing international obligations owed to the target State. As explored in 
Chapter V, this question could cover obligations relating to trade agreements, financ ia l 
assets, or other specific bilateral or multilateral agreements between the target State 
and those taking the measures in question.190 
Of course, such a basis under the Charter would require an interpretation of the 
General Assembly’s general power to recommend measures for the maintenance of 
peace as including the power to permit the temporary violation of other internationa l 
obligations. While a power to recommend (or ‘authorise’) coercive measures could 
explain some general compatibility with the principle of non-intervention, and State 
sovereignty by extension, based on State consent to these Charter powers – they do 
not easily explain the conflict between this power and other international obligations. 
                                                 
189 See further, Hailbronner and Klein (n.27), at 264-267. 
190 See Chapter V, Section 1.2. 
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The crux of this issue may come down to the interpretation of Article 103 of 
the Charter, which provides: 
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.  
 
The problem here is that this provision only seems to grant precedence to the UN 
Charter obligations. Recommendations (or requests, as some of the Assembly’s 
Resolutions state)191 are by their very nature non-binding, and therefore not 
obligations. However, there have been some interpretations of Article 103 which seek 
to explain its compatibility with the Security Council’s power to ‘authorise’ measures, 
and therefore the possibility that authorisations may render legal conduct incompatib le 
with other international obligations. Frowein and Krisch, for example, argue that these 
authorisations have not been opposed on the ground of conflicting treaty obligations, 
and the Charter would not achieve its purpose and objective of allowing the Security 
Council to take the action it deems appropriate and deprive it from the flexibility it is 
supposed to have in these matters.192 Of course, Frowein and Krisch do not adopt the 
interpretation of ‘recommendations’ that this author adopts above,193 and therefore 
also consider that action in pursuance of recommendations require a separate legal 
basis in international law.194 Similarly, Lord Bingham in Al-Jedda accepted the 
argument put by Frowein and Krisch regarding Article 103, and also suggested that 
‘obligations’ in the provision should not be interpreted narrowly.195  
Kolb undertakes a brief assessment of this debate, ultimately concluding that 
Article 103 should be read to allow ‘authorisations’ within their scope, but still 
maintaining a difference between ‘authorisations’ and ‘recommendations’ despite 
                                                 
191 See, for example, UNGA Res 1761 (XVII) (n.177), at para [4]. 
192 J Frowein and N Krisch, “Article 39”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2002), at 728-729; see also Sarooshi (n.81) at 149-151. 
193 I.e. that a recommendation necessarily implies and authorisation, where the body in question has the 
power to authorise. 
194 Frowein and Krisch (n.192) at 728. 
195 R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence (n.114) at paras [34] per Lord Bingham. The ECHR 
in this case seemed to take a more nuanced interpretation: see, Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (n.125) at 
para [109]. 
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both being of a non-mandatory character.196 On the other hand, in the ILC’s study on 
the fragmentation of international law, its Study Group considered that non-binding 
resolutions adopted by UN organs, including the Security Council, do not fall within 
the scope of Article 103.197 Dawidowicz similarly argues on this basis that measures 
requested or recommended by the General Assembly could only be justified on the 
basis of general international law.198 
In the context of the Security Council’s powers, Frowein and Krisch suggest 
that the power to authorise force, as a ‘stronger power’, necessarily implies that there 
must be a power to authorise ‘weaker measures’.199 Unfortunately, even applying that 
logic to the General Assembly’s powers, it simply does not follow that coercive 
economic measures are ‘weaker’ or ‘less invasive’ than the use of force. In fact, in 
many cases, a general trade embargo could have more far reaching effects on the 
security and stability of a situation than, for example, a precise and limited milita ry 
operation. The legal debate surrounding the use of force is often ‘limited’ to whether 
the military operation violates the prohibition of force and State sovereignty more 
generally. It has been demonstrated above how recommendations by a competent UN 
body can render such measures compatible with these principles. What is not clear, 
however, is whether such authorised or recommended uses of force violate other 
international agreements. Of course, it is certainly possible for a military operation to 
take place in such a way without violating trade agreements, or other specific treaties.  
In light of this discussion, it is evident that the debate regarding Article 103 is 
far from settled, but there does seem to be some consensus that recommendations 
themselves are outside the scope of the provision. In any case, notwithstanding the 
(rather unconvincing) possibility of applying a wide interpretation of Article 103 to 
General Assembly recommendations, this author does not believe that there is enough 
evidence of State practice to determine sufficiently that these recommendations can 
provide a standalone legal basis for coercive economic measures. Firstly, as 
                                                 
196 R Kolb, “Does Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations Apply only to Decisions or Also to 
Authorizations Adopted by the Security Council?” (2004) 64 ZaöRV 21, available at: 
<http://www.zaoerv.de/64_2004/64_2004_1_a_21_36.pdf> (accessed 20/10/2017). 
197 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, (13 April 2006) 
UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, at para [331]; This position is also supported by Bernhardt: R Bernhardt, 
“Article 103”, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary  (Oxford: OUP, 2nd 
ed, 2002). 
198 Dawidowicz (n.186), at 377. 
199 Frowein and Krisch (n.192) at 729. 
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Dawidowicz interprets, the practice of the General Assembly seems to indicate its 
encouragement of the use of countermeasures, based on customary international law, 
rather than indicating a belief that it may ‘legalise’ such actions itself.200 Secondly, it 
is important to distinguish between the practice in support of the General Assembly to 
have the power to recommend or authorise force – thus granting permission to act in 
a way that would otherwise be contrary to a fundamental principle of the Charter , 
namely Article 2(4) – and practice suggesting it has the power to allow States to ignore 
their treaty obligations. While there may be evidence of the first, there does not seem 
to be a clear indication of the latter.  
Even if one were to leave this question open, there is also an issue that 
transpires when specifically considering coercive measures in the context of the 
responsibility to protect. In particular, the General Assembly’s power to recommend 
coercive measures is likely to be restricted to measures adopted in the pursuance of 
the maintenance of international peace and security.201 As highlighted in Chapter V, 
there may be instances where the use of non-forcible measures could aid the 
prevention of the relevant atrocity crimes, but the situation has not yet reached a 
threshold to be considered a threat to or breach of international peace and security. 202 
This could be where gross violations of human rights are occurring, or there are other 
breaches of obligations erga omnes that have not yet transformed into a threat to 
international peace and security. Similarly, at this point, the Security Council might 
not be considered to have failed in its responsibility to maintain international peace 
and security, but is certainly failing in its similar responsibility to protect. 
In such circumstances, the only feasible way in which the Assembly’s 
recommendations may be compatible with the principle of non-intervention is where 
they are based upon the law of countermeasures. This is because, while it might be 
clear that the General Assembly can take measures for the maintenance of peace, there 
is no evidence of a comparable power for the general promotion of human rights or 
other related purposes of the UN.  
 
 
 
                                                 
200 Dawidowicz (n.186), at 411-412, 417. 
201 See Section 1.2. 
202 See Chapter V, Section 2.3. 
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1.3.2.2 Countermeasures as a Legal Basis 
 
The law and requirements of countermeasures have been outlined in some detail in 
Chapter V. Recalling the ILC’s works on the Responsibility of Internationa l 
Organisations for Internationally Wrongful Acts,203 it is worth remembering that these 
Articles only address in detail the issue as to whether States or internationa l 
organisations may take countermeasures against another international organisation. 
In the commentaries accompanying the IO Articles,204 it is also worth remembering 
that the Commission pointed out in its commentary that the Articles refer to 
international law for the conditions concerning countermeasures taken against States 
by international organisation,205 and in this regard the ILC suggested that one may 
apply by analogy the conditions for countermeasures set out in the Articles on State 
Responsibility.206  
The Articles do, however, place some restrictions on the taking of 
countermeasures by international organisations in any case. For internationa l 
organisations, the ILC has been much more restrictive in its proposed Articles 
regarding countermeasures. The ILC recognises, in Article 22 of the IO Articles, that 
an international organisation may take countermeasures in certain circumstances. 
However, the Articles provide at the outset four important restrictions, namely: (i) that 
the substantive and procedural conditions required by international law are adhered 
to;207 (ii) that the countermeasures are not inconsistent with the rules of the 
organisation;208 (iii) that no appropriate means are available for otherwise inducing 
compliance with the obligations breached;209 and (iv) that countermeasures may not 
be taken by an international organisation in response to a breach of the rules of that 
organisation, unless so provided for by those rules.210  
                                                 
203 See, generally, UNGA Res 66/100, Responsibility of International Organisations, (9th December 
2011) UN Doc A/RES/66/100, Annex. 
204 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisation, with Commentaries’, 
available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf > 
(accessed 20/10/2017); also included in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Sixty-Third Session’, (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011) UN Doc A/66/10, from 69. 
205 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (Commentaries) (n.204), at 47, Article 
22 Commentary, para [2]. 
206 Ibid.  
207 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (n.203), Article 22(1) and Article 
22(2)(a). 
208 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (n.203), Article 22(2)(b). 
209 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (n.203), Article 22(2)(c). 
210 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (n.203), Article 22(3). 
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With regard to the General Assembly on these issues, point (ii) essentially 
means that the General Assembly may not use a breach of the UN Charter as a 
countermeasure, and therefore the competences and procedural requirements that the 
General Assembly is bound by still hold firm when utilising countermeasures. More 
notably, however, point (iv) suggests that the General Assembly may not take  
countermeasures against breaches of the UN Charter, unless the Charter itself so 
provides for such measures.  
In the context of the responsibility to protect, it was argued above that there 
certainly is support for the ability of States to take proportionate countermeasures in 
response to breaches of obligations erga omnes, such as systematic violations of 
human rights, or even the commission of the atrocity crimes themselves. As for such 
measures by an international organisation, the ILC did note just one possible example 
of countermeasures being utilised by an international organisation against a State.211 
However, if the General Assembly was simply recommending in its Resolutions that 
States take countermeasures themselves, the measures are not strictly being taken by 
the UN as an organisation, but by the States themselves. Whether a recommendation 
for States to do so has any implications for the responsibility of the UN itself is largely 
irrelevant considering the practice outlined above that suggests it is within the General 
Assembly’s power to do so. This also indicates that such recommendations are also 
within the restrictions of Article 22 of the IO Articles, even if they could be considered 
countermeasures in themselves. 
Thus, when making recommendations to take coercive economic measures, the 
General Assembly is well within its power to recommend the taking of non-injured 
State countermeasures. This does necessitate, however, that the procedural and 
substantive restrictions on these measures are adhered to by States – and it would 
certainly be reckless, if not illegal, for the General Assembly to make 
recommendations which do not also reflect these safeguards. In this sense, as outlined 
above, the measures recommended must above all be proportionate; their purpose 
must be to induce the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under 
international law, and in that sense be reversible; they must not involve the use of 
force, or affect obligations such as the protection of fundamental rights, and norms of 
                                                 
211 ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (Commentaries) (n.204), at 89, Article 
57 Commentary, para [2], footnote 338. 
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jus cogens; and, finally, the target of the countermeasures must be given an 
opportunity to comply with its obligations, and be notified of the decision to take such 
measures. 
One of the biggest fears surrounding the use of non-injured party 
countermeasures is the risk of abuse that comes with such a freedom. However, by 
utilising these measures through the recommendations of the General Assembly, not 
only does this provide an alternative basis for implementing the responsibility to 
protect beyond the Security Council, but it also provides an additional institutiona l 
safeguard that was so widely called for by those States initially hesitant to recognise 
the viability of these measures.212 Furthermore, it is convincing that the role of the 
General Assembly in this regard, representing almost the entire internationa l 
community of States, provides a further legitimising factor for the taking of these 
measures, and the harmonizing of the actions of the international community in 
pursuance of the responsibility to protect.213 
 
1.4 Conclusions on General Assembly Measures 
 
Within the United Nations, in the face of deadlock in the Security Council, and a 
failure for this organ to live up to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the organisation itself may still have the opportunity 
to live up to its primary purpose. The General Assembly can assume its residual 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and while it is 
not a replacement for the mechanism of the Security Council, it is still able to 
harmonise the actions of States in pursuance of coercive and forcible measures to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Admittedly there are still questions relating to the compatibility of 
recommendations generally with Article 103 of the Charter, and whether this indicates 
any substantive limitation on the legality to use force in pursuance of a 
recommendation by virtue of pre-existing treaty obligations. Unfortunately, a detailed 
analysis of this is issue is beyond the scope and capacity of this thesis. Nevertheless, 
restricting General Assembly recommendations to use coercive economic measures to 
                                                 
212 See Chapter V, Section 2.2; see also Dawidowicz (n.186), at 415-416, and 418. 
213 See again, Panel of Experts in the 1997 Report of the Secretary General on Economic Measures 
(n.184) at para [76(d)]. 
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the doctrine of countermeasures does provide a sound legal basis to continue. In this 
author’s view, there would be nothing too restrictive, given the scope and impact of 
these measures, that would render their use to implement a tertiary responsibility to 
protect as ineffective. The safeguards therein, it is submitted, seem very well balanced 
for these purposes. 
These methods demonstrate legal avenues to implement the responsibility to 
protect beyond the inaction or paralysis of the Security Council, especially in 
situations where mass atrocities also engage the responsibility to mainta in 
international peace and security. In light of this, and the arguments in previous 
Chapters, it is submitted that there is room within the United Nations for a tertiary 
responsibility to protect. Not only is this a continuation of the responsibility to protect 
as a political and moral doctrine, but where the maintenance of international peace and 
security is concerned may also be a continuation of the international community’s 
legal duty not to ignore situations which endanger international peace and security. 
Again, this does not require the use of the measures outlined herein, but simply that 
the international community must utilise the most appropriate means to prevent 
breaches of the peace, and the commission of atrocity crimes.  
 
2. The Tertiary Responsibility Beyond the UN 
 
Implementing a tertiary responsibility to protect beyond the Security Council may also 
involve measures adopted beyond the United Nations itself. This section will 
investigate the possibility of forcible and coercive measures being utilised by regiona l 
arrangements and States individually, on a unilateral basis, to prevent or suppress the 
commission of mass atrocity crimes. It is important to address the legality of action 
beyond the United Nations even though action may be legal through the General 
Assembly, simply because the rarity of action through the Assembly and the difficulty 
in achieving political consensus in this organ could well hamper any internationa l 
response to a crisis involving mass atrocities if the possibilities of action stopped there. 
Indeed, where it is evident that the Security Council is manifestly failing in its 
responsibility to protect, quick and legal action at a regional level could provide and 
effective preventive response prior to more international measures being adopted by 
the General Assembly. Therefore, it is helpful to identify measures that may be utilised 
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at the regional level so that an effective local response might be identified in the face 
of inaction and failure at the international level. 
It is argued herein that forcible measures by regional organisations are still 
restricted to being authorised by a competent body of the United Nations, but that there 
is the possibility of authorisation being granted after emergency action has been taken. 
This does, however, risk the action not being authorised ex post facto and remaining 
illegal. In terms of non-forcible measures, the doctrine of countermeasures provides a 
further legal basis for collective coercive action by regional bodies to implement their 
tertiary responsibility to protect. 
 
2.1 Regional Organisations and the Responsibility to Protect 
 
The place of regional organisations and their role in collective security has been 
debated in detail by a number of commentators.214 Indeed, there has also been 
discussion in recent years regarding the role of regional organisations in implementing 
the responsibility to protect, especially with regard to peaceful tools of prevention and 
assistance.215 
It is not the place of this thesis to repeat these debates, or to provide a detailed 
analysis of their roles of prevention and capacity building therein. Instead, it is 
important for us to briefly assess the role and powers of regional organisations in 
implementing a tertiary responsibility to protect beyond the United Nations , 
specifically investigating the use of force and other coercive measures for this purpose . 
In this regard, the argument for the existence of this tertiary responsibility is 
strengthened by demonstrating that there are legal avenues for regional organisat ions 
to implement the responsibility to protect in the face of deadlock in the UN Security 
Council. 
                                                 
214 See, for example, most recently, NI Diab, “Enforcement Action by Regional Organisations 
Revisited: The Prospective Joint Arab Forces”, (2017) 4(1) Journal on the Use of Force and 
International Law 86. 
215 See, generally, discussions of the role of regional organisations in: Report of the Secretary-General, 
The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 
(18th June 2011) UN Doc A/65/877–S/2011/393; Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility to 
Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, (25th July 2012) UN Doc A/66/874–S/2012/578, at [35]-[37];  
Report of the Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect, (13 July 2015) A/69/981–S/2015/500 at [57], [68]; Report of the Secretary-General, 
Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next Decade of the Responsibility to Protect , (22 July 2016) UN Doc 
A/70/999–S/2016/620, at [46], [59]. 
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Chapter VIII of the UN Charter clearly recognises a role for regiona l 
organisations and arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security, 
subject to the proviso in Article 53(1) that any enforcement action be authorised by 
the Security Council.216 By extension, in those situations where the responsibility for 
peace and security overlaps with the responsibility to protect, there is also a role for 
regional organisations in the prevention and suppression of mass atrocities.  
In the Agenda for Peace report, the Secretary-General recognised that regiona l 
organisations and arrangements could play a crucial role in efforts such as 
peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding and peacemaking.217 The report 
also noted that the end of the Cold War had ushered in a new era of opportunity for 
regional organisations to be utilised for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.218 This did, however, come with a significant limitation: 
 
But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements and agencies can render 
great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes 
and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, 
particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.219 
 
In his supplement to this report,220 the Secretary-General stressed the need for 
coordination between regional organisations and the United Nations in matters of 
peace and security,221 and clearly preferred the primacy of the United Nations above 
any unilateral action when it came to the use of enforcement measures.222 
In 2004, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change223 
considered regional organisations ‘a vital part of the multilateral system’.224 One of 
the Panel’s key recommendations in this regard was that “Authorization from the 
                                                 
216 This limitation will be addressed in detail in Section 2.3.3. 
217 See generally, Report of the Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping, (17 June 1992) UN Doc A/47/277—S/74111. 
218 Ibid, at [60]-[62]. 
219 Ibid, at [63]. 
220 Report of the Secretary-General, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the 
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nation s, (25 January 1995) 
UN Doc A/50/60—S/1995/1. 
221 See, ‘Supplement to An Agenda For Peace’ (n.220), at [81]-[96]. 
222 See, ‘Supplement to An Agenda For Peace’ (n.220), at [80], and [88]. 
223 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, (New York, UN Publications, 2004). 
224 High-Level Panel (n.223), at para [272]. 
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Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations,”225 thus 
keeping in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter. However, the 
recommendation goes on, “recognizing that in some urgent situations that 
authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced.”226 Indeed, in the 
context of the responsibility to protect, this possibility of ex post facto authorisat ion 
for regional enforcement action was endorsed by the original ICISS Report,227 and 
even cautiously cited by the Secretary-General in his very first report on the 
responsibility to protect.228 While there may be cautious political support for this 
practice, the legality of such action will be addressed below.229 
While regional organisations have a general ‘role’ to play in the maintenance 
of peace and protection of populations from mass atrocities, the actual responsibilities 
of these organisations are yet to be determined. Abass230 makes a proposal regarding 
the powers of regional organisations specifically in the situation where the Security 
Council and the General Assembly fail to discharge their responsibilities for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.231 He argues that in these 
circumstances, regional organisations should be able to act in defence of collective 
interests.232 Abass bases this argument upon a theory of social contracts233 whereby, 
in domestic settings, the people are assumed to have entered into a social contract with 
the sovereign, with the sovereign acting by virtue of the consent of the subjects which 
places certain constraints on the exercise of power.234 Where the sovereign fails in its 
responsibilities to the people, the argument goes, the legal powers revert back to the 
people.235 Abass argues that the conferral of authority to the Security Council by States 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, by analogy to this social 
                                                 
225 High-Level Panel (n.223), at para [86] and [272]. 
226 Ibid. 
227 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), at [6.5] and [6.35]. 
228 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect , (12th January 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/677, at para [58]. 
229 See Section 2.3.3. 
230 A Abass, Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond Chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter (Hart, 2004). 
231 Abass (n.230), at 135. 
232 Abass (n.230), at 135. 
233 While social contract theory is beyond the scope of this thesis, Abass’ argument draws upon the 
works of philosophers such as: T Hobbes, Leviathan (London, Collins, 1651, republished 1962); J Loke, 
Two Treatises of Civil Government (London, Everyman, 1690, republished 1924); M Tebbit, 
Philosophy of Law: An Introduction (London, Routledge, 2000); J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford , 
OUP, 1972); and D Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London, Fontana, 1972). 
234 Abass (n.230), at 131-133. 
235 Abass (n.230), at 131-133, and 135. 
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contract theory, suggests that States themselves can assume authority for the 
maintenance of peace and security where the Security Council has failed, and thus act 
through regional organisations for the defence of collective interests.236 The current 
author does not necessarily accept or adopt the social contract theory, and the 
argument that the legal powers of the Security Council can be assumed by States or 
regional organisations itself is also not convincing. There seems no evidence of an 
accepted doctrine whereby such a transfer of power would take place upon the failure 
of the Security Council. 
On the other hand, when addressing responsibility only, the underlying 
philosophy of Abass’ argument does however provide a convincing basis for the 
premise that the legal responsibilities of the Security Council are assumed by States 
where the Security Council fails to uphold them. In this respect, it is convincing to 
suggest that the responsibilities of the Security Council may revert to States when 
there is a failure to maintain peace and security, or indeed a failure to protect in the 
context of the responsibility to protect. This follows, and is compatible with, the 
recognised ‘residual’ responsibility of the General Assembly, as discussed above. To 
continue this ‘residual’ responsibility to States as members of the internationa l 
community in general seems the next logical step in this ‘doctrine’ of responsibilit ies.  
Therefore, while we may accept the roles and responsibilities of regiona l 
organisations, the fundamental protections of Article 2(4) and non-intervention cannot 
be ignored. To truly determine whether the responsibility to protect continues beyond 
UN inaction to regional organisations, there must also be an ability to act upon it. We 
shall apply the findings of Chapter IV relating to the prohibition of force and Chapter 
V on the use of non-forcible measures to the question of implementing the tertiary 
responsibility to protect. 
 
2.2 Forcible Measures 
 
It was previously explained in Chapter IV that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter clearly 
prohibits unilateral uses of force, such as humanitarian intervention, because they are 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter and find no basis in contemporary 
international law. Therefore, there does not seem to be much leeway for actions by 
                                                 
236 Abass (n.230), at 132-134, and 135. 
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regional organisations that may be set up for maintaining regional peace and security. 
Nevertheless, there are a few plausible arguments in favour of regional enforcement 
mechanisms being consistent with these fundamental rules, and it is in light of these  
arguments that we shall investigate whether such organisations have any legal basis to 
utilise forcible measures in this context. This author argues that there is no legal basis 
for regional mechanisms to take unilateral military measures without UN approval, 
but notes the contentious possibility of this approval being granted after emergency 
action has begun. 
 
2.2.1 Regional Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
The legality of regional enforcement mechanisms, and their compatibility with the UN 
Charter, becomes particularly contentious when an organisation is set up with explicit 
security powers that seem to allow intervention in a Member State. The most 
prominent example of this is in the African Union. The Constitutive Act of the African 
Union237 provides an unprecedented right to intervene in a Member State under Article 
4(h), where it provides as a principle of the AU: 
 
the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity. 
 
Additionally, a 2003 amendment to this provision, which has not yet entered into 
force, included intervention in circumstances of ‘a serious threat to legitimate order to 
restore peace and stability.’238 Since Article 4(h) allows intervention in response to 
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, there is clearly a close relationship 
between this provision and the responsibility to protect. 
                                                 
237 Constitutive Act of the African Union, (adopted 11th July 2000, entered into force on 26th May 2001) 
2158 UNTS 3 [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act]. 
238 Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union 2003, (Adopted by the 1st 
Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 3 February 2003; and 
by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo, Mozambique on 11 July 2003) 
available at: 
<http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_AMENDMENTS_CONSTITUTIVE_ACT_O
F_THE_AFRICAN_UNION.pdf > (accessed 20/10/2017). For the current status of the Protocol, see 
OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters at: <http://www.au.int/en/treaties> (accessed 
20/10/2017). 
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Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Treaty239 enables the organisation to institutionalise mechanisms for the maintenance 
of peace and security in the region.240 In 1999, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol 
establishing a mechanism for conflict prevention and security241 which contained 
powers of intervention in humanitarian crises. The Protocol established the Mediation 
and Security Council,242 which was granted the power under Article 10(2)(c) to 
“authorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of 
political and military missions”. The Protocol also established that the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) would also assist the Mediation and Security 
Council,243 and was charged with the mission of “humanitarian intervention in support 
of humanitarian disaster.”244 Considering these mechanisms, Abass suggests that there 
is a “gradual but steady movement of regional organisations towards a more 
autonomous regime of collective security” and that this “can no longer be denied in 
legal analysis.”245 
At first glance, both mechanisms seem at odds with the requirement of Security 
Council authorisation under Article 53(1) of the UN Charter, and perhaps even the 
prohibition of force under Article 2(4). By allowing action beyond the United Nations, 
it could be said that these provisions are incompatible with these obligations under the 
Charter, and therefore the Charter obligations must prevail in accordance with Article 
103. However, this would assume that these provisions are to be interpreted as 
allowing such unilateral intervention. As we shall now investigate, there may be 
interpretations of these mechanisms that render them compatible with the Charter, and 
therefore still valid. 
Another argument in favour of these mechanisms’ validity is to suggest that 
they represent a valid form of treaty-based consent to the interventions that they 
purport to allow. In this regard, Abass argues: 
                                                 
239 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (adopted 24 July 
1993, entered into force 23 August 1995) 2373 UNTS 233. 
240 Ibid, Article 58. 
241 ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping and Security (Lome, 10 December 1999) Doc A/P.1/12/99, reprinted in (2005) 5(2) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 231-259. 
242 ECOWAS 1999 Protocol (n.241), Article 8. 
243 ECOWAS 1999 Protocol (n.241), Article 17. 
244 ECOWAS 1999 Protocol (n.241), Article 22(c). 
245 Abass (n.230), at 176; for further analysis of the ECOWAS mechanism in particular, see: A Abass, 
“The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems”, (2000) 5(2) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 211. 
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The validity of transforming host state consent into a treaty obligation derives, not 
only from the existence of affirmative state practice to that effect, but largely from the 
fact that states made a conscious choice to change the status of the principle from a 
soft law obligation into treaty law.246 
 
The difficulty with this assertion is that Article 2(4), the prohibition of force, is 
considered jus cogens and therefore, as discussed in Chapter IV, any treaty-based 
derogation from this would be void in accordance with Article 53 of the VCLT. This 
raises two issues to be addressed: firstly, whether such treaty-based consent could be 
compatible with Article 2(4), so as not to constitute a prohibited derogation; and, 
secondly, what effect such treaty-based consent has on the scope of the prohibition of 
force. A further, related issue, is the compatibility of these mechanisms with the 
separate requirement of Security Council authorisation under Article 53(1) of the 
Charter. 
 
2.2.2 Compatibility with Article 2(4) 
 
In the specific context of the use of force by regional organisations, Abass interprets 
Article 2(4) in such a way that only ‘aggression’ is considered jus cogens, and thus 
leaving room for non-aggressive elements of Article 2(4) to be contracted out by State 
consent.247 This, accordingly, would explain the ability of regional arrangements to 
use force and be compatible with Article 2(4).248 
However, the position of the current author, as outlined in Chapter IV, is that 
Article 2(4) as a whole is considered jus cogens, but this does not mean that consent 
(whether treaty-based or otherwise) does not have a place in determining the scope of 
Article 2(4). For example, consent can determine the extent to which territoria l 
integrity and political independence protect the State. However, consent cannot 
derogate from or contract out of the provision prohibiting force ‘in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’. Therefore, consent – based upon 
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248 Abass (n.230) at 201-208. 
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treaty or otherwise – cannot grant a use of force that would be inconsistent with 
Purposes of the United Nations. 
The question to be addressed here is therefore whether the use of force by a 
regional security arrangement, pursued in accordance with a treaty-based consent, is 
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
 
2.2.2.1 Territorial Integrity and Political Independence 
 
As above, for any use of force by regional organisations to be consistent with Article 
2(4), it must first not violate the principles of territorial integrity and politica l 
independence. The relevant question here, to determine whether there are any inherent 
qualifications of these principles in these circumstances, is whether the relevant 
regional treaty provides a legal basis for such a use of force. In other words, does the 
relevant treaty provide a treaty-based consent that inherently limits the existing 
territorial integrity and political independence of the State concerned? Of course, as 
will be recalled from Chapter IV, this does not mean that the relevant treaty may 
provide for the forcible change of territorial boundaries or even imposing a new 
political regime – these specific aspects of territorial integrity and politica l 
independence seem to have a character at least similar to jus cogens when it comes to 
the use of forcible measures. 
 
2.2.2.2 Consistency with the Purposes of the United Nations 
 
The use of force inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations includes any 
unilateral measure that is not authorised by a competent organ of the United 
Nations.249 This is because such unilateral action, beyond the UN, is not considered 
an ‘effective collective measure’ in accordance with Article 1(1), and also does not 
harmonise the actions of nations in accordance with Article 1(4). Therefore, for any 
treaty-based form of intervention in a regional arrangement to be compatible with 
Article 2(4), it must be capable of being interpreted in a way that provides for the 
primacy of the United Nations.  
                                                 
249 See Chapter IV, Section 3.3. 
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Although the AU Constitutive Act, and the ECOWAS Protocol, do not 
explicitly provide for the authorisation of the UN in their procedure, it does not seem 
proportionate to invalidate these treaties simply on the basis that this is missing.  
Indeed, it is perfectly possible for this procedure to still be adhered to even though it 
is not specifically provided for. So long as, in practice, the primacy of the UN security 
mechanism is provided for, such provisions might be considered consistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. The question as to when such an authorisation might 
be provided is a separate matter, as shall now be discussed. 
 
2.2.3 Compatibility with Article 53(1) 
 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, while recognising the role of regional organisat ions 
in the maintenance of international peace and security, keeps some control over their 
actions when it comes to enforcement action. For example, Article 52(1), while 
providing for the existence and role of regional organisations or arrangements in this 
regard, restricts their activities to being “consistent with the Purposes and Principles 
of the United Nations.” Furthermore, Article 53(1) states: 
 
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or 
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall 
be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the 
authorization of the Security Council … 
 
It seems clear that the use of force by a regional organisation would be considered 
‘enforcement action’ within the meaning of this provision. Importantly, however, 
Article 53(1) only prohibits enforcement action being taken without the authorisat ion 
of the Security Council – not necessarily prohibiting the existence of the provisions 
such as Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. To be compatible with this obligat ion 
under the UN Charter, the regional arrangements must at least leave room for, and be 
compatible with, the authority of the Security Council.  
A question that has developed from practice is whether the Security Council’s 
authorisation must come before the relevant action is taken or whether it can be 
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granted after the fact.250 In the context of the responsibility to protect, this would 
perhaps be arguable in circumstances where an emergency local response is necessary 
to prevent atrocities, but it would take too long to gain approval from the Security 
Council. Such an interpretation would mirror what is allowed for self-defence in 
Article 51, where the State is free to take forcible action until the Security Council 
steps in.  
In the AU’s Ezulwini Consensus,251 the Members of the AU declared their 
willingness as a Regional Organisation to be bound by the authority of the UN Security 
Council, but also made clear that the AU was willing to act in circumstances requiring 
urgent action and achieve the requisite authority from the Security Council after the 
fact.252 
In the ECOWAS 1999 Protocol, Article 52(3) provides: 
 
In accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS 
shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of 
the objectives of this Mechanism.253 
 
This provision only requires that ECOWAS shall ‘inform’ the United Nations of a 
military intervention, rather than seeking authorisation for it. This is certainly 
consistent with Article 54 of the UN Charter, which requires that “The Security 
Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in 
contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” Again, just because the mechanism 
itself does not explicitly provide for the Security Council authorisation in accordance 
with Article 53(1), does not mean that it cannot be adhered to in practice. 
However, interviews with officials conducted by Ademola Abass certainly 
reveal some fundamental understandings in this regard. Abass details an interview 
                                                 
250 See above, n.227 and accompanying discussion. 
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with the former Director of the Peace and Security department of the AU,254 where the 
Director suggested that the AU would not always seek an authorisation from the 
Security Council prior to an enforcement action. The Director stated that the AU was 
“not an arm of the United Nations. We accept the UN’s global authority, but we will 
not wait for the UN to authorise an action that we intend to take.”255 Most revealing 
of all, the Director went on to state: “we are in a tacit agreement with the United 
Nations on this and there is an understanding to that effect.”256 Abass also suggests 
that the Director of the ECOWAS Legal Department also gave a similar answer to a 
similar question in 2000.257 Of course, it is not clear from these statements alone 
whether such ‘tacit agreements’ still exist, or whether these views are shared among 
States to evidence a subsequent agreement or practice relating to the interpretation of 
Article 53(1) of the Charter. 
The origins of the possibility of ex post facto authorisations seem to come from 
the actions of ECOWAS itself.  Of note, having captured the broad attention of 
academic commentators, are the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leonne 
in the 1990s.  
In 1989, Charles Taylor led an uprising and insurgency against President Doe 
of Liberia, leading the ‘National Patriotic Front of Liberia’ (NPFL) into Liberia from 
Côte d’Ivoire.258 Taking control of up to 90% of Liberian territory by mid-1990, the 
rebel forces made an advance towards the capital of Monrovia. The UN Security 
Council did not immediately respond to this situation, despite the Government seeking 
support from the UN. As a result, in August 1990 ECOWAS called on the warring 
factions to observe a ceasefire259 and established its Cease-fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG)260 with powers to conduct military operations “for the purpose of 
                                                 
254 Ambassador Sam Ibok, interview conducted on 2 February 2004 by Ademola Abass, detailed in 
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255 Ibid. 
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Monitoring the ceasefire, restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions 
for free and fair elections”.261 
ECOMOG, although cited in official documents as a peacekeeping force, 
managed to secure Monrovia and aided the installation of an interim government under 
President Sawyer. ECOWAS secured the agreement of all warring factions to a 
ceasefire on 28th November 1990, where all parties also agreed that the ceasefire was 
to be monitored by ECOMOG.262 This was formalised in a ceasefire agreement in 
February 1991.263 This ceasefire largely held until August 1992, when fighting erupted 
again. This prompted ECOMOG to once again defend Monrovia, this time also 
capturing territory from the NPFL forces.264 
Although seemingly a ‘peacekeeping force’, doubts arise given its supposedly 
loose interpretation of its mandate, its clear preference for one side of the conflict, and 
the fact that some of its actions were more akin to peace enforcement than 
peacekeeping.265 As Gray points out, not all the warring factions initially consented to 
the presence of ECOMOG, as is usually expected for peacekeeping missions.266 Abass 
suggests that ECOMOG was intended to be an enforcement operation from the 
outset,267 and cites the “all-out military action” taken by ECOMOG to prevent the 
capture of Monrovia following the death of President Doe as evidence of this.268 
Notwithstanding this ‘quasi-enforcement’ role, the legal basis for ECOMOG’s 
actions is also widely disputed. Some authors suggest that President Doe consented to 
the operation,269 and therefore the ECOMOG mission was an intervention by 
invitation which does not require any prior authorisation by the UN Security 
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Council.270 However, others question the validity of this consent, arguing that Doe did 
not have effective control over most of Liberia at the time.271 
De Wet and Nolte suggest that there seems to be no official record of President 
Doe’s invitation, but acknowledge that this was widely reported by news media at the 
time.272 In fact, the ECOWAS Official Journal includes the letter containing Doe’s 
invitation,273 in which he called for ECOWAS to “take note of [his] personal concerns 
and the collective wishes of the people of Liberia, and to assist in finding a constitut ion 
and reasonable solution to the crisis in our country as early as possible.”274 Doe also 
suggested that it was “time to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-keeping Force into 
Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension and to assure a peaceful transitiona l 
environment.”275 
Walter argues that this invitation by President Doe is not very explicit, that it 
does not clearly demand an intervention, and that ECOWAS did not invoke the letter 
as a justification for its actions.276 Similarly, Abass argues that such an invitation 
would have been superfluous because ECOWAS had apparently already assumed 
competence to intervene without this invitation.277  Frank goes further to suggest that 
the ECOWAS force was not the force that Doe requested, and so reflected an 
intervention that would have to be authorised under Article 53(1) of the Charter.278 
It is perhaps a stretch in logic to suggest that the ECOWAS action could not 
be based on this invitation because it was not explicitly invoked. Still, there can be no 
doubt that ECOMOG’s monitoring role was accepted by all the warring parties via the 
November 1990 joint declaration,279 and the February 1991 ceasefire agreement. The 
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question therefore is whether its intervention prior to this was based upon an invitat ion 
or not. Evidently, this issue remains a point of contention. 
In any case, we must also address the arguments in favour of this practice as a 
precedent for the ability of the Security Council to authorise such action after the fact. 
ECOWAS called upon the UN Security Council to support its humanitarian and 
political action as early as August 1990.280 Those who do support this intervention as 
a precedent indicating the viability of ex post facto authorisation argue that the 
Security Council’s subsequent Resolutions commending ECOWAS are sufficient to 
establish such a subsequent authorisation.281 Indeed, the Security Council did 
eventually become involved in the situation, and passed Resolutions which, among 
other things, commended ECOWAS “for its efforts to restore peace, security, and 
stability in Liberia”,282 and welcomed the continued commitment of ECOWAS “to 
and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict.”283 The Council 
did not explicitly authorise ECOWAS to take enforcement action, merely ‘recalling’ 
Chapter VIII of the Charter in the preamble to its Resolution,284 and citing Chapter 
VII only specifically in the context of establishing an arms embargo.285 
Indeed, these Resolutions are quite vague. De Wet argues that the language is 
broad and vague enough to apply only to those aspects of intervention that constituted 
classic peacekeeping.286 Nevertheless, the persistence of advocates of ex post facto 
authorisation argue that the Security Council’s subsequent legal ‘sanitisation’ of such 
interventions may well be implicit in their general approval or commendations of these 
missions.287 
The ECOWAS mission in Sierra Leone is also cited in favour of such a 
practice. The crisis in Sierra Leone erupted in May 1997 when a coup d’état overthrew 
the established government. ECOMOG forces were already present in the country to 
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287 See Frank (n.278) at 156; Walter (n.271), at 180-185; see also a discussion of this issue by J Bröjmer 
and G Ress, “Article 53” in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford : 
OUP, 2nd ed, 2002), at 865-866. 
273 
 
monitor the overspill of the ongoing Liberian conflict, and Nigeria and Guinea sent 
further troops into Sierra Leonne in response to this coup – claiming to be acting as 
ECOMOG forces.288 
In a Meeting of Foreign Ministers in June 1997,289 ECOWAS Ministers agreed 
that: 
 
… no country should grant recognition to the regime that emerged following the coup 
d'état of 25 May 1997, and to work towards the reinstatement of the legitimate 
government by a combination of three measures, namely, dialogue, imposition of 
sanctions and enforcement of an embargo and the use of force.290 
 
In August 1997, ECOWAS formally extended the mandate of ECOMOG to Sierra 
Leone to monitor and supervise all ceasefire violations, and enforce a sanctions regime 
and embargo.291 Abass again noted that ECOMOG’s action in Sierra Leonne 
commenced undisguised as enforcement action rather than peacekeeping.292  
Eventually, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1132 (1997)293 in 
October 1997, which authorised the enforcement of an arms and oil embargo by 
ECOMOG, but did not explicitly authorise any other use for force or enforcement 
action.294 De Wet notes that ECOMOG’s enforcement action extended beyond its 
mandate, and was not authorised by the Security Council.295  
On this point, Gray notes that in its reports to the Security Council, ECOMOG 
was careful to claim only to be acting in self-defence.296 Most notably, when 
ECOMOG made its final military push to overthrow the junta, ECOMOG claimed that 
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this was as a direct result of unprovoked attacks against it,  297 and referred to 
‘international rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations’.298  
Once again, some argue that ECOMOG was invited by the overthrown 
Government to intervene in the State,299 although this is also contested.300 And so, it 
is difficult to determine without further investigation whether ECOMOG’s action in 
Sierra Leonne was truly enforcement, or simply intervention by invitation.  
Like the situation in Liberia, the Security Council did commend ECOMOG on 
its role “in support of the objectives related to the restoration of peace and security”. 301 
But these were similarly vague and not sufficiently precise enough to be convinc ing 
‘authorisations’ of ECOMOG’s earlier military actions, even if they can be interpreted 
to indicate support for them.302 
Based on this analysis, it does not seem that ECOWAS’ actions in Liberia and 
Sierra Leonne provide sufficiently unambiguous evidence of a practice that indicates 
the interpretation of Article 53(1) of the Charter. Nevertheless, considering the issue 
more generally, there are a few conceptual arguments worth addressing. 
For example, when addressing the possibility of regional organisations taking 
emergency action to implement the responsibility to protect, the ICISS noted that a 
strict interpretation of Article 53(1) requires enforcement by regional organisat ions 
always to be subject to prior Security Council authorisation.303 On the other hand, 
Walter argues that the wording of Article 53(1) does not seem to exclude the 
possibility that an authorisation can be given after the fact.304 Instead, the reasons 
against such an interpretation seem to be based upon concerns about the Security 
Council’s control over such operations, fettering the discretion of the Council in this 
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regard and the centralised use of force that is purportedly inherent in the Charter 
system.305 
Akehurst suggests that such a practice would encourage illegal acts.306 
Moreover, De We suggests that this interpretation would negate the fact that the 
Security Council may be deliberately refraining from action, arguing that this would 
turn the Charter system on its head and force the Security Council to explain why it 
was not adopting military measures.307 This, she argues, is the opposite of what was 
envisaged for the Charter whereby the Council should have the freedom to ‘opt-in’ to 
its choice of enforcement measures rather than ‘opt-out’ of those already being 
taken.308 
Of course, the Council does have the freedom to choose whether to employ 
enforcement measures. But, as addressed earlier in Chapter III, it does not have the 
freedom to ignore a situation altogether, and its lack of action in this regard may well 
be taken into account when determining whether it has failed in its responsibilit ies 
under the Charter, and its responsibility to protect.309 Furthermore, should a regiona l 
organisation decide to take enforcement action that is deemed inappropriate, or is 
conducted with duplicitous intentions, the Security Council is well within its powers 
to either condemn such action, or to decide not to authorise it ex post facto.310 This 
would simply mean that the regional action remains illegal as both a breach of Article 
53(1) and Article 2(4).311 In this situation, the risk is really on the regional organisation 
taking action without authorisation – if the Security Council does not authorise its 
intervention after the fact, its actions will remain illegal and it will still be liable in 
international law for this violation.312 
Regarding the worries that such an emergency response could be abused by 
regional organisations, analogies may be drawn to the ‘emergency response’ permitted 
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under self-defence in Article 51 of the Charter.313 Indeed, concerns about the abuse of 
an emergency response by regional organisations (which is still to be authorised in any 
case) might be compared to the possibility of the right to self-defence itself being 
abused by States. Such abuses are the responsibility of the Security Council to monitor 
in any case, and arguments suggesting that these abuses might be used by Permanent 
Members of the Security Council to their political advantage314 perhaps reveal more 
problems with the law of the Security Council itself rather than the dangers of allowing 
ex post facto authorisations. Indeed, some authors suggest that the risk of abuse by 
regional organisations is alleviated by their institutional and collective safeguards.315 
Finally, commentators have also acknowledged the novel possibility of the 
Security Council adopting a general authorisation to regional organisations that might 
permit future emergency responses before the Council itself is able to take up the 
matter.316 Such an authorisation could, for example, take the form of a carefully 
drafted Resolution which permits emergency action in very limited circumstances 
until the Security Council acts. This solution could prescribe safeguards and 
principles, and does seem to provide a suitable middle ground between relying on a 
regional organisations own safeguards and standards against the abuse of an ex post 
facto method, and harmonising international standards for emergency local responses 
to humanitarian crises.317 Although such a solution might be unlikely in the current 
political climate, it would certainly offer a legal alternative to the status quo. 
One final issue with Article 53(1) and the use of force is whether this provision 
means that enforcement action can be authorised via a recommendation of the General 
Assembly, rather than the Security Council. The problem here is that Article 53(1) 
only refers to the Security Council making the requisite authorisation. However, if one 
accepts the practice of States interpreting the General Assembly’s powers as includ ing 
the ability to recommend enforcement action, as established above, it is not too much 
of a stretch to also imply that this practice necessitates an interpretation of Article 
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53(1) that allows regional organisations to act upon such recommendations. The 
necessary implication here would be to interpret Article 53(1) as requiring 
authorisation by the Security Council, only where such authorisation is possible – i.e. 
when the Security Council has not failed in its responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and the General Assembly has not assumed its 
residual responsibilities in this regard.  
This would not mean that upon Security Council failure that regiona l 
organisations no longer must seek authorisation from the UN. For their actions to 
remain compatible with Article 2(4), and the requirement of action being consistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations, such authorisation is still necessary to render 
any use of force consistent with these Purposes.318 In other words, Article 52(1) may 
be interpreted to be contingent on the Security Council’s ability to authorise action, 
and therefore its responsibilities under the Charter, but Article 2(4) is not.  
 
2.2.4 Conclusions on Forcible Measures by Regional Organisations 
 
Generally, any use of force by a regional organisation, without the authorisation of the 
Security Council, would fall foul of the prohibition of force in Article 2(4) and the 
separate requirement under Article 53(1) that no enforcement action shall be 
undertaken without such authorisation. Regional mechanisms that provide for ‘rights’ 
or ‘powers’ in treaty law for intervention are not necessarily void due to their potential 
derogation from the jus cogens prohibition of force, so long as they remain consistent 
with the Purposes of the UN by ensuring that any intervention undertaken in 
accordance with such provisions is authorised by a competent organ of the United 
Nations. 
Arguments in favour of a ‘right’ to use force and then seek ex post facto 
authorisation currently do not have convincing State practice to support such an 
ability. However, it is certainly possible for the Security Council to do this. The only 
problem is that any regional enforcement action undertaken prior to such authorisat ion 
will remain illegal until the Council authorises such action, if ever. 
Fitting this into the tertiary responsibility to protect, this issue would be 
rendered moot in any case. This is because the tertiary responsibility only applies when 
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the Security Council is paralysed or deadlocked, and has failed in its responsibilit ies 
under the Charter. The next stage in the responsibility is then to seek action through 
the General Assembly – and, as highlighted above, this itself may come with politica l 
inaction. Where both UN organs fail to act, the use of force by a regional organisat ion 
cannot be authorised, and would therefore be illegal. Emergency action that is taken 
in this regard might well be seen as legitimate or necessary in some limited situations, 
but it will remain illegal, and it is a risk for the organisation in question to gamble on 
the hope that the Security Council might resume its responsibilities in response to such 
action. 
This author does not believe that any legitimacy or necessity of such 
emergency action can justify an illegal use of force. To implement the responsibility 
to protect with illegal action not only taints the credibility of the concept, but also 
provides fuel for those who are willing to turn a blind eye and maintain deadlock or 
paralysis to criticise necessary action as hypocritical or having hidden agendas. If the 
responsibility to protect is to be implemented beyond the Security Council, it must be 
done so in a way that does not fundamentally undermine the concept itself. If illega l ity 
implies inaction in such circumstances, one solution is to change the law itself. Given 
that this is a monumental task and unlikely in the foreseeable future, the alternat ive 
would be to consider another approach. Non-forcible measures may well provide such 
an avenue. 
 
2.3 Non-Forcible Coercive Measures 
2.3.1 Regional ‘Sanctions’ Regimes 
 
The ability of regional organisations or arrangements to utilise non-forcible coercive 
measures and ‘sanctions’ falls largely into two categories. Firstly, there are regiona l 
organisations where their constitutive treaties allow the imposition of these measures 
against their Member States. The logic here is that the Member States consent, via the 
treaty, to the possibility that sanctions be imposed against them – just as would be the 
case with Article 41 of the UN Charter.  
Article 22(d) of the ECOWAS 1999 Protocol,319 for example, charges 
ECOMOG with the enforcement of sanctions and embargoes. Similarly, the AU 
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Constitutive Act provides for the imposition of sanctions in Article 23, with Article 
23(2) specifically providing that “any Member State that fails to comply with the 
decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the 
denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other 
measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly.” 
The main issue that may arise here is whether the imposition of such measures 
could be considered ‘enforcement action’ for the purpose of Article 53(1) of the 
Charter, thus requiring Security Council authorisation for them to be imposed legally. 
This will be addressed below. 
The second category includes regional organisations where the founding treaty 
provides for the power to take economic or coercive measures against non-Member 
States. The European Union’s powers to implement measures under the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)320 is a very clear example of this. For example, 
Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)321 
provides for the imposition of restrictive measures which include “the interruption or 
reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more 
third countries” following the adoption of a decision to take such measures under the 
provisions of the CFSP in Chapter 2 of Title V, TEU. 
Such provisions are clearly designed to render the measures compatible with 
the internal rules of the organisation – for example, it would allow derogation from 
certain trade rules for the European Union, enabling certain goods to be subject to 
restriction where this might not otherwise be allowed.322 The issue here is that these 
treaties cannot logically bind external States, and so any incompatibility of these 
measures with either non-intervention or other obligations in international law must 
be based upon a principle of general international law. In this case, as addressed in 
Chapter V, this would be the doctrine of countermeasures. 
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2.3.2 Compatibility with Non-Intervention / Countermeasures 
 
The adoption of coercive measures by regional organisations against non-Member 
States would require legal justification where these measures go beyond retorsion. For 
example, as addressed in Chapter V, where trade restrictions or embargoes fall foul of 
World Trade Organization rules and cannot be justified under the security exceptions 
therein.323 
Generally, the doctrine of countermeasures could provide a legal basis for such 
action, allowing States or regional organisations to disregard certain internationa l 
obligations as a countermeasure against another prior breach of an internationa l 
obligation by the target State. The requirements of the doctrine of countermeasures 
have been covered in some detail in Chapter V, and so will not be repeated in detail 
here, but we shall apply these requirements to this tertiary responsibility to protect by 
regional organisations. 
 In the context of the responsibility to protect, it was argued in Chapter V that 
the commission of atrocity crimes automatically reach the threshold of a ‘serious’ 
violation of an erga omnes obligation for the purpose of non-injured party 
countermeasures.324 In this regard, this author argued that non-injured party 
countermeasures are permissible where atrocity crimes are occurring, or there are 
serious and widespread violations of human rights as a ‘precursor’ to such atrocities 
occurring. When it comes to the prevention of the atrocities associated with the 
responsibility to protect, because countermeasures are only available in response to a 
breach of an international obligation, utilising such measures to prevent atrocities 
would be restricted to proportionate measures in response to violations of erga omnes 
obligations that have not yet amounted to actual atrocity crimes – hence the association 
with serious human rights abuses. 
Again, although this seems to provide a limited response when it comes to 
prevention, rather than suppression, in any event it would be less likely (although not 
impossible) that the Security Council had failed in its secondary responsibility to 
protect if atrocity crimes were not yet occurring. When assessing the implementat ion 
of the tertiary responsibility to protect, following failure and deadlock, the situation is 
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likely to be much more imminent, and so regional organisations would likely be able 
to respond to violations of international law and erga omnes that had not yet occurred 
when the Security Council was seized of the matter. 
As noted with regard to the taking of these measures by the General Assembly, 
the taking of countermeasures by a regional organisation also comes with additiona l 
safeguards. Briefly, the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of Internationa l 
Organisations for Internationally Wrongful Acts325 require: (i) that the substantive and 
procedural conditions required by international law are adhered to;326 (ii) that the 
countermeasures are not inconsistent with the rules of the organisation;327 (iii) that no 
appropriate means are available for otherwise inducing compliance with the 
obligations breached;328 and (iv) that countermeasures may not be taken by an 
international organisation in response to a breach of the rules of that organisat ion, 
unless so provided for by those rules.329 Just as point (ii) essentially meant that the 
General Assembly may not use a breach of the UN Charter as a countermeasure, 
regional organisations are equally restricted as regards their founding treaties. 
As will be recalled, the substantive and procedural conditions in point (i), as 
outlined above, include: proportionality, reversibility, compatibility with fundamenta l 
norms and jus cogens, and the opportunity of the target State to be notified of such 
measures and comply with its obligations. 
Finally, in terms of the risks of abuse surrounding non-injured party 
countermeasures, acting through regional organisations arguably also provides 
another institutional safeguard.330 Although not as harmonizing as the General 
Assembly or the Security Council, it would certainly add to the legitimacy of the 
action, especially if conducted by a regional organisation within its own region. 
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2.3.3 Compatibility with Article 53(1) 
 
The only contentious issue left to be addressed in this regard is whether the taking of 
such countermeasures by a regional organisation could be considered ‘enforcement 
action’ for the purposes of Article 53(1) of the Charter, and therefore require 
authorisation by the Security Council. This issue was debated by States in the 1960s. 
Firstly, the Organisation of American States (OAS) imposed sanctions against 
the Dominican Republic in response to certain interventions and interferences within 
Venezuela.331 Walter makes note of events in the Security Council at this time, 
whereby the Soviet Union put forward a draft resolution seeking to ‘authorise’ these 
sanctions under Article 53 ex post facto, apparently attempting to create a precedent 
requiring non-military measures by regional organisations to be authorised under 
Chapter VIII, thus defining them as ‘enforcement action’.332 Indeed, this did spark 
some debate in the Security Council on the scope of Article 53, with the USSR making 
comparisons to the measures available to the Council itself under Article 41, and the 
US and other States rejecting such arguments.333 The USSR draft was ultimate ly 
rejected, and a US draft which simply ‘took note’ of the OAS measures was adopted 
instead.334 
In October 1962, President John F Kennedy announced that he would impose 
a naval quarantine on Cuba to compel the removal of Soviet missiles from the 
country.335 At the same time, the OAS issued a Resolution336 recommending that 
members:  
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take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force, 
which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot 
continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet Powers military material and related supplies 
which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles 
in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace 
and security of the Continent.337 
  
This action seems much more robust than the Dominican Republic example,  
nevertheless it is considered by some as an instance of action which does not fall 
within the purview of ‘enforcement action’ under Article 53(1).338 In fact, the OAS 
did take other economic measures against Cuba in January 1962, but this was based 
upon the State’s communist ideology, which the OAS States viewed as inconsistent 
with their principles, and its support for ‘subversive activities’ within Venezuela.339 
Bröjmer and Ress suggest that these instances in the 1960s indicate a 
conclusive interpretation of Article 53 as not including sanctions as ‘enforcement’ 
measures.340 While the Cuban Missile Crisis is perhaps not as conclusive for this,341 
the discussions in the Security Council following the OAS sanctions against the 
Dominican Republic are certainly more convincing.  
In any case, since the OAS measures of the 1960s, as O’Connell notes, 
“Economic sanctions have been imposed often enough by individual states and 
organizations without prior Security Council authorization to suggest that the term 
‘enforcement’ no longer encompasses these cases.”342 This much is now clear, 
especially considering the numerous examples of measures adopted by States 
discussed in Chapter V. Therefore, given the vast evidence of non-forcible measures 
being taken by States and regional agencies without Security Council authorisations, 
this author submits that such coercive measures are not to be considered ‘enforcement 
action’ within the meaning of Article 53(1). 
 
                                                 
337 Ibid, Annex, at 3. 
338 See, generally, L Meeker, “Defensive Quarantine and the Law”, (1963) 57(3) American Journal of 
International Law 515, at 521-522. 
339 On these points, see: Gray (n.258), at 397; Abass (n.230) at 49; Akehurst (n.305), at 190-192. 
340 Bröjmer and Ress (n.287), at 860. 
341 Akehurst, for example, discusses the Cuban Missile Crisis and the quarantine therein as a possible 
use of force: (n.305), at 197-203. 
342 ME O’Connell, “The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo”, (2000) 22 Human Rights 
Quarterly 57, at 64. 
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2.4 Unilateral Coercive Measures 
 
It is left for us to assess briefly whether non-forcible coercive methods might be taken 
by States unilaterally, rather than through a regional organisation, to implement the 
tertiary responsibility to protect. 
 
2.4.1 Countermeasures by States 
 
Since the law of countermeasures is, at its most fundamental level, applicable directly 
to States, it is certainly possible based upon the analysis above that a State may take 
countermeasures where the requisite conditions are met. For example, if a 
neighbouring State is committing atrocity crimes related to the responsibility to 
protect, there is no reason why this State cannot take proportionate countermeasures – 
for example, relating to trade between the two States, or even perhaps related to 
bilateral agreements that might be logistically and tactically important to the target 
State’s objectives. 
The concern here would be that the State’s measures alone would either not be 
enough to be effective, or may be inconsistent with any wider regional or internationa l 
measures that might be taken by regional organisations or the General Assembly. 
Therefore, coordination is important with the tertiary responsibility to protect, and it 
might therefore be preferable to implement the tertiary responsibility to protect 
through the relevant institutions rather than on a unilateral basis. 
Finally, in theory such measures might become available to a State unilatera lly 
before the tertiary responsibility to protect is ‘activated’ – i.e. before the Security 
Council is even considered to have failed in its responsibility. Although measures may 
be legally available, the compartmentalisation of different responsibilities under the 
‘responsibility to protect’ provides further safeguards to prevent their abuse by acting 
as a clear framework as to when these measures would be available. In other words, 
the tertiary responsibility to protect is the opening of another compartment of the 
overall responsibility to protect toolbox. The tertiary responsibility reveals the tools 
that are available and who should consider using them – it does not necessarily 
determine which tools would be most appropriate in any given situation.  
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2.4.2 A Note on the Supply of Arms, Equipment, and Assistance  
 
Finally, it is worth briefly addressing the possibility of States (or even regiona l 
organisations for that matter) supplying arms, or non-lethal equipment, to rebel groups 
or armed factions within a State. This may be provided as either a measure to help 
defend civilians against a government committing, or about to commit, atrocity 
crimes, or as a measure to aid non-State groups in the suppression of such atrocities. 
This method became a contentious issue during the Syrian crisis, where some States 
and regional organisations have supplied funding, arms and assistance to the Syrian 
Opposition.343 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider this issue in 
detail, it is worth highlighting briefly, especially given the growing use of this tactic 
in recent crises, to demonstrate some possible implications of a tertiary responsibility 
to protect, and indeed indicate paths that may be taken for future research in this 
regard.344 
In terms of the supply of arms to rebel groups or factions in a civil war, even 
where there may be atrocities underway or threatened by the controlling government, 
international law is very clear that such assistance is a violation of international law. 
Firstly, in the Nicaragua Case345 the ICJ made very clear that the arming and training 
of armed groups could amount to a threat or use of force, contrary to the prohibit ion 
of force in international law.346 The court cited the Friendly Relations Declaration347 
in support of this conclusion – in particular the provisions that declare an illegal use 
of force to include “organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or 
armed bands … for incursion into the territory of another State” and “participating in 
acts of civil strife … in another State.”348 
The supply of funding to such groups, however, does not violate the 
prohibition of force.349 This funding does, on the other hand, constitute an intervention 
                                                 
343 For a detailed overview of this practice, see T Ruys, “Of Arms, Funding and ‘Non -lethal 
Assistance’—Issues Surrounding Third-State Intervention in the Syrian Civil War”, (2014) 13 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 13-53. 
344 Indeed, academic investigation of this issue is very limited indeed. 
345 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA)  
(Merits), Judgment of 27th June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
346 Ibid, at para [228]. 
347 UNGA Res 2625(XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations , Annex. 
348 See also Ruys (n.343), at para [26]. 
349 Nicaragua (n.345), at para [228]. 
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into the internal affairs of the State concerned, and thus a violation of the principle of 
non-intervention.350 Indeed, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention351 
could not be clearer when it declared: 
 
… no State shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, 
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of 
another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.352 
 
The question therefore is whether the breach of this obligation – the principle of non-
intervention – is permissible under the law of countermeasures. In such circumstances, 
the same safeguards would apply as above, including the requirement of a prior breach, 
and the principle of proportionality. Unfortunately, even at this point it seems unlike ly 
that aid to rebels could be compatible with the law of countermeasures for one 
fundamental reason – such measures are generally not by their nature reversible, and 
so they fall foul of one of the key requirements of the doctrine. Even if it could be 
considered proportionate in response to the commission of mass atrocity crimes 
related to the responsibility to protect, the funding of groups that are fighting (perhaps 
rightfully so) for a permanent change in their country, a change that would be 
irreversible even if the breaches of erga omnes obligations ceased. Of course, funding 
could well be stopped, but those funds would no longer be in the control of the regiona l 
organisation or State who originally supplied them, and so the violation of the 
principle of non-intervention would not be remedied as a true countermeasure could 
be. 
Indeed, as Ruys rightly highlights,353 the principle of non-intervention itself is 
still elusive as a concept, and much more investigation is needed on this matter to 
determine the legality of these measures of intervention. Even considering this there 
is also the unclear issue as to whether there exists a standalone principle in 
international law prohibiting intervention in civil war – on both sides.354 
                                                 
350 Ibid, at para [228], [242]. 
351 UNGA Res 2131(XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty , 21st December 1965, UN Doc 
A/RES/2131(XX). 
352 Ibid, at para [2]. 
353 Ruys (n.343), at para [62], [69]. 
354 Ruys (n.343), at para [39]-[51]. 
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Indeed, regardless of the legal hurdles still to be assessed, the fundamenta l 
problem with this type of measure is that it is perhaps not an implementation of the 
tertiary responsibility to protect, but rather a ‘delegation’ or a ‘passing of the buck’ of 
this responsibility to groups within the State in crisis. For the State providing such 
assistance, it does not implement their responsibility to protect, and it certainly does 
not absolve them of it either. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
Having established the detailed legal competences and powers of the General 
Assembly, regional organisations, and States acting unilaterally, it may be concluded 
that there is legal space for the tertiary responsibility to protect to be adopted and 
implemented by the relevant actors. 
In the event of failure by the Security Council, there are legal avenues for the 
General Assembly to utilise forcible measures, and to implement non-forcib le 
measures in line with the doctrine of countermeasures, where the requisite legal 
criteria is met. Acting through the General Assembly provides the best institutiona l 
legitimacy for such action, but mobilising the Assembly into action comes with its 
inherent political difficulties.  
Where the General Assembly cannot be mobilised, there is still a residual 
responsibility on the international community as a whole that can be assumed through 
the actions of regional organisations. Forcible action by regional organisat ions 
remains illegal without the authorisation of either the Security Council or the General 
Assembly, and although there is a legal possibility of ex post facto authorisation in the 
event of emergency responses, it is certainly a risk for such organisations to take and 
for their action not to be subsequently authorised.  Non-forcible measures once again 
can only be taken based upon the customary international law doctrine of 
countermeasures, where the threat or commission of atrocities results in violations of 
erga omnes obligations. 
Therefore, having established that those actors with a residual responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security, and thus a responsibility to protect in 
applicable situations, are capable of implementing their responsibilities, there is not 
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only room for the tertiary responsibility to protect, but there are also a great number 
of tools available for its implementation.
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VII 
General Conclusions 
 
 
 
When the UN Security Council fails in its responsibility to protect, and does not step 
in to take timely and decisive action in response to a State’s manifest failure to protect 
its populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing, this thesis has demonstrated that there is room for a ‘tertiary’ responsibility 
to protect beyond the inaction of the Security Council. 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate from the outset that the Security 
Council’s responsibility to protect is more than a moral commitment to do the right 
thing. When a situation involving mass atrocities can be objectively determined to 
constitute at least a threat to international peace, the responsibility to protect overlaps 
with the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of internationa l 
peace and security, and becomes a legal responsibility. In such circumstances, where 
the Security Council fails to act, either paralysed by the abuse of the veto power, or 
failing to respond to a colossal situation like Rwanda in 1994, its responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security does not cease with this inaction. 
Instead, there is a continuum of responsibility, whereby the responsibility continues to 
be assumed by the actors with residual responsibility. When this happens, the 
responsibility to protect also continues with it.  
However, in order to determine whether this responsibility is actionable, the 
thesis set out to demonstrate two things. Firstly, that there was ‘room’ for this 
responsibility, in the sense that there was legal space for the responsibility to continue. 
In this regard, the thesis investigated the use of force and non-forcible coercive 
measures as methods of implementing this tertiary responsibility. Considering the fact 
that the responsibility requires a ‘timely and decisive response’ where ‘peaceful 
measures are inadequate’, the only way in which the responsibility to protect could 
continue beyond the Security Council, in this form, is where there are legal avenues 
to either utilise non-forcible measures, or the use of force. 
Secondly, even where such legal avenues might exist, the actors with residual 
responsibility must also be capable of implementing these measures. Therefore, the 
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second part of the investigation sought to demonstrate whether the relevant actors in 
question have the necessary legal competences to act, and that they were not bound by 
any other restrictions in international law to utilise the proposed measures. 
By conducting an in-depth assessment of the prohibition of force, it was 
established that the original intentions of the drafters of the Charter sought to create a 
carefully-constructed prohibition in Article 2(4) that was not general and all-
encompassing in nature, but did prohibit the unilateral use of force. This interpretat ion, 
it was argued, is consistent with the practice of States today, whereby the main 
methods of using force that are consistent with this prohibition are in self-defence, and 
via the powers of the Security Council. However, the interpretation does leave room 
for force to be utilised by the UN General Assembly, where it can be established that 
it has the competence to do so. Therefore, one legal avenue was found that met the 
first test for establishing the tertiary responsibility to protect. In this sense, the thesis 
did not argue in favour of what the law should be, instead it argued in favour of what 
the law was supposed to be. 
In terms of non-forcible, but still coercive measures, the thesis investigated the 
use of measures such as asset freezes, trade restrictions, and travel bans, as a method 
of implementing the tertiary responsibility to protect beyond the Security Council. By 
conducting an assessment of the principle of non-intervention, and the doctrine of 
countermeasures, it was argued that there are special circumstances where these 
measures may be utilised by actors beyond the Security Council. In particular, where 
there has been a serious violation of an obligation erga omnes – in this case, a gross 
and systematic violation of human rights that may lead to mass atrocities, or the 
commission of atrocity crimes themselves – recent State practice shows evidence that 
the doctrine of countermeasures allows proportionate measures to be taken that would 
normally violate an international obligation, even where the party taking such 
measures has not been directly injured by the erga omnes breach. However, it was 
argued therein that such a breach is very likely to ‘injure’ the international community 
in any case by virtue of the type and seriousness of such obligations. The doctrine of 
countermeasures also provides for procedural and substantive safeguards to prevent 
the misuse or abuse of this legal avenue, however it was also argued that the 
framework of the tertiary responsibility to protect could provide an additiona l 
safeguard itself too. 
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Finally, when establishing the actors with the competence to implement these 
measures, the tertiary responsibility to protect moved to the actor with the most 
relevant residual responsibilities and competences. At first, the General Assembly’s 
residual responsibility is engaged within the UN system of collective security. It was 
argued that the competences of the General Assembly provided sufficient grounds to 
demonstrate that the Assembly itself could recommend both forcible and non-forcib le 
measures to implement the tertiary responsibility to protect. Forcible measures by the 
General Assembly are compatible with the prohibition of force in Article 2(4) because: 
(i) the powers of the Assembly, as established by the subsequent agreement and 
practice of States, constitute an inherent limitation of the territorial integrity and 
political independence of a State in accordance with the first part of the prohibit ion; 
and (ii) such measures are consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, being a 
collective measure within the UN framework and by harmonising the actions of States 
in this regard. Non-forcible measures by the Assembly, because of the nature of 
recommendations as non-binding acts, and the lack of evidence demonstrating the 
ability of the Assembly to disregard States’ other international obligations, must still 
be recommended in accordance with the doctrine of countermeasures. 
Where the General Assembly does not assume its residual responsibilities, the 
responsibility to protect and the responsibility for the maintenance of internationa l 
peace and security revert back to the international community as a whole. To 
implement this responsibility beyond the UN, it was argued that regional organisat ions 
and arrangements are the next most suitable and competent actors to implement this. 
While the use of force by such organisations would still be unilateral, and therefore 
fall foul of the prohibition of force, there is a controversial possibility that these 
organisations taking action in an emergency and receiving ex post facto approval – 
although this runs the risk of remaining an illegal use of force should authorisation not 
be granted, and so this was not considered a suitable avenue for implementing the 
tertiary responsibility to protect. Finally, the use of non-forcible measures, in line with 
the doctrine of countermeasures, may be used by regional organisations. By utilis ing 
such institutions, a further ‘institutional safeguard’ against the abuse of this doctrine 
exists. 
In sum, this thesis has sought to demonstrate that inaction in the face of 
atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, 
does not have to be weighed down by the paralysis of the UN Security Council. Not 
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only is there room for the tertiary responsibility to protect, but in situations where the 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security is engaged, the tertiary 
responsibility to protect is a legal necessity.  
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